Anthony Moore v. Fargo Police Department

Eighth Circuit

Anthony Moore v. Fargo Police Department

297 F. App'x 569

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedOctober 27, 2008

Docket07-2186

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 297 F. App'x 569 (Anthony Moore v. Fargo Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Anthony Moore v. Fargo Police Department, 297 F. App'x 569 (8th Cir. 2008).

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PER CURIAM.

Anthony James Moore appeals the district court’s¹ adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. After careful de novo review, viewing the evidence and all favorable inferences from it in a light most favorable to Moore, see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.2006), we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was proper. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore’s late-tendered motion for leave to amend his complaint. See Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir.2008). Finally, we grant appellee’s request to file an over-length addendum, but we deny any request by appellee for sanctions.

The dissenting opinion advances an argument not raised by Moore, see JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 875 n. 8 (8th Cir.2008) (“To be reviewable, an issue must be presented in the brief with some specificity”), and we see no extraordinary reason to reject the sufficiency of counsel’s affidavit on our own initiative. Counsel can be competent to provide an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment, e.g., Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d 736, 741-42 (2d Cir.1987), the city’s attorney attested that she [570]*570personally conducted a thorough and diligent search of the records of the police department, and it was not plainly erroneous for the district court to presume that the attorney for the city was familiar with the city’s police files. Cf. In re Apex Exp. Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 635 (4th Cir.1999) (“We have held in the Rule 56(e) context that ordinarily, officers would have personal knowledge of the acts of their corporations.”) (internal quotation omitted); Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that where “the attorney negotiated the settlement and handled all the related transactions,” it was “reasonable to assume that he had personal knowledge” of whether payment was received by his client).

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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PER CURIAM.

Anthony James Moore appeals the district court’s¹ adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. After careful de novo review, viewing the evidence and all favorable inferences from it in a light most favorable to Moore, see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir.2006), we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was proper. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore’s late-tendered motion for leave to amend his complaint. See Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488, 497 (8th Cir.2008). Finally, we grant appellee’s request to file an over-length addendum, but we deny any request by appellee for sanctions.

The dissenting opinion advances an argument not raised by Moore, see JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters Bank, NA, 539 F.3d 862, 875 n. 8 (8th Cir.2008) (“To be reviewable, an issue must be presented in the brief with some specificity”), and we see no extraordinary reason to reject the sufficiency of counsel’s affidavit on our own initiative. Counsel can be competent to provide an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment, e.g., Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d 736, 741-42 (2d Cir.1987), the city’s attorney attested that she [570]*570personally conducted a thorough and diligent search of the records of the police department, and it was not plainly erroneous for the district court to presume that the attorney for the city was familiar with the city’s police files. Cf. In re Apex Exp. Corp., 190 F.3d 624, 635 (4th Cir.1999) (“We have held in the Rule 56(e) context that ordinarily, officers would have personal knowledge of the acts of their corporations.”) (internal quotation omitted); Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that where “the attorney negotiated the settlement and handled all the related transactions,” it was “reasonable to assume that he had personal knowledge” of whether payment was received by his client).

The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

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