COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE KATHALEEN ST. JUDE MCCORMICK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
August 14, 2024
Kathleen DeLacy Jason C. Powell Martin D. Page Thomas J. Reichert Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP Laurel A. LaLone 1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305 The Powell Firm, LLC Wilmington, DE 19803 1813 N. Franklin Street Wilmington, DE 19802
Re: Angela Okafor Carlisle v. Rone Everett, C.A. No. 2023-0077-LM
Dear Counsel:
This letter resolves the exceptions filed to Magistrate Mitchell’s Final Report
(the “Final Report”) dated January 31, 2024.1 For the reasons discussed below, the
exceptions are granted, and I will preside over all further proceedings in this action.
I. Factual And Procedural Background
This case concerns the Estate of Sharif Kihill Green, who died on June 18,
2022. Weeks prior to his death, on June 1, the Philadelphia Orphan’s Court provided
Green and Everett with a marriage license. The license authorized Green and
Respondent Rone Everett to marry on or after June 4. The license also stated that it
was “valid only in Pennsylvania.”2 On June 3, Everett was admitted to a hospital in
1 Carlisle v. Everett, 2024 WL 368379 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2024); see also C.A. No. 2022-
0077-LM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 34. 2 Dkt. 39 (“Pet.’s Opening Br.”), Ex. D (Marriage License). C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 2 of 7
New Jersey.3 He was incapacitated and confined to bed from June 3 until he died.4
The marriage certificate was executed on June 6 and witnessed by Everett’s
stepfather.5 The marriage certificate states that Green and Everett were married in
Philadelphia.6
Everett opened Green’s estate as Green’s wife with the Delaware Register of
Wills on August 26, 2022, and was appointed the estate’s personal representative.7
Green’s mother, Petitioner Angela Carlisle, does not recognize Green’s
marriage to Everett and wishes to serve as personal representative of Green’s estate.
On December 14, 2022, Carlisle filed a letter with the Register of Wills contesting
Everett’s appointment.8 She claimed that Everett’s marriage to Green was
impossible due to his location on the date of their marriage.9 The same day, the Chief
Deputy of the Register of Wills contacted several persons to investigate Carlisle’s
claims, including the Philadelphia County Clerk of the Orphans’ Court, Tiffany
Gordon.10 Gordon confirmed on December 15 that the Orphans’ Court had the actual
marriage certificate on file.
3 Dkt. 1 (“Pet. for Removal”) ¶ 7. 4 Id. ¶ 8.
5 Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. E (Marriage Certificate).
6 Id.
7 Dkt. 30, Ex. F.
8 New Castle County Register of Wills Case No. ROW 181736 Dkt. (“ROW Dkt.”) 5.
9 Id.
10 ROW Dkts. 6–8; Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. I. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 3 of 7
The Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Division further responded by a letter dated
December 22, received on December 28, and uploaded to the docket on January 3,
2023. The letter stated:
A Marriage Licensing application as completed and approved by our office for [Green and Everett] on June 1, 2022, during a Zoom meeting. The applicants indicated that Mr. Green was hospitalized at the time and provided proper documentation for the Marriage License Clerk to conduct a Zoom Sick Call.
Proper documentation would have included a completed application and a Doctor’s Note from the attending physician indicating the hospitalized applicant is of sound mind and body to make their own decision and has a diagnosis of a terminal illness. The Doctor’s Note must be on the physician’s letterhead and signed by the physician.
We are searching for our paper file on this matter so that we may confirm the exact documentation that was provided.11
A Philadelphia Assistant Solicitor confirmed by email, a week later, that the
Orphans’ Court received the fully executed marriage certificate. 12
Carlisle filed this action to remove Everett as personal representative on
January 24, 2023, alleging that the marriage was fraudulent because Green was
hospitalized in New Jersey on the day of the marriage ceremony and thus could not
have married Everett in Philadelphia, as the certificate stated.13
11 ROW Dkt. 11.
12 ROW Dkt. 12.
13 Pet. for Removal ¶ 10. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 4 of 7
Everett moved to dismiss the petition, and the Magistrate Judge heard
argument on October 2, 2023. During argument, the parties requested leave to
submit supplemental briefing on an issue raised by the Magistrate concerning the
implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.14 Supplemental briefing concluded on November 20.
