Opinion issued April 19, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00464-CV ——————————— ANDREW PATTERSON, Appellant V. TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 129th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2013-01531
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this judicial proceeding challenging an administrative decision of the
Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation, Andrew
Patterson appeals a no-evidence summary judgment denying his request for supplemental income benefits (SIBs) that the Department also had denied. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2002, Andrew Patterson suffered an injury when he fell down a flight of
stairs. Patterson was assigned an impairment rating of fifteen percent, which
entitled him to SIBs if he complied with statutory work search requirements. See
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 408.1415, –.142 (West 2015). Patterson applied for and
was granted SIBs for the first quarter of his injury. However, his applications for
SIBs for the second through fourth quarters following the injury were denied in
September 2006. In a subsequent administrative hearing, an administrative appeals
panel upheld the denial of SIBs for these quarters. Later judicial review before a
state district court confirmed the decision.
Patterson then challenged his impairment rating. After another contested
hearing, the hearing officer increased his impairment rating to twenty-one percent.
The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
Patterson then again applied for SIBs for the fifth through twenty-fifth
quarters following his injury. At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer
found that Patterson did not timely file his applications for SIBs for these quarters,
but the filing deadline was excused because Patterson’s impairment rating had
increased. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.105 (2016). The officer also found
2 that Transcontinental had waived any challenge to the SIBs. The hearing officer
noted, however, that if she had reached the merits of Patterson’s claim, she would
have denied it due to Patterson’s failure to comply with the work search
requirements of the statute. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.142.
The appeals panel reversed the hearing officer’s decision in part, because the
statute waives the filing deadline only if the applicant’s initial impairment rating is
increased from less than fifteen percent to fifteen percent or more. See 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 130.105(a)(3). Patterson’s initial rating was fifteen percent, so the
filing deadline remained in effect. Relying on the hearing officer’s fact findings,
the appeals panel held that Patterson had failed to establish that any of his later
applications were timely filed and that Transcontinental had not waived its
challenge to his failure to timely apply for SIBs for those quarters. See id.
§ 130.104(c) (requiring that application for SIBs be filed seven days before the
beginning of the quarter for which SIBs are sought).
Patterson seeks judicial review of this appeals panel’s decision in this suit.
The trial court granted Transcontinental’s no-evidence motion for summary
judgment, rejecting Patterson’s challenge to the appeals panel’s decision. On
appeal from the trial court, Patterson challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction,
contending that Transcontinental failed to submit a proposed judgment to the
Department of Insurance before entry of any judgment, as required by statute. See
3 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a). He further contends that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
Section 410.258 of the Labor Code requires a party who sought judicial
review of an administrative appeals panel’s decision to submit any proposed
judgment to the Department at least thirty days before judgment is scheduled to be
entered. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a). Any judgment entered without this
notice is void. Id. § 410.258(f); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797,
801 (Tex. App.―Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
We presume, however, that the judgment of the trial court is regular and
correct. S. Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 249 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied) (citing McElyea v. Parker, 81 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1935));
Casillas v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., 146 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2004, no pet.). In accordance with this presumption, a party challenging the trial
court’s judgment must demonstrate any irregularity in the judgment under review
from the trial court record. See Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14.
The trial court’s final judgment bears two stamps indicating that it was
received by the Department on December 15, more than a month before it was
signed on January 26. It also recites that “notification to the [Department] was
4 made pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 410.258.” Thus, the record reflects that the
Department received notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson nevertheless
insists that a document exists in which the Department certified that a search of its
records could not locate notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson has not
identified this document in the record, nor has he presented it to us under our
authority to consider matters beyond the record in determining our jurisdiction.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West 2004); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i);
Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14. We conclude that Patterson has failed to rebut the
presumption that the judgment is valid; thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to
render its judgment. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a); Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at
13; Casillas, 146 S.W.3d at 738.
II. Summary Judgment
Patterson next contends that the trial court erred in granting
Transcontinental’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. We review a trial
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315
S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). When reviewing a summary judgment, we view the
evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable
inference in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164
S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott,
128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). In a no-evidence motion for summary
5 judgment, the movant asserts that no evidence supports an essential element of the
nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at
trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 523–24 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each
challenged element. Mack Trucks, Inc. v.
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Opinion issued April 19, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-15-00464-CV ——————————— ANDREW PATTERSON, Appellant V. TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 129th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2013-01531
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this judicial proceeding challenging an administrative decision of the
Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation, Andrew
Patterson appeals a no-evidence summary judgment denying his request for supplemental income benefits (SIBs) that the Department also had denied. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2002, Andrew Patterson suffered an injury when he fell down a flight of
stairs. Patterson was assigned an impairment rating of fifteen percent, which
entitled him to SIBs if he complied with statutory work search requirements. See
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 408.1415, –.142 (West 2015). Patterson applied for and
was granted SIBs for the first quarter of his injury. However, his applications for
SIBs for the second through fourth quarters following the injury were denied in
September 2006. In a subsequent administrative hearing, an administrative appeals
panel upheld the denial of SIBs for these quarters. Later judicial review before a
state district court confirmed the decision.
Patterson then challenged his impairment rating. After another contested
hearing, the hearing officer increased his impairment rating to twenty-one percent.
