Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. v. Officer Preston

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedFebruary 1, 2023
Docket5:22-cv-01292
StatusUnknown

This text of Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. v. Officer Preston (Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. v. Officer Preston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. v. Officer Preston, (C.D. Cal. 2023).

Opinion

Case 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Document 10 Filed 02/01/23 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Date: February 1, 2023

Title: ANTHONY AVON DABBS SR. v. OFFICER PRESTON

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAREN E. SCOTT

Jazmin Dorado Not Present Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANT: None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order to Show Cause Why Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed

In July 2022, Plaintiff Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint against Defendant Officer Preston (“Defendant”) of the Hemet Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used excessive force on March 23, 2020, by tazing Plaintiff in the temple. The Complaint says, “refer to the case BAF2000363.” (Dkt. 1 at 5.) Per Riverside County Superior Court records available online and subject to judicial notice, case no. BAF2000363 is related to case no. BAF2201142. In those cases, Plaintiff was charged with robbery (Cal. Pen. Code § 211), assault with a deadly weapon (“ADW”) on a peace officer (id. § 245(c)), and resisting or deterring an officer (id. § 69). These charges arose from events that took place on March 23, 2020. In January 2023, Plaintiff was convicted of violating California Penal Code sections 69 and 245(c), but the robbery count was dismissed. Plaintiff’s sentencing is scheduled for February 17, 2023. Before authorizing service, federal courts must screen inmate complaints and dismiss any case that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. Case 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Document 10 Filed 02/01/23 Page 2 of 11 Page ID #:27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Date: February 1, 2023 Page 2

§§ 1915(e)(2); 1915A. The Court has reviewed the Complaint and determined that it may fail to state a claim because it is time-barred or Heck-barred. I. The Time Bar. A court may consider affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, when screening a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Simmons v. Wallace, No. 3:10-cv-00280, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28329, at *3 (D. Alaska Mar. 18, 2011). If a complaint appears to fail to state a claim based on the statute of limitations, then the screening court must allow the plaintiff to present arguments that the statute of limitations either has not run or that tolling applies. Cooper v. Nielson, No. 99-15074, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22926 (9th Cir. Sep. 15, 1999) (unpublished). Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Instead, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury suits. In California, that limitatoins period is two years. Flynt v. Shimazu, 940 F.3d 457, 461 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1.) The limitations period begins to run when the claim accrues. Generally, an excessive force claim under § 1983 accrues when the allegedly excessive force was used. Garcia v. Cty. of Riverside Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. ED CV 16-1381-DSF-JCG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156541, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2016). Per Plaintiff’s allegations, his claim accrued on March 23, 2020, such that the two-year statute of limitations expired on March 23, 2022, unless Plaintiff qualifies for tolling. Plaintiff did not file the Complaint until July 2022, so his Complaint appears time-barred unless he qualifies for tolling. Federal courts apply the forum state’s laws regarding tolling, except to the extent such laws are inconsistent with federal law. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1(a), there is a two-year tolling period for plaintiffs who are “at the time the cause of action accrued, imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life.” Plaintiff’s return address is 30755-B Auld Road in Murrieta, the address of Riverside County’s Cois M. Byrd Detention Center. Based on the mention of bail bonds in the online court records for Plaintiff’s criminal case, Plaintiff may have been released on bail at some point. The dates and length of his custody may be relevant to determining his eligibility for tolling under section 352.1(a). Branson v. United States Forest Serv., No. 2:19-cv-01399, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1126, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2023) (holding tolling ceased upon release on bail). Case 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Document 10 Filed 02/01/23 Page 3 of 11 Page ID #:28 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 5:22-cv-01292-MEMF-KES Date: February 1, 2023 Page 3

In responding to this Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff may explain (1) whether he seeks tolling under California Code of Civil Procedure section 352.1(a) or any other tolling doctrine; (2) if/when he was released from custody since his arrest on March 23, 2020; and (3) what facts support the application of any other tolling doctrine. II. The Heck Bar. A § 1983 claim must be dismissed if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Thus, Heck bars a plaintiff’s civil lawsuit if it would negate an element of the offense or establish facts inconsistent with the plaintiff’s conviction. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (analyzing the Heck bar after a resisting arrest conviction under Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)); Beets v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding Heck barred excessive force claims when the officer “acted during the course of [the plaintiff’s] criminal activity and brought that activity to an end”). An essential element to establish a violation of California Penal Code sections 69 and 245(c) is that the resisting/deterring or assaulting of the peace officer occurred while the officer was lawfully performing his/her duties. “A police officer is not lawfully performing her duties if [she or he] … uses unreasonable or excessive force on the individual at the time the defendant’s unlawful resistance, delay or obstruction is occurring.” Melgar v. Lopez, No. CV 14-8316-DOC-AJW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134391, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2015). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Preston deployed his tazer when Plaintiff was “unarmed with both hands raised seated inside of a vehicle,” posing “neither a threat towards him nor the public.” (Dkt.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Kristy Beets v. County of Los Angeles
669 F.3d 1038 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Oscar W. Jones v. Lou Blanas County of Sacramento
393 F.3d 918 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Smith v. City of Hemet
394 F.3d 689 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Larry Flynt v. Stephanie K. Shimazu
940 F.3d 457 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Anthony Avon Dabbs Sr. v. Officer Preston, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anthony-avon-dabbs-sr-v-officer-preston-cacd-2023.