1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 * * * ANGELICA MARIA FRANCES, as an Case No. 3:25-CV-00682-ART-CLB 4 Individual and as Primary Trustee of the P. Brown Trust, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF 5 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 Plaintiff, 6 v. 7 CHURCHILL COUNTY AUTHORITIES, et 8 al., 9 Defendants.
10 Before the Court is Plaintiff Angelica Maria Frances’s (“Frances”) pro se civil rights 11 complaint, (ECF No. 1-3), two applications to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF Nos. 9, 12 11), an emergency motion to temporarily correct public records, (ECF No. 14), an 13 emergency motion for cease and desist, (ECF No. 15), and a motion for an extension of 14 time to complete supplemental filings, (ECF No. 16). The Court now screens Frances’s 15 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and, for the reasons discussed below, recommends 16 this action be dismissed. The Court further recommends that Frances’s District of Nevada 17 application to proceed in forma pauperis be granted, but that the rest of her motions be 18 denied. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 On December 1, 2025, Frances initiated this action by filing a complaint. (ECF No. 21 1-3.) Frances did not pay the filing fee nor file an application to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”). The Court therefore ordered Frances to either pay the full $405 filing fee for a civil 23 action or file a completed application to proceed IFP. (ECF No. 5.) On December 17, 24 2025, Frances filed a Nevada state court application to proceed IFP, as well as this 25 Court’s short and long form applications. (ECF Nos. 9, 11.) Approximately two weeks 26
27 1 This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Anne R. Traum, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate 1 later, Frances filed the two emergency motions, (ECF Nos. 14, 15), and her motion to 2 extend time to file supplemental filings, (ECF No. 16). 3 The Court will first address Frances’s two IFP applications. 4 II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 5 A person may be granted permission to proceed IFP if the person “submits an 6 affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that the 7 person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefore. Such affidavit shall state the 8 nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to 9 redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 10 (en banc) (stating 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all actions filed IFP, not just prisoner 11 actions). 12 Pursuant to LSR 1-1: “Any person who is unable to prepay the fees in a civil case 13 may apply to the court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The application must be 14 made on the form provided by the court and must include a financial affidavit disclosing 15 the applicant’s income, assets, expenses, and liabilities.” 16 “[T]he supporting affidavit [must] state the facts as to [the] affiant’s poverty with 17 some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 18 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A litigant need not “be 19 absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefits of the statute.” Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de 20 Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948). 21 The Court has reviewed Frances’s applications to proceed IFP. (ECF Nos. 9, 11.) 22 Frances’s Nevada state court application to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 9), is improper. Local 23 Rule LSR 1-1 states applications to proceed IFP “must be made on the form provided by 24 the court.” The Court told Frances as much when it directed her to file an application to 25 proceed IFP or pay the filing fee. (See ECF No. 5.) Given Frances’s disregard of the Local 26 Rules and this Court’s order, the Court recommends her state court application to proceed 27 IFP, (ECF No. 9), be denied. As to Frances’s District of Nevada application, (ECF No. 1 the Court recommends Frances’s District of Nevada application to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 2 11), be granted. 3 III. SCREENING STANDARD 4 Prior to ordering service on any Defendant, the Court is required to screen an in 5 forma pauperis complaint to determine whether dismissal is appropriate under certain 6 circumstances. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the in 7 forma pauperis statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss an 8 in forma pauperis complaint for the enumerated reasons). Such screening is required 9 before a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis may proceed to serve a pleading. Glick v. 10 Edwards, 803 F.3d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 2015). 11 “[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – (A) 12 the allegations of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or 13 malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 14 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 15 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). 16 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 17 granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 18 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. When reviewing the adequacy of a complaint 19 under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). 20 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The standard for 21 determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 22 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 23 standard for failure to state a claim.”). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling 24 on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 25 2000) (citation omitted). 26 The Court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light 27 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. 1 are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes 2 v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). 