Andrew Verhines v. Shirley N. Weber

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ANDREW VERHINES, Case No. 1:24-cv-01111-KES-EPG 10 Plaintiffs, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT DEFENDANT’S 11 v. MOTION TO DISMISS BE DENIED 12 SHIRLEY N. WEBER, (ECF No. 62) 13 Defendant. OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS 14

15 16 Plaintiff Andrew Verhines proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action. 17 (ECF Nos. 1, 3, 61). Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of California’s requirements to 18 qualify as a candidate for U.S. Congress in California’s 21st Congressional District. He claims 19 that he desires to run in the 2026 election but is effectively barred by California’s filing-fee and 20 signature-in-lieu requirements. Now before the Court is Defendant, California Secretary of State Shirley N. Weber’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. (ECF No. 62). 21 Notably, the assigned District Judge has already granted Plaintiff leave to file his second 22 amended complaint, over Defendant’s opposition, and ordered that Plaintiff may proceed on his 23 First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims. (ECF No. 60, p. 2) (“Plaintiff’s motion for 24 leave to file a second amended complaint, Doc. 54, is GRANTED IN PART insofar as plaintiff is 25 permitted to file the second amended complaint to proceed only on his First Amendment and 26 Equal Protection Clause claims regarding California’s filing-fee and signature-in-lieu 27 requirements as set forth in his lodged second amended complaint.”). 28 1 Because the Court again finds that the allegations in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint 2 are sufficient to state a claim that California’s filing-fee and signature-in-lieu requirements violate 3 Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 4 recommends denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. I. BACKGROUND 5 A. Procedural History 6 On September 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed his complaint. (ECF No. 1). 7 On October 2, 2024, the Court issued a screening order that concluded that Plaintiff stated 8 a claim under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 9 Amendment. (ECF No. 7). In that order, the Court reviewed the relevant legal standards in depth, 10 including the Anderson/Burdick framework to challenge the relevant California Elections Code 11 provisions, and found that “Plaintiff’s allegations—that he is unable to afford to pay the filing fee 12 to run for Congress or to obtain the 2,000 signatures needed to avoid paying the filing fee— 13 sufficiently state a claim under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause to proceed 14 past the screening stage.” (ECF No. 7, at p. 4). 15 After Defendant was served with the complaint, the parties engaged in additional litigation 16 and, on July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file his second amended complaint. 17 (ECF Nos. 40, 54). Defendant filed an opposition to the motion on August 7, 2025, arguing that 18 leave to amend should be denied because it would be futile. (ECF No. 56). 19 On September 18, 2025, the Court issued findings and recommendations recommending, 20 in relevant part, that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed only on his First Amendment and Equal 21 Protection Clause claims regarding California’s filing-fee and signature-in-lieu requirements 22 based on the allegations in the second amended complaint. (ECF No. 59). 23 The assigned District Judge adopted the findings and recommendations in full, and ordered that “[t]his case proceeds on the second amended complaint only on plaintiff’s First 24 Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims regarding California’s filing-fee and signature- 25 in-lieu requirements.” (ECF Nos. 60, p. 2). 26 B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 27 Rather than respond to Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, Defendant filed a motion to 28 1 dismiss on January 16, 2026. (ECF No. 62). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims fail “under 2 the Anderson/Burdick framework . . . because Plaintiff’s burdens are minimal and California has 3 important, well-settled, ‘too obvious,’ regulatory interests in the ballot access laws being 4 challenged.” (Id. at 12). Additionally, Defendant argues that “Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1989) establishes that ballot access laws requiring either payment of a filing fee or sufficient 5 signatures on a petition in lieu of a filing fee are constitutional.” (Id. at 11). 6 Plaintiff filed his opposition on January 23, 2026. (ECF No. 64). Citing his allegations 7 that “the State’s own records show a near-total failure rate” for candidates trying to access the 8 ballot by obtaining signatures in lieu of paying the filing fee, he argues that California’s system is 9 unconstitutional. (Id. at 2). He also argues that Andress is distinguishable and does not dispose of 10 his case. (Id.). 11 Defendant’s reply, filed on February 2, 2026, reiterates her arguments in favor of 12 dismissal. (ECF No. 65). 