The appeals panel affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.
Patterson then again applied for SIBs for the fifth through twenty-fifth
quarters following his injury. At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer
found that Patterson did not timely file his applications for SIBs for these quarters,
but the filing deadline was excused because Patterson’s impairment rating had
increased. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.105 (2016). The officer also found
2 that Transcontinental had waived any challenge to the SIBs. The hearing officer
noted, however, that if she had reached the merits of Patterson’s claim, she would
have denied it due to Patterson’s failure to comply with the work search
requirements of the statute. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.142.
The appeals panel reversed the hearing officer’s decision in part, because the
statute waives the filing deadline only if the applicant’s initial impairment rating is
increased from less than fifteen percent to fifteen percent or more. See 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 130.105(a)(3). Patterson’s initial rating was fifteen percent, so the
filing deadline remained in effect. Relying on the hearing officer’s fact findings,
the appeals panel held that Patterson had failed to establish that any of his later
applications were timely filed and that Transcontinental had not waived its
challenge to his failure to timely apply for SIBs for those quarters. See id.
§ 130.104(c) (requiring that application for SIBs be filed seven days before the
beginning of the quarter for which SIBs are sought).
Patterson seeks judicial review of this appeals panel’s decision in this suit.
The trial court granted Transcontinental’s no-evidence motion for summary
judgment, rejecting Patterson’s challenge to the appeals panel’s decision. On
appeal from the trial court, Patterson challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction,
contending that Transcontinental failed to submit a proposed judgment to the
Department of Insurance before entry of any judgment, as required by statute. See
3 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a). He further contends that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
Section 410.258 of the Labor Code requires a party who sought judicial
review of an administrative appeals panel’s decision to submit any proposed
judgment to the Department at least thirty days before judgment is scheduled to be
entered. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a). Any judgment entered without this
notice is void. Id. § 410.258(f); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797,
801 (Tex. App.―Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
We presume, however, that the judgment of the trial court is regular and
correct. S. Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 249 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2007, pet. denied) (citing McElyea v. Parker, 81 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1935));
Casillas v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., 146 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2004, no pet.). In accordance with this presumption, a party challenging the trial
court’s judgment must demonstrate any irregularity in the judgment under review
from the trial court record. See Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14.
The trial court’s final judgment bears two stamps indicating that it was
received by the Department on December 15, more than a month before it was
signed on January 26. It also recites that “notification to the [Department] was
4 made pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 410.258.” Thus, the record reflects that the
Department received notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson nevertheless
insists that a document exists in which the Department certified that a search of its
records could not locate notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson has not
identified this document in the record, nor has he presented it to us under our
authority to consider matters beyond the record in determining our jurisdiction.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West 2004); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i);
Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14. We conclude that Patterson has failed to rebut the
presumption that the judgment is valid; thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to
render its judgment. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a); Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at
13; Casillas, 146 S.W.3d at 738.
II. Summary Judgment
Patterson next contends that the trial court erred in granting
Transcontinental’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. We review a trial
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315
S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). When reviewing a summary judgment, we view the
evidence in a light favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable
inference in the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164
S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott,
128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). In a no-evidence motion for summary
5 judgment, the movant asserts that no evidence supports an essential element of the
nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at
trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 523–24 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the
nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each
challenged element. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.
2006); Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524. Pro se litigants like Patterson must follow the
same procedural rules as licensed attorneys, including the rules governing
summary judgment proceedings. See Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271
S.W.3d 928, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
Transcontinental moved for summary judgment on the ground that Patterson
failed to present any evidence that his SIB applications were timely filed. Section
130.104 of Title 28 of the Administrative Code requires claimants to apply for
SIBs no later than seven days before the beginning of the quarter for which the
applicant seeks benefits. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 130.104. The appeals panel
determined that Patterson did not apply for SIBs for the quarters at issue until May
of 2010, after the time for application had expired for each of them. Thus, the
appeals panel determined that Patterson did not timely apply for benefits and that
his failure to apply for them was not excused by the later increase in his
impairment rating.
6 The administrative decisions find that Patterson failed to timely apply for
SIBs for the contested quarters. The record lacks any summary judgment evidence
of the date Patterson applied for benefits in contravention of the facts found in the
administrative hearing decisions. Patterson bore the burden of producing evidence
to establish that an issue of material fact existed. See Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 582.
In his brief, Patterson complains that Transcontinental has deliberately withheld
information and documentation from him and thus his failure to adduce facts to
support his claim of timely filing must be excused. Patterson has not supported his
allegation with legal authority or citations to the record demonstrating any
obstruction of the discovery process or spoliation of evidence. Without any
supporting evidence, Patterson’s claim of justification for his lack of evidence is
not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Rocha v. State, 464
S.W.3d 410, 418 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).
Because Patterson produced no evidence to support his assertion that he
timely filed the applications, we hold that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 582; Hahn, 321
S.W.3d at 524.
7 CONCLUSION
Because Patterson failed to produce evidence supporting his contention that
the administrative appeals panel erred in concluding that he failed to timely apply
for benefits, the trial court properly granted the motion for a no-evidence summary
judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland Justice
Panel consists of Justices Bland, Brown, and Lloyd.