Opinion issued August 20, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-14-00846-CV ——————————— ANNA AMBOREE, Appellant V. MICHELLE BONTON, ELLIS BONTON, ELLIS INDUSTRIES, INC., THE EDUCATION VALET, INC., SONIA JORDAN, DANIELLE HARRISON AND DECOUNDER THOMPSON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 157th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2012-55684
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Anna Amboree, challenges the trial court’s rendition of summary
judgment in favor of appellees, Michelle Bonton, Ellis Bonton, Ellis Industries,
Inc. (“Ellis Industries”), the Education Valet, Inc. (“Education Valet”), Sonia Jordan, Danielle Harrison, and Decounder Thompson (collectively, “appellees”), in
her suit against them for tortious interference, fraud, conspiracy, wrongful
termination of her employment under Sabine Pilot, 1 violation of the Texas Open
Meetings Act,2 and a declaratory judgment. In two issues, Amboree contends that
the trial court erred in granting appellees summary judgment.
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Background
In her fourth amended petition, Amboree alleges that she was employed as
The Rhodes School’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), Business Manager, and
Human Resources Manager (“HR Manager”). Michelle Bonton, “a founding
member, the principal[,] and [the] superintendent” of The Rhodes School, was
Amboree’s supervisor and the individual to whom she “directly” reported.
Amboree “advised . . . Bonton . . . on financial and business matters as they related
to the school.” For instance, she “advised” Bonton “that the school was required to
obtain permits from Harris County when performing construction on the school”;
Bonton could not use the school’s property “for personal use”; fulfilling Bonton’s
request to “verify employment” of her daughter would be “fraud[ulent]” because
her daughter “was out of state on an internship at the time”; “it [would be] illegal
1 Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985). 2 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 551.001–.146 (Vernon 2012 & Supp. 2014).
2 [for Bonton] to change [a] student’s grades without teacher involvement”; and
Bonton was improperly using grant funds. Bonton continuously “ignored”
Amboree’s advice. Also, Bonton wrongfully “took out and paid profit in the form
of ‘commissions’ [to] herself as a grant writer on grants,” employed relatives at
The Rhodes School, and allowed relatives to serve on the school’s board—actions
which Bonton swore on the charter school’s application that she would not do.
Moreover, according to Amboree, the “principal[s]” and “sole shareholders”
of the company that “provide[s] bus transportation [for] The Rhodes School” are
Bonton and her husband, Ellis Bonton. Sonia Jordan, Bonton’s “good friend and
[a school] board member,” on behalf of The Rhodes School, signed a
transportation contract with the Bontons’ company, Ellis Industries, and “a check
for $15,000” without approval from the school board. And although Amboree
recommended that the school “purchase a bus to transport students,” Bonton
decided to use a “van” instead, “in violation of the transportation code.” The
Rhodes School, rather than Ellis Industries, also paid certain school employees to
“attend driver training” and transport students to school on behalf of Ellis
Industries. According to Amboree, Bonton “managed Ellis Industries f[ro]m her
office at The Rhodes School . . . and parked the bus [on school property] without
compensating the school” or board approval. And Bonton used school staff,
equipment, supplies, and funds to run Ellis Industries. The Bontons also “created
3 and ran the Crayon Club[3] day care on the premises of The Rhodes
School . . . without paying rent” to the school. Although Amboree “advised”
Bonton that she “could not use the school’s facilities and employees for a for-profit
business at no cost,” Bonton “refused to pay a portion of the utilities and space” for
the Crayon Club.
Amboree further alleges that Bonton, “[a]gainst the better interest of the
school,” “executed . . . and illegally backdated” a lease agreement between The
Rhodes School and Jordan’s husband. The lease was intended to pay the Jordans
for “board meetings (past and present) that were being held at [their] house,”
despite the fact that The Rhodes School was available for such meetings and was
“closer and free.”
In July 2010, Bonton “violated the [Texas] Open Meetings Act by posting
the [board] meeting without sufficient notice.” At the July meeting, she “added her
daughter . . . and her very good friend[,] Mignonne Anderson[,] to the budget as
new full time employees.” And Bonton “increased [the school’s] transportation
budget to allow her to support her daughter’s and other friend’s salar[ies] by
intentionally and willfully and fraudulently inflating the [school’s] enrollment
numbers.” When Amboree advised Bonton that using “fabricated enrollment
3 According to Amboree, Education Valet is doing business as the “Crayon Club.”
4 numbers was illegal” and Amboree “refused to take part in using” the inflated
numbers, Bonton became “very defensive.”
