Ann McQuerter v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Does 1 through 10, inclusive

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26-cv-00007-DMS-JLB ANN MCQUERTER,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF’S 14 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; and COMPLAINT DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 6] 16

17 18 Pending before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s motion to 19 dismiss the second claim of Plaintiff Ann McQuerter’s Complaint. (Mot., ECF No. 7-1.) 20 Plaintiff responded in opposition (“Opposition”), (Opp’n, ECF No. 8), and Defendant filed 21 a reply, (Reply, ECF No. 9). The matter is suitable for resolution without oral argument. 22 (ECF No. 10.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 The Court accepts the Complaint’s allegations as true for purposes of resolving the 25 motion. Plaintiff maintained personal accounts with Defendant, including a personal 26 checking account at issue here (“Account”). (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, ¶ 5.) At all relevant 27 times, Plaintiff safeguarded her Account. (See id. ¶¶ 6, 12.) On an unknown date, an 28 unknown person made three electronic funds transfers, in the amounts of $4,350, $4,200, 1 and $4,100, from Plaintiff’s Account to Tinker Federal Credit Union in Oklahoma. (Id. ¶¶ 2 7, 9.) The three transfers were processed on September 16, 2025. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff did 3 not initiate or authorize these transfers and has no connection with Tinker Federal Credit 4 Union or any person or entity in Oklahoma. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) 5 On multiple occasions, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s branch offices in San Diego, 6 California and explained to the branch managers that she did not authorize the electronic 7 transfers. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) Plaintiff was told the issue would be handled by Defendant’s 8 fraud department, and later told over the phone that Defendant would not honor her 9 disputes. (Id. ¶ 26.) Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with a written decision and did 10 not make a good faith investigation into the unauthorized transfers. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 26, 29.) 11 Defendant has not refunded the money to Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also disputed 12 the transfers with Tinker Federal Credit Union. (Id. ¶ 18.) Tinker Federal Credit refunded 13 $4,000 to Plaintiff, based on the amounts it could retrieve from the receiving account, but 14 refused to provide additional information or documentation without a subpoena. (Id. ¶¶ 15 18, 19.) 16 Plaintiff originally filed suit in San Diego Superior Court, alleging: (1) a violation 17 of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (“EFTA”), and (2) financial 18 elder abuse, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30(a). (Id. at 3–4.) Defendant removed to 19 federal court, (ECF No. 1), then moved to dismiss the financial elder abuse claim, (Mot. 20 5–6). 21 II. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 23 Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a pleading must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of 24 the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim 25 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”; and (3) “a demand for the relief sought, which 26 may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Lyon 27 v. Denlay, No. 25-CV-00667, 2026 WL 926037, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026), report and 28 recommendation adopted, No. 25-CV-00667, 2026 WL 1234034 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2026). 1 Rule 8(a) requires the complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 2 and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 3 (citation omitted). “The complaint must clearly and fully set forth ‘who is being sued, for 4 what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.’” Lyon, 2026 WL 5 926037, at *2 (quoting McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996)). While 6 “the pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” “it demands 7 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. 8 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 9 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 10 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that a 11 complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” 13 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a 14 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 15 that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 16 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 17 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 18 alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . 19 be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise 21 a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If Plaintiff “ha[s] 22 not nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the complaint “must 23 be dismissed.” Id. at 570. 24 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must 25 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 26 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 519 27 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts are not “required to accept as true allegations 28 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 1 In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. 2 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Under California law, financial elder abuse occurs when “a person or entity . . . 5 [t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains . . . [or] [a]ssists in taking, secreting, 6 appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder . . . for a wrongful 7 use or with intent to defraud, or both . . . [or] by undue influence.