NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0303n.06
No. 24-1964
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 16, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ANTHONY LEE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) DANA, INC., ) OPINION Defendant-Appellee. ) ) )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony Lee (Lee) appeals the
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Dana, Inc. (Dana) on his claims
alleging retaliation and race-based discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII;
retaliation and race-based discrimination in violation of the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act (ELCRA); and wrongful discharge in violation of Michigan public policy. We affirm.
I.
Lee, a Black man, began working for Dana through a temporary agency in June 2003.
Dana employed Lee directly as an assembly operator beginning in September 2004. In 2007, Lee
became a material handler and was required to operate a forklift. Between August and September
of 2014, Lee was involved in two forklift accidents in which he hit stationary objects with his
forklift. After the first accident, Lee was temporarily barred from operating a forklift, and after
the second, he received a verbal warning and a disciplinary write-up. Lee hit a stationary object
with his forklift a third time in November 2016. Because of the severity of this accident, Dana No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
removed Lee from his material-handler position and reassigned him to an assembly-operator
position.
Lee filed two internal grievances through his union, on February 14, 2017 and August 21,
2018, requesting that his forklift privileges be reinstated. The second grievance stated, “The
[union] committee feels the time of this discipline has gone beyond reasonable time limits.” (R.
19-11, Employee Grievance, PID 347).
Lee also submitted two documents to human resources in December 2017. In the first, he
requested a copy of his personnel file and a written statement explaining why he was not permitted
to drive a forklift. In the second, he complained that his supervisor refused to allow him to serve
as a Team Lead, which involves supervisory and training duties. Lee submitted another complaint
to human resources in January 2018, in which he alleged that his supervisors caused him to lose
wages by failing to give him the same opportunities to work overtime that they gave other
employees. He also complained that one of his supervisors spoke to him in an unprofessional tone
and lied to him about whether he was scheduled to work overtime on a particular day.
Additionally, he asserted that another employee who had been involved in a forklift accident had
regained his forklift privileges, while Lee had not.
Lee submitted a third complaint to human resources in May 2018. In this complaint, he
asserted that he was written up twice in one week for unsubstantiated violations and that one of
his supervisors continually harassed him. He also reasserted his complaint that his forklift
privileges had not yet been reinstated, claiming that Dana’s policy was to terminate all disciplinary
actions after one calendar year. Lee further alleged that he was denied job opportunities for which
he was qualified in favor of employees with less seniority. Lastly, he claimed that his pay had
declined and that his supervisors overlooked him when assigning overtime shifts. The following
-2- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
month, he spoke with a human-resources associate, asserting again that less-qualified employees
received job opportunities that he did not and that his supervisors were not giving him overtime
shifts.
Diane Ricevuto, who worked in Dana’s human-resources department at the time of Lee’s
complaints, testified that she investigated Lee’s complaints of harassment and determined that
none had merit. Ricevuto stated that when she received complaints of harassment, she reviewed
video evidence of the alleged incidents and interviewed the supervisors who were allegedly
involved.
Dana has an attendance policy under which employees accumulate points for attendance
infractions and employees with three points receive a three-day suspension. Lee received a point
for missing a mandatory overtime shift on August 16, 2018. Because this was Lee’s third
attendance point, he received a three-day suspension. Lee later received back pay for this
suspension because one of his other attendance points was given in error.
In September 2018, Dana’s human-resources department agreed to lift Lee’s suspension
from driving forklifts and allow him to apply for open material-handler positions if he signed a
form affirming his understanding of Dana’s safety rules and willingness to comply with them. The
form stated, “The parties understand that this is a non-precedent and non-prejudice settlement.”
(R. 19-12, 2nd Level Grievance Response, PID 348). Lee refused to sign the form and therefore
continued to be barred from operating a forklift. He testified that he did not sign the form because
Ricevuto had explained that signing the form would settle all his complaints and grievances.