3 A complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a 4 cause of actions,” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief 5 above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 6 “The pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely 7 creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (citation and quotation 8 marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include “enough facts to state a claim to 9 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 10 678 (2009). 11 A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face 12 of the complaint the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, 13 or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United 14 States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th 15 Cir. 1990). 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 A. Motion to Extend Time for Supplemental Filings 18 The Court will first address Frances’s motion for an extension of time to complete 19 supplemental filings. (ECF No. 16.) Frances argues she needs an additional 60 to 90 20 days to complete her supplemental filings due to damage caused by Defendants. (Id.) 21 For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Frances is not permitted to file 22 supplemental filings, and therefore recommends her motion be denied. 23 Local Rule 7-2(g) prohibits the filing of “supplemental pleadings, briefs, authorities, 24 or evidence without leave of court granted for good cause.” The Court “may strike 25 supplemental filings made without leave of court.” LR 7-2(g). Here, Frances filed five 26 supplemental filings, totaling more than 600 pages, without seeking leave of court. (See 27 ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-4, 8, 12, 13.) Not only does this violate Local Rule 7-2(g), but Frances’s 1 not a repository for miscellaneous documents that [Frances] believes may support [her] 2 claims.” Thompson v. Nev. Sec’y of State, 2026 WL 84538, at *3 (D. Nev. 2026) (quoting 3 Dillon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272388, at *3 (D. Nev. 2021)). 4 Moreover, even if Frances’s supplemental filings were properly before the Court, 5 Frances fails to provide citations to specific parts of the record. She instead makes 6 general references to them and expects the Court to sift through the filing to find the 7 support she believes is contained within them. For example, in her declaration in support 8 of emergency motions, Frances states the relevant facts “concerning abuse of authority 9 and coordinated misconduct by Churchill County authorities is set forth in Supplemental 10 Statement No. 2, Part One – RICO Group I.” (ECF No. 15-1.) Frances fails to cite to a 11 specific page despite the fact Supplemental Statement No. 2 is 226 pages long. (ECF No. 12 12.) “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” Murthy v. Missouri, 13 603 U.S. 43, 67 n.7 (2024) (citation modified) (quoting Gross v. Cicero, 619 F.3d 697, 14 702 (2010)). It is Frances’s responsibility to present her arguments and evidence in a 15 logical and coherent manner to the Court, which she fails to do. The Court will therefore 16 not consider any of Frances’s supplemental filings in screening her complaint and 17 addressing her two emergency motions. 18 Furthermore, at this point in the litigation, such voluminous filings are unnecessary. 19 Frances is at the pleading stage and is not yet required to prove her case with evidence. 20 Rather, she simply needs to assert factual allegations which, if true, would entitle her to 21 relief. Hence, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)’s requirement that litigants provide “a 22 short and plain statement” showing they “are entitled to relief.” Frances needs to provide 23 the basic who, what, when, where, and how of her claims so the Court can analyze their 24 validity, she does not need to conclusively prove them. 25 Because Frances failed to obtain leave of court before making her supplemental 26 filings, and because Frances’s supplemental filings are inappropriate, the Court 27 recommends they be stricken. (See ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-4, 8, 12, 13.) Furthermore, because 1 motion for an extension of time to complete her supplemental filings, (ECF No. 16), be 2 denied. 3 B. Screening of the Complaint2 4 In her complaint, Frances sues the Churchill County Recorder, Treasurer, Planning 5 Department, Sheriff’s Office, TCID, and unnamed private co-conspirators (collectively 6 referred to as “Defendants”). (ECF No. 1-3 at 4.) She alleges Defendants engaged in a 7 “pattern of misconduct” that “was deliberate, targeted, and executed with knowledge, 8 coordination, and intent” designed “to dispossess Plaintiff of her property, obstruct federal 9 filings, destroy evidence, and cause Plaintiff severe physical, financial, and constitutional 10 harm.” (Id. at 4-5.) According to Frances, Defendants engaged in “repeated and 11 sophisticated” cyber-attacks and “violent, life-threatening criminal conduct,” as well as 12 killed “[m]ore than 260 livestock animals.” (Id. 5-7.) 13 Frances lists the following nine causes of action: (1) RICO in violation of 18 U.S.C. 14 § 1962(c); (2) RICO in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); (3) violations of the Fourth, 15 Fourteenth, and First Amendments actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) 16 conspiracy to deprive Frances of her constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; 17 (5) failure to prevent ongoing constitutional violations in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (6) 18 mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343; (7) real estate and public 19 records fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1028A, NRS 205.395, and NRS 239.310; 20 (8) obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 1519; and (9) stalking, 21 harassment, and retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A, 1512, 1513. 