II. Legal Analysis
In her Final Report dated January 31, 2024, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) be
granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.15 Carlisle filed exceptions, which the
parties argued on May 17.16
This court applies de novo review to the factual and legal findings of a
Magistrate.17 The narrow question presented on exceptions is whether this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action to remove Everett as a personal
representative of the estate.18
This court acquires subject matter jurisdiction “in only three ways: (1) the
invocation of an equitable right; (2) the request for an equitable remedy when there
is no adequate remedy at law; or (3) a statutory delegation of subject matter
14 Dkt. 38 at 45.
15 Dkt. 34.
16 Dkt. 44.
17 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. 1999).
18 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 7–13; see Dkt. 41(“Resp.’s Answering Br.”) at 14–17. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 5 of 7
jurisdiction.”19 At base, Petitioner seeks the removal of a representative of an
estate.20 This relief is equitable in nature and is thus within the court’s equitable
jurisdiction.21 This court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction. The exceptions
are sustained.
This conclusion, however, stops far short of resolving the thorny issues raised
by the parties. Magistrate Judge Mitchell was rightly concerned that Carlisle’s
petition sought to collaterally attack Green’s marriage to Everett. Although she
framed this as a question of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), I view it
as an issue of standing under Rule 12(b)(6). That is, the question, to my mind, is
whether Carlisle has standing to challenge Green’s marriage to Everett in this court
or elsewhere on the basis of fraud. The parties did not directly address this issue,
and they are granted leave to do so. They may also raise any other legal argument
that has been preserved or that is prompted by the reframing of the issue.
19 Quarum v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 2019 WL 158153, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2019)
(quoting Hillsboro Energy, LLC v. Secure Energy, Inc., 2008 WL 4561227, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2008)). 20 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 14–15.
21 Matter of Est. of Gusoff, 2024 WL 1903744, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2024) (removing
an estate representative under this court’s “equitable power”); Nelson v. Russo, 844 A.2d 301, 303 (Del. 2004) (commenting that “[t]he only way a court could order removal . .
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE KATHALEEN ST. JUDE MCCORMICK LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
August 14, 2024
Kathleen DeLacy Jason C. Powell Martin D. Page Thomas J. Reichert Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP Laurel A. LaLone 1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305 The Powell Firm, LLC Wilmington, DE 19803 1813 N. Franklin Street Wilmington, DE 19802
Re: Angela Okafor Carlisle v. Rone Everett, C.A. No. 2023-0077-LM
Dear Counsel:
This letter resolves the exceptions filed to Magistrate Mitchell’s Final Report
(the “Final Report”) dated January 31, 2024.1 For the reasons discussed below, the
exceptions are granted, and I will preside over all further proceedings in this action.
I. Factual And Procedural Background
This case concerns the Estate of Sharif Kihill Green, who died on June 18,
2022. Weeks prior to his death, on June 1, the Philadelphia Orphan’s Court provided
Green and Everett with a marriage license. The license authorized Green and
Respondent Rone Everett to marry on or after June 4. The license also stated that it
was “valid only in Pennsylvania.”2 On June 3, Everett was admitted to a hospital in
1 Carlisle v. Everett, 2024 WL 368379 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2024); see also C.A. No. 2022-
0077-LM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 34. 2 Dkt. 39 (“Pet.’s Opening Br.”), Ex. D (Marriage License). C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 2 of 7
New Jersey.3 He was incapacitated and confined to bed from June 3 until he died.4
The marriage certificate was executed on June 6 and witnessed by Everett’s
stepfather.5 The marriage certificate states that Green and Everett were married in
Philadelphia.6
Everett opened Green’s estate as Green’s wife with the Delaware Register of
Wills on August 26, 2022, and was appointed the estate’s personal representative.7
Green’s mother, Petitioner Angela Carlisle, does not recognize Green’s
marriage to Everett and wishes to serve as personal representative of Green’s estate.
