Angel Didier Deagueros Mota v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General of the United States, in his official capacity, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-01254
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 ANGEL DIDIER DEAGUEROS MOTA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01254-RBM-MSB

9 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 10 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

11 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General of [Doc. 1] the United States, in his official capacity, 12 et al.,1 13 Respondents. 14

15 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Angel Didier Deagueros Mota’s (“Petitioner”) 16 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) 17 For the reasons below, the Petition is DENIED. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 A. Factual Background 20 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico. (Doc. 4-1 at 5.) It is unclear when Petitioner 21 entered the United States, but he “has lived in the United States since early childhood.” 22 (Id.; Doc. 1 ¶ 2.) On October 27, 2004, Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping. (Doc. 4- 23 1 at 4.) On January 19, 2005, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed from the 24 United States to Mexico. (Id. at 5.) The next day, Petitioner was physically removed to 25 Mexico. (Id.) 26 27 1 Todd Blanche is automatically substituted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28 1 Subsequently, Petitioner re-entered the United States without being admitted or 2 paroled. (See id.) On March 31, 2025, Petitioner was arrested on a criminal arrest warrant 3 for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. (Id.) On April 3, 2025, the United States District Court 4 for the Central District of California granted Petitioner a bond. (Id.) “As a result, an I-247 5 detainer was lodged.” (Id.) On April 4, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody of the 6 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and served with a Notice of Intent/Decision to 7 Reinstate Prior Order. (Id.; Doc. 4-1 at 8.) DHS “reinstated [Petitioner’s] prior removal 8 order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).” (Doc. 1 ¶ 3.) 9 Petitioner then expressed a fear of returning to Mexico. (Id.) DHS found that 10 Petitioner did not have a reasonable fear, and the immigration judge affirmed this finding. 11 (Id.) On April 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for review to the Ninth Circuit, 12 challenging DHS’s reinstatement of his final removal order. (See Doc. 7 at 1; Doc. 8 at 2.) 13 Specifically, Petitioner argues that (1) “DHS did not meet its burden of proof, by clear and 14 convincing evidence, that [he] had departed the United States under a final order of removal 15 and that he had subsequently reentered the United States without having been admitted;” 16 (2) “his counsel was not served with DHS’s decision to reinstate the prior order of 17 removal;” and (3) “the reinstatement of removal process is arbitrary and capricious.” (See 18 Doc. 5-1 at 3 (Petition for Review of Final Order of Removal).) The Ninth Circuit issued 19 a stay of removal on April 30, 2025. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) Despite that stay, DHS mistakenly 20 removed Petitioner to Mexico later that same day. (Doc. 4 at 2.) Following further 21 litigation, Petitioner was paroled back into the United States in August 2025 and returned 22 to immigration custody. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4.) The petition for review is still pending before the 23 Ninth Circuit. (See Doc. 7 at 1; Doc. 8 at 2.) Petitioner has not received a bond hearing 24 since he last entered immigration custody. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 30.) 25 B. Procedural Background 26 Petitioner filed his Petition on February 26, 2026. (Doc. 1.) The next day, the Court 27 set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed their Return to Petition (“Response”) 28 on March 6, 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Traverse to Return to Petition (“Reply”) 1 on March 12, 2026. (Doc. 5.) On March 24, 2026, the Court ordered further briefing 2 regarding: (1) the subject of Petitioner’s petition for review; and (2) the statutory authority 3 governing Petitioner’s detention in light of the Ninth Circuit stay of removal and decision 4 in Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). (Doc. 6 at 2–3.) Respondents 5 filed their Supplemental Brief on April 2, 2026. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner filed his Supplemental 6 Brief the same day. (Doc. 8.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner initially argued that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth 19 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 38–57.) Respondents initially argued that 20 Petitioner is subject to a final removal order and thus mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. 21 § 1231. (Doc. 4 at 3–6.) The Parties also initially agreed that Petitioner was subject to 22 § 1231. (See id.; Doc. 1 ¶ 6.) The Court then ordered further briefing. In his Supplemental 23 Brief, Petitioner argued that when a court of appeals stays a removal order “pending 24 judicial review, the governing detention statute is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than 8 U.S.C. 25 § 1231.” (Doc. 8 at 3, 4–6 (discussing Prieto-Romero).) In their Supplemental Brief, 26 Respondents argued that Prieto-Romero does not control because Petitioner’s petition for 27 review “is limited to a review of DHS’s reinstatement of [his] 2005 removal order” and 28 “does not challenge the validity of the underlying removal order itself.” (Doc. 7 at 2–3.) 