Angel Zamora v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 3, 2021
• Docket: 2:20-cv-02503
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 ANGEL ZAMORA, GABRIEL LOAIZA Case No. 2:20-cv-02503-ODW (MRWx) and JORGE GUILLEN, individuals, on 12 behalf of themselves and on behalf of all ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 persons similarly situated, DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE CLASS CLAIMS FROM FIRST AMENDED 14 Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT [34] 15 v. 16 PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO., L.P., a 17 Limited Partnership; and DOES 1 through 18 50, inclusive,

19 Defendants. 20 21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 On January 31, 2020, Plaintiffs Angel Zamora, Gabriel Loaiza, and Jorge Guillen 23 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this putative class action in the Los Angeles Superior 24 Court against their employer, Defendant Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. (Notice of 25 Removal (“Notice”), Ex. A (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1.) On March 16, 2020, Defendant 26 removed the case to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 27 §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453 (“CAFA”). (Notice ¶¶ 4–5, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs 28 moved to remand, and Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint. (See Mot. Remand, 1 ECF No. 12; Mot. Dismiss Compl., ECF No. 11.) The Court denied the motion to 2 remand and granted the motion to dismiss in part, with leave for Plaintiffs to amend. 3 (Order Denying Mot. Remand & Granting in Part Mot. Dismiss Compl., ECF No. 30.) 4 Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (FAC, ECF No. 33.) 5 Now, Defendant moves to dismiss or strike the class claims from the FAC. (Mot. 6 Dismiss Class Claims FAC (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 34.) The Motion is fully 7 briefed. (See id.; Opp’n Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 37; Reply ISO Mot. (“Reply”), ECF 8 No. 39.) For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.1 9 II. BACKGROUND 10 Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendant on behalf of 11 themselves and the class they seek to represent. With their FAC, Plaintiffs again allege 12 eight claims against Defendant: (1) violation of California Business and Professions 13 Code sections 17200, et seq. (“UCL”); (2) failure to pay overtime compensation; 14 (3) failure to pay minimum wages; (4) failure to provide required meal periods; 15 (5) failure to provide required rest periods; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized 16 statements; (7) failure to reimburse employees for required expenses; and (8) failure to 17 pay wages when due. (See FAC.) 18 The gist of Plaintiffs’ new factual allegations is that “[Plaintiffs] work on 19 [Defendant’s] Los Angeles County Sheriff’s fleet maintenance team,” and “[a]s part of 20 their job tasks for [Defendant], [Plaintiffs] repair and maintain police vehicles for Los 21 Angeles County.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 48, 58, 80, 90.) The FAC goes on to describe several 22 ways in which Defendant allegedly violated the UCL and applicable labor laws, based 23 on Plaintiffs’ personal experiences on Defendant’s Los Angeles County Sheriff’s fleet 24 maintenance team. (See Opp’n 1–3 (citing FAC).) 25 Significantly, Plaintiffs also bring their claims “on behalf of a California class, 26 defined as all individuals who are or previously were employed by [Defendant] in 27

28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 California as non-exempt employees . . . at any time during the period beginning on the 2 date four (4) years prior to the filing of” the FAC (the “Class”). (FAC ¶ 21 (emphasis 3 added).) Plaintiffs also state, in perhaps every conclusory articulation possible, that the 4 action is appropriate for class certification. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 28–30.) 5 Previously, the Court denied Defendant’s request to dismiss class claims from 6 the original Complaint. (Order Denying Mot. Remand & Granting in Part Mot. Dismiss 7 Compl. 15.) At the time, the Court determined Defendant’s request was premature, and 8 that the sufficiency of class allegations was best determined on a motion for class 9 certification in due time. (Id.) Nevertheless, in light of Plaintiffs’ amendments in the 10 FAC, Defendant once again moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ class allegations. (See Mot.)2 11 III. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A court may dismiss all or part of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a 13 cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable 14 legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To 15 survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 16 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 17 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual “allegations must be enough to raise a 18 right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 19 555 (2007). That is, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 20 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 21 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 Determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 23 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 24 experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court is generally limited to 25 the pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 26 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee, 250 F.3d at 679. However, 27

