Andrew Sparling v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 5, 2017
• Docket: 34A02-1611-CR-2711
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 05 2017, 9:05 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Donald E.C. Leicht Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Kokomo, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Jesse R. Drum Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Andrew Sparling, June 5, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 34A02-1611-CR-2711 v. Appeal from the Howard Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable George A. Appellee-Plaintiff Hopkins, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-1604-F4-80

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Andrew Sparling (“Sparling”) pleaded guilty in Howard Superior Court to

Level 4 felony burglary under the terms of a plea agreement with the State.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 1 of 8 Sparling now claims the trial court failed to sentence him according to the

agreement.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural Posture

[3] On the evening of April 21, 2016, Sparling was seen breaking into and robbing

a home in Greentown, Indiana. Pockets flush with loot, Sparling attempted to

flee but was quickly found and arrested by officers of the Greentown Police

Department. On April 26, 2016, the State charged Sparling by information in

Howard Superior Court with Level 4 felony burglary and Class C misdemeanor

possession of paraphernalia.

[4] Sparling is a young man with a history of property and drug crimes. At the time

of this crime, he was severely dependent on methamphetamine. Sparling’s

mother, herself a victim of Sparling’s past thefts, wrote the trial judge and

earnestly pleaded for her son to be placed in a “program in prison called

Therapeutic Community[,]1 . . . a bootcamp for substance abuse recovery.”

1 Therapeutic Community programs are part of “Purposeful Incarceration.” “Purposeful Incarceration” is a program instituted by the Department of Correction and our trial courts: In 2009 the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) began a cooperative project with Indiana Court Systems called Purposeful Incarceration (P.I.). The Department works in collaboration with Judges who can sentence chemically addicted offenders and document that they will “consider a sentence modification” should the offender successfully complete an IDOC Therapeutic [C]ommunity. This supports the Department of Correction and the Judiciary to get addicted offenders the treatment that they need and work collaboratively to support their successful re-entry into society.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 2 of 8 Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 39. On August 5, 2016, Sparling and the State

submitted a plea agreement for the trial court’s acceptance or rejection. In

relevant part the agreement provided,

It is recommended that the Defendant be placed in a Therapeutic Community Program while incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction[]. Upon successful completion of said program, with no objection from the State, the Court will consider modifying the Defendant’s sentence, so as to reduce the total time of incarceration.

Id. p. 42. The presentence investigation report noted Sparling’s wish to be

placed in C.L.I.F.F. (“Clean Lifestyle Is Freedom Forever”), a Therapeutic

Community program specially targeted to methamphetamine users. Appellant’s

App. Vol. III, p. 8. The report recommended that the plea agreement be

accepted.

[5] At Sparling’s change of plea hearing on August 12, 2016, the court read the

agreement aloud, including the portion quoted above, and asked whether

Sparling understood it to be the entire agreement; Sparling said he did. Tr. p. 4.

At Sparling’s sentencing hearing on September 23, 2016, the court began by

announcing, “I am prepared to accept the recommendation” — that is, the plea

agreement.2 Tr. p. 8. After establishing Sparling’s knowing and intelligent

Purposeful Incarceration, Indiana Department of Correction, http://www.in.gov/idoc/2798.htm (last visited March 2, 2017); see also Marley v. State, 17 N.E.2d 335, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing same), trans. denied. 2 In the Howard County courts, plea agreements presented to the court are apparently styled “recommendations.” See Hunter v. State, 60 N.E.3d 284, 287–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting sua sponte “an

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 3 of 8 waiver of his trial and appeal rights, the court imposed Sparling’s sentence,

purportedly “[p]ursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.” Tr. p. 14.

[6] The court noted,

[The presentence investigation report] recommended that Mr. Sparling be allowed to attend the (inaudible) [sic] program. I don’t have any problems with that. I want to make it clear, though, I do not consider this therapeutic community. As I understand it, it’s a separate program.

Tr. p. 15. The prosecutor responded, “Judge, I’m trying to figure out from

[defense counsel], [but] we were kind of of the impression it may be part of the

same program.” Id. The court concluded, “Well, I’m going to put it in the

sentencing order that it’s not, in the court’s opinion, it is not community

therapeutic.” Id.