22 Frances’s complaint is replete with issues. First, her allegations are vague and 23 largely conclusory. For example, in Count VII (real estate and public records fraud) 24 Frances states Defendants “altered, deleted, and falsified property records, misapplied 25 tax classifications, and refused lawful filings to create an appearance of delinquency or 26 abandonment . . . to facilitate seizure of Plaintiff’s land.” (ECF No. 1-3 at 12.) Frances 27 2 As discussed above, in screening Frances’s complaint the Court relies only on the 1 does not state when any of these events occurred, what documents were falsified or 2 refused, or which Defendant was involved. 3 Similarly, in Count II (RICO) Frances states “[e]ach Defendant contributed overt 4 acts to further the conspiracy.” (Id. at 10.) Frances does explain what these alleged overt 5 acts were or how they contributed to the conspiracy. The same is true for each Count 6 Frances lists, though the Court will not repeat them here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 8 entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 9 grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotation and alteration omitted). 10 Frances’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8’s notice requirement. 11 Second, Frances relies on an impermissible “everyone did everything” shotgun 12 style pleading. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming 13 dismissal of shotgun pleading). Frances makes no attempt at explaining which 14 Defendants engaged in what conduct. Nor does Frances state in what capacity she is 15 suing the named Defendants. (See ECF No. 1-3 at 4.) Moreover, Frances lists unknown 16 Defendants. For example, Frances sues TCID but does not explain who or what TCID is. 17 (Id.) Frances also sues “private co-conspirators involved in RICO” but provides no 18 description of who these people are or how they are involved. (Id.) In essence, Frances 19 is attempting to sue some number of Doe Defendants, which is disfavored. See Gillespie 20 v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 21 For these reasons alone dismissal is appropriate. Nevertheless, the Court will 22 address each of Frances’s claims. 23 1. Counts I & II (RICO) 24 Frances alleges Defendants violated two subsections of the Racketeer Influenced 25 and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 1962(d). (ECF 26 No. 1-3 at 9-10.) Subsection (c) prohibits persons employed by or associated with an 27 enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from engaging in the “enterprise’s 1 § 1962(c). Subsection (d) prohibits conspiring to violate the other subsections of the 2 statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). There are multiple problems with these claims. 3 First, as mentioned above, Frances fails to state in what capacity she is suing each 4 Defendant. “Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, state agencies and officials are 5 generally immune from liability under RICO.” Kamal v. County of Los Angeles, 2019 WL 6 2502433, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2019); see also Comm. to Prot. Our Agric. Water v. Occidental 7 Oil and Gas Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1132, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Vierria v. Cal. Highway 8 Patrol, 644 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (E.D. Cal 2009); Quan v. San Francisco Police Dep’t, 9 2012 WL 4477621, at *16-*17 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Thus, to the extent Frances is suing 10 Defendants in their official capacity her claim is barred. 11 Second, to the extent Frances is suing Defendants in their individual capacity, she 12 fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. There are five elements to a civil RICO 13 claim: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity 14 (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to the plaintiff’s ‘business or property.’” 15 Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996). As already mentioned, Frances 16 relies on vague and conclusory allegations. For example, as to the enterprise element, 17 Frances simply asserts “Defendants formed an association-in-fact enterprise as defined 18 by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).” (ECF No. 1-3 at 8.) And as to the predicate acts element, 19 Frances concludes without any factual support that Defendants engaged in “mail fraud, 20 wire fraud, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, extortion, cybercrime, retaliation, and 21 deprivation of rights under color of law.” (Id. at 9.) A complaint must contain factual 22 allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 23 U.S. at 555. Here, Frances has failed to provide facts bringing her claims above the 24 speculative level. 25 Accordingly, the Court recommends Counts I and II be dismissed with leave to 26 amend to give Frances an opportunity to provide sufficient facts to state a claim. However, 27 Frances is cautioned that she may only bring RICO claims against Defendants in their 1 2. Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX (Criminal Statutes) 2 Frances improperly tries to bring criminal charges against Defendants. Frances 3 alleges that Defendants committed mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 4 1343 (Count VI), real estate and public records fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 5 1028A, NRS 205.395, and NRS 239.310 (Count VII), obstructed justice in violation of 18 6 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 1519 (Count VIII), as well as stalked, harassed, and retaliated 7 against her in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A, 1512, 1513 (Count IX). (ECF No. 1-3 at 8 11-12.) “[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 9 nonproseuction of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also 10 Tia v. Crim. Investig. Demanded as Set Forth, 441 Fed. Appx. 457, 458 (9th Cir. 2011) 11 (affirming dismissal of “request for criminal investigation into the alleged RICO 12 conspiracy” because the plaintiff “lack[ed] standing to compel an investigation or 13 prosecution of another person”). Frances therefore does not have standing to prosecute 14 criminal statutes, and her claims are barred. 