COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, McCullough and Senior Judge Clements UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ANGIE BROWN MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0815-13-1 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. NOVEMBER 19, 2013 KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Gregory E. Camden (Montagna, Klein & Camden LLP, on briefs), for appellant.
C. Ervin Reid (Goodman, Allen & Filetti, on brief), for appellees.
Angie Brown (claimant) appeals from an order of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission (the commission) denying her claims for benefits. On appeal, claimant contends:
1) the commission erred in failing to recognize claimant’s head as a body part injured during her
work accident; 2) the commission erred in failing to find claimant’s August 2011 hospitalization
was related to her work injury; and 3) the commission erred in terminating temporary partial
disability benefits. Finding no error, we affirm the commission.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. I. Background1
On appeal from the commission, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
employer, the party prevailing below. See Starbucks Coffee Co. v. Shy, 61 Va. App. 229, 233,
734 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2012).
A. Claimant’s Injury and Initial Award Order
So viewed, the evidence indicated that claimant was injured on November 20, 2007,
when she was struck by a motor vehicle while working for Kentucky Fried Chicken (employer).
Claimant filed a claim for benefits shortly thereafter, alleging injuries to her left foot, left knee,
head, and left side. Thereafter, the parties entered into an agreement to pay benefits that
identified the nature of claimant’s injury as “left knee sprain, left ankle sprain, posttraumatic
headaches, [and] bruising on the left side.” The commission approved the parties’ agreement
and entered an order awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits on March 14, 2008.
The order did not describe the nature of claimant’s injury.
B. Medical Treatment
Claimant began treating with Dr. Donald LaMarche in April of 2008, after suffering what
claimant “thought maybe . . . a seizure.” Dr. LaMarche diagnosed claimant with a convulsive
disorder. He stated that the cause of claimant’s seizures was not clear, although he noted that
one of claimant’s medications “ha[d] been associated with seizures.” Over the following years,
Dr. LaMarche continued to treat claimant for her convulsive disorder. Dr. LaMarche also treated
claimant for headaches, which eventually became claimant’s primary complaint. Dr. LaMarche
opined that claimant’s headaches were likely secondary to stress and anxiety.
1 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this appeal. -2- In addition to her treatment with Dr. LaMarche, claimant also met with Dr. Alan Towne
for an independent medical examination in May 2009. Dr. Towne diagnosed claimant as having
a history of seizures predating her November 2007 work accident. However, he also noted that
claimant’s seizures following her work accident “were significantly different from her prior
episodes,” and included episodes of loss of consciousness.
C. Claimant’s Return to Work and Change in Condition
On September 7, 2010, claimant began working as a school bus driver. Shortly
thereafter, employer filed an application for a hearing, requesting that the commission terminate
claimant’s temporary total disability benefits based on her return to work. Claimant filed an
application requesting an award of temporary partial disability benefits. The parties
subsequently executed a number of agreement forms regarding claimant’s request for benefits.
Those forms described the nature of claimant’s work injury as including an injury to her head.
On May 18, 2011, the commission entered an order awarding claimant temporary partial
disability benefits. The award also modified the nature of claimant’s injury to cover the
following body parts: “left knee sprain, left ankle sprain, posttraumatic headaches, [and]
bruising of the left side.” Neither party appealed this order.
D. August Hospitalization
On August 9, 2011, claimant was admitted to an emergency room under a stroke protocol
after exhibiting changes in her mental status, slurred speech, and left-sided weakness. Claimant
was discharged from the hospital on August 12, 2011. Her discharge summary notes reflect that
the doctors ruled out a stroke based on the results of MRI and CT scans and “suspect[ed]
recurrent [seizure] activity based” on two seizure events that occurred during her hospitalization.
Nevertheless, upon discharge, the doctors’ impression remained “slurred speech and [left] sided
weakness.”
-3- In the months following her hospitalization, claimant continued her treatment with
Dr. LaMarche. On August 17, 2011, Dr. LaMarche examined claimant and noted that he was
“not sure why” claimant experienced her recent symptoms, which included loss of
consciousness, shaking, left hemiparesis (i.e., weakness on the left side of the body), and left
hemisensory loss (i.e., diminished sensation on the left side of the body). Dr. LaMarche
expressed similar uncertainty after examining claimant in September, noting that claimant’s left
hemiparesis was of unclear etiology. Dr. LaMarche recommended that claimant undergo a “finer
cut” MRI and electroencephalogram (EEG) test in order to further assess her condition.