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 8 § 15610.30(a). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff qualifies as an “elder” (at least 65 9 years old), id. § 15610.27, or that money is “personal property,” Cal. Civ. Code § 14. But 10 for the reasons below, the Court finds the Complaint violates Rule 8(a) and 12(b)(6). 11 A. Rule 8(a) 12 First, Defendant correctly argues the “Complaint does not specify which of the three 13 types of violations [Defendant] allegedly committed in this case, thus failing to provide 14 [Defendant] with ‘fair notice’ of the alleged wrongdoing.” (Mot. 8.) The Complaint 15 broadly alleges Defendant “violated the Elder Abuse Act, Welf. And Inst. Code 16 15610.30(a),” (Compl. ¶ 33), without specifying which of Defendant’s actions violated 17 which provision of section 15610.30. Plaintiff’s Opposition explains Defendant’s alleged 18 failure to refund Plaintiff the money transferred out of her Account constitutes an unlawful 19 retention or assistance in retaining her personal property in violation of section 20 15610.30(a)(1)–(2), (see Opp’n 4–5); however, the Complaint does not make this legal 21 theory clear. Indeed, neither the word “retained,” nor any variation of the word, appears 22 in the Complaint. (Reply 2.) It is also unclear whether Plaintiff wishes to pursue only this 23 theory or other violations of section 15610.30 as well. “[C]ourts have found as insufficient 24 pleadings that fail to specify which part of a multi-part statute Defendants have allegedly 25 violated.” Song v. Drenberg, No. 18-CV-06283, 2019 WL 1998944, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 26 6, 2019); see also, e.g., Mesi v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 315CV00555, 2016 WL 27 11184699, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 10, 2016) (dismissing claims because the plaintiff does not 28 specify which “portions” of Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 598 and 598A the defendants violated); 1 Sakugawa v. Countrywide Bank F.S.B., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1220–21 (D. Haw. 2011) 2 (dismissing claim because the plaintiff failed to specify which provision of the Real Estate 3 Settlement Procedures Act that was violated). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not 4 specify how or under what provisions Defendant reportedly violated section 15610.30, the 5 Court finds Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with “fair notice” of her precise claim. 6 Thus, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s financial elder abuse claim with leave to amend. 7 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 8 Plaintiff also fails to state a financial elder abuse claim. She argues an “unlawful 9 retention of funds may occur when a company withholds providing an elder funds they are 10 legally entitled to.” (Opp’n 5 (citing Crawford v. Cont’l Cas. Ins. Co., No. SACV 14- 11 00968, 2014 WL 10988334, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2014); Rosove v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 12 No. 14-cv-01118, 2014 WL 2766161 at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2014); Johnston v. Allstate 13 Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-574, 2013 WL 2285361, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2013)).) 14 Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendant unlawfully retained or assisted in retaining her 15 personal property by failing to refund Plaintiff the money transferred out of her Account. 16 (See id. at 4–5.) However, an entity “retains” property per section 15610.30 when an elder 17 is “deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, 18 or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a 19 representative of an elder.” Rittenmeyer v. Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 25-CV-00621, 2026 20 WL 353061, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (emphasis in original) (quoting Cal. Welf. & 21 Inst. Code § 15610.30(c)). “An entity does not violate § 15610.30(a)(1) when it simply 22 processes a transaction involving a third party.” Id. And here, the Complaint “does not 23 allege that Defendant . . . breach[ed] any contract by failing to pay the funds.” Id. 24 Further, the Court finds Plaintiff’s authority to be unpersuasive. The cases cited hold 25 the “denial of policy coverage benefits to an elderly individual can violate the Elder Abuse 26 Act.” Crawford, 2014 WL 10988334, at *2. Plaintiff argues “[w]hether the denial of funds 27 is based on an insurance policy or a bank account is of no consequence.” (Opp’n 6.) The 28 Court disagrees. These cases “rely on the proposition that the plaintiff had a personal | || property interest in money based on an event that triggered coverage under an insurance 2 ||policy.” (Reply 5.) The Court does not read these cases to extend to a bank’s refusal to 3 ||refund a customer’s money, at least when, as here, the Complaint does not allege the bank 4 || was contractually obligated to pay the funds. Thus, Plaintiff's financial elder abuse claim 5 insufficiently pled. The claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend per Rule 12(b)(6).! 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs second claim is 8 || GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days to file an Amended 9 ||Complaint. Plaintiff shall include her EFTA claim in the Amended Complaint if she wishes 10 continue to pursue that cause of action. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 Dated: May 15, 2026 \ f \ 13 Ln Wn. Mow Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ' Plaintiff raises only the unlawful retention theory in her Opposition and fails to adequately specify in her 27 Complaint whether she seeks other legal theories under section 15610.30. To the extent Plaintiff □□□□□□□□ to raise additional legal theories not addressed in this Order, those claims are dismissed for failing to 28 comply with Rule 8(a). □□