15 Accordingly, the Court recommends Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX be dismissed with 16 prejudice and without leave to amend since amendment would be futile. 17 3. Count III (§ 1983) 18 Frances sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging they violated her First, 19 Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1-3 at 10.) According to Frances, 20 “County officials deprived [her] of due process and property rights by falsifying records, 21 refusing lawful filings, targeting her with selective enforcement, and retaliating when she 22 sought help.” (Id.) Defendants also “conducted warrantless intrusions, surveillance, and 23 property interference under color of law.” (Id.) These allegations are vague, conclusory, 24 and are based on speculation. The Court therefore recommends Count III be dismissed 25 with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. Should Frances choose to file an amended 26 complaint she must allege facts sufficient to support each constitutional claim as 27 discussed below. Furthermore, each alleged constitutional violation must be plead in a 1 It appears Frances’s Fourth Amendment claim is that Defendants entered and/or 2 surveilled her property without a warrant. However, Frances offers no details about these 3 incidents. The Fourth Amendment only protects “against unreasonable searches and 4 seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV (emphasis added). Therefore, for Frances to state a 5 claim she must allege facts which, if true, would show Defendants engaged in 6 unreasonable actions. To be clear, the facts must show Defendants acted legally 7 unreasonably, not unreasonably in Frances’s own subjective view. 8 Turning next to Frances’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Frances alleges 9 Defendants violated both her due process rights and her right to equal protection under 10 the law. (ECF No. 1-3 at 10.) A § 1983 claim based upon a procedural due process 11 violation has three elements: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 12 Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process.” 13 Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2022). Although Frances alleges 14 Defendants interfered with her property rights, she provides no supporting details as to 15 how they did so, nor does she provide any details about what process she received and 16 why it was insufficient. 17 As to Frances’s equal protection claim, to state a claim she “must show that the 18 defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [her] based upon 19 membership in a protected class.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 20 1998). Thus, should Frances choose to file an amended complaint she must explain what 21 protected class she belongs to, and allege sufficient facts to show Defendants 22 discriminated against her in some way due to her membership in that class. 23 Lastly, as to France’s First Amendment retaliation claim, to state a claim she must 24 show: (1) that she “was engaged in constitutionally protected activity;” (2) that 25 Defendants’ actions caused her “to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary 26 firmness from continuing to engage in that activity;” and (3) that Defendants’ actions were 27 “substantially motivated as a response to [her] exercise of constitutionally protected 1 (quoting Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 2 1999)). 3 Because Frances does not allege sufficient facts to show that her First, Fourth, or 4 Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, the Court recommends Count III be 5 dismissed with leave to amend. 6 4. Count IV (Conspiracy to Deprive Rights) 7 Frances sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)-(3) for allegedly conspiring 8 to interfere with her civil rights. (ECF No. 1-3 at 11.) According to Frances, Defendants 9 “coordinated across county offices and private groups to obstruct [her] access to courts, 10 suppress evidence, and intimidate witnesses.” (Id.) Frances asserts Defendants were 11 “motivated by discriminatory animus and the desire to prevent [her] from exercising her 12 protected rights.” (Id.) As with her other claims, Frances’s vague and conclusory 13 allegations are insufficient to state a claim under either § 1985(2) or § 1985(3). 14 To state a claim under § 1985(3) Frances must allege facts showing Defendants 15 engaged in: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, 16 any person or class of persons equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 17 immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby 18 a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of 19 a citizen of the United States.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 20 1992) (quoting United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828- 21 29 (1983)). 22 As to Frances’s § 1985(2) claim, there are two distinct clauses in subsection (2), 23 and it is unclear which clause Frances is pursuing a claim under. See Dooley v. Reiss, 24 736 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984). To state a claim under the first clause, which 25 prohibits conspiring to prevent a person from participating in federal court proceedings or 26 injuring them for having done so, Frances must show there was: “(1) a conspiracy 27 between two or more persons; (2) to deter a witness by force, intimidation, or threat from 1 injury to the claimant.” David v. United States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1987), 2 abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Head v. Wilkie, 936 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th 3 Cir. 2019) (recognizing that David’s holding as to who can assert an injury under § 1985(2) 4 is abrogated, but the essential elements remain the same); see also Haddle v. Garrison, 5 525 U.S. 121 (1998) (addressing what types of injuries are cognizable under § 1985(2)). 