Ricevuto stated in an email that she “tried to explain to [Lee] that the [form] was not meant as an
. . . agreement, but, more of a discussion and reminder of the company’s position with respect to
safety rules and the operation of heavy mobile equipment.” (R. 19-13, Human Resources Email,
-3- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
PID 349). In November 2018, after “the union and Ant Lee pushed the issue,” Dana agreed to lift
the forklift prohibition without Lee signing the form, reasoning that two years had passed since
Lee’s last forklift accident. (R. 21-1, Ricevuto Deposition, PID 453).
Later in November, Lee’s supervisors informed Ricevuto that they wished to terminate
Lee’s employment, citing an incident in which he was missing from the production line for twenty
minutes, a harassment complaint against him from another employee, and two incidents in which
he failed to work assigned overtime shifts. In a November 13, 2018 email to her coworkers
regarding Lee’s termination, Ricevuto stated, “We have reason to believe that Ant Lee is preparing
a discrimination claim against Dana[.] He recently requested a copy of his file[.]” (R. 19-20,
Termination Emails, PID 361). On November 15, 2018, Ricevuto stated in an email that human
resources had suspended Lee pending further review of his supervisors’ reports. About two weeks
later, Dana terminated Lee’s employment, citing five instances in which he arrived late or left early
during mandatory overtime shifts.
On May 21, 2020, Lee filed this action alleging retaliation and race-based discrimination
and harassment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; retaliation and race-based
discrimination in violation of the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), Mich. Comp.
L. § 37.2101 et seq.; and wrongful discharge in violation of Michigan public policy. Dana moved
for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Lowe v. Walbro LLC,
972 F.3d 827, 831 (6th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
-4- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742, 748
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving
party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Id.
Because Lee is the non-moving party, we must accept his evidence as true and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001).
A.
Lee asserts that the district court erred in granting Dana summary judgment on his Title
VII and ELCRA retaliation claims. To make a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII,
an employee must show “(1) he . . . engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the
exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against
the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). The burden
then shifts to the employer to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.”
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). If the employer meets
this burden, the employee must demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason “was a pretext
designed to mask retaliation.” Id. A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that “(1) the
employer’s stated reason for terminating the employee has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered
for terminating the employee was not the actual reason for the termination, or (3) the reason offered
was insufficient to explain the employer’s action.” Id. at 545. For retaliation claims under
ELCRA, “the plaintiff must show that his participation in activity protected by the [EL]CRA was
a significant factor in the employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal
link between the two.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
-5- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
The district court determined that Lee’s retaliation claim failed on the causation prong. At
the time of his termination, Lee had not filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) charge or a lawsuit, but he argues that Dana engaged in “preemptive retaliation” by firing
him when Ricevuto believed he was preparing to file a claim. (Appellant Br., 21 (citation
omitted)). This court has held that “the instigation of proceedings leading to the filing of a
complaint or a charge, including a visit to a government agency to inquire about filing a charge”
constitutes protected activity. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313
(6th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Assuming arguendo that Lee’s
conduct would fall within Booker’s reach, his retaliation claims fail nonetheless because he has
not demonstrated a causal connection between his preparation for filing a claim and his
termination.
Lee contends that in his fifteen years of employment with Dana, he “never accumulated
enough attendance points to justify termination” and “had never been accused of harassment” until
Dana believed he was preparing to file a discrimination complaint. (Appellant Br., 24). Although
this court has determined that “a disparity in the amount of disciplinary action [before and after
protected activity] may certainly be sufficient in appropriate cases to support an inference of
retaliation,” it stated that such a disparity was not sufficient when there was “no evidence directly
linking the . . . citations at issue” to the plaintiff’s protected conduct. Cooper v. City of N. Olmsted,
795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986).
Here, there is no evidence “directly linking” the allegations against Lee to his preparation
for filing a lawsuit. In the email in which Ricevuto mentioned a potential discrimination claim,
she also stated that she had confirmed that Lee’s supervisors “wish[ed] to move forward with
termination” and referred to the incidents Lee’s supervisors had reported that led to his
-6- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
termination—“Missing from Line for 20 minutes and impacting production”; “Harassment
complaint . . . against Ant Lee”; “missing [overtime] on 11/7”; and “missing [overtime] on 11/8.”