In regard to the termination of her employment, Amboree alleges that “[a]t
the September 2010 board meeting, the board approved terminations that were not
an agenda item” and “were not properly noticed.” Further, Bonton provided false
information to the board about Amboree and the discontinuation of certain funding
for the school. Bonton used the purported lack of funds as a “pre-textual” reason
for recommending the termination of Amboree’s employment. According to
Amboree,
After a history of [her] informing . . . Bonton of the illegality, unethical nature and inappropriate business decisions of her actions as they related to The Rhodes School . . . and refusing to participate in such illegal acts . . . [Bonton] determined that [Amboree] was an obstacle in [her] continuing to use The Rhodes School as a conduit or tool for her own for profit businesses by siphoning off government funds and taxes . . . .
Amboree seeks damages for tortious interference with her employment
contract, fraud, conspiracy, wrongful termination of her employment under Sabine
Pilot, and violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act. She also seeks a judgment
declaring that appellees “violated the [Texas] Open Meetings Act” and the
“termination” of her employment is “void.” Amboree further requests
reinstatement of her employment.
5 Appellees filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, asserting, in
regard to Amboree’s tortious-interference claim, that she “was not employed” by
appellees and “cannot produce competent evidence that . . . [they] willfully and
intentionally interfered with her employment contract[,] . . . the interference, if
any, proximately caused her injury[,] [or] . . . she incurred actual damage or loss.”
In regard to Amboree’s fraud claim, appellees asserted that she “cannot produce
competent evidence that . . . [they] made a representation to her which was
material and false,” “if a false representation was made, . . . [they] knew it was
false or . . . made [it] recklessly, as a positive assertion, without knowledge of its
truth,” a representation was made with the requisite intent, or she “relied on” any
such representation, “acted on it,” or “suffered damage or a loss as a result.”
Appellees further asserted that Amboree’s “‘cause of action’ for civil conspiracy
[was] not a cause of action, but, rather, a type of participatory liability to establish
joint and several liability for those who agree to participate in an agreement to
commit a tort” and “the underlying tort for a conspiracy must be an intentional
tort.” And they argued that “[b]ecause [Amboree] cannot produce competent
evidence that . . . [appellees] committed an intentional tort against her,” she cannot
“establish . . . the . . . elements of conspiracy.” Finally, in regard to Amboree’s
Sabine Pilot claim, appellees asserted that she “cannot proffer competent evidence
6 in support of the third element of her claim,” i.e., that her employment was
terminated solely because of her refusal to perform an illegal act.
In her response, Amboree did not direct the trial court to any evidence
related to the challenged elements of her claims. Instead, her response and her
affidavit attached to the response merely regurgitate the facts Amboree alleges in
her fourth amended petition.
After Amboree filed her response to appellees’ summary-judgment motion,
the trial court granted the motion, finding that “an adequate time for discovery has
passed,” and it concluded “with regard to each of . . . Amboree’s claims against
[appellees],” that there is “no evidence of one or more elements on which
[Amboree] has the burden of proof.” Further, the trial court stated that its
summary judgment was “final” against Amboree “on all of her claims against
[appellees].”
Standard of Review
We review a no-evidence summary judgment de novo under the same legal-
sufficiency standard used to review a directed verdict. Provident Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,
118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003). To prevail on a no-evidence summary-
judgment motion, a movant must establish that there is no evidence of an essential
element of the non-movant’s cause of action or affirmative defense. TEX. R. CIV.
7 P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex.
2004). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to present evidence raising a
genuine issue of material fact as to each of the elements challenged in the motion.
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006); Hahn v. Love, 321
S.W.3d 517, 524 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Although
the non-movant is not required to marshal her proof, she must present evidence
that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.
2004); Mott v. Red’s Safe & Lock Servs., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A no-evidence summary-judgment motion may
not be granted if the non-movant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to
raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. See Ridgway,
135 S.W.3d at 600. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence
“rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in
their conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711
(Tex. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). When reviewing a no-evidence
summary-judgment motion, we assume that all evidence favorable to the non-
movant is true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in
favor of the non-movant. Spradlin v. State, 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
8 Summary Judgment
In her first issue, Amboree argues that the trial court erred in granting
appellees summary judgment because “the additional claims asserted . . . in [her]
[f]ourth [a]mended [p]etition” “were not considered” by the court. In her second
issue, Amboree argues that the trial court erred in granting appellees summary
judgment on her remaining claims because she raised “a genuine issue of material
fact” on the elements of those claims. In response, appellees assert that “the
additional claims in Amboree’s [f]ourth [a]mended [p]etition are against The
Rhodes School, a party which was not before the trial court” and “[t]here is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding any of Amboree’s causes of action.”