6 To state a claim under the second clause, which prohibits similar actions but with 7 regard to state court proceedings, Dooley, 736 F.2d at 1395, Frances must show: (1) two 8 or more persons conspired; (2) “for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or 9 defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice” in state court; (3) with the intent to 10 deny [her] the equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985; see also Seung v. 11 Beardmoro, 2017 WL 426871, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 12 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1985). The Ninth Circuit has held that the words “equal protection” in 13 the second clause “require an allegation of class-based animus” to state a claim. Bertz, 14 773 F.2d at 1029-30; see also Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. Of Regents, 859 F.2d 732, 736 n.3 15 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, in addition to the elements outlined above Frances must also allege 16 facts indicating Defendants took the complained of action because she belonged to a 17 particular class. 18 Because Frances has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim, and because it 19 is unclear exactly what claims Frances is pursuing, the Court recommends Count IV be 20 dismissed with leave to amend. 21 5. Count V (Failure to Prevent Violations) 22 Finally, the Court will address Frances’s claim Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 23 1986. (ECF No. 1-3 at 11.) Frances alleges “Defendants knew of ongoing violations” but 24 “failed to act.” (Id.) According to Frances, “Officials in multiple departments were 25 repeatedly notified of stalking, threats, property crimes, and record tampering,” yet 26 “refused assistance, dismissed reports, or directly assisted perpetrators, enabling 27 ongoing harm.” (Id.) These vague and conclusory assertions are insufficient to state a 1 See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). As just 2 discussed, Frances has failed to do so. Assuming Frances can state a valid claim under 3 § 1985, she must then allege sufficient facts to show Defendants: (1) knew of a conspiracy 4 to violate her rights; (2) had the power to prevent her rights from being violated; but (3) 5 refused or neglected to do so. Delta Savings Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1024 6 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Frances has not stated a claim under § 1985 she necessarily 7 cannot state a claim under § 1986. Accordingly, the Court recommends Count V be 8 dismissed with leave to amend so Frances can supply the necessary factual support. 9 6. Amended Pleading Requirements 10 If Frances chooses to file an amended complaint, she is advised that an amended 11 complaint supersedes (replaces) the original complaint and, thus, the amended complaint 12 must be complete in and of itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 13 Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named 14 in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”). Any 15 allegations, parties, or requests for relief from prior papers that are not carried forward 16 will no longer be before the court. Frances should clearly title the amended pleading as 17 “First Amended Complaint.” For each Defendant and each claim, Frances must allege 18 true facts sufficient to show they violated her rights based on the above discussion. 19 Frances is admonished that she may not rely on supplemental filings to support her 20 complaint. For each claim Frances must provide “a short and plain” statement identifying 21 which Defendants the claim is against and what specific facts entitle her to relief on that 22 claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Vague and conclusory allegations will not suffice. 23 The Court notes that, if Frances chooses to file an amended complaint curing the 24 deficiencies as outlined in this recommendation, she should file the amended complaint 25 within 30 days from the date of entry of the District Court’s order addressing this report 26 and recommendation. If Frances chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the 27 stated deficiencies the action will be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. 1 C. “Emergency” Motions 2 Frances filed two motions styled as emergencies: (1) a motion to temporarily 3 correct public records and restore trust property, (ECF No. 14); and (2) a motion for cease 4 and desist/anti-retaliation and non-interference order, (ECF No. 15). The Court has 5 reviewed both and finds neither constitute an emergency. 6 The filing of emergency motions is disfavored and should be confined to “the most 7 limited circumstances.” Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 3d 1137, 1141 8 (D. Nev. 2015). Emergency motions burden both the parties and the court, requiring each 9 to “abandon other matters to focus on the pending ‘emergency.’” Id. When a party files a 10 motion on an emergency basis, it is within the sole discretion of the Court to determine 11 whether any such matter is, in fact, an emergency. LR 7-4(c). The local rules make clear 12 that “[e]mergency motions should be rare” and that “[t]he court may determine whether 13 any matter submitted as an ‘emergency’ is, in fact, an emergency.” LR 7-4(b)-(c). The 14 Court has the discretion to strike the emergency designation of a pleading, and the 15 pleading filed with the court must comply with the local rules. Tumminello v. Capstone 16 On-Campus Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:25-CV-01740-CDS-NJK, 2025 WL 2711865, at *2 (D. 17 Nev. Sept. 22, 2025); LR 7-4(c) (“Failure to comply with the requirements for submitting 18 an emergency motion may result in denial of the motion.”) 