Andrews v. Independent School District No. 57

2000 OK CIV APP 103, 12 P.3d 491, 71 O.B.A.J. 2694, 2000 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 66, 2000 WL 1512867
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedSeptember 11, 2000
Docket93,255
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 2000 OK CIV APP 103 (Andrews v. Independent School District No. 57) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andrews v. Independent School District No. 57, 2000 OK CIV APP 103, 12 P.3d 491, 71 O.B.A.J. 2694, 2000 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 66, 2000 WL 1512867 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

BUETTNER, Judge:

T1 Appellant Kathy Andrews was terminated from her employment as a career teacher on the ground of moral turpitude. After trial de novo, the trial court found that Andrews had a romantic type of relationship with a minor student which violated the student/teacher relationship to an extent and degree that the violation constituted moral turpitude. The court granted judgment in favor of Independent School District No. 57 (Enid School District). We affirm.

[ 2 Andrews was a special education teacher at Waller Junior High School in Enid, Oklahoma. The student had attended Waller, but had never been one of Andrews' students. At the time of trial, the student was seventeen and attending Enid High School. Andrews had been warned by the student's parents' lawyer and her school administrators not to have contact with the minor. In his letter to the School Board, the superintendent stated:

My recommendation for dismissal is based on the following facts. On Tuesday, October 27, 1998 she [Andrews] made improper contact with a student as verified by the Enid Police Department. She and this student were found at her residence. The Police report indicates the time of 11:88 a.m. Prior to this incident she was advised by the school administration to no longer make contact with the student. She also had received a letter from the student's parents' attorney directing her to make no further "telephonic communication, verbal communication, electronic or written communication" with the student. She was also directed by this letter to "avoid any face-to-fact contact" with the student and to "discourage this student from any further contact" with her. There is evidence that she made other prior contact with this student and of public hugging and kissing between the teacher and student. She also violated school and district policies with this relationship and leaving school on Tuesday, October 27, 1998 without checking out of the office.

Andrews received a copy of this letter. There is no allegation that the Teachers Due Process Act of 1990 was in any way violated or flawed. 70 0.8.1991 § 6-101.20 et seq. 1

Procedure and Standard of Review

13 Although the teacher whose employment is terminated becomes the plaintiff upon the filing for trial de novo, the teacher does not have the burden of proving that the termination was erroneous. The burden of proof rests with defendant to show that the statutory grounds for termination or non reemployment are met. The trial is not a review of the administrative procedure. Because the Teachers Due Process Act statutorily modifies the common law at-will employment doctrine, we review the findings of fact of the trial court as if it were a law action tried to the court and give those findings of fact the same great deference we give those rendered by a jury.

Facts

T4 The boy's mother surreptitiously installed a recording device on an extension telephone located in the family house. She recorded conversations between her son and Andrews on at least three days. A tran-seript of the conversations as well as the *494 tapes, were admitted into evidence. Witnesses testified that the minor would often visit Andrews' classroom. He was observed massaging her shoulders. Another student testified that Andrews discussed the relative penis sizes of the two teenaged boys. There was testimony that the student and Andrews were seen kissing. An unidentified person called "Sir" had warned Andrews of the wiretapping and that the boy's family was pushing for a charge against her of indecent liberties with a minor. Nonetheless, Andrews met the student and took him to her home. When the police arrived with the boy's father, who had been alerted by his private investigator that the two had entered the home but not emerged, Andrews at first denied that he was there.

15 Andrews and the boy consistently denied any wrong or bad behavior, or improper relationship between them. A rebuttal witness testified through deposition of a sexual relationship between him and Andrews which occurred when he was fourteen and fifteen years old, approximately fifteen years before the trial of the cause at hand.

Issues and Discussion

T6 Andrews first contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that the interceptions of the telephone conversations did not violate the Oklahoma Security of Communications Act, 18 O.S.1991 § 176.1 et seq. and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Andrews testified that the voices on the tapes were hers and the student's. «When Enid Schools moved for admission of the tapes, Andrews objected because she had already admitted having some conversations with the student,. The court asked then whether there were objections to the admission into evidence of the tapes and Andrews' lawyer inquired:

Mr. LaMunyon: Being played?
The Court:-- into evidence?
Mr. LaMunyon: To be played?
The Court: No, be admitted into evidence.
Mr. LaMunyon: No.
The Court: As part of the record. Tapes will be admitted.

'T7 A foundation was laid which the court accepted through the testimony of the boy's mother. The tapes contained information relevant to proving the statutory ground for termination, that is, moral turpitude. Andrews waived any objection to their admission. There is no error on this account. 2

T8 Next, Andrews argues that her due process rights were violated when the trial court allowed evidence beyond the scope of the issues framed by the notice of termination. The notice, however, alleged facts beyond the October 27, 1998 transgressions. She was put on notice that the School District had information of prior contact with «the student and with their public hugging and kissing. The court's admission of evidence concerning her behavior with the minor was within seope of the notice.

19 She also addresses her behavior as it relates to moral turpitude. "It has been said 'a teacher ... in the public school system is regarded by the public and pupils in the light of an exemplar, whose words and actions are likely to be followed by the children coming under her [his] care and protection."" Vaughn v. Board of Bar Examiners for the Oklahoma Bar Association, 1988 OK 87, 759 P.2d 1026, 1030, citing Board of Education of City of Los Amgeles v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546, 552, 261 P.2d 261, 265 (1958). " The teaching profession, not unlike the legal profession, imposes a code of ethics upon its members. When a teacher in the public schools engages in sexually provocative or exploitive conduct with his/her minor students such conduct constitutes immorality and warrants his/her dismissal or the denial or revocation of hig/her teaching certificate." Id. at 1080. Vaughn was denied admission to the Oklahoma State Bar after a hearing concerning his moral fitness to be admitted to the bar. He had been discharged from his teaching position based on two incidences with fourteen year old female students.

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Bluebook (online)
2000 OK CIV APP 103, 12 P.3d 491, 71 O.B.A.J. 2694, 2000 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 66, 2000 WL 1512867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andrews-v-independent-school-district-no-57-oklacivapp-2000.