1 As the statutory provision governing Petitioner’s detention determines the procedures 2 Respondents must follow, the Court will address this issue first. 3 A. Detention Under § 1226 or § 1231 4 Here, Petitioner has a removal order that was reinstated and is administratively final, 5 but has been stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending its disposition of his petition for review. 6 (Doc. 4-1 at 5; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3, 4.) Accordingly, the question is whether Petitioner’s detention 7 is governed by § 1226 or § 1231. 8 1. Section 1231(a) 9 “Congress has created an expedited process for [noncitizens] who reenter the United 10 States without authorization after having already been removed.” Johnson v. Guzman 11 Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021). That process states: 12 If the Attorney General finds that [a noncitizen] has reentered the United States illegally after having been removed . . . , under an order of removal, the 13 prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to 14 being reopened or reviewed, the [noncitizen] is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the [noncitizen] shall be removed under 15 the prior order at any time after the reentry. 16 17 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). 18 Section 1231(a)(5) “applies to ‘all illegal reentrants,’ and it ‘explicitly insulates the 19 removal orders from review,’ while also ‘generally foreclos[ing] discretionary relief from 20 the terms of the reinstated order.” Johnson, 594 U.S. at 530 (quoting Fernandez-Vargas 21 v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006) (alteration in original)). However, a circuit court still 22 has “jurisdiction to review certain challenges to the reinstatement proceedings and orders.” 23 Bravo-Bravo v. Garland, 54 F.4th 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2022), abrogation on other grounds 24 recognized by Suate-Orellana v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2024). 25 “First, the [noncitizen] may challenge errors or defects in the reinstatement 26 proceedings or reinstatement order.” Id. at 638 (citing Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of 27 Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)). In this type of challenge, “a 28 petitioner cannot raise a due process challenge to an underlying removal order, and review 1 of the reinstatement itself is limited to confirming the agency’s compliance with the 2 reinstatement regulations.” Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1137 (emphasis added). 3 “Second, the [noncitizen] may collaterally attack the removal order underlying the 4 reinstatement order, provided that the [noncitizen] can claim there was a gross miscarriage 5 of justice in the proceedings resulting in the underlying removal order.” Bravo-Bravo, 54 6 F.4th at 637 (citing Cuenca v. Barr, 956 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2020)) (emphasis 7 added). If the appellate court “determines there was a gross miscarriage of justice, the 8 removal order cannot be reinstated, although the [petitioner] may be subject to a new order 9 of removal.” Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 54 F.4th 597, 605 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Vega- 10 Anguiano v. Barr, 982 F.3d 542, 551 (9th Cir. 2019)) (emphasis added). 11 Third, the noncitizen may pursue “withholding-only relief to prevent DHS from 12 executing his removal to the particular country designated in his reinstated removal order.” 13 Johnson, 594 U.S. at 530. A petitioner who brings this type of challenge is governed by 14 § 1231 and not entitled to a bond hearing under Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 526. 15 2. Section 1226(a) 16 “A non-citizen who is seemingly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) based on a final 17 order of removal—where administrative review is complete, but removal is stayed by the 18 court of appeals pending review of the case—is treated as if detained under 8 U.S.C. 19 § 1226(a).” Hernandez-Castro v. Lyons, Case No. 1:25-CV-01574 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 20 3771344, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). “Put differently, when the appellate court issues 21 a stay, the [noncitizen] may not be detained under any subsection of § 1231(a) unless and 22 until the court finally denies the [noncitizen’s] petition for review.” Id. at *10 (citing 23 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1060). 24 That language, however, is not as sweeping as Petitioner argues. First, the stay must 25 relate to an appellate court’s judicial review of the removal order itself, not a determination 26 regarding credible fear or withholding of removal. See Escobar v. Bondi¸ Case No. 3:26- 27 cv-00197-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 473046, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026) (citations 28 omitted); Johnson, 594 U.S. at 526. Second, the petition for review, if granted, must be 1 capable of disturbing the validity of the final removal order. These are the lessons of 2 Johnson v. Guzman Chavez and Prieto-Romero v. Clark. 3 In Johnson, the Supreme Court was “asked to decide [whether § 1226 or § 1231] 4 applies to [noncitizens] who were removed from the United States but later reentered 5 without authorization, were subject to reinstated orders of removal, and then sought 6 withholding of removal based on fear of persecution in the particular countries designated 7 by their removal orders.” 