Angela Todd v. RBS Citizens, N.A.

483 F. App'x 76
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 18, 2012
Docket11-1180
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 483 F. App'x 76 (Angela Todd v. RBS Citizens, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angela Todd v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 483 F. App'x 76 (6th Cir. 2012).

Opinion

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

In this employment discriminations case, plaintiff Angela Todd claims she was terminated by defendant Citizens Bank because of race. During the relevant period, Todd managed two branches of the bank, which were subject to quarterly risk assessments. Todd’s branches failed three out of four risk assessments, after which she was fired. Todd filed suit, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Citizens Bank because Todd failed to prove her prima facie case and, alternatively, could not show pretext. Because Todd could not establish that Citizens Bank’s explanation for her termination was pretext for discrimination, summary judgment was warranted.

On July 14, 2000, Todd, who is African American, was hired as an in-store sales manager by Charter One Bank, which was acquired by Citizens Bank in 2004. R. 32-3, ¶ 3; R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 26-27. Todd soon became a branch manager, in which capacity she was charged with running a bank branch and responsible for “meeting her sales goals, supervising her colleagues, and maintaining operational compliance at her branch.” R. 32-4, Fisher Aff. at ¶ 4. Todd was responsible for the security of the bank’s assets, and was required to perform spot checks designed to ensure that her subordinates followed proper financial protocol. R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 132. Citizens Bank’s Retail Colleague Commitment Guidelines emphasized that branch managers are “ultimately responsible for the operation of their branch(es).” R. 32-8 at 3.

In January 2005, Todd was transferred to manage the Grosse Point branch of Citizens Bank, and shortly thereafter was elevated to officer status. R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 132. The Bank did not confer officer status on all branch managers, and Todd testified that the status meant that she had a more direct fiduciary duty to protect the assets of the bank. Id. at 82.

In 2007, Citizens Bank implemented a new process called “risk assessments,” designed to test a branch’s ability to pass a corporate audit. Id. at 54, 393. The new risk assessment process standardized how to measure the operational compliance of the various, newly-acquired branches. R. 32-6, Jordan Dep. at 15-16. The operations department, headed by Laura Jordan, conducted the risk assessments on a quarterly basis. Id. at 18. Operations managers, who reported to Jordan, would answer a series of standardized questions during multiple, surprise visits to each branch. Id. at 14, 21, 23; R. 32-7, Grosse Pointe Risk Assessments. The questions tested each branch in the areas of cash handling, compliance, security, and business account openings. R. 32-7. Based on the operation manager’s evaluation, each branch received a computerized score represented as a percentage. R. 32-6, Jordan Dep. at' 17. This score determined whether a branch was rated green, yellow, or red. Citizens Bank expected all branches to be rated green. Regional managers had no involvement in the ratings. R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 138.

As part of this new process, Citizens Bank adopted a policy that disciplined *78 branch managers for failing a rating. R. 32-9, at 2-7. Under this policy, a branch manager who received a red risk rating was placed on a Performance Development Plan (“PDP”). Id. at 5-6. If the circumstances warranted stronger action, the regional manager had the discretion to issue PDP’s for the entire branch’s management team. Id. If there was no improvement in performance, the regional manager could put a “Final Written Warning” in place for the “members of the management team that were determined as responsible for the initial Red Risk Assessment/Audit.” Id. A subsequent failure to improve performance would result in termination.

In the second quarter of 2008, while the Grosse Pointe branch was managed by Todd, the branch faded a risk assessment, scoring 53.64% and receiving a red rating. R. 32-7 at 2-6. At that time, Todd reported to regional manager Michael Cullen. R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 94. Todd testified that the branch was poorly managed and deserved the red rating: “the branch was just sloppy.... [and] whatever we received, the performance development plan, we deserved.” Id. at 235.

As a result of the failed risk assessment, and pursuant to Citizen Bank’s discipline policy, Cullen placed Todd on a PDP. See R. 32-11, PDP at 2-5. The PDP warned Todd that “if you do not demonstrate immediate and sustained improvement or if other deficiencies arise, management will continue the Performance Management Improvement Process, which may result in further corrective action up to and including termination.” Id. at 2. In making the decision to place Todd on the PDP, Cullen did not attempt to differentiate the mistakes Todd personally made from those of her subordinates. R. 38-4, Cullen Dep. at 48. Instead, Cullen determined that Todd had overall responsibility for the branch and issued the PDP on that basis. Id. As part of the PDP, Cullen conducted initial meetings with Todd to discuss the PDP. Cullen also agreed to have further meetings with Todd, but could not recall if those occurred on a weekly basis. Id. at 64-65.

Following the second quarter rating, an operations manager supporting the region partnered with the Grosse Pointe branch. This manager, Allison Gabler, gave Todd’s branch significant attention beyond what other branches in the region received. R. 32-10, Gabler Dep. at 77, 81. In addition, Laura Jordan, the Operations Director, held a meeting with the entire Grosse Pointe branch staff to impress upon them the gravity of the situation. R. 32-6, Jordan Dep. at 30-31. Gabler testified that, in her five years as operations manager, she had attended only one other meeting of this nature. R. 32-10, Gabler Dep. at 54.

Notwithstanding this increased attention, the Grosse Pointe branch scored 57.00% and received another red rating in the third quarter of 2008. R. 32-7 at 7-19. The assessment was based on surprise visits that occurred on July 11, August 22, and September 15, 2008. Id. at 7. Many of the errors were attributable to Todd’s subordinates; however, Todd personally made some non-supervisory errors that contributed to the negative assessment. For example, during one surprise visit, Todd did not know her signature authority limits, alarm code, or password. R. 32-2, Todd Dep. at 353-355. Further, Todd testified that she understood that verification of business accounts was important to prevent money laundering, yet failed to open and verify business accounts properly. R. 32-7 at 2, 23. At least some of the errors were attributable to actions taken by the assistant manager, who was in control of the branch during Todd’s 10-day vacation, from which she returned on September 15.

*79 Todd asserts that two of her subordinates — Natalie Davis (assistant manager) and Kathleen Williamson (teller manager), who are both white — were primarily responsible for the branch’s failure to pass the risk assessments. Assistant Manager Davis had left $10,000 sitting in the ATM machine over the weekend, and Teller Manager Williamson had stopped performing audits on the cash drawers of the tellers. R. 38-34, Todd Aff. ¶ 7.

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483 F. App'x 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angela-todd-v-rbs-citizens-na-ca6-2012.