Anthony Cobb v. Department of the Army

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 7, 2022
DocketAT-0752-21-0258-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Anthony Cobb v. Department of the Army (Anthony Cobb v. Department of the Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anthony Cobb v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTHONY W.N. COBB, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-21-0258-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: July 7, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Stephan B. Caldwell, Esquire, Riverdale, Georgia, for the appellant.

Mary Rae Dudley, Fort Gordon, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the agency action removing the appellant from the Federal service. On petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in not sustaining the charges

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

against the appellant because he did not consider relevant facts and because he misapplied the law. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 15-26. In the appellant’s cross petition for review, he argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal. 2 PFR File, Tab 5 at 7-12. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during e ither the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

2 The appellant has also filed a motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to provide interim relief. PFR File, Tab 4. Therein, he argues that, although the administrative judge ordered the agency to appoint him to his prior position of police officer, the agency issued a memorandum stating that he remained decertified from the Individual Reliability Program (IRP) and that he was detailed to the position of emergency management specialist. Id. at 7-9, 13-16. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that, in providing interim relief, an agency may reassign an employee to a new position if it determines that returning the employee to his original position would unduly disrupt the work environment and pays the employee all the pay and benefits of the original position. Nadolski v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 105 F.3d 642, 644-45 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, although the agency did not explicitly state that it was making an undue disruption determination, the Board will infer such a determination if the agency can show that it had a strong overriding interest or compelling reason for assigning duties other than those assigned prior to the appellant’s separation. See Lednar v. Social Security Administration, 82 M.S.P.R. 364, ¶ 9 (1999); see also Haebe v. Department of Justice, 81 M.S.P.R. 167, ¶ 14 (1999), rev’d on other grounds, 288 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the agency’s reason for reassigning the appellant is his subsequent decertification from the IRP —a condition of employment required for police officers. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13-16. Although the appellant takes issue with this IRP decertification, PFR File, Tab 4 at 8, the Board lacks the authority to review whether the agency’s decision to reassign the appellant on that basis was made in good faith, King v. Jerome, 42 F.3d 1371, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Rather, the Board’s authority is restricted to deciding whether an undue disruption determination was made when required, and whether the appellant is receivin g the appropriate pay and benefits. Id. The record establishes that the agency made an implicit undue disruption determination, and the appellant has not alleged that he is not receiving all the pay and benefits of his original position. Accordingly, we find that the agency complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief order, and we deny his motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review. 3

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available th at, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 3 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

ORDER ¶2 We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal and to restore the appellant effective February 10, 2021. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts,

3 While not argued by the appellant, we observe that the administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s disclosures about (1) the agency’s hiring of an officer who had been accused of theft, and (2) its alleged manipulation of the classification of the appellant’s pre-detail position to facilitate the selection of a specific individual appear to impose an affirmative duty on the appellant to seek explanation from agency management when considering whether certain facts are “readily ascertainable” by the appellant for purposes of determining whether the appellant’s belief that the agency engaged in wrongdoing under the whistleblower protection statutes is reasonable. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 57, Initial Decision (ID) at 13 -16. To the extent it was error to impose such a requirement, we find that the appellant’s disclosures are not protected for other reasons. Regarding his disclosure that the agency hired an officer who had been accused of theft, although the appellant need not accurately label the sort of wrongdoing at issue, a disclosure must still be specific and detailed, and not a vag ue allegation of wrongdoing. Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 14 (2014). Here, the appellant did not state that the hiring constituted any sort of wrongdoing or identify a law, rule, or regulation that was purportedly violated, nor did he provide any details of the alleged theft incident, such as when it occurred or what or how much was stolen. IAF, Tab 22 at 49. Regarding his disclosure concerning the alleged manipulation of the classification of the position, we agree with the administrative judge that it was the appellant’s “own supposition” that it was his position that was converted and not a position from another division. ID at 13.

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Anthony Cobb v. Department of the Army, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anthony-cobb-v-department-of-the-army-mspb-2022.