UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANIMAL PARTISAN,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23 - 1990 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Animal Partisan, a nonprofit organization, brought this lawsuit under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to compel the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
release certain records regarding its involvement in two conferences. The FBI has since produced
the requested records. What remains is a motion from Animal Partisan requesting $93,823.09 in
attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons below, the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
“Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 to grant a right of public access to governmental
information ‘long shielded unnecessarily from public view[.]’” Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488
F.3d 446, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973), superseded by statute,
Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93–502, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1563 (1973)). FOIA requires
that “records and material in the possession of federal agencies be made available on demand to
any member of the general public.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 221
(1978); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552. It allows the public to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d
1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Even though the Act was “broadly conceived,” EPA, 410 U.S. at 80, it
includes nine “carefully structured . . . exemptions,” NLRB, 437 U.S. at 220–21. These exemptions
demonstrate that the public’s right to information is “‘not absolute’ and that disclosure of certain
information ‘may harm legitimate governmental or private interests.’” Martin, 488 F.3d at 453
(quoting Summers v. DOJ, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). One such exemption,
Exemption 7(A), applies to certain “records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes” if “the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably
be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). FOIA permits
courts to award “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred” in FOIA
litigation “in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Animal Partisan “is an animal rights organization dedicated to alleviating the suffering of
animals used in agriculture and research through legal action.” Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. “Part of
this work includes monitoring the activities and operations of law enforcement agencies, like [the]
Defendant, and how those law enforcement agencies conduct investigations related to animal
rights activists.” Pl.’s Mot. at 7, ECF No. 17. And obtaining records through FOIA is critical to
the organization’s work. See Declaration of William Craig Lowrey (Lowrey Decl.) ¶ 5, ECF No.
17-3. On October 27, 2022, Animal Partisan submitted a FOIA request for “numerous types of
records including records showing the FBI’s involvement in two conferences, [North American
Meat Institute] NAMI’s 2020, and 2022 Animal Care and Handling Conferences[.]” Compl. ¶ 9.
2 On November 2, 2022, the FBI indicated that it was closing the request because it was
unable to locate responsive records. Lowrey Decl. ¶ 12. The FBI advised that “it would conduct
an additional search if [Animal Partisan] could provide more information related to the subject of
the request.” Id. Animal Partisan then renewed its FOIA request and provided additional
information. Id. ¶ 13. On November 15, 2022, the FBI issued its final determination:
The material you requested is located in an investigative file which is exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) exempts from disclosure:
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings . . .
The records responsive to your request are law enforcement records; there is a pending or prospective law enforcement proceeding relevant to these responsive records, and release of the information could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. Therefore, your request is being administratively closed.
Lowrey Decl. ¶ 14.
On December 1, 2022, Animal Partisan appealed the FBI’s final determination to the
Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy (OIP). Id. ¶ 15. The appeal “challenged the
FBI’s failure to segregate portions of the records to which FOIA Exemption 7(A) did not apply,
as well as the FBI’s failure to balance its own privacy concerns with the public interest in
disclosure.” Id.; see also FOIA Appeal at 3, ECF No. 1-11. Animal Partisan also “argued the
requested records were already made public through the FBI’s presentation at the Meat Institute’s
conferences, so the records were not subject to exemption.” Id.; see also FOIA Appeal at 5. On
January 20, 2023, OIP affirmed the FBI’s determination and closed the appeal. See Declaration of
Michael G. Seidel (Seidel Decl.) ¶ 12, ECF No. 18-1. “OIP determined that the FBI properly
withheld information in full because of its protection from disclosure under the FOIA pursuant to
3 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) and that it was reasonably foreseeable that disclosure of the information
would harm the interests protected by this provision.” Id.
Animal Partisan filed its Complaint on July 11, 2023, and the FBI filed its Answer on
August 18, 2023. See Compl.; Answer, ECF No. 5. A month later, the FBI began “conferring with
the record custodians to re-confirm the possible application of specific exemptions.” Jt. Status Rep.
(Sept. 15, 2023), ECF No. 7. On October 13, 2023, the FBI heard from its field office in Dallas
“that there was no longer any harm related to investigatory actions associated with the FOIA
release of information.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 13. According to the FBI, “the investigative activity,
necessitating the application of [Exemption (7)(A)], ceased on February 2, 2023[,] when
prosecution was declined[,] and the internal investigation was closed.” That did not change the
fact that Exemption (7)(A) “was applicable at the time of the initial FOIA request and all following
communications, including the administrative appeal to OIP, through the closure of the
administrative case.” Id. ¶ 13 n.5.
