Angel M. Vacca v. Zelda Glass

Court of Appeals of Texas

Angel M. Vacca v. Zelda Glass

148 S.W.3d 207

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 7, 2004·No. 06-04-00098-CV·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinions

OPINION

Opinion by Justice ROSS.

Angel M. Vacca, an inmate currently residing in the Barry Telford Unit in New Boston, Texas, sued several prison guards and administrators for causing Vacca to be [208] disciplined for an infraction he contends was contrived against him in retaliation for his initiating a federal lawsuit. Vacca’s amended petition named Zelda Glass, Ronald Farrington, and Jonathan R. Rayburn as defendants. The trial court dismissed Vacca’s lawsuit after finding Vacca’s petition had failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002) (inmate who proceeds informa pau-peris must file with petition (a) affidavit listing all other lawsuits previously brought, except those under Texas Family Code, and (b) certified copy of inmate’s trust account). It is from that dismissal which Vacca now appeals.

As a general rule, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction if it disposes of all issues and parties in a case and no further action is required to determine the controversy. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex.1993); Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986); North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966). A judgment that fails to dispose of all issues and all parties before the trial court is neither final nor, with certain exceptions, appealable. Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.1995).

In the case now on appeal, the trial court’s judgment of dismissal states “that all claims against Defendants Zelda Glass, Mendell Glass and Ronald Farrington are DISMISSED as frivolous.” The trial court’s judgment does not dispose of Vac-ca’s claims against Jonathan R. Rayburn, and it contains no “Mother Hubbard” clause. Thus, it is not a final, appealable judgment. Cf. id.

None of the exceptions to the general requirement that a judgment be final before it may be appealed apply to Vacca’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Vacca’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

OPINION

Opinion by Justice ROSS.

Angel M. Vacca, an inmate currently residing in the Barry Telford Unit in New Boston, Texas, sued several prison guards and administrators for causing Vacca to be [208] disciplined for an infraction he contends was contrived against him in retaliation for his initiating a federal lawsuit. Vacca’s amended petition named Zelda Glass, Ronald Farrington, and Jonathan R. Rayburn as defendants. The trial court dismissed Vacca’s lawsuit after finding Vacca’s petition had failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002) (inmate who proceeds informa pau-peris must file with petition (a) affidavit listing all other lawsuits previously brought, except those under Texas Family Code, and (b) certified copy of inmate’s trust account). It is from that dismissal which Vacca now appeals.

As a general rule, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction if it disposes of all issues and parties in a case and no further action is required to determine the controversy. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591-92 (Tex.1993); Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986); North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966). A judgment that fails to dispose of all issues and all parties before the trial court is neither final nor, with certain exceptions, appealable. Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex.1995).

In the case now on appeal, the trial court’s judgment of dismissal states “that all claims against Defendants Zelda Glass, Mendell Glass and Ronald Farrington are DISMISSED as frivolous.” The trial court’s judgment does not dispose of Vac-ca’s claims against Jonathan R. Rayburn, and it contains no “Mother Hubbard” clause. Thus, it is not a final, appealable judgment. Cf. id.

None of the exceptions to the general requirement that a judgment be final before it may be appealed apply to Vacca’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss Vacca’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Angel M. Vacca v. Zelda Glass, 148 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

Pincite

148 S.W.3d 207 (Angel M. Vacca v. Zelda Glass) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinions

Related