On December 14, 2022, Carlisle filed a letter with the Register of Wills contesting
Everett’s appointment.8 She claimed that Everett’s marriage to Green was
impossible due to his location on the date of their marriage.9 The same day, the Chief
Deputy of the Register of Wills contacted several persons to investigate Carlisle’s
claims, including the Philadelphia County Clerk of the Orphans’ Court, Tiffany
Gordon.10 Gordon confirmed on December 15 that the Orphans’ Court had the actual
marriage certificate on file.
3 Dkt. 1 (“Pet. for Removal”) ¶ 7. 4 Id. ¶ 8.
5 Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. E (Marriage Certificate).
6 Id.
7 Dkt. 30, Ex. F.
8 New Castle County Register of Wills Case No. ROW 181736 Dkt. (“ROW Dkt.”) 5.
9 Id.
10 ROW Dkts. 6–8; Pet.’s Opening Br., Ex. I. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 3 of 7
The Clerk of the Orphans’ Court Division further responded by a letter dated
December 22, received on December 28, and uploaded to the docket on January 3,
2023. The letter stated:
A Marriage Licensing application as completed and approved by our office for [Green and Everett] on June 1, 2022, during a Zoom meeting. The applicants indicated that Mr. Green was hospitalized at the time and provided proper documentation for the Marriage License Clerk to conduct a Zoom Sick Call.
Proper documentation would have included a completed application and a Doctor’s Note from the attending physician indicating the hospitalized applicant is of sound mind and body to make their own decision and has a diagnosis of a terminal illness. The Doctor’s Note must be on the physician’s letterhead and signed by the physician.
We are searching for our paper file on this matter so that we may confirm the exact documentation that was provided.11
A Philadelphia Assistant Solicitor confirmed by email, a week later, that the
Orphans’ Court received the fully executed marriage certificate. 12
Carlisle filed this action to remove Everett as personal representative on
January 24, 2023, alleging that the marriage was fraudulent because Green was
hospitalized in New Jersey on the day of the marriage ceremony and thus could not
have married Everett in Philadelphia, as the certificate stated.13
11 ROW Dkt. 11.
12 ROW Dkt. 12.
13 Pet. for Removal ¶ 10. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 4 of 7
Everett moved to dismiss the petition, and the Magistrate Judge heard
argument on October 2, 2023. During argument, the parties requested leave to
submit supplemental briefing on an issue raised by the Magistrate concerning the
implications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.14 Supplemental briefing concluded on November 20.
II. Legal Analysis
In her Final Report dated January 31, 2024, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the motion to dismiss under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) be
granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.15 Carlisle filed exceptions, which the
parties argued on May 17.16
This court applies de novo review to the factual and legal findings of a
Magistrate.17 The narrow question presented on exceptions is whether this court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action to remove Everett as a personal
representative of the estate.18
This court acquires subject matter jurisdiction “in only three ways: (1) the
invocation of an equitable right; (2) the request for an equitable remedy when there
is no adequate remedy at law; or (3) a statutory delegation of subject matter
14 Dkt. 38 at 45.
15 Dkt. 34.
16 Dkt. 44.
17 DiGiacobbe v. Sestak, 743 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. 1999).
18 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 7–13; see Dkt. 41(“Resp.’s Answering Br.”) at 14–17. C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 5 of 7
jurisdiction.”19 At base, Petitioner seeks the removal of a representative of an
estate.20 This relief is equitable in nature and is thus within the court’s equitable
jurisdiction.21 This court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction. The exceptions
are sustained.