With the exemption no longer applicable, the FBI made “its ‘first and final’ record release”
on January 31, 2024. Lowrey Decl. ¶ 21 (quoting Jt. Status Rep. (Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 9).
Animal Partisan was “not satisfied with the adequacy of the FBI’s search” and sent a letter
identifying responsive records not yet released, including a “slideshow from the FBI’s presentation
at the Meat Institute’s 2020 Animal Care and Handling Conference.” Id. ¶ 22. On June 28, 2024,
the FBI released additional responsive records, including the slideshow. Id. ¶ 23.
After the FBI released the final records, the Parties attempted to settle attorneys’ fees and
costs. Lowrey Decl. ¶ 25. But those negotiations failed, prompting the instant motion for
$93,823.09 in attorneys’ fees and costs. See Pl.’s Mot. at 38. The motion is fully briefed and ripe
for resolution. See Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 19.
4 LEGAL STANDARD
Courts may award “reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred”
in FOIA litigation. 5 U.S.C. § 552(4)(E)(i). A FOIA plaintiff must demonstrate both “eligibility”
and “entitlement” to fees and costs. Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d
521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Eligibility is a “threshold inquiry.” McKinley v. Fed. Hous. Financy
Agency, 174 F. Supp. 3d 220, 222 (D.D.C. 2012). To establish eligibility, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that it “substantially prevailed” in the litigation. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). This requires
a showing that the plaintiff obtained relief through a “judicial order, or an enforceable written
agreement or consent decree,” or by obtaining a “voluntary or unilateral change in position by the
agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I)–(II). The
second prong of the statute requiring a voluntary or unilateral change in the agency’s position is
referred to as the “catalyst theory.” Grand Canyon Tr. v. Bernhardt, 947 F.3d 94, 95 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (citation omitted). “If . . . the court proceeds to the entitlement prong[,] . . . [it] considers a
variety of factors to determine whether the plaintiff should receive fees.” Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524
(emphasis in original). To obtain attorneys’ fees under FOIA, a plaintiff must satisfy both prongs
of the test. See McKinley, 739 F.3d at 710.
DISCUSSION
Without a court-ordered disclosure, Animal Partisan relies on the catalyst theory to
establish its eligibility for attorneys’ fees and costs. Animal Partisan argues that it “received the
records at issue, but only after [it] filed its Complaint and compelled the agency to release the
records.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. The FBI counters that “due to events external to this case, there was no
longer any investigation-related harm that would result from the release of the information.” Def.’s
Opp’n at 8. Although Animal Partisan has established its eligibility for attorneys’ fees and costs
under the statute, the Court finds that it has not demonstrated that it is entitled to such fees.
5 A. Eligibility
The “key question” under the catalyst theory is “whether ‘the institution and prosecution
of the litigation cause[d] the agency to release the documents obtained during the pendency of the
litigation[.]’” Calypso Cargo Ltd. v. U.S. Coast Guard, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2011)
(cleaned up). Whether a plaintiff has sparked this type of change is “largely a question of
causation.” Mobley v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned
up). “While the temporal relation between an FOIA action and the release of documents may be
taken into account in determining the existence vel non of a causal nexus, timing, in itself or in
conjunction with any other particular factor, does not establish causation as a matter of law.” Pub.
Law Educ. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 744 F.2d 181, 184 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Instead, when
“disclosure is triggered by events unrelated to the pending lawsuit, the causal nexus is missing,
and the requester cannot be deemed a ‘prevailing party[.]’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in
Washington v. Dep’t of Justice, 83 F. Supp. 3d 297, 303 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that this “prevent[s]
[the] plaintiffs from being the beneficiaries of purely extrinsic factors”).
Animal Partisan argues that its lawsuit was the catalyst to the agency producing documents.
Pl.’s Mot. at 17. The agency instead points to events unrelated to the lawsuit that triggered
disclosure—i.e., the declination of the relevant prosecution that removed the investigation-related
harm that would result from release of the information. See id. at 17–18. At first blush, the agency’s
argument seems reasonable. If, in fact, the relevant prosecution was declined after the filing of the
lawsuit, it would explain the agency’s change in position regarding disclosure. But the record does
not bear this out.
