Andy Michael Thompson v. Nevada Secretary of State

Opinion

DISTRICT OF NEVADA Andy Michael Thompson, Case No. 2:25-cv-01284-CDS-EJY

Plaintiff Order Dismissing Complaint Without Prejudice and With Leave to Amend, v. Denying Plaintiff’s Motions, Overruling Objection, and Striking Improperly Filed Nevada Secretary of State, Notices

Defendant [ECF Nos. 9, 10, 19, 20, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33, 34]

On October 6, 2025, I issued an order to show cause (OTSC) in this action, requiring plaintiff Andy Thompson to show cause as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of standing. OTSC, ECF No. 17. Thompson filed a timely response on October 22, 2025. Resp., ECF No. 18. Also pending is Thompson’s objection to two orders issued by the magistrate judge, two motions for a hearing, and a motion for temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 10, 25, 32. For the reasons set forth herein, I dismiss the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. I deny all pending motions and overrule the pending objection. Finally, I strike several improperly filed notices. I. Background1 As set forth in the OTSC, Thompson is a registered voter in Clark County, Nevada, and “a participant” in the 2024 federal election. Compl., ECF No. 1. He brings this purported 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent alleged “imminent and deliberate destruction of federally protected election records in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 20701.” Id. Specifically, Thompson seeks “[i]mmediate injunctive relief (TRO and permanent injunction), ” a “declaratory judgment affirming the violation of federal rights,” a “mandamus

