Andrew J. Walters v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 25A-CR-1735
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana Andrew J. Walters, Appellant-Defendant FILED Mar 23 2026, 9:17 am

v. CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

March 23, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1735 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Samuel R. Keirns, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 02D06-2403-F5-123

Opinion by Judge Foley Judges May and Altice concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 1 of 10 Foley, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial, Andrew J. Walters (“Walters”) was convicted of several

criminal offenses and adjudicated a habitual offender, 1 for which he received an

aggregate sentence of twelve years executed in the Indiana Department of

Correction (“the DOC”). Walters appeals and raises two restated issues for our

review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting an

amendment to his habitual offender enhancement charge; and

II. Whether Walters’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum by a

half day.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On March 21, 2024, the State charged Walters with Count I: resisting law

enforcement as a Level 5 felony; Count II: resisting law enforcement as a Level

6 felony; Count III: theft as a Level 6 felony; Count IV: resisting law

enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor; and Count V: unauthorized entry of a

1 Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 2 of 10 motor vehicle as a Class B misdemeanor. 2 See Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 16–

31. The charges stemmed from Walters’s conduct on March 18, 2024.

[4] On September 5, 2024, the State filed its notice of intent to seek habitual

offender enhancement (“the September 2024 Notice”). See id. at 55–56. The

matter proceeded to a two-day bifurcated jury trial on February 4, 2025. While

the jury was deliberating on the guilt phase, the State moved to amend the

September 2024 Notice in order to correct the date of an alleged prior

conviction by seven days, from June 19, 2017, to June 12, 2017, (“the February

2025 Amendment”). See id. at 97.

[5] Walters objected to the State’s motion, challenging “the timeliness of it” and

argued the State was attempting to correct “numerous errors” with the

amendment. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 209. The State responded that the September 2024

Notice “had 06/19/2017 and [the State was] seeking to amend it to

06/12/2017[,]” which was “a minor error” that “does not go to the substance

of the charge[.]” Id. at 210. The State asserted that, “pursuant to statute and

case law[,]” it was “entitled to amend [the allegation]” affecting the second

phase of the jury trial “even though the jury ha[d] received the case” for

deliberations at the guilt phase. Id. The trial court granted the State’s motion to

2 An additional charge of possession of paraphernalia was later dismissed. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 83–84, 107.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 3 of 10 amend over Walters’s objection. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 111; Tr. Vol. 2

pp. 210–11.

[6] The jury found Walters guilty as charged in the guilt phase of the trial. The trial

court then instructed the jury as to the habitual offender phase, using the dates

for the alleged prior convictions found in the February 2025 Amendment. After

hearing evidence and argument, the jury found Walters to be a habitual

offender. The trial court stated that a sentencing hearing would be held on

February 28, 2025, and that “Count I, Parts I and II, will be enhanced by Count

VII. Count II is vacated and dismissed as it’s an identical charge with Count

IV.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 233.

[7] The sentencing hearing proceeded as scheduled, and the trial court sentenced

Walters to an aggregate sentence of twelve years executed in the DOC. Walters

was ordered to serve six years on Count I enhanced by six years on Count VII,

two years and 183 days on Count III, one year on Count IV, and 180 days on

Count V. The trial court ordered sentences for Counts I, III, IV, and V to be

served concurrently. See Tr. Vol. 2 p. 241; Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 199–

200. Walters now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Habitual Offender Enhancement [8] Walters contends that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the

February 2025 Amendment to the habitual offender charge. Walters argues

that the February 2025 Amendment was the initial filing of the habitual

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 4 of 10 offender enhancement against Walters, and that as a result it was untimely

under I.C. 35-34-1-5(e), 3 which requires an amendment of a charging

information to include a habitual offender charge to be made at least thirty days

prior to the commencement of the trial. Walters characterizes the filing of the

February 2025 Amendment as the belated filing of a habitual offender

allegation, rather than an amendment of a timely habitual offender allegation.

[9] Walters did not object to the filing of the September 2024 Notice at the time it

was filed or while making his objection to the February 2025 Amendment. To

the extent Walters alleges that the September 2024 Notice was defective or

failed to comply with the requirements of I.C. 35-50-2-8, that argument was not

made before the trial court below and is waived. See Haymaker v. State, 667

N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind. 1996).

[10] The September 2024 Notice filed by the State set forth the prior unrelated

felony convictions the State alleged formed the basis for establishing that

Walters was a habitual offender. Because the September 2024 Notice was

timely, having been filed more than 30 days prior to the trial, we next consider

3 Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(e) states:

An amendment of an indictment or information to include a habitual offender charge under IC 35-50-2-8 must be made at least thirty (30) days before the commencement of trial. However, upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the filing of a habitual offender charge at any time before the commencement of the trial if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. If the court permits the filing of a habitual offender charge less than thirty (30) days before the commencement of trial, the court shall grant a continuance at the request of the: (1) state, for good cause shown; or (2) defendant, for any reason.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 5 of 10 whether the trial court’s February 2025 Amendment was timely. “We review a

trial court’s decision on whether to permit an amendment to a charging

information for an abuse of discretion.” Bright v. State, 205 N.E.3d 1055, 1059

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Hobbs v. State, 160 N.E.3d 543, 551 (Ind. Ct. App.

2020), trans. denied.).