On November 11, 2011, Dr. LaMarche wrote a letter to the commission requesting
authorization to perform an additional MRI and EEG scan. Dr. LaMarche stated that “he saw
[claimant] on August 17, 2011, for a recent seizure that resulted in a visit to [an] . . . Emergency
Room. [Claimant], as a result of th[at] . . . event . . . suffered from left-sided weakness of her
body and slurred speech.” One week later, Dr. LaMarche prepared a letter that expressed his
belief, within a reasonable degree of medical probability,2 that claimant’s alleged convulsive
activity was related to her original work injury. The letter also expressed Dr. LaMarche’s view
that claimant’s hemiparesis may be related to her work injury, though he could not come to this
conclusion within a reasonable degree of medical probability without additional testing.
E. Deputy Commissioner Hearing
On November 21, 2011, the deputy commissioner held a hearing to address claimant’s
claims for benefits, which requested permanent partial disability, temporary partial disability
benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and penalties for employer’s failure to pay benefits
2 For purposes of this opinion, medical probability and medical certainty are used interchangeably to reflect the findings of Dr. LaMarche and Dr. Towne.
-4- pursuant to the May 18, 2011 award.3 The claims did not include a request to add claimant’s
head injury as a body part injured in her compensable accident.
After the hearing, the deputy commissioner entered a partial award order. The order
affirmed that claimant was under an open award for temporary partial disability benefits pursuant
to the commission’s May 18, 2011 award order. The order also scheduled an independent
medical examination, after which the deputy commissioner would determine whether claimant’s
August hospitalization was related to her work injury and whether she was entitled to temporary
total disability benefits beginning August 9, 2011.
On January 17, 2012, Dr. Towne performed an independent medical examination of
claimant. He diagnosed claimant with seizures, left hemiparesis with left lower extremity
weakness, and left-sided sensory deficits. Pertaining to the diagnoses, Dr. Towne concluded that
claimant’s seizures, left lower extremity weakness, and pain diagnoses were causally related to
her work accident. He was, however, unable to offer an opinion with regard to whether
claimant’s August hospitalization was casually related to her work accident.
Following the completion of Dr. Towne’s independent medical exam, the deputy
commissioner entered an order denying claimant’s requests for medical benefits related to her
August hospitalization and temporary total disability benefits. In addition, the deputy
commissioner terminated claimant’s award for temporary partial disability benefits, because
“there [was] no evidence that claimant engaged in any kind of marketing [following] her August
9, 2011 hospitalization.”
Claimant promptly filed a motion for reconsideration that, among other things, requested
that the deputy commissioner amend the award order to include claimant’s head as an injured
3 During the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the parties stipulated that the commission’s May 18, 2011 award was in full force and effect as of the time of the hearing. That order described the nature of claimant’s injury as “left knee sprain, left ankle sprain, posttraumatic headaches, [and] bruising on the left side.” -5- body part consistent with the parties’ “[p]revious agreement forms and awards.” The deputy
commissioner denied claimant’s motion for reconsideration.
F. Full Commission Hearing
On review, the commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s order. The commission
concluded that claimant failed to carry her burden of proof that her August hospitalization was
causally related to her compensable injury. While Dr. LaMarche opined that claimant’s
left-sided weakness required claimant’s hospitalization and “may be related” to her work
accident, he could not maintain this opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
Thus, the evidence showed only a possibility of causation. Similarly, the commission affirmed
the deputy commissioner’s decision to terminate claimant’s temporary partial disability benefits,
concluding that while claimant was partially disabled following her hospitalization, she had
neither worked nor marketed her remaining work capacity during that time.
Finally, the commission refused to consider the issue of claimant’s head injury on review.
The commission found that whether claimant suffered a head injury as a result of her work
accident was not raised in claimant’s claims for benefits and, accordingly, was not before the
deputy commissioner. Rather, according to the commission, claimant first raised the issue in her
request for reconsideration of the deputy commissioner’s award order.
Commissioner Marshall dissented in part from the commission’s opinion. Commissioner
Marshall concluded that the commission’s prior awards “already cover[ed] [claimant’s] head
injury” and that claimant met her burden of proof regarding her August hospitalization.
Commissioner Marshall concurred with the commission’s finding that the deputy commissioner
property terminated claimant’s temporary partial disability award.
Claimant filed a request for reconsideration with the commission, which was denied.
This appeal followed.
-6- II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“Decisions of the commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible evidence,
are conclusive and binding on this Court.” Manassas Ice & Fire Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227,
229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991). “However, the commission’s legal determinations are not
binding on appeal and will be reviewed de novo.” Wainwright v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 50 Va. App. 421, 430, 650 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2007).
