Anthony Muzereus v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 1, 2023
DocketDC-3330-16-0605-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Anthony Muzereus v. Department of the Army (Anthony Muzereus v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anthony Muzereus v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTHONY E. MUZEREUS, III, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-3330-16-0605-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: February 1, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Michael W. Macomber, Albany, New York, for the appellant.

Leah S. Serrano, Alexandria, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied his request for corrective action pursuant to the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). On petition for review, the appellant asserts that the agency should have considered his military service toward meeting the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

time-in-grade and specialized experience requirements for the position at issue and that the administrative judge improperly relied on Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), in denying corrective action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 As the administrative judge properly concluded, when an agency fills a vacancy via the merit promotion process, a preference-eligible veteran does not receive any advantage beyond the ability to apply and be considered for the position. Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 818 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Walker v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 15 (2006) (finding that 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) does not provide preference eligibles with any advantage beyond the opportunity to compete for particular positions); see Montgomery v. Department of Health & Human Services , 123 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 11 (2016) (finding that the right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) includes the agency’s consideration of the veteran’s application). However, the opportunity-to-compete provision set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) does not apply to veterans, like the appellant, already employed in the Federal 3

civil service who are seeking merit promotions. Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶¶ 15-17 (citing Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1338-39). Thus, the appellant was not entitled, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3304(f) or 3311, or any other veterans’ preference statute or regulation, to consideration of his non-Federal civil service experience, i.e., his military experience , for the purposes of determining whether he met the time-in-grade or other eligibility requirements of the position. Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1339. ¶3 On review, the appellant argues that his case is distinguishable from Kerner because the petitioner in Kerner lacked the requisite specialized experience, whereas the appellant had the required specialized experience , but the agency did not consider it. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 11. However, the petitioner in Kerner explicitly argued, as did the appellant here, that the agency violated his rights under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f) because it did not credit his non-Federal civil service experience towards the time-in-grade requirement in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 3311. Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1337-38. We find no principled basis to distinguish Kerner on its facts. The appellant also asserts on review that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) engaged in “misplace[d] reliance on the legislative history of the VEOA,” in reaching its conclusion in Kerner and that the Board should thus reject the principle of stare decisis and not follow the court’s decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-16. Kerner is controlling authority that the Board is bound to follow. Oram, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17; see Conner v. Office of Personnel Management, 120 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 620 F. App’x 892 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that it is axiomatic that precedential decisions of the Federal Circuit are controlling authority for the Board and that the Board is bound to follow them unless they are overruled by the court sitting en banc ). The appellant further argues on review that Kerner is inconsistent with another Federal Circuit case, Lazaro v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 666 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and that Kerner, therefore, is of little precedential value. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9 -10. 4

The court’s decision in Lazaro does not state whether the vacancy announcement in question was filled through an open competitive process or merit promotion procedures, and thus the strength of any comparisons among Kerner, Lazaro, and the instant case is not clear. 2 The appellant’s arguments on review do not demonstrate that he is entitled to corrective action.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Related

Lazaro v. Department of Veterans Affairs
666 F.3d 1316 (Federal Circuit, 2012)
Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Conner v. Office of Personnel Management
620 F. App'x 892 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance
818 F.3d 1357 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Navy
2022 MSPB 30 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

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Anthony Muzereus v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anthony-muzereus-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2023.