Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee

CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedDecember 6, 2018
DocketM2017-00908-CCA-R3-PC
StatusPublished

This text of Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee (Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee, (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

12/06/2018 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs March 21, 2018

ANGEL GEOVANNA HURTADO v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2010-B-1624 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge ___________________________________

No. M2017-00908-CCA-R3-PC ___________________________________

A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Angel Geovanna Hurtado, of three counts of aggravated child abuse, one count of child neglect, and one count of reckless aggravated assault. She was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Angel Geovanna Hurtado, No. M2014-00180-CCA-R3CD, 2014 WL 7417763 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2014). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed, asserting that she is entitled to relief based upon her trial counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Kara L. Everett, Carthage, Tennessee, for the appellant, Angel Geovanna Hurtado.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Sophia S. Lee, Senior Counsel; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Tammy Meade, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Background

On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts presented at trial as follows: On June 15, 2010, a Davidson County grand jury charged [Petitioner] with four counts of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect, all involving her infant son, A.H., and all Class A felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-15-401, -402. [Petitioner] proceeded to trial, where the following evidence was presented.

The victim’s date of birth was [ ], 2008. In June 2009, [Petitioner] and her infant son moved to the Antioch residence of Vicente Jesus Gonzalez, [Petitioner’s] boyfriend; Mr. Gonzalez was not the child’s biological father. Prior to the move, [Petitioner] lived with her parents.

On October 27, 2009, the victim was taken to Southern Hills Hospital for an arm injury; there it was determined that the victim suffered a fracture in his left arm to the humerus, a bone in the upper arm. Following this visit, the case was referred to the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) for further investigation as to the cause of the child’s injuries. On October 28, the following day, Tiffany Rhodes, a DCS case worker, went to the address provided during the visit to Southern Hills, which turned out to be [Petitioner’s] mother’s home. [Petitioner’s] family accompanied Ms. Rhodes to the correct location, the residence where [Petitioner] lived with Mr. Gonzalez. Mr. Gonzalez and [Petitioner] lied to Ms. Rhodes - Mr. Gonzalez provided a false identity, identifying himself to Ms. Rhodes as Jose Hurtado, [Petitioner’s] brother, and they then stated that the residence belonged to Mr. Hurtado.

The following conversation transpired:

Jose Hurtado stated he was the brother of [Petitioner], he stated he did not witness the child falling. He stated that he works late in the evening and when he get[s] home in the morning, he goes to sleep. He stated that he awoke around 12:30 p.m., and [Petitioner] explained to him about [the victim’s] falling. He stated that [the victim] looked fine and was asleep. He stated that Southern Hills Medical explained that [the victim] had a strain in his left shoulder and a break in his left arm and sent the family home.

According to Ms. Rhodes’s notes, she spoke with [Petitioner] in English that day. Also, the use of an interpreter was not mentioned during the conversation with either [Petitioner] or Mr. Gonzalez.

Following the interview with Ms. Rhodes, the child was taken to Vanderbilt Children’s Hospital for further observation. Once there, the

-2- victim was initially seen by Vanderbilt Pediatric Primary Care for assessment of the fracture to his left humerus bone. The record from Pediatric Primary Care, entered as an exhibit, reflects that [Petitioner], her brother, and a case worker were present with the victim when they arrived at the hospital. The history provided in that record states: “seen yesterday at So[uthern] Hills E[mergency] D[epartment and] diagnosed [with left] humerus fracture (after falling on an outstretched arm per mom). DCS involved [due to] possible spiral [fracture] of arm. Cont[inues] to be active [and] playful.” The victim was then referred to Dr. Neil Green, a qualified expert in the field of pediatric orthopedic medicine and child abuse.

According to Dr. Green, a “hospital-based translator” was used to facilitate the conversation between himself and [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] provided the following explanation for the victim’s injury to Dr. Green: “She told me that [the victim] was [thirteen]-months . . . and was just beginning to learn to walk, and she was helping him walk and he fell.” According to Dr. Green’s trial testimony, he took this statement to mean that the victim “fell on an outstretched arm[,]” but [Petitioner] made no mention of the victim’s falling from a step or any height. However, Dr. Green authored the following statement after completing his evaluation of the victim, which was admitted as an exhibit: “The injury ([left] humerus [fracture]) is consistent with the story the mother gives as an explanation to his injury. Mom states [the victim] fell with an outstretched [left] arm down [one] step. This [left] humerus [fracture] can happen with this incident.” Based upon Dr. Green’s initial conclusion, no additional X-rays were taken of the victim that day.

At trial, Dr. Green clarified his conclusion regarding the left humerus injury:

Fractures of the humerus, again the bone in the upper arm, do not occur in children below the age of [twelve] months as a result of accidental trauma. So whenever we see a young child with a fracture of the humerus, who is a non-walking child, we immediately feel that that is the result of non-accidental trauma until we can prove it otherwise.

This particular child was [thirteen] months of age and was just beginning to walk, and the mom said that the child had fallen. I felt that was a possible explanation, but I was concerned about non- accidental trauma. The child was beginning to walk, he had been seen by DCS or Child Protective Services, and had also been seen

-3- by pediatricians at Vanderbilt and there were no red flags raised so I didn’t investigate this further.

Dr. Green testified that he did not have the benefit of the Southern Hills medical record or photographs of the steps outside [Petitioner’s] residence at the time he made his initial conclusion.

Dr. Green was asked to further describe the victim’s humerus fracture, stating that “[m]ost likely it’s the result of some rotation or twisting injury.” He continued,

The bone itself can’t rotate. The way the fracture could occur would be some rotation of the entire arm, probably with the elbow somewhat bent. A child could sustain a fracture like this with a fall on the arm, and then the body rotates around that arm that is fixed. It is unlikely in a young child of this age because their body mass is not quite large enough to do that, but in an older child that is how that would occur.

Dr.

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Angel Geovanna Hurtado v. State of Tennessee, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/angel-geovanna-hurtado-v-state-of-tennessee-tenncrimapp-2018.