Fourth Amended Petition
In regard to her first issue, Amboree’s live pleading at the time appellees
filed their no-evidence motion for summary judgment was her third amended
petition. Subsequent to the filing of appellees’ motion, but prior to the trial court’s
summary-judgment ruling, Amboree filed her fourth amended petition. Amboree
asserts that her fourth amended petition “contained new causes of action,” making
the trial court’s final-summary judgment order, which dismissed “all of her claims
against [appellees],” improper.
As a general rule, “[a] plaintiff’s timely filed amended pleading supersedes
all previous pleadings and becomes the controlling petition in the case.” Elliott v.
9 Methodist Hosp., 54 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 63, 65. A plaintiff timely files an amended
pleading if she does so seven days before trial. 4 TEX. R. CIV. P. 63; see also Sosa
v. Cent. Power & Light, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (explaining, under rule
63, leave not required for plaintiff to amend if amended petition filed “seven days
or more before the date of trial” (internal quotations omitted)); Masonic Bldg.
Ass’n of Hous., Inc. v. McWhorter, 177 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“[P]arties must amend their pleadings seven days before
trial . . . .”). For purposes of rule 63, “[a] summary judgment proceeding is a trial.”
Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988); Wheeler
v. Yettie Kersting Mem’l Hosp., 761 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
Amboree filed her fourth amended petition on September 8, 2014, and the
record shows that the trial court signed its order granting summary judgment eight
days later, on September 16, 2014.5 In their briefs, however, the parties indicate
that appellees’ summary-judgment motion was submitted for a ruling on
September 15, 2014—seven days after Amboree filed her amended petition. 4 If a plaintiff files an amended petition “within seven days” of trial, she must request leave from the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 63. 5 The trial court’s order states: “On this day came to be heard Defendants Michelle Bonton’s, Ellis Bonton’s, Ellis Industries, Inc.’s, The Education Valet, Inc.’s, Sonia Jordan’s, Danielle Harrison’s, and Decounder Thompson’s Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment . . . .”
10 Notably though, it does not matter whether the trial court heard appellees’ motion
on September 15 or 16 because, either way, Amboree timely filed her fourth
amended petition. See Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895 (holding second amended petition
timely filed “exactly one week before a scheduled summary judgment hearing”);
see also Masonic Bldg., 177 S.W.3d at 470 (noting trial began six days after
plaintiffs filed their amended pleading, “one day too soon”); Rabbani v.
Timberlake, No. 01-95-01126-CV, 1996 WL 434212, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (holding
plaintiffs’ amended petition timely filed when “hearing on the summary judgment
was set on May 31, 1995, and the amended petition was filed on May 24, 1995”).
Accordingly, we conclude that Amboree’s fourth amended petition was her live
pleading at the time the trial court rendered summary judgment on her claims. See
Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895; Elliott, 54 S.W.3d at 793.
Having concluded that Amboree’s fourth amended petition is her live
pleading, we must now consider whether it contains additional new claims which
were not properly disposed of through summary judgment. See Sosa, 909 S.W.2d
at 895 (when amended petition timely filed, trial court must base its decision on
amended pleading, not any superseded petition). Generally, once a plaintiff has
timely amended her petition to add new claims, the defendants are not entitled to a
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s entire case, unless the defendants amend or
11 supplement their motion for summary judgment to address the newly added
claims. 6 See Rotating Servs. Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 245 S.W.3d 476, 487 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); see also Johnson v. Rollen, 818
S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“A summary
judgment may not be granted . . . on a cause of action not addressed in the
summary judgment proceeding.”). This is because “[t]he fact that [a plaintiff]
amend[s] [her] petition and add[s] new causes of action after [the defendants] filed
[their] motion for summary judgment[,] does not change [the defendants’] burden
to establish [their] entitlement to summary judgment . . . on each alleged cause of
action.” Johnson, 818 S.W.2d at 183.