28 2 Because the Court grants Defendant’s Motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not consider Defendant’s alternative request to strike the class allegations under Rule 12(f), and declines to do so. 1 a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, 2 and unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 3 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 A court dismissing a complaint should provide leave to amend if the complaint 5 could be saved by amendment. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 6 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The Court should freely 7 give leave when justice so requires.”). Reasons to deny leave to amend include “bad 8 faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.” Serra v. Lappin, 9 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting William O. Gilly Enters. v. Atl. Richfield 10 Co., 588 F.3d 659, 669 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 11 182 (1962). 12 IV. DISCUSSION 13 Defendant moves to dismiss the class allegations from the FAC on the ground 14 that Plaintiffs fail to allege any factual basis for the alleged class. (See generally Mot.) 15 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations insofar as they 16 establish claims on behalf of Plaintiffs themselves; rather, Defendant merely argues the 17 FAC is devoid of any factual basis for bringing Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of every 18 non-exempt worker Defendant employed in all of California over the past four years. 19 (Reply 1–5.) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations, even taken as true, show 20 only that Defendant is responsible for labor violations at a single Los Angeles location, 21 with respect to a handful of individuals—i.e., the mechanics who service police vehicles 22 for Defendant’s Los Angeles County Sheriff’s fleet maintenance team. (Mot. 5; 23 Reply 7–8.) Over Plaintiffs’ protest, the Court agrees with Defendant. 24 Despite their many arguments suggesting otherwise, Plaintiffs acknowledge class 25 allegations may sometimes be dismissed at the pleading stage. (See Opp’n 5, 11, 26 18–19); see also, e.g., Ovieda v. Sodexo Ops., LLC, No. CV 12-1750-GHK (SSx), 27 2012 WL 1627237, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (dismissing class claims where 28 “Plaintiff allege[d] no facts to demonstrate or even suggest that any member of the 1 putative class had similar work experiences”). Defendant argues this case fits the bill 2 for dismissing class claims at the pleading stage, as Plaintiffs assert no factual basis to 3 demonstrate that Plaintiffs (as members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s fleet 4 maintenance team) had similar work experiences as the rest of the alleged Class. (See 5 generally Mot.; Reply.) 6 In opposition, Plaintiffs maintain their claims are sufficiently alleged because 7 each claim is supported with factual allegations regarding Plaintiffs’ personal 8 experiences on the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s fleet maintenance team. 9 (Opp’n 9–17.) Plaintiffs also emphasize that each cause of action includes an allegation 10 that the claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiffs 11 insist Defendant’s Motion is an improper attempt to prematurely decide class 12 certification under the guise of a motion to dismiss. (See generally id.) 13 However, Plaintiffs’ arguments suffer from a basic logical disconnect. Whether 14 Plaintiffs adequately allege claims on their own behalf is beside the point. Plaintiffs do 15 not assert any factual support for their class allegations. Rather, Plaintiffs merely allege 16 that their claims are also brought on behalf of the Class. Without any factual support, 17 and especially in light of the new facts in the FAC, the Court finds such leaps 18 implausible. For instance, Plaintiffs claim Defendant failed to reimburse them for 19 purchasing tools and equipment necessary for servicing police vehicles. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 15, 20 47, 102.) Plaintiffs also allege this claim is brought on behalf of every worker 21 Defendant employed in California over the past four years (which includes secretaries, 22 human resources employees, accounting employees, and more). (See id.; Mot. 11.) 23 This will not do. Plaintiffs cannot point to a fish in the surf to force Defendant on a 24 deep-sea charter. See Flores v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. SACV 25 14-1093 AG (ANx), 2015 WL 12912337, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (“[I]f a 26 class action complaint could survive a motion to dismiss based merely on the need for 27 class discovery, then many, if not all, class action complaints would have expansive 28 class allegations and definitions to permit a fishing expedition during discovery.”). 1 Perhaps some or all of Plaintiffs’ claims can plausibly be asserted on behalf of 2 || the putative Class in an amended pleading. But for now, the class claims in the FAC 3 || are DISMISSED. 4 Vv. CONCLUSION 5 In summary, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Class Claims from the FAC 1s 6 || GRANTED. (ECF No. 34.) The class allegations in Plaintiffs’ FAC are DISMISSED 7 || with leave to amend. If Plaintiffs file a Second Amended Complaint, they must do so 8 | within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and Defendant shall file its response in 9 || accordance with Rule 15(a)(3). If Plaintiffs do not timely file an amended pleading, 10 || Defendant shall file an Answer to the FAC within thirty-five (35) days of this Order. 11 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 14 March 3, 2021 ss 15 wx Lidl iit 7 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II ig UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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