13 II. PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 Plaintiff alleges in his second amended complaint that he is a resident of Fresno County, 15 California and “[h]e is the sole provider for a family of eight and has an annual income under 16 $55,000.” (ECF No. 61, p. 1). He “attempted to qualify as a candidate for U.S. Congress in 17 California’s 21st Congressional District in both 2022 and 2024 but was excluded from the ballot 18 due to inability to pay the filing fee or meet the alternative signature requirement.” (Id.). “He 19 intends to run in the 2026 election but remains effectively barred by California's ballot access 20 laws . . . .” (Id.). 21 “For the 2024 election, the required filing fee was $1,740” or “equal to 1 % of the first- 22 year salary of the office sought.” (Id. at 2). The state allows a candidate to submit 2,000 valid 23 signatures in lieu of paying this fee. However, Plaintiff was unable to obtain the signatures. “Plaintiff personally attempted to collect signatures in both 2022 and 2024. He invested over 20 24 hours across multiple methods, including door-to-door outreach, social media engagement, and 25 public tabling. Despite his efforts, he collected only 40-60 valid signatures each cycle-rendering 26 the waiver inaccessible.” (Id.). Similarly, he alleges that he “attempted to meet the requirement 27 through substantial good-faith efforts but was unsuccessful. Had he possessed the financial 28 1 resources to pay the fee outright, his candidacy would have proceeded—highlighting the 2 discriminatory effect of the current scheme.” (Id. at 3). 3 Further, he alleges that all candidates—except one—in recent election cycles were unable 4 to access the ballot using the signature-in-lieu requirement. “[P]ublic records obtained by Plaintiff from the Secretary of State (Exhibit A) show that only one out of 506 congressional candidates 5 over the past two election cycles successfully obtained a full filing fee waiver through this 6 method-a documented failure rate of 99.8%.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff attaches documents to his 7 complaint concerning public records requests in support of this allegation. (Id. at 5-10). 8 Plaintiff alleges that California’s filing fee structure violates his First and Fourteenth 9 Amendment rights. (Id. at 3). And he seeks a declaration that it violates these rights and 10 injunctive relief prohibiting its enforcement. (Id. at 4). 11 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 12 A. Motion to Dismiss 13 In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in 14 the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). “[T]he court must construe 15 the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking all [of the plaintiff’s] allegations 16 as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from the complaint in [the plaintiff’s] favor.” Doe v. 17 United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, pro se pleadings “must be held to 18 less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 19 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 20 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the 21 complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short 22 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 23 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 24 “Furthermore, Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will 25 succeed on the merits. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very 26 remote and unlikely but that is not the test.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 27 (2002) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 28 1 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 2 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must 3 be facially plausible, i.e., the complaint must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw 4 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a 5 defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 6 B. First and Fourteenth Amendments 7 Election-based restrictions implicate the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 8 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983) 9 (“In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and do 10 not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a 11 number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 12 Amendment.”). 13 As the Court explained in its screening order, the Court finds the following standards 14 applicable: 15 [N]ot all election rules or practices impose constitutionally suspect burdens on the right to vote. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 16 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). Under our federal Constitution, “States retain the power to 17 regulate their own elections,” [Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)], and states have long “enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes,” 18 each of which “inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote,” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564. Because “there must be a 19 substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes,” Burdick, 20 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 21 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974)), the Supreme Court has developed a “flexible standard” for assessing constitutional challenges to election rules, id. at 434, 112 22 S.Ct. 2059. That standard has come to be known as the “Anderson/Burdick framework,” named after the two Supreme Court decisions that elucidated it— 23 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and 24 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). This flexible standard requires courts to balance the nature and extent of the alleged 25 burden on the right to vote against the State’s interest in maintaining its chosen system of election administration. Ariz. Democratic Party v. Hobbs, 18 F.4th 26 1179, 1187 (9th Cir. 2021). 27 . . . . . . . [T]he standard requires us to first consider “the character and 28 magnitude of the asserted injury” to voters’ rights, before weighing that injury 1 “against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’” [Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434] (quoting Anderson, 460 2 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564). If a plaintiff shows a “severe” burden on the right to vote, courts may uphold the challenged law or practice only if the State can show 3 that it is “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” 4 Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). By contrast, laws that impose lesser burdens on the right to vote “trigger 5 less exacting review.” Mecinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 904 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 6 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997)), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 143 S. Ct. 525, 214 7 L.Ed.2d 300 (2022). Indeed, if a law “imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon” voters’ rights, “‘the State’s important regulatory interests are 8 generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564). 9 Election Integrity Project California, Inc. v. Weber, 113 F.4th 1072, 1082–84 (9th Cir. 2024); see 10 Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying the Anderson/Burdick framework 11 to challenge to California Elections Code brought by candidate for public office). 12 Additionally, the Court notes that the Supreme Court has cautioned against viewing 13 pleadings differently based on the classification of a constitutional challenge as facial or as- 14 applied because this “invites pleading games” as such distinctions can be “amorphous.” Bucklew 15 v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 139 (2019) (citation omitted). See also Mi Familia Vota v. Hobbs, 608 16 F. Supp. 3d 827, 839 (D. Ariz. 2022) (noting in case involving challenge to voting laws that 17 “[t]he State is not entitled to dismissal based on its arguments related to facial versus as-applied 18 challenges”). 19 IV. ANALYSIS 20 A. Overview of Election Process Before addressing the Anderson/Burdick framework, the Court summarizes the election 21 system at issue. 22 To run for office, Plaintiff is required to pay a filing fee equivalent to 1% of a 23 Congressmember’s $174,000 annual salary, i.e., $1,740. Cal. Elec. Code § 8103(a)(2) (requiring a 24 fee paid to the Secretary of State of “[o]ne percent of the first-year salary for the office of 25 Representative in Congress.”). However, Plaintiff may alternatively submit 2,000 signatures in 26 lieu of paying the filing fee. Cal. Elec. Code § 8106(a)(2) (permitting a candidate to “submit a 27 petition containing signatures of registered voters in lieu of a filing fee,” specifically, “[f]or the 28 1 office of . . . the United States House of Representatives, 2,000 signatures.”). Candidates have 55 2 days to gather signatures before the declaration of candidacy and nomination papers are 3 available.1 A candidate may submit a total of 2000 signatures to avoid any filing fee; or may 4 submit a combination of signatures and a filing fee as each signature is worth $0.87.2 Cal. Elec. Code § 8106(b)(3) (providing for a pro rata portion of a filing fee to be paid to cover the lack of 5 all required signatures). 6 A candidate must obtain nomination documents and has a maximum of 25 days3 to gather 7 between 40 to 60 signatures before filing nomination papers. Cal. Elec. Code § 8062(a)(2) 8 (requiring signatures of “not fewer than 40 nor more than 60” registered voters for nomination 9 papers). Signatures obtained towards the filing fee are counted towards the signatures needed for 10 nomination papers. Cal. Elec. Code § 8106(d) (“All valid signatures obtained pursuant to this 11 section shall be counted toward the number of voters required to sign a nomination paper in 12 accordance with Section 8061 or 8405”). 13 A person may also access the ballot as a write-in candidate and does not have to pay the 14 filing fee. Cal. Elec. Code § 8064 (“No fee or charge shall be required of a write-in candidate 15 except in the case of a candidate for city office, as provided in Section 10228.”). However, the 16 person still has to gather 40 to 60 signatures for the nomination papers. Cal. Elec. Code § 8600(b) 17 (noting that a write-in candidate must obtain “[t]he requisite number of signatures on the 18 nomination papers, if any, required pursuant to Sections 8062”). A write-in candidate has 43 days 19 to obtain signatures for nomination papers. Cal. Elec. Code § 8601 (“The statement and 20 nomination papers shall be available on the 57th day prior to the election for which the candidate 21 is filing as a write-in candidate, and shall be delivered to the elections official responsible for the 22 conduct of the election no later than the 14th day prior to the election.”). 23 B. Discussion The Court recommends denying the motion to dismiss based on the same reasoning set 24