[11] Amendments to an indictment or a charging information are governed by

Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5. Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(a)(9) permits

the prosecuting attorney to amend the charging information “at any time” for

immaterial defects, including “any other defect which does not prejudice the

substantial rights of the defendant.” See Sidener v. State, 55 N.E.3d 380, 385–86

(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding defendant’s substantial rights were not

prejudiced by an amendment to the date of the habitual offender charge).

[12] Here, the State amended the habitual offender charge to correct an inaccurate

date on one of the underlying felony convictions and Walters failed to

demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the timing of the amendment. See

Haymaker, 667 N.E.2d at 1114. Moreover, after the trial court granted the

amendment, Walters failed to request a continuance. See id. Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State

leave to file the February 2025 Amendment to the habitual offender charge.

II. Illegal Sentence [13] Walters next contends the trial court sentenced him to an illegal sentence,

exceeding the permissible statutory maximum by one half day or twelve hours.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 6 of 10 See Appellant’s Br. p. 16. “An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to

a trial court’s sentencing decisions[.]” Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind.

2024) (citing Holder v. State, 119 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). In

Anderson, our Supreme Court held that “a sentence is ‘illegal’ only if it is outside

the prescribed statutory range or is unconstitutional.” Anderson v. State, 269

N.E.3d 817, 822 (Ind. 2025). When a sentence exceeds statutory limits, the

sentence is contrary to law, and we generally remand the case for resentencing.

See, e.g. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144–45 (Ind. 2022) (remanding for

resentencing when the aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court exceeded

the maximum sentence authorized by statute).

[14] Under Count III, Walters was convicted of a Level 6 felony and sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of two years and 183 days. Indiana Code section 35-50-

2-7(b) specifies that a person who commits a Level 6 felony “shall be

imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2

½) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Walters argues that

his sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence by

one half days or twelve hours. See Appellant’s Br. p. 16.

[15] “The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and further the intent of the

legislature.” State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711 (Ind. 2018) (quoting West v.

Off. of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016)). “To that end, we look

to the statute’s plain language, giving its words their ordinary meaning and

considering the structure of the statute as a whole.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). However, “when a statute permits more than one reasonable

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 7 of 10 interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous.” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1139

(citing Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016)). “And when a statute is

ambiguous, we resort to the rules of statutory construction to determine its

meaning.” Id. “In criminal cases, this includes the rule of lenity—a rule that

requires us to construe a penal statute strictly against the State while resolving

any ambiguities in favor of the defendant.” Id. (citing Meredith v. State, 906

N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ind. 2009)). “[E]ven under this rule, we avoid construing a

statute so narrowly ‘as to exclude cases they fairly cover.’” Id. (quoting

Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 872). “Ultimately, we presume the legislature intended

for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the

statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010)).

[16] We conclude Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) is unambiguous. Trial courts

have discretion to impose a sentence within the range of six months to two and

one-half years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Based on the standard 365-day year, a

maximum sentence—two and one-half years—would equate to two years and

182.5 days, not 183 days. Whether by convenience, custom, or preference, the

trial court converted the sentence into a combination of years and days, and in

doing so, rounded the portion of the sentence expressed by days up from 182.5

days to 183 days. As a result, Walters’s sentence exceeds the maximum

possible sentence for a Level 6 felony.

[17] The State defends the trial courts sentence by citing to Indiana Trial Rule 6(A)

as providing the proper method to calculate the passage of time. Trial Rule

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 8 of 10 6(A) provides that a period of time “runs until the end of the next day.” We

note however, that the Rules of Trial Procedure govern only “procedure and

practice” in Indiana courts. Ind. Trial Rule 1. The maximum sentence

authorized under our sentencing statutes is a matter of substantive criminal law

and not a matter of court practice or procedure and offer no aid in interpreting

the statute.

[18] The State advances numerous public policy arguments in support of their

position: claiming that trial courts have previously sentenced defendants to

sentences of two years and 183 days for Level 6 felonies; that partial day

sentences are administratively burdensome for the DOC to manage; and “the

historic custom has been to sentence defendants to whole numbers of days.”

Appellee’s Br. p. 18. Ultimately, the State’s public policy arguments fail to

override the clear and unambiguous language prescribed in Indiana Code

section 35-50-2-7(b). 4 Moreover, a sentencing court can readily comply with

the clear language of the Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) by utilizing the

express language of the statute and sentencing a defendant to two and one-half

years, or if a court prefers to convert the sentence into a computation of days, to

round down to the nearest whole number. 5

4 To the extent the State invites our court to decline to follow the logic and reasoning of its prior decision in Mitchell v. State, No. 25A-CR-301 (Ind. Ct. App. July 24, 2025) (mem.), we decline to do so. 5 Since we conclude the statute is unambiguous, we do not address Walters’s argument as to applicability of the Rule of Lenity. See Appellant’s Reply. Br. pp. 14–15.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 9 of 10 Conclusion [19] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the February 2025

Amendment to Walters’s habitual offender charge. Further, Walters’s sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum and must be corrected. See Fix, 186 N.E.3d at

1144–45. Therefore, we remand and instruct the trial court to impose a

sentence for Count III that does not exceed two and one-half years.

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Sean M. Surrisi Wyland, Humphrey, Clevenger & Surrisi, LLP Plymouth, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Megan M. Smith Assistant Section Chief Capital and Habeas Litigation Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1735 | March 23, 2026 Page 10 of 10