The agency’s investigative activity “ceased on February 2, 2023,” before commencement
of this lawsuit, “when prosecution was declined[] and the internal investigation was closed.” See
6 Seidel Dec. ¶ 13 n. 5. For five months, the agency took no steps to revisit its application of
Exemption 7(A). Animal Partisan then filed its Complaint on July 11, 2023. See Compl. A month
later, the FBI filed its Answer on August 22, 2023. The Court then ordered the Parties to meet and
confer, and the FBI reached out to the relevant custodians to consider whether the exemption was
still valid. See Jt. Status Rep. at 1 (Sept. 15, 2023), ECF No. 7 (The “Federal Bureau of
Investigation . . . is currently conferring with the record custodians to re-confirm the possible
application of specific exemptions.”). And on October 12, 2023, the agency learned from the
Dallas Field Office “that there was no longer any harm related to investigatory actions associated
with the FOIA release of information.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 13. The FBI then released documents on
January 23, 2024. Id. ¶ 14. On this record, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit “substantially
caused the requested records to be released,” because it was “reasonably necessary” to prompt the
FBI to reconsider the application of Exemption 7(A). Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Serv’s., 142 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Washington (CREW) v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining
that “reliance on Exemption 7(A) may become outdated when the proceeding at issue comes to a
close”) (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
The agency’s sole response is that the Plaintiff should have submitted a new FOIA request,
which “would have resulted in the same determination, without the need for litigation.” Seidel
Decl. ¶ 28; see also id. ¶ 29. But “the mere fact that a FOIA requester might have ultimately
received the documents in question in the absence of litigation is not a sufficient basis for a finding
that it has not substantially prevailed[.]” Fund for Constitutional Gov’t. v. Nat’l Archives & Record
Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1981). And the agency itself directed the Plaintiff to file a
lawsuit “if [it was] dissatisfied with [the] action on [its administrative] appeal.” OIP Determination
7 at 1, ECF No. 1-12. Animal Partisan simply followed that instruction. Because its lawsuit caused
release of the documents, Animal Partisan is eligible for attorneys’ fees and costs under FOIA.
B. Entitlement
If a Court finds that a plaintiff is eligible for fees, it must consider four factors to determine
whether it is entitled to fees: “(1) the public benefit derived from the case, (2) the commercial
benefit to the requester, (3) the nature of the requester’s interest in the information, and (4) the
reasonableness of the agency’s conduct.” Morley v. CIA, 719 F.3d 689, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
“Although these factors must be balanced, failure to satisfy the fourth element may foreclose a
claim for attorney fees.” Summers v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 477 F. Supp. 2d 56, 63 (D.D.C. 2007)
(citing Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v Dep’t of Agric., 11 F.3d 211, 216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
The “sifting of those criteria over the facts of a case is a matter of district court discretion.” Tax
Analysts v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Weighing the four factors,
the Court finds that Animal Partisan is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
1. Public Benefit
In assessing the public benefit factor, a court must consider “both the effect of the litigation
for which fees are requested and the potential public value of the information sought.” Davy v.
CIA, 550 F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The “effect of the litigation inquiry” asks “simply
whether the litigation caused the release of requested documents, without which the requester
cannot be said to have substantially prevailed.” Morley v. CIA, 810 F.3d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
And to have “potential public value” the request “must have at least a modest probability of
generating useful new information about a matter of public concern.” Id. The public benefit favors
the plaintiff “where the complainant’s victory is likely to add to the fund of information that
citizens may use in making vital political choices.” Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir.
8 1979) (cleaned up). This is an ex ante inquiry. See Morley, 810 F.3d at 844 (“Lest there be any
uncertainty . . . the public-benefit factor requires an ex ante assessment of the potential public
value of the information requested, with little or no regard to whether any documents supplied
prove to advance the public interest[.]”).
Having already decided that the litigation caused the release of the requested documents,
see supra, at 6–7, the Court will consider the potential public value of the records obtained. Animal
Partisan sought records related to the FBI’s involvement in two conferences held by the North
American Meat Institute, “a trade association that represents companies that process 95 percent of
beef, pork, veal and 70 percent of turkey products in the United States.” Compl. ¶¶ 2–3. Curiously,
both Parties focus on the ex post benefits (or lack thereof) of the records obtained, see Pl.s’ Mot.
at 25–27; Def’s Opp’n at 13–15, even though the inquiry is ex ante, see Hall & Assocs. v. EPA,
703 F. Supp. 3d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2023) (The ex-ante “inquiry turns on the facts as they existed—
and as they were known to the FOIA requester and other members of the public—at the time the
FOIA requester faced the decision of whether to bring suit.”).