This conclusion, however, stops far short of resolving the thorny issues raised
by the parties. Magistrate Judge Mitchell was rightly concerned that Carlisle’s
petition sought to collaterally attack Green’s marriage to Everett. Although she
framed this as a question of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), I view it
as an issue of standing under Rule 12(b)(6). That is, the question, to my mind, is
whether Carlisle has standing to challenge Green’s marriage to Everett in this court
or elsewhere on the basis of fraud. The parties did not directly address this issue,
and they are granted leave to do so. They may also raise any other legal argument
that has been preserved or that is prompted by the reframing of the issue.
19 Quarum v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 2019 WL 158153, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2019)
(quoting Hillsboro Energy, LLC v. Secure Energy, Inc., 2008 WL 4561227, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 3, 2008)). 20 Pet.’s Opening Br. at 14–15.
21 Matter of Est. of Gusoff, 2024 WL 1903744, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2024) (removing
an estate representative under this court’s “equitable power”); Nelson v. Russo, 844 A.2d 301, 303 (Del. 2004) (commenting that “[t]he only way a court could order removal . . . would be through mandatory injunction”); see also Davis v. Browne, 1859 WL 2010, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 1859) (noting that removal of a trustee requires an injunction); Ct. Ch. R. 207 (stating that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over “petitions for review of proof of will, petitions for partition, caveats against allowance of instrument as will, petitions for removal of personal representatives, and other similar petitions concerning the estates of decedents that require judicial action by the Court of Chancery” (emphasis added)). C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 6 of 7
There are strong competing arguments that point in opposite directions. On
the one hand, 13 Del. C. § 1506 (which governs efforts to challenge Green’s marriage
to Everett)22 grants very few persons who are not parties to a marriage standing to
challenge its validity “after the death of either party to the marriage” for estate
administration purposes or otherwise.23 Everett does not fall into any of the
categories of persons recognized by this statute. One might argue that the express
inclusion of a list of persons with standing to challenge a marriage for estate
administration purposes, along with the exclusion of parents of the deceased from
that list, means that the General Assembly did not intend to allow parents of a
deceased person to challenge the decedent’s marriage for estate administration
purposes.
On the other hand, “the public policy against fraud is a strong and venerable
one that is largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is wrong.” 24 Carlisle
claims that Everett fraudulently secured the marriage so as to foreclose Carlisle from
22 The parties married in Pennsylvania, but Delaware law governs efforts to annul
that marriage because Green and Everett lived in Delaware. See 23 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3104(b); 13 Del. C. § 1504(a). 23 See 13 Del. C. § 1506(b)(4) (“A decree of annulment for the reason set forth in
paragraph (a)(7) of this section may be sought by either party, by the legal spouse in case of bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages, by the appropriate state official, or by a child of either party at any time prior to the death of either party or prior to the final settlement of the estate of either party and the discharge of the personal representative, executor or administrator of the estate, or prior to 6 months after an order of distribution is made under Chapter 23 of Title 12.”). 24 Abry P’rs V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2006). C.A. No. 2022-0077-LM August 14, 2024 Page 7 of 7
administering her son’s estate. The question is whether Delaware law impliedly
grants Carlisle standing to pursue that cause of action.25
The parties are ordered to confer to determine whether they can agree on an
orderly way to take this action to its conclusion, including by addressing the standing
issue I have raised in this letter. If agreement is reached, the parties are ordered to
submit a form of scheduling order for my review. If not, the parties are ordered to
submit competing scheduling orders and schedule a telephonic hearing to resolve the
issue.
Sincerely,
/s/ Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick
Chancellor
cc: All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)
25 As a second basis for recommending dismissal, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that the Orphans’ Court’s letters prompted by the Register in Chancery’s investigation deserved respect under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To this, Carlisle responds that the marriage certificate is not entitled to deference if it was procured by fraud as Carlisle alleges. The Magistrate Judge further reasoned that Carlisle had not adequately alleged fraud with particularity as required by Court of Chancery Rule 9. The Magistrate Judge made excellent points, but I read the record and the rule slightly differently and believe that Carlisle met the heightened pleading standard in this action.