[7] On September 23, 2016, the court entered judgment of conviction against

Sparling. The judgment order provided, “[The] Court recommends that

Defendant be allowed to participate in CLIFF if participation is not deemed to

be Therapeutic Community.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 45. The

chronological case summary (“CCS”) noted, “As a specific order, any therapy

done while incarcerated will not be considered to be therapeutic Community

[sic] program.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 6. In the abstract of judgment

unusual and concerning facet of this case” on appeal from Howard Circuit Court involving failure to recognize “recommendation of plea” as plea agreement); Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 41 (plea agreement styled “recommendation of plea agreement”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 4 of 8 submitted to the Department of Correction, the field for “Purposeful

Incarceration” read, “No.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 2.

[8] On October 25, 2016, Sparling moved to correct error in the September 23,

2016, judgment order:

[Under the plea agreement,] the Defendant was to be recommended to be placed in a Therapeutic Community while incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction[].

The [judgment order] states the “Court recommends that Defendant be allowed to participate in CLIFF if participation is not deemed to be Therapeutic Community.”

Wherefore, the Defendant respectfully requests the court modify the [judgment order] to include the Defendant to be recommended to participate in a Therapeutic Community during his incarceration in the Indiana Department of Correction[].

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48. The court summarily denied the motion on

November 15, 2016, after no response was received from the State.

[9] Sparling timely appealed, claiming the trial court improperly modified his plea

agreement with the State by not recommending Therapeutic Community

placement. We agree.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Plea agreements are contracts between an accused and the State, and we review

them as such. Campbell v. State, 17 N.E.3d 1021, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

“We interpret plea agreements with the primary goal of giving effect to the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 5 of 8 parties’ intent. Terms that are clear and unambiguous are conclusive of this

intent; as such, the reviewing court must apply the contractual provisions” as

they stand. Id. at 1024 (citation omitted).

[11] Sparling and the State agree that the trial court did not have discretion to

modify the plea agreement; it could only choose to reject it entirely or to accept

it and enforce it according to its terms. Ind. Code §§ 35-35-4-3-3(b) (rejection),

(e) (acceptance); Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004); Pannarale v. State,

638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). “The court is not only bound to the specific

charges and sentencing guidelines; once a plea is accepted, a court is bound by

all the terms in the agreement which are within its legal power to control.” State

v. Holloway, 980 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (original emphasis,

quotations omitted) (quoting Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ind. 1991)).

[12] The State argues that, when the court said Sparling was recommended for

C.L.I.F.F. participation “if participation is not deemed to be Therapeutic

Community,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 45, what the court meant was,

“[E]ven if CLIFF is not a Therapeutic Community Program, because that is

what the parties agreed to, then Sparling should still be allowed to participate.”

Appellee’s Br. at 7. That may have been what the court meant, but it is not

what the court said. The court said Sparling should participate in C.L.I.F.F. “if

[it] is not”—that is, on the condition that it is not—deemed to be a Therapeutic

Community program. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 45.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 6 of 8 [13] Even if the State is correct about what the court meant, the court still erred. In

the August 5, 2016, plea agreement, the parties agreed to “place[ment] in a

Therapeutic Community,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48, not placement in

C.L.I.F.F. Thus, the trial court should not have recommended C.L.I.F.F.

irrespective of whether it was a Therapeutic Community, but a Therapeutic

Community irrespective of whether it was C.L.I.F.F.

[14] The language of the judgment order notwithstanding, the CCS is clear: “As a

specific order, any therapy done while incarcerated will not be considered to be

therapeutic community program.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 6 (emphasis

added). It is well settled “that the trial court speaks through its CCS . . . .” Beeler

v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; see also Young v.

State, 765 N.E.2d 673, 678 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (encouraging trial courts to

use CCS notations to explain entries because inter alia conducive to appellate

review). Moreover, though Therapeutic Community participation falls under

Purposeful Incarceration, see supra note 1, Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 8, in the

abstract of judgment forwarded to the Department of Correction, the field for

“Purposeful Incarceration” read, “No.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 2.

[15] The difference to Sparling is extremely important. If he successfully completes

the programming at a Therapeutic Community, he will be eligible for sentence

modification. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48. This is the opportunity he

bargained for; that bargain must be accepted and enforced, or rejected entirely.

The trial court did not have discretion to accept the agreement and then modify

its terms.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 7 of 8 Conclusion

[16] The trial court improperly modified the plea agreement by refusing to

recommend a Therapeutic Community program for Sparling. We vacate its

September 23, 2016, judgment order and remand with instructions either to

accept the August 5, 2016, plea agreement and enforce its terms, including

recommending Sparling for Therapeutic Community treatment, or to reject it

entirely.

[17] Reversed and remanded.

Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A02-1611-CR-2711 | June 5, 2017 Page 8 of 8