Based on the record before the Court, the information obtained appears only marginally
“likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital political choices.”
Fenster, 617 F.2d at 744. Although “[m]embers of the public remain highly interested in animal
welfare within the animal agriculture and research industries, as well as the policing of animal
rights activism,” Lowrey Decl. ¶ 6, many of the records sought were likely already in the public
domain because the conferences were external, see Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1094 (noting that
public benefit is “less than overwhelming” where “the public had the benefit of access to all or
most of this information”). And the records sought do not seem to concern any FBI activity
9 regarding the investigation and prosecution of animal rights activists. See Compl. ¶ 9. On balance,
the public benefit factor only slightly favors Animal Partisan.
2. Commercial Benefit & Interest in the Information
The second factor considers whether the FOIA plaintiff derived a public benefit from
obtaining the records, while the third factor looks at the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the
records. These factors “are closely related and often considered together.” Nat’l Sec. Archive v.
U.S. Dep’t of Def., 530 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201 (D.D.C. 2008). “Under the second criterion a court
would usually allow recovery of fees where the complainant was indigent or a nonprofit public
interest group . . . but would not if it was a large corporate interest.” Fenster, 617 F.2d at 742 n. 4
(quoting S. Rep. No. 93–854, at 19). Under the third factor, “a court would generally award fees
if the complainant’s interest in the information sought was scholarly or journalistic or
public-interest oriented.” Fenster, 617 F.2d at 742 n. 4 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93–854, at 19).
Animal Partisan is a nonpartisan public interest group that sought these records “to monitor
[the FBI’s] participation in conferences and inform the public of its ongoing activities and
operations related to investigating and overcharging animal rights activists as ‘domestic
terrorists.’” Pl.’s Mot. at 28. As part of these efforts, it publicized the obtained records via blog
posts on its website and on social media posts. See Lowrey Decl. ¶ 27. And these records have
been cited in articles published by other media organizations domestically and abroad. See id.
¶¶ 28–29. Thus, the second and third factors favor Animal Partisan.
3. Reasonableness of the Agency’s Conduct
Finally, a court must determine whether the government had a reasonable basis for
withholding the information. In making this determination, a court must consider (1) whether the
agency’s opposition to disclosure had a reasonable or colorable basis in law, and (2) whether the
10 agency was recalcitrant in its opposition or obdurate in its behavior. Elect. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. United
States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 27, 45 (D.D.C. 2016). “Under either factor, the
agency carries the burden of showing it behaved reasonably.” Id.; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Justice, 878 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237 (D.D.C. 2012). “The question is not whether [the
plaintiff] has affirmatively shown that the agency was unreasonable, but rather whether the agency
has shown that it had any colorable or reasonable basis for not disclosing the material until after
[the plaintiff] filed suit.” EPIC, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 45–46 (quoting Davy, 550 F.3d at 1163).
Starting with the reasonableness of the agency’s opposition to disclosure, the FBI argues
that it reasonably withheld the relevant records under Exemption 7(A). See Def.’s Opp’n at 16. It
points out that the exemption “was applicable at the time of the initial FOIA request and all
following communications, including the administrative appeal to OIP, through the closure of the
administrative case.” Seidel Decl. ¶ 13 n.5. The Court agrees. See CREW, 746 F.3d at 1098 (“[A]n
ongoing criminal investigation typically triggers Exemption 7(A).”); see also Mullen v. U.S. Army
Crim. Investigation Command, No. 1:10-cv-262, 2012 WL 2681300, at *10 (E.D. Va. July 6, 2012)
(“[T]he existence of an ongoing investigation” is a reasonable basis in law to withhold documents,
especially if the “Defendant demonstrated responsiveness to the FOIA request once the
investigation . . . concluded.”).
Animal Partisan counters that the agency improperly applied Exemption 7(A) because it
“failed to explain how responsive records would interfere with enforcement proceedings and,
instead, only provided the text of the statutory language and its own legal conclusions.” Pl.’s Mot.
at 30. But the FBI’s failure to provide these particulars does not render its decision unreasonable.