As noted above, Amboree, in her fourth amended petition, as she did in her
third amended petition, brings claims for tortious interference, fraud, conspiracy,
and wrongful termination of her employment under Sabine Pilot. Appellees
addressed each of these causes of action in their no-evidence summary-judgment
motion. However, Amboree, in her fourth amended petition, adds a claim against
6 We note that “[a]n amended or supplemental motion for summary judgment is not always necessary, [for instance], when the amended petition essentially reiterates previously pleaded causes of action,” “when a ground asserted in a motion for summary judgment conclusively negates a common element of the newly and previously pleaded claims,” or “when the original motion is broad enough to encompass the newly asserted claims.” See Rotating Servs. Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 245 S.W.3d 476, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). Appellees do not argue, and the record does not show, that such circumstances are present in this case.
12 appellees for violating the Texas Open Meetings Act and seeks a judgment
declaring that appellees violated the Act and the termination of her employment is
“void.” Appellees, in their summary-judgment motion, did not address these new
claims. Cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (“The motion must state the elements as to
which there is no evidence.”); Thomas v. Omar Invs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 681, 685
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (“In a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment, the movant must specifically state which elements of the nonmovant’s
claims lack supporting evidence.”).
Appellees argue that the trial court did not err in granting them summary
judgment on Amboree’s entire case because “the additional claims” in her fourth
amended petition are “against The Rhodes School, a party which was not before
the trial court.” They assert that although Amboree in her fourth amended petition
“purports to add a claim for violation of the ‘[Texas] Open Meetings Act,’” she
“fails to identify who or what entity the claim is aimed against.”
However, contrary to appellees’ assertions, Amboree, in her fourth amended
petition, alleges that appellees, not The Rhodes School:
terminated [her] employment in a special meeting that was called in violation of [t]he [Texas] Open Meetings Act as well as took actions in other meetings also in violation of [t]he . . . Act. . . . [Bonton] tortuously interfered with [Amboree] by call[ing] a meeting in violation of the Open Meetings Act as well as the actions taken against [Amboree] in that illegal meeting. [Bonton’s] subsequent actions in this meeting were void, invalid and unenforceable. Because Bonton, Jordan, Decounder and Thompson violated the [Texas] Open
13 Meetings Act they are liable in their individual capacity. Because Bonton additionally violated the . . . Act to further her personal interests and illegal actions she is liable in her individual capacity for the [Texas] Open Meetings Act violations as well as the remedies, including but not limited to back pay, actual damages and attorneys’ fees.
(Internal footnote omitted.) And Amboree, in fact, seeks a judgment declaring that
appellees violated the Texas Open Meetings Act and the termination of her
employment is “void.”
Although Amboree, in her fourth amended petition, does purport to add The
Rhodes School as a defendant in regard to her claim concerning the Texas Open
Meetings Act, the petition itself reveals that she does not allege that the school
alone violated the Act; rather, she asserts her new claim and seeks a declaratory
judgment against appellees as well.7
Here, the trial court, in its summary-judgment order, stated that “with regard
to each of . . . Amboree’s claims against [appellees], there is no evidence of one or
more elements on which [Amboree] has the burden of proof at trial.” And the trial
court granted “final summary judgment” against Amboree “on all of her claims
against [appellees].” However, a trial court may not grant summary judgment on
claims not addressed in a summary-judgment motion. Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins.
7 Because The Rhodes School is not a party to this appeal, we express no opinion as to whether it is a defendant in this case.
14 Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex. 1990); Chessher v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d
563, 564 (Tex. 1983).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on Amboree’s claim against appellees for violating the Texas Open
Meetings Act and her request for a judgment declaring that they violated the Act
and the termination of her employment is “void.”
We sustain Amboree’s first issue.
Remaining Claims
In regard to Amboree’s second issue, concerning her claims against
appellees for tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy, we note that she, on
appeal, as she did in the trial court, merely asserts that “a genuine issue of material
fact exist[s] in [her remaining] causes of action.” Amboree does not, however,
actually specify in her brief what “fact issues” actually exist.8
8 We do not address whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Amboree’s claim concerning the wrongful termination of her employment under Sabine Pilot. In her reply brief, Amboree states: “[I]t is important to note that [Amboree] did not appeal [the Sabine Pilot] claim or address it in her initial [b]rief. . . . Amboree stipulates that she [is] not moving forward [with] that claim in this appeal.” Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor of appellees on Amboree’s claim for wrongful termination of her employment under Sabine Pilot. See Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655– 56 (Tex. 2001) (indicating appellate court should affirm trial court’s summary judgment on unchallenged claims); Miner Dederick Constr., LLP v. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp., 403 S.W.3d 451, 462 n.2, 471 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (affirming summary judgment because appellant stated “in its brief that it d[id] not dispute the granting of summary judgment against it on its tort claims”).