B. Claimant’s Head Injury
On review of the deputy commissioner’s award, the commission found that claimant’s
head injury “was not before the [d]eputy [c]ommissioner” and refused to consider the issue “for
the first time [on review].” Claimant assigns error to the commission’s failure to recognize her
head as a body part injured during her work accident. Finding no error, we affirm the
commission’s opinion.
Upon our review of the record, we find that claimant did not raise the issue of her head
injury at the hearing before the deputy commissioner. The only issues that were before the
deputy commissioner were those addressed in claimant’s claims for benefits, which requested
additional disability benefits and penalties for employer’s failure to pay benefits under the
commission’s May 18, 2011 award order. Moreover, as the parties stipulated, the commission’s
May 18, 2011 award order was in effect at the time of the hearing before the deputy
commissioner. That order did not include claimant’s head injury, listing instead “posttraumatic
headaches.” Claimant neither appealed that order nor requested that the deputy commissioner
amend the award order to include her head as an injured body part. Rather, claimant first
requested to add her head injury as an injured body part by filing a request for reconsideration
after the deputy commissioner entered the award order.
-7- Relying on Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Mease, 62 Va. App. 190, 745 S.E.2d 155 (2013),
claimant contends that the evidence in the record, including her initial claim for benefits,
provided employer with sufficient notice of her head injury. Moreover, she asserts that employer
was “aware of [her] head injury” and demonstrated through its “course of conduct” that
claimant’s head injury was encompassed in the commission’s May 18, 2011 award order.
Accordingly, she contends that she “alleged an injury to her head” at all times.
We find claimant’s reliance on Phillip Morris misplaced. In Phillip Morris, we addressed
whether the claimant’s request for physical therapy was timely filed. Id. at 197-98, 745 S.E.2d at
158. In doing so, we considered the employer’s conduct and knowledge of the claimant’s injury
in order to ascertain the scope of the parties’ agreement to pay benefits as it related to the
claimant’s request for physical therapy. Id. at 199-200, 745 S.E.2d at 159-60. This Court’s
conclusion in Phillip Morris that the “employer had sufficient notice” of the claimant’s injury,
therefore, addressed whether the claimant met his obligation to assert his claim against the
employer within the two-year statute of limitations, not whether the issue was properly before
the deputy commissioner at that particular hearing. Id. at 200, 745 S.E.2d at 159. Nothing in our
analysis spoke to the issue raised here: whether the commission erred in refusing to consider an
issue for the first time on review. Because the issue of claimant’s head injury was not before the
deputy commissioner, we find that the commission did not err by refusing to consider this issue
on review for the first time and, therefore, we affirm the commission.4
4 We make no finding regarding claimant’s head injury or the scope of the parties’ prior award orders, viewing those issues as potentially the subject of future consideration by the commission. We do note, however, that employer conceded during oral argument that claimant’s request to add her head as a compensable injury has not been foreclosed and is the subject of future resolution. -8- C. Claimant’s August Hospitalization
Claimant next assigns error to the commission’s finding that she failed to prove that her
August hospitalization was causally related to her work injury. She contends that she was
hospitalized because of her seizure activity, which Dr. LaMarche “related to her original [work]
injury.” Accordingly, claimant argues that the evidence presented to the commission established
that her hospitalization was causally related to her work injury. We disagree.
In order to recover the costs of medical treatment under the Workers’ Compensation Act,
an injured employee must show that her treatment was causally related to a compensable work
injury. See Watkins v. Halco Eng’g Inc., 225 Va. 97, 101, 300 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1983). Here,
the commission concluded that claimant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that her
August hospitalization was casually related to her work injury. Unless we can say as a matter of
law that the evidence submitted by claimant sustained her burden of proof, the commission’s
determination is binding upon this Court. Tomko v. Michael’s Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699,
173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
Claimant argued before the commission, as she does now, “that she sought treatment at
the hospital [in August 2011] for her seizures.” However, the commission attributed claimant’s
hospitalization “[to her] slurred speech and left-sided body weakness,” not her seizure disorder.
In addition, the commission concluded that the evidence established only a possibility, not a
probability, that claimant’s hospitalization was causally related to her work accident. The
commission’s findings are not without support in the record.
Claimant was admitted to the hospital under a stroke protocol on August 9, 2011, after
presenting to the emergency room with slurred speech and left-sided weakness. The doctors
initially suspected that claimant suffered a stroke, but that diagnosis was ruled out after the
doctors reviewed claimant’s MRI and CT scans. Based on the results of those tests and seizure
-9- activity claimant exhibited during her hospitalization, the doctors concluded that claimant’s
condition was “looking more like [a] s[eizure] d[isorder].” Notwithstanding that conclusion, the
doctors’ main impression upon claimant’s discharge remained slurred speech and left-sided
weakness.