(R. 19-20, PID 361). This email in no way suggests that Dana was planning to terminate Lee’s
employment because he was preparing to file a discrimination claim. Rather, it acknowledges
Lee’s apparent plan to file a lawsuit and indicates that Ricevuto was considering how to protect
Dana following Lee’s termination—Ricevuto stated, “The question is, what is the best way to
handle this case so that termination sticks.” (Id.)
Lee also notes that the allegation of harassment, the reprimand for being away from his
workstation, and the accumulation of two attendance points occurred within about a month after
he requested his personnel file. But “the fact of temporal proximity alone [is] not particularly
compelling” when “the plaintiff’s retaliation case was otherwise weak” and “there was substantial
evidence supporting the defendant’s version of the events.” Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d
559, 567 (6th Cir. 2000). Compare Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding that temporal proximity combined with one comment containing “no subtext of animus”
was insufficient to establish pretext), with Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 542, 550 (finding evidence
supporting retaliation when temporal proximity was coupled with the plaintiff experiencing a
“retaliatory atmosphere” following his complaints and the plaintiff’s supervisor disputing his
claims during a meeting), and Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 570 (6th Cir. 2019)
(finding evidence supporting retaliation when there was temporal proximity and the plaintiff
“presented testimony from fellow employees that she was singled out for adverse treatment and
presented undisputed evidence, such as doctor’s notes excusing her absences, that at least some of
her disciplinary writeups were unjustified”).
-7- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
Lee asserts that Dana incorrectly assigned overtime shifts to him, rather than to a temporary
employee, and then used his failure to work these shifts as a pretext to fire him. But one of the
Dana employees involved in the decision to fire Lee stated in an email that “even if the schedule
was wrong, he can’t just refuse to work. He knows the process, file a grievance.” (R 19-20, PID
360). And Lee has presented no evidence that Dana’s account of his actions or how they violated
its rules is false. This case therefore differs from Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d
333, 351–52 (6th Cir. 2021), in which this court found sufficient evidence of pretext to avoid
summary judgment when the defendant purportedly fired the plaintiff because of her “difficult
communication style,” but some employees “reported having good working relationships with [the
plaintiff]” and “several of the . . . employees who complained about [the plaintiff]’s
communication style also complained about [the plaintiff]’s protected activities.” See also
Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Admin. Bd., 68 F.4th 1030, 1041 (6th Cir. 2023)
(finding sufficient evidence supporting administrative finding of pretext when “[the defendant]’s
rationale for [the plaintiff]’s termination . . . was inconsistent”).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Dana
on Lee’s retaliation claims.
B.
Lee also contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of Michigan public policy. The Michigan Supreme Court has determined
that “some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be
actionable.” Landin v. Healthsource Saginaw, Inc., 854 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710, 711 (Mich. 1982) (per curiam)).
-8- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
Lee argues that “Dana violated Michigan public policy because it retaliated and ultimately
fired Mr. Lee for refusing to enter into a settlement agreement to waive his complaints and
grievances in exchange for his right to work and apply for a Material Tech position.” (Appellant
Br., 26–27). Regardless whether this action would constitute a discharge in violation of public
policy under Michigan Supreme Court precedent, this claim fails because Lee has presented no
evidence that his refusal to sign the relevant form contributed to his firing. This form was not
mentioned in the emails regarding Dana’s plans to fire him, and Lee has not otherwise supported
this allegation.
Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on Lee’s claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
C.
Lee next asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his racial-discrimination claims.
In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he
is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job; (3) he suffered an adverse
employment decision; and (4) he was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated
differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant to provide a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”
Id. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the reason provided
was “merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 391–92.
Lee argues that he has demonstrated disparate treatment by showing that one of his
supervisors disciplined him for an attendance infraction but failed to discipline a white employee
who committed the same infraction, another supervisor gave a white employee “preferential
-9- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
treatment,” and an all-white hiring panel refused to select him to be a Team Lead. (Appellant Br.,
30).