15 As noted above, appellees, in their no-evidence summary-judgment motion,
asserted that Amboree could not “produce competent evidence” regarding certain
specific elements of her claims for tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) (“After adequate time for discovery, a party . . . may move
for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more
essential elements of a claim . . . on which an adverse party would have the burden
of proof at trial.”). Once appellees challenged the elements of Amboree’s causes
of action, it then became Amboree’s burden to “produce[] summary judgment
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact” on each element attacked. Id.;
see also Mack Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582.
Here, Amboree, in her response to appellees’ no-evidence summary-
judgment motion, did not direct the trial court to any evidence on the challenged
elements of her claims for tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy. Cf. Mack
Trucks, 206 S.W.3d at 582 (explaining “burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
present evidence raising an issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the
motion”); Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524 (“The trial court must grant the motion unless
the non-movant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue
of material fact.”); Brewer & Pritchard, P.C. v. Johnson, 7 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999), aff’d, 73 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002) (noting
“general” assertions of existence of “genuine issues of material fact” inadequate).
16 Nor does she direct us to any evidence in the record that actually supports the
existence of any purported “fact issues.” Cf. Manautou v. Ebby Halliday Real
Estate, Inc., No. 05-13-01035-CV, 2015 WL 870215, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“When a trial court grants a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment, in order to adequately challenge on appeal each
possible ground for summary judgment, an appellant must cite the specific
evidence in the record that it relied upon to defeat the motion and describe why
that evidence raised a fact issue.”); Blake v. Intco Invs. of Tex., Inc., 123 S.W.3d
521, 525 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (“An appellant has a duty to
show that the record supports her contentions.”); Brewer, 7 S.W.3d at 868 (noting
“general” assertions of existence of “genuine issues of material fact” inadequate).
Instead, Amboree, in her brief, merely makes bare assertions that she has
“offered substantial evidence” that appellees “willfully and intentionally interfered
with her employment at [T]he Rhodes School”; “fir[ed] her without legitimate
reason and for [their own] person[al] and financial interests”; and the
“interference” and her “termination[] caused [her] injuries.” In regard to her fraud
and conspiracy claims, Amboree blankly asserts that “a combination of persons
acted with [the] intent to accomplish 1) for an unlawful purpose or 2) a lawful
purpose by unlawful means, 3) that those combinations had a meeting of the minds
17 on the intent or object to further the course of action” and argues that she “suffered
as a result.”
Notably, “[i]t is not our duty [on appeal] to sua sponte conceive of potential
fact issues and then search the appellate record for evidence supporting their
existence.” Daniel v. Webb, 110 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no
pet.); see also Bich Ngoc Nguyen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 404 S.W.3d 770, 776–77
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“In the absence of any guidance from the
non-movant where the evidence can be found, the trial and appellate courts are not
required to sift through voluminous deposition transcriptions in search of evidence
to support the non-movant’s argument that a fact issue exists.” (internal quotations
omitted)); Brookshire Katy Drainage Dist. v. Lily Gardens, LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301,
308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“[I]n determining whether
a respondent to a no-evidence motion for summary judgment has sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact, courts are not required to search
the record without guidance.” (internal quotations omitted)).
We conclude that Amboree did not carry her burden to produce evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements of her claims
against appellees for tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees on Amboree’s claims for tortious interference, fraud, and conspiracy.
18 We overrule Amboree’s second issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the portion of the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor of
appellees on Amboree’s claims for tortious interference, fraud, conspiracy, and
wrongful termination of her employment under Sabine Pilot. We reverse the
portion of the trial court’s judgment that was purportedly rendered in favor of
appellees on Amboree’s claim for violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act and
her request for a judgment declaring that appellees violated the Act and the
termination of her employment is “void.” And we remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Bandera Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Gilchrist, 946 S.W.2d 336, 336–37 (Tex. 1997) (where trial court
errs in granting summary judgment on unaddressed claims, appellate court should
remand those claims for further proceedings); Postive Feed, Inc. v. Guthmann, 4
S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“When, as here,
a trial court grants more relief by summary judgment than requested, by disposing
of issues never presented to it, the interests of judicial economy demand that we
reverse and remand as to those issues . . . .”).
19 Terry Jennings Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.