See, e.g., United America Financial, Inc. v. Potter, 770 F. Supp. 2d 252, 258 (D.D.C. 2011)
(finding the government’s reliance on a FOIA exemption reasonable even though “it ultimately
11 failed to make the required specific and particularized showing that disclosing the identities of
these employees would result in harm or harassment” because “[t]he claim was [still] based on
sound legal theory”). Animal Partisan also claims that the FBI “failed to segregate and release
responsive non-exempt records.” Pl.’s Mot. at 31 (citing to Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Sec., 892 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2012)). But since the Parties “never engaged in any
substantive motions practice,” Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 375 F. Supp. 3d 50, 67
(D.D.C. 2019), the Court cannot assess the strength of this contention, see, e.g., Los Padres
ForestWatch v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 22-cv-3702, 2025 WL 925376, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,
2025).1 Ultimately, on this record, the agency’s reliance on Exemption 7(A) appears reasonable.
See LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 627 F.2d 481, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting
that to “rebut a claim of Government unreasonableness or obduracy, the Government need not
prove that the information was in fact exempt, only that the Government had a reasonable basis in
law for concluding that the information in issue was exempt”).
Turning to the second factor, the FBI was neither recalcitrant in its opposition nor obdurate
in its behavior. Indeed, as the Plaintiff concedes, once this lawsuit was commenced, the FBI
promptly turned over the requested records. See Lowrey Decl. ¶¶ 21–24. And when the Plaintiff
raised adequacy concerns about the agency’s initial search, the FBI swiftly agreed to a
supplemental search and produced the additional information. Id. ¶ 23. “[T]his is not a case in
which the government stubbornly refused to accede to a valid claim.” Peter S. Herrick’s Customs
1 Animal Partisan cites Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 892 F. Supp. 2d 28, 53 (D.D.C. 2012), to support its segregability argument. There, the court found that the government did not have a colorable basis in law for withholding the requested documents because its only explanation for producing the documents after the plaintiff filed suit was that it had “conduct[ed] another round of review.” Id. That is a far cry from this case where the government had a reasonable basis to withhold the requested information under Exemption 7(A) until the underlying investigation came to an end.
12 & Int’l Trade Newsl. v. Customs & Border Prot., No. 04-cv-0377, 2006 WL 3060012, at *10
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2006). And there is no evidence of bad faith. See Los Padres ForestWatch, 2025
WL 925376, at *10 (“Agencies should not be penalized or disincentivized from voluntarily and
promptly revisiting the adequacy of their efforts after litigation has commenced, at least where
there is no evidence of bad faith or indifference.”). In the end, the FBI turned over the responsive
records within three months of hearing from its field office about the relevant prosecution and
determining the exemption no longer applied. Compare with Potter, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 258
(finding “no evidence of obdurate behavior” though “litigation stretched on for a period of almost
four years” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the FBI had a reasonable basis for withholding the relevant records and did not
engage in obdurate behavior, the fourth factor cuts in its favor.
* **
When deciding entitlement to fees and costs, no one factor is dispositive. See Davy, 550
F.3d at 1159. Here, the first, second, and third factors weigh in favor of an award of fees and costs,
and the fourth weighs against one. Considering these competing factors, the Court finds that
Animal Partisan is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. Although three of the four factors favor
Animal Partisan, the first factor only slightly favors the organization. And the fourth factor heavily
favors the agency, as it had a reasonable basis for initially withholding the relevant records under
Exemption 7(A) and acted swiftly to turn over the records once it learned that the underlying law
enforcement investigation had ceased. See supra, at 11–14. In these circumstances, the Court finds
that an award of fees and costs is not “necessary to implement FOIA” and that the cost of litigating
a case like this one would not “dissuade” a FOIA applicant “who ha[s] been denied information
from invoking [its] right to judicial review.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Nationwide Bldg.
13 Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see, e.g., Morley, 894 F.3d at 396
(finding no entitlement to fees where “factor four heavily favor[ed] the agency and the other three
factors only slightly favor[ed]” the plaintiff); Assassination Archives and Research Center, Inc. v.
CIA, No. 17-cv-160, 2019 WL 1491982, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2019) (finding the plaintiff was not
entitled to attorneys’ fees where the “first three factors may weigh in [the plaintiff’s] favor,
but . . . the fourth factor weighs strongly in the [defendant’s] favor”).2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Plaintiff’s Motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs, ECF No. 17.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: June 30, 2025
2 Although the Court need not consider whether it should exercise its discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, it is dubious of the reasonableness of Animal Partisan’s fees and costs. Animal Partisan seeks $93,823.09 for a relatively straightforward FOIA case, and almost one-third of that amount represents “fees-on-fees,” i.e., attorneys’ fees to litigate this very motion.