Lee testified that when he and a white coworker each missed a mandatory overtime shift
on August 16, 2018, he received a disciplinary point, while his coworker did not. Dana conceded
that this event took place but asserted that Lee received the point because of a clerical error that
was corrected after Lee filed a grievance. But because Lee erroneously stated in his grievance that
he received the point on August 15th, rather than August 16th, the error was not resolved at that
time. Nonetheless, one of Lee’s attendance sheets has handwritten Xs next to the August 16th
point, a point from April 3rd that Dana had found to be erroneous, and a point from August 6th
with the words “no write-up” written next to it. And the August 16th point was eventually removed
from his attendance record. This evidence supports Dana’s explanation that the point was given
by mistake. And Lee has presented no evidence that Dana’s explanation is false. See Blair v.
Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, to show pretext, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the proffered reason [for the defendant’s action] (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did
not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the
challenged conduct.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, this event does not
support Lee’s racial-discrimination claim.
Turning to Lee’s argument that one of his supervisors gave a white employee “preferential
treatment,” (Appellant Br., 30), Lee complained in his deposition that this employee was allowed
to drive a forklift when he was not certified to do so, while Lee remained barred from driving the
forklift. But Lee fails to demonstrate that he and this employee were “similarly situated.” White,
533 F.3d at 391. Lee was barred from operating a forklift after being involved in three forklift
-10- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
accidents. The record does not indicate that the white employee he identifies as a comparator had
a similar record of accidents.
The hiring panel’s refusal to make Lee a Team Lead also fails to demonstrate racial
discrimination. To be eligible for a Team Lead position, employees were required to have no
disciplinary action on their record and two or fewer attendance points. According to data on
Dana’s computer system, Lee did not meet either of these prerequisites when he applied for the
Team Lead positions. And he has provided no evidence that white employees lacking these
qualifications were hired as Team Leads or that these requirements were pretextual. The remainder
of Lee’s complaints of unequal treatment involved other Black employees and therefore do not
constitute evidence of racial discrimination.
Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Lee’s racial-discrimination claims.
D.
Lee next contends that the district court erred in dismissing his hostile-work-environment
claim. To prevail on this claim, Lee must establish (1) he “belonged to a protected group,” (2) he
“was subject to unwelcome harassment,” (3) “the harassment was based on race,” (4) “the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment,” and (5) “[Dana] knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to act.” Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2011).
In support of this claim, Lee asserts that his white supervisors “retaliate[ed] against him,
causing him to lose money”; a white supervisor spoke to him in an “unprofessional, harassing and
discriminatory” tone; and his supervisors gave two white employees “preferential treatment.”
(Appellant Br., 31). Although Lee has presented no evidence of explicitly race-based harassment,
“[c]onduct that is not explicitly race-based may be illegally race-based and properly considered in
-11- No. 24-1964, Lee v. Dana, Inc.
a hostile-work-environment analysis when it can be shown that but for the employee’s race, [he]
would not have been the object of harassment.” Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695,
706 (6th Cir. 2007). But Lee has failed to demonstrate that any of the incidents he cites occurred
because of his race.
One of the white employees Lee claims received preferential treatment is the same
employee who Lee complained was permitted to drive a forklift when Lee was not. The other
white employee Lee claims was given preferential treatment is the employee who was awarded a
Team Lead position for which Lee had applied in June 2018. As explained, Lee was temporarily
barred from driving a forklift because of his history of accidents, and he did not qualify for the
Team Lead position because of his discipline and attendance record. Lee also once complained
that one of these white employees worked 16-hour shifts, while Lee was not permitted to do so.
But the supervisor responsible for approving Lee’s shift told him that someone else had approved
the other employee’s shift and that 16-hour shifts were against company policy. Further, although
Lee asserts that his supervisors caused him to lose wages through dysfunctional overtime
scheduling, he has not demonstrated that his supervisors favored white employees for overtime
shifts. Nor has he shown that the supervisor who allegedly spoke to him in a harassing tone spoke
to him differently from white employees.
For these reasons, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Lee’s racial-
harassment claim.
III.
For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM.
-12-