25 1 This number is based on interconnected provisions, which determine the amount of time to obtain signatures. See California Election Code § 8106(b) and (b)(3) and § 8020(b). 26 2 The $0.87 figure is calculated by dividing the filing fee ($1,740) by the number of signatures required (2,000). 27 3 This number is based on the time that nomination forms are available, 113 days prior to the primary election, subtracting the time to submit them, 88 days prior to the election, i.e., 113-88 equals 25 days. See 28 California Election Code § 8020(b). 1 forth in its screening order and its recommendation to grant Plaintiff leave to file this second 2 amended complaint, over Defendant’s opposition. Notably, Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the 3 second amended complaint sufficiently state a claim to proceed past the pleading stage. 4 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges: [P]ublic records obtained by Plaintiff from the Secretary of State (Exhibit A) show 5 that only one out of 506 congressional candidates over the past two election cycles 6 successfully obtained a full filing fee waiver through this method-a documented failure rate of 99.8%. 7 Plaintiff personally attempted to collect signatures in both 2022 and 2024. He 8 invested over 20 hours across multiple methods, including door-to-door outreach, social media engagement, and public tabling. Despite his efforts, he collected only 9 40-60 valid signatures each cycle-rendering the waiver inaccessible. 10 (ECF No. 61, p. 2). 11 While Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a severe burden because he has not sufficiently alleged reasonable diligence in attempting to access the ballot, the Court disagrees. 12 The Ninth Circuit has “held that the burden on plaintiffs’ rights should be measured by whether, 13 in light of the entire statutory scheme regulating ballot access, ‘reasonably diligent’ candidates 14 can normally gain a place on the ballot, or whether they will rarely succeed in doing so.” Nader v. 15 Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1035 (citation omitted). And “[t]o determine the severity of the burden, . . 16 . past candidates’ ability to secure a place on the ballot can inform the court’s analysis.” Id. 17 (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his and other candidates’ inability to obtain a 18 fee waiver through the signature-in-lieu method sufficiently allege a severe burden on the right to 19 vote. 20 Defendant also argues that “[t]he ballot-access laws being challenged in this case prevent 21 frivolous, fraudulent, and nonserious candidacies, promote efficiency, and avoid voter confusion 22 and overcrowding of the ballot” and, thus, it need not proffer evidence regarding its interest in 23 maintaining its chosen system of election administration. (ECF No. 62, pp. 19-20). Again, the 24 Court disagrees. As the Ninth Circuit has noted: 25 We also disagree with the notion that a state is categorically “not required to make an evidentiary showing of its interests.” Post at 460. We acknowledge, as we must, 26 that a state need not offer “elaborate, empirical verification” that voter confusion in fact occurs, Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, particularly where the 27 burden a challenged regulation imposes on a plaintiff’s associational rights is 28 slight or minimal. But we cannot agree that “[e]ven a speculative concern of voter 1 confusion is sufficient” as a matter of law to justify any regulation that burdens a plaintiff’s rights, post at 449 (bracket omitted) (quoting Stone v. Bd. of Election 2 Comm’rs, 750 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2014)), especially where that burden is more than de minimis. If the Anderson/Burdick framework is to remain a sliding-scale, 3 “means-end fit analysis,” Pub. Integrity All., Inc. v. City of Tucson, 836 F.3d 1019, 4 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), that from time to time “require[s] an assessment of whether alternative methods would advance the proffered governmental interests,” 5 Dudum, 640 F.3d at 1114 n.27, then a state must sometimes be required to offer evidence that its regulation of the political process is a reasonable means of 6 achieving the state’s desired ends. See, e.g., Ariz. Green Party, 838 F.3d at 990 7 (“Analogy and rhetoric are no substitute for evidence ....”); cf., e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 469 (9th Cir. 2014) (refusing to take legislative justifications at face 8 value when applying heightened scrutiny to policies that “implicate constitutional rights”). Permitting a state to justify any non-severe voting regulation with a 9 merely “speculative concern of voter confusion,” post at 448 (bracket omitted) (quoting Stone, 750 F.3d at 685), would convert Anderson/Burdick’s means-end fit 10 framework into ordinary rational-basis review wherever the burden a challenged 11 regulation imposes is less than severe. We have already rejected such an approach. Pub. Integrity All., 836 F.3d at 1024–25. 