1 Unless otherwise noted, the court only cites to Thompson’s original complaint (ECF No. 1) to provide context to this action, not to indicate a finding of fact. order compelling the Secretary of State to preserve all records under 52 U.S.C. § 20701,” and a “[r]eferral of Ott and all involved state officials to appropriate disciplinary boards, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the FBI for potential criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2071.” ECF No. 1 at 1–2 (emphasis omitted). II. Discussion A. The complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because this court is one of limited jurisdiction,2 I ordered Thompson to show cause as to which allegations in the complaint give rise to standing in this court. See ECF No. 17. In his response, Thompson argues that “Defendant’s destruction of 2024 election records during litigation violates 52 U.S.C. § 20701 and NRS 293.391(1).”3 ECF No. 18. Based on this, Thompson further asserts that, as “a duly registered Nevada voter,” the deprivation of “his statutory right to access and verify records for the mixed 2024 election” constitutes a concrete injury, and therefore, his claim gives rise to both “federal question (28 U.S.C. § 1331) and civil rights (28 U.S.C. § 1343) jurisdiction.” Id. at 2. But I find Thompson’s arguments unpersuasive on three fronts. First, Thompson errs in his assertion that 52 U.S.C. § 20701 confers jurisdiction over this action. Numerous courts across the country have found that “52 U.S.C. § 20701 does not confer a private right of action.” Fox v. Lee, 2019 WL 13141701, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2019); Ickles v. Whitmer, 2022 WL 4103030, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2022) (finding that “52 U.S.C. [§] 20701 likely does not create a private right of action”); Soudelier v. Dep’t of State La., 2022 WL 3686422, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff’s motion fails because the statutes under which plaintiff seeks relief, which included 52 U.S.C. § 20701, do not confer private rights of action); Ayyaduri v. Galvin, 560 F. Supp. 3d 406, 408–09 (D. Mass. 2021) (“Plaintiff had also failed 2 Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, “possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (cleaned up). 3 The complaint does not bring a claim, nor set forth any allegations or claims under Nevada Revised Statute 293.391(1). I therefore disregard this part of Thompson’s response. to plead a plausible claim for which relief could be granted because the Complaint only alleged that Secretary Galvin had failed to preserve ballot images in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 20701- 20702, which do not provide a private right of action.”). I agree with the conclusion set forth in these decisions and adopt it here. Indeed, 52 U.S.C. § 20703 explicitly states that the Attorney General or his representative has the authority to demand records for inspection, reproduction; there is no provision permitting anyone else to make such a demand. See 52 U.S.C. § 20703. Because 52 U.S.C. § 20701 does not confer a private right of action, Thompson cannot rely on that statute as a statutory basis for jurisdiction. Second, Thompson’s argument that there is jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 likewise fails. The complaint generically asserts that Thompson’s procedural due process rights were deprived, and that his access to meaningful litigation and to petition the government was prevented and interfered with. ECF No. 1 at 3–4. But the complaint nor the response to the show cause order explain what gives rise to jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, much less does it state a claim under that statute. As explained in the OTSC, for Thompson to state a claim “under § 1983, [he] must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” ECF No. 17 at 4 (citing Ochoa v. Pub. Consulting Grp., Inc., 48 F.4th 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988))). While Thompson does have due process rights, it remains unclear how Thompson’s due process rights were violated based on the limited allegations in the complaint. And Thompson’s response to the OTSC does not provide any further explanation or clarification. The record does reveal however that Thompson has had (and continues to have) access to courts: he has brought not only this action, but a related state action. Thus, even liberally construing the complaint, I do not see how this court has jurisdiction over this action. Third and finally, Thompson’s response to the OTSC fails to establish that he had “a personal stake in the outcome” of the 2024 elections, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a link between his voter status and the 2024 election, nor has he provided support to establish he suffered “an invasion of legally protected interest.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Neither his OTSC response nor the complaint sets out any information showing a personal injury resulting from the destruction of election records. Instead, he summarily contends that as a voter he has a “substantive right . . . to verify federal and state election integrity.” ECF No. 18 at 3. But Thompson cites no points or authorities to support this assertion, and 52 U.S.C. § 20701–20703 does not provide that a citizen has a right to this information. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (“[A] plaintiff suffers an injury in fact when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.”) (cleaned up) (emphasis added); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that the failure to obtain information subject to disclosure under Federal Advisory Committee Act constituted a “sufficiently distinct injury” to confer standing to sue) (emphasis added). Because Thompson failed to establish “actual injury and redressability, there is no case or controversy under Article III of the federal constitution and no federal jurisdiction.” See Bell v. City of Kellog, 922 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining federal courts are not forums for hearing generalized grievances by citizens, and a party must assert his own rights); see also Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of claims for lack of standing and finding that the plaintiff, as a voter, had “no greater stake in this lawsuit than any other United States citizen” and that his alleged injury was merely a “‘generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’ which is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of standing”) (citation omitted). Consequently, the complaint fails to demonstrate that Thompson has standing to bring this action. Simply put, neither the complaint nor Thompson’s response to the OTSC demonstrates he has standing to bring this action. However, under Rule 15(a), a court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The court has serious doubts that Thompson will be able to cure the subject matter jurisdiction issue present in this action. But because leave to amend should be granted unless the deficiencies of the complaint clearly cannot be cured by amendment, DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992), I dismiss the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. Further instructions are provided in the conclusion. B. Thompson’s motions are denied, and the objection is overruled (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 25). Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint is dismissed, I deny the following motions: motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 9), motion for expedited hearing (ECF No. 10), and the motion to expedite ruling (ECF No. 32).4 Thompson is cautioned that motions for hearing and motions for expedited treatment are disfavored. If a court needs a hearing, one will be set. Any requests for expedited treatment are akin to seeking emergency treatment. As previously explained to Thompson; to file an emergency motion, a party must comply with Local Rule 7-4. See ECF No. 8. Thompson did not comply with LR 7-4 in filing his motion for an expedited hearing. I also overrule without prejudice Thompson’s objection to the magistrate judge’s orders (ECF No. 25) because I lack subject matter jurisdiction. If Thompson elects to file a first amended complaint, the court will determine if it must resolve the objection on the merits. 4 Thompson filed a supplement to his motion to expedite. Supplementation is not permitted without leave of court, so the filing at ECF No. 33 is stricken. See LR 7-2(g) (“Supplementation prohibited without leave of court. A party may not file supplemental pleadings, briefs, authorities, or evidence without leave of court granted for good cause. The judge may strike supplemental filings made without leave of court.”). C. Thompson’s notices are stricken as improper (ECF Nos. 19, 20, 27, 29, 34). The court has authority to strike an improper filing under its inherent power to control its docket. See Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010). That is because “[e]very paper filed with the . . . [court], no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources,” and “part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). Here, Thompson has filed four separate improper “notices.” See ECF Nos. 19, 20, 27, 29, 34.5 Notices are a type of filing that should rarely be used and only for administrative functions—such as notifying the court of an address change or informing the court that an attorney is appearing to represent a client. See, e.g., LR IA 3-1 (notifying court of a change of contact information); LR IA 1-4 (submitting a notice of an in-camera submission); LR IC 1-1(d) (notices of manual filings). Notices cannot, however, be used to make the court’s docket a repository for allegations or alleged discovery. See Hinojos v. Weir, 2025 WL 2337103, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2025) (“The court’s docket is not a repository for the parties’ evidence.”); see also Dillon v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 272388, at *3 (D. Nev. July 19, 2021) (“The Court’s docket is not a repository for miscellaneous documents that a litigant believes may support his claims.”). All court filings requesting relief or requesting that the court make a ruling or take an action of any kind must be in the form of a motion and filed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7; LR 7-2. Accordingly, because Thompson’s notices are improperly filed, they are hereby stricken. 5 Excluded from this list is the notice of non-opposition docketed at ECF No. 28. That notice was properly filed. Conclusion 2 IT IS ORDERED that the complaint dismissed without prejudice. If Thompson elects to 3 file an amended complaint, he has until January 26, 2026, to do so, and it must be titled “First Amended Complaint.” Thompson is not permitted to bring any new claims or name any new 5} defendants. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Thompson’s motion for a temporary restraining order, 7 request for an expedited hearing, and the motion to expedite ruling [ECF Nos. 9, 10, 32] are 8 denied. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the notices filed at [ECF Nos. 19, 20, 27, 29, 34], the 10] plaintiffs motion to expedite ruling [ECF No. 32], and the plaintiff's supplement [ECF No. 33] are stricken. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's objection [ECF No. 25] is overruled without prejudice. /, / Dated: January 12, 2026 LZ tle U ig States District Judge ‘