594 U.S. at 526. In deciding that § 1231 applied, the Supreme 8 Court reasoned “that removal orders and withholding-only proceedings address two 9 distinct questions. As a result, they end in two separate orders, and the finality of the order 10 of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only 11 proceedings.” Id. at 539 (“the grant of withholding relief under CAT ‘does not disturb the 12 final order of removal,’ ‘affect the validity of the final order of removal,’ or otherwise 13 ‘merge into the final order of removal’”) (quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 582 14 (2020)). It is therefore clear that Johnson’s holding is grounded in the fact that a petition 15 for review regarding withholding of removal may prevent removal to a particular country, 16 but does not prevent a final order of removal from being issued. See also Padilla-Ramirez 17 v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 2017) (“This narrow question of to where [the 18 noncitizen] may be removed is distinct from the broader question of whether the 19 [noncitizen] may be removed.”) (emphasis in original). 20 In Prieto-Romero, the Ninth Circuit held that “when a court of appeals issues a stay 21 of removal pending its decision on [a noncitizen’s] petition for review of his removal order, 22 the removal period begins only after the court denies the petition and withdraws the stay 23 of removal.” 534 F.3d at 1059. This is because “[i]t is reasonable to consider the judicial 24 review of a removal order as part of the process of making an ultimate ‘decision’ as to 25 whether [a noncitizen] ‘is to be removed.’” Id. at 1062. In other words, the petitioner’s 26 removal order is not final under these circumstances until the appellate court rules on the 27 petition for review. 28 1 3. Analysis 2 Here, Petitioner’s appeal concerns reinstatement of his removal order, not any 3 determination regarding withholding-only proceedings. (See supra Section I.A.) It does 4 not challenge the removal order underlying his reinstatement order, nor does it raise a 5 “gross miscarriage of justice” claim. See Bravo-Bravo, 54 F.4th at 637. Therefore, the 6 Ninth Circuit’s review will be “limited to confirming the agency’s compliance with the 7 reinstatement regulations.” Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1137; see also Bible, 882 F.3d 8 at 830. Even assuming Petitioner succeeds at the Ninth Circuit, his petition for review will 9 not “affect the validity of the final order of removal.” Johnson, 594 U.S. at 539. And 10 unlike the petitioners in Prieto-Romero, Petitioner already has a final order of removal. 11 (See Doc. 4-1 at 5 (“On January 19, 2005, an Immigration Judge . . . ordered [Petitioner] 12 removed from the United States.”).) His petition for review may result in the invalidation 13 of his reinstatement order, but it will not affect his underlying removal order. He is not 14 within the class of petitioners contemplated by Prieto-Romero and is thus subject to 15 § 1231(a). 16 B. Relief under § 1231 17 As such, Petitioner is not statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. See Johnson v. 18 Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 581 (2022) (“there is no plausible construction of the text 19 of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the Government to provide bond hearings before immigration 20 judges after six months of detention”). Petitioner argues, though, that even under § 1231 21 he is entitled to relief under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), because his removal 22 is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Doc. 8 at 7–8; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 23 31–44.) Respondents argue that “Petitioner cannot show he faces an ‘indefinite and 24 potentially permanent’ detention” because his appellate “proceedings have a definite 25 ending point,” after which Petitioner may be removed. (Doc. 5 at 5–6 (quoting Zadvydas, 26 533 U.S. at 696).) 27 The Supreme Court has recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable period of 28 detention after a noncitizen's removal order becomes final. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 1 “After this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there 2 no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the 3 ||Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Jd. The Court 4 || finds that Respondents have the better argument here. 5 In the typical Zadvydas case, the government is unable to remove the 6 [noncitizen] because the country of removal refuses to accept them or to provide travel documents. That is not the case here. ... Indeed, [Petitioner] 7 was removed [to Mexico] in [2005 and]. . . the sole obstacle removal appears g to be the pending appeal. ... That alone does not render removal unforeseeable under Zadvydas. See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (holding 9 that Mexican national “faces a significant likelihood of removal in the 10 reasonably foreseeable future because the government can repatriate him to Mexico if his pending bid for judicial relief from his administrative final 11 removal order proves unsuccessful”). 12 || Hurtado-Romero v. Sessions, 2018 WL 2234500, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2018); see also 13 || Bermudez v. Gonzalez, No. CV F 07-00807 LJO DLB HC, 2007 WL 2913938, at *5 (E.D. 14 Oct. 4, 2007) (denying Zadvydas claim because “[a]lthough the Ninth Circuit has 15 || ordered a stay of Petitioner’s removal pending review of the petition, once the stay is lifted, 16 || the agency is free to remove him’). 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Because Petitioner is subject to § 1231(a) and there is a significant likelihood that 19 || Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Petition (Doc. 1) is 20 || DENIED without prejudice. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||DATE: April 10, 2026 23 eet Bernie, Moidtagges > 24 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 27 28