19 “A party or attorney’s failure to effectively manage deadlines, discovery, trial, or 20 any other aspect of litigation does not constitute an emergency.” LR 7-4(b). The local 21 rules require that all emergency motions “be accompanied by a declaration setting forth: 22 (1) the nature of the emergency; (2) the office addresses and telephone numbers of 23 movant and all affected parties; and (3) a statement of movant certifying that” the parties 24 have met and conferred but could not “resolve the matter without court action.” See LR 25 7-4(a) (cleaned up). Further, “[i]f the nature of the emergency precludes a meet and 26 confer, the statement must include a detailed description of the emergency, so the court 27 can evaluate whether a meet and confer truly was precluded.” See id. 1 adequately describe the emergency, does not identify who she is seeking relief against, 2 nor include any discussion about attempts to meet and confer or why a meet and confer 3 was not possible. (See ECF No. 15-1.) Frances’s declaration, much like her complaint, 4 relies on conclusory statements with no factual support. For example, Frances states she 5 reported misconduct and has “been subjected to retaliatory social coercion operating 6 through both formal channels and informal retaliation infrastructure that functions outside 7 official documentation.” (Id. at 2.) However, Frances makes no attempt at describing how 8 she has been retaliated against, who is retaliating against her, what misconduct she 9 reported, so on and so forth. 10 The same is true for Frances’s motions. In her motion to correct public records 11 Frances states she has suffered “ongoing, irreparable harm” but provides no argument 12 as to how. (ECF No. 14.) And in her motion for cease and desist, Frances states she is 13 suffering ongoing retaliation but does not provide any argument or even identify who is 14 retaliating against her. (ECF No. 15.) Aside from being erroneously styled as 15 emergencies, Frances’s two motions are woefully inadequate and do not comply with the 16 Local Rules. See LR 7-2. 17 For these reasons, the Court recommends Frances’s motion to correct public 18 records, (ECF No. 14), and motion for cease and desist, (ECF No. 15), be denied. 19 Frances is cautioned that if she improperly files emergency motions in the future she may 20 be sanctioned. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the reasons outlined above, the Court recommends Frances’s District of 23 Nevada application to proceed IFP, (ECF No. 11), be granted, and that her Nevada state 24 court application, (ECF No. 9), be denied. As to Frances’s complaint, (ECF No. 1-3), the 25 Court recommends Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX be dismissed with prejudice and without 26 leave to amend, and that Counts I, II, III, IV, and V be dismissed with leave to amend so 27 Frances has an opportunity to provide sufficient facts to support her various claims. 1 motion for cease and desist, (ECF No. 15), and motion for an extension of time, (ECF No. 2 16), be denied. 3 The parties are advised: 4 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of 5 Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this Report and 6 Recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled 7 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” and should be 8 accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court. 9 2. This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and any 10 notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the 11 District Court’s judgment. 12 V. RECOMMENDATION 13 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Frances’s District of Nevada 14 application to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 11), be GRANTED. 15 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Frances’s Nevada state court application 16 to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 9), be DENIED. 17 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk FILE Frances’s complaint, (ECF 18 No. 1-3), but NOT issue summons at this time. 19 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX, (ECF No. 1-3 20 at 11-12), be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 21 because Frances does not have standing to prosecute criminal statutes. 22 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Counts I, II, III, IV, and V, (ECF No. 1-3 at 23 9-11), be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 24 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if Frances chooses to file an amended 25 complaint curing the deficiencies outlined in this order, Frances shall file the amended 26 complaint within 30 days from the date of entry of the District Court’s order addressing 27 this report and recommendation. 1 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that if Frances chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the stated deficiencies, the Court recommends dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim. 4 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Frances’s emergency motion for 5 | temporary correction of public records and restoration of trust property, (ECF No. 14), and 6 | her emergency motion for cease and desist, (ECF No. 15), be DENIED. Frances is 7 | cautioned that the filing of improper emergency motions in the future may result in 8 | sanctions, including denial of the motion. 9 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Frances’s motion for extension of time to 10 | complete supplemental filings, (ECF No. 16), be DENIED. 11 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Frances’s supplemental filings, (ECF Nos. 12| 1-2, 1-4, 8, 12, 13), be STRICKEN. Frances is cautioned that if she files supplemental 13 | filings in the future without first obtaining leave of court to do so the Court will strike them 14 without notice. 15 DATED: January 15, 2026 . 16 17 UNITED STATES\MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 47