12 Soltysik, 910 F.3d at 448–49; see Mecinas, 30 F.4th at 905 (“And given that Arizona’s asserted 13 interest in a manageable ballot could seemingly be effectuated through a nondiscriminatory 14 ordering system, judgment in the Secretary’s favor is premature at this juncture.”) (citation and 15 quotation marks omitted). In short, the Court finds that it is not clear on the face of the complaint 16 that the State’s interest in maintaining its chosen system of election administration outweighs the 17 burden on the right to vote. 18 Lastly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of 19 law under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1989). (ECF 20 No. 62, p. 12). In that case, a candidate for United States Senator argued that his civil rights were 21 violated when he was denied certification on the ballot because he could not afford the $1502 or afford to pay signature gatherers to obtain 10,000 signatures in lieu of paying the filing fee as 22 provided under California Elections Code § 6555 (since repealed). Id. at 240. The district court 23 granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding “the 24 requirement that Andress collect 10,000 signatures within approximately forty-five days [was] 25 reasonable and constitutionally adequate” and that “Andress does not contend he was denied the 26 opportunity to prepare and file the nominating petitions,” and, moreover, “the California statute 27 does not require that only paid solicitors may gather the signatures.” Id. at 242. 28 1 The Court finds that Andress does not resolve the constitutional issue in this case at this 2 stage in the case. Andress is a decision from 1989 that addresses a different political office, 3 different signature requirements, and an overall different election system than the one at issue 4 here. As the Ninth Circuit has cautioned, “context-specific analysis [is needed] in ballot access cases.” Arizona Green Party v. Reagan, 838 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Analogy and rhetoric 5 are no substitute for evidence, particularly where there are significant differences” in the election 6 systems at issue; rather, the constitutionality of a system “rests on the specific facts of a particular 7 election system.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]hat filing deadlines of similar lengths may 8 prove unconstitutionally burdensome in the context of some election schemes does not eliminate 9 the need for evidence that a severe burden was imposed by the filing deadline in this case.” Id.; 10 see Feldman v. Arizona Sec’y of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366, 387 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that 11 “constitutional challenges to election laws cannot be resolved by any ‘litmus-paper test’ that will 12 separate valid from invalid restrictions.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Among other 13 things, there may be significant differences in the pool of persons from whom signatures can be 14 obtained—i.e., Plaintiff may have a much smaller number of persons to obtain signatures from. 15 See Arizona Democratic Party, 18 F.4th at 1190 (noting that burdens placed on an identifiable 16 segment, including the less affluent segment of the community, “are more likely to raise 17 constitutional concerns”); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792 (noting that signature-gathering efforts in 18 advance of general election posed difficulties on candidate). 19 Thus, the Court cannot conclude that, based solely on the allegations in Plaintiff’s second 20 amended complaint, the burden posed by California’s qualifications for this elected office are 21 outweighed by the State’s interest and thus are constitutional. See Arizona Green Party, 838 F.3d 22 at 991 (noting that it would be “in a most unusual circumstance” that a court could deem a ballot 23 regulation unconstitutional on its face without further evidence). V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss 25 be denied. (ECF No. 62). 26 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 27 Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within 28 1 | thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party 2 | may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document 3 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 4 | reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 5 | objections. Further, any objections shall be limited to no more than fifteen (15) pages, including 6 exhibits. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result 7 in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing g Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). ? | IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 1, | Dated: _February 12, 2026 [Jee ey UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1]