The medical evidence relating claimant’s slurred speech and left-sided weakness to her
work injury is similarly conflicting. Following her hospitalization, claimant continued treating
with Dr. LaMarche, who sent a letter to the commission on November 10, 2011, which related
claimant’s hospitalization to her work injury. Dr. LaMarche stated that “[he] saw [claimant] on
[August 17, 2011] for a recent seizure that resulted in a visit to the [hospital] . . . . [A]s a result
of this recent event, [claimant] has suffered from left-sided weakness of her body and slurred
speech.” However, Dr. LaMarche’s treatment notes from claimant’s August 17, 2011
examination state that Dr. LaMarche was “not sure why [claimant]” suffered from left-sided
weakness. Dr. LaMarche also expressed uncertainty regarding claimant’s condition after he sent
his November 10, 2011 letter to the commission. In particular, Dr. LaMarche noted that
claimant “is . . . suffering from [left-sided weakness] which may be related to the [work] injury,”
but he could not say “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” See Clinchfield Coal Co.
v. Brown, 229 Va. 249, 251, 329 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985) (“A mere opinion that the condition may
have resulted from the accident is not sufficient.” (emphasis added)).
In addition, Dr. Towne expressed uncertainty about claimant’s condition following his
independent medical examination. While Dr. Towne diagnosed claimant with left hemiparesis
and left upper extremity sensory defects, he did not attribute those diagnoses to claimant’s work
injury. Moreover, he stated that he could not conclude within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that claimant’s August hospitalization was causally related to her work injury.
- 10 - As the Supreme Court of Virginia has previously held, the commission resolves conflicts
in the medical evidence, and its decisions when based upon credible evidence are binding on the
Court. See Celanese Fibers Co. v. Johnson, 229 Va. 117, 120-21, 326 S.E.2d 687, 690 (1985).
The commission evaluated the conflicting medical evidence and concluded that claimant failed
to prove that her August hospitalization was causally related to her work injury. That finding is
not without support in the record. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Robinson, 32 Va. App. 1, 5, 526
S.E.2d 267, 269 (2000) (“‘[T]he commission’s findings are binding even if the weight of the
evidence is contrary to those findings.’” (quoting Kane Plumbing v. Small, 7 Va. App. 132, 136,
371 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1988))). Accordingly, we affirm the commission’s decision.
D. Temporary Partial Disability Benefits
Finally, claimant asserts that the commission erred in terminating her award for
temporary partial disability benefits because she failed to market her remaining work capacity.
Claimant contends that an injured worker “who is released to light duty work while receiving
benefits under an outstanding award has no obligation to market her residual capacity.” Finding
no error in the commission’s opinion, we affirm.
Ordinarily, a claimant under an open award is not required to market her remaining work
capacity. See generally Linda D. Slough, Virginia Practice: Workers’ Compensation § 29:6
(2012-13 ed.) (“If an injured employee is not under an open award and the employee receives a
light duty release to return to work, the employee has a duty to market his residual capacity.”).
However, claimant filed a claim for a change in condition requesting temporary total disability
benefits. As the party alleging a change in condition, claimant bore the burden to prove the
allegation by a preponderance of the evidence, which included an obligation for her to market
her remaining work capacity. See Pilot Frieght Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 439,
399 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986); see also Lawrence J. Pascal, Virginia Workers’ Compensation
- 11 - § 6.02 (4th ed. 2011) (“[A]n injured worker who is seeking an initial award of benefits or a
change-in-condition and has been released to light duty work has the burden of proving
marketing of remaining physical capacity.” (citing WMATA v. Harrison, 228 Va. 598, 324
S.E.2d 654 (1985))); Martin v. Univ. of Va. Med. Cntr., No. 200-60-98 (Va. Workers’ Comp.
Comm’n May 30, 2006) (holding that the claimant, who was under an open award for temporary
partial disability benefits, was required to prove adequate marketing when she filed a
change-in-condition application seeking temporary total disability benefits).5 Because claimant
did not present evidence that she marketed her remaining work capacity, we hold that the
commission did not err in finding that she was not entitled to disability benefits and terminating
her award for temporary partial disability benefits.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we find that the commission did not err in refusing to consider
claimant’s head injury on review, finding that claimant did not adequately prove that her
hospitalization was causally related to her work injury, and terminating claimant’s award for
temporary partial disability benefits. The decision of the commission is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
5 While decisions of the commission are not binding on this Court, they may be persuasive in some cases. See Pruden v. Plasser Am. Corp., 45 Va. App. 566, 580, 612 S.E.2d 738, 745 (2005). - 12 -