IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 87253-2-I
ANDREA LEIGH ENGLESON DIVISION ONE RAVENET,
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
LOUIS ALFONSO RAVENET,
Appellant.
SMITH, J. — Louis and Andrea Ravenet separated in July 2020 after
25 years of marriage. Following trial, the court entered findings, conclusions, and
related orders dissolving the marriage and distributing property. Andrea was
awarded the majority of real property, and Louis was given the marital
businesses and accounts. Louis appealed the court’s distribution of marital
assets, its decision to not appoint a special master, and its award of attorney fees
to Andrea.
Because the court was not required to appoint a special master,
considered all the evidence presented, and made an equitable distribution of the
property, we affirm. No. 87253-2-I/2
FACTS
Background
Louis Ravenet and Andrea Engleson Ravenet1 married in October 1995.
During their marriage, they had three children together, all of whom are now
adults. Over the course of their marriage, Louis and Andrea founded and
operated several companies, as well as managed and renovated real properties.
Around July 2020, the parties separated.
At the time of separation, the parties owned three properties: Carbon,
Beryllium, and Victoria. Carbon is a 4-unit condominium valued at $1,700,000,
with a mortgage balance of $1,400,000. Louis lived in unit one and did not pay
rent. The rent generated from the tenants was nearly sufficient to pay the
mortgage. Beryllium is a 12-unit residential property. After the parties
separated, the property went into foreclosure and Louis listed the property for
sale without Andrea’s knowledge. The property was listed at $5,250,00 and sold
for $4,620,000.2 A high-interest lender holds the Beryllium Note in the amount of
$1,200,000. If all tenants at Beryllium continue to occupy the units and pay rent,
the Note will be repaid by 2038. Under the lending agreement, the parties
receive approximately $3,400 per month paid into escrow and the remainder of
the aggregate rent from the tena[nts is paid toward the Note. The parties’ third
1 We refer to the parties by their first names solely for the purpose of clarity and to avoid confusion. 2 Andrea consented to the sale once she found out the property was on the market.
2 No. 87253-2-I/3
property, Victoria, is a condominium valued at $525,000, with a mortgage of
$259,266.
Carbon and Beryllium are owned by shell companies—Beryllium, LLC and
Carbon, LLC, which are held by Vanitas, LLC. Vanitas is a holding company
created by Louis and Andrea to manage the family assets, including real estate
and other business ventures. Under Vanitas, Andrea and Louis also formed
Fresnel, LLC, which has three subsidiary business holdings3 and was created to
develop various energy projects in Latin America, including a major natural gas
operation in Peru. The project in Peru started in 2018 and suffered ongoing
financial setbacks. At the time of separation, the parties had a 31 percent share
in Fresnel.
During the marriage, both Andrea and Louis actively participated in the
various businesses. Andrea mainly focused on customer relations and business
promotion, while Louis handled business operations, development, and
financing. Louis was in control of the finances, but Andrea had unfettered access
to the accounts and “took whatever she needed whenever she wanted.”
Several times during their marriage, Louis deactivated Andrea’s credit
cards subsequent to an argument between the two. He also transferred money
from their joint account to a personal account. After separation, Louis continued
to prevent Andrea from accessing marital assets by removing her from many of
their business and personal bank accounts. Louis also redirected tenant rent
3 Okra, LLC; Okra Energy Alabama, LLC; and Pure LNG, S.A.C.
3 No. 87253-2-I/4
payments from Beryllium and Carbon to his personal accounts and stopped
paying the mortgage on Beryllium, leading to its foreclosure.
In May 2023, Andrea became aware that the Victoria property was set for
auction due to foreclosure. Because Andrea had no access to the couple’s
personal bank accounts, she withdrew $100,000 from the Fresnel business
account, upon which she was a cosigner, to pay off the unpaid taxes. When
Andrea tried to pay the taxes, she found out the bank had proactively paid the
debt and rolled it into the HELOC. Andrea then used the funds withdrawn to pay
for attorney fees, family emergencies, and living expenses for herself and her
daughter, who was a minor at the time. Louis initiated a contempt proceeding,
alleging Andrea had no authority to remove funds from the Fresnel account.
Louis maintained the funds were controlled by outside investors and the
investors were threatening to sue and withdraw further investments. The court
denied the motion, stating Louis failed to provide any evidence about the
ownership structure of Fresnel, and he had not met his burden of showing that
the funds were anything other than community funds in a community account.
The court also noted that Louis had transferred large sums directly from the
Fresnel account to his personal account, and provided “20 pages of outgoing
wire transfers from unidentifiable bank accounts.”
Procedural History
In December 2022, Andrea petitioned for dissolution. After several
attempts to serve Louis, to no avail, Andrea moved to serve Louis by
4 No. 87253-2-I/5
publication.4 The court granted the motion.
In September 2023, Andrea served Louis with her first set of
interrogatories and requests for production. Louis did not produce discovery
materials before the deadline. Trial was originally scheduled for November 2023,
but at a pretrial conference in early November, Andrea asked for a short
continuance of four to six weeks to obtain the outstanding discovery. Louis
requested a longer continuance, asserting he needed additional time to conduct
an audit of the couple’s assets. Andrea stated she was not interested in having
an accounting firm appointed because she believed it would only delay trial
further. The court informed Louis that if a dispute existed as to whether an
auditor was necessary, he would need to move to compel. The court continued
the trial to January 2024.
In December, Louis had not produced discovery, and Andrea moved to
compel discovery. The court granted the motion. At a pretrial conference in
early January 2024, Andrea noted that Louis still had not produced discovery.
Louis pointed to “serious medical issues” for his inability to produce discovery
and requested another continuance. The court granted a continuance and
reminded Louis what was required of discovery, specifically that he was required
to produce original documents in English.5
4 Louis travelled frequently for work and Andrea had no way to determine his location at any given time. Andrea e-mailed Louis at three different addresses and attempted to personally serve him three times. 5 Prior to this point, Louis had produced summaries of bank statements, instead of the originals, and offered documents in Spanish.
5 No. 87253-2-I/6
In February 2024, Louis requested another continuance because of “a
medical condition and impending surgical procedure.” Andrea reluctantly agreed
and the court continued the trial to May 2024. The parties stipulated to another
continuance in April 2024, and the trial was set for August 2024.
Trial commenced in August 2024. Both parties proceeded pro se. At the
start of trial, Louis requested another continuance due to illness. The court noted
it had not been apprised of any medical conditions before that day and, without
medical documentation, the trial would go forward as scheduled. The court
explained that it did not find the circumstances extraordinary enough to warrant a
continuance because Louis demonstrated “a pattern of this type of delay.”
While addressing preliminary matters, the court expressed frustration that
Louis had not produced his trial brief until that morning at 9:00 a.m. The court
inquired whether Louis had provided his trial brief to Andrea, and Louis said he
had sent it to the bailiff, but had not copied Andrea. The court reminded Louis
that ex parte contact with the court is “inexcusable,” and found Louis’s behavior
amounted to intransigence.6
Much of the testimony at trial centered on the valuation of Fresnel.
Despite multiple requests, Louis failed to provide the court or Andrea with
credible financial information related to Fresnel. Based on outdated corporate
reports and 2019 earnings statements, Andrea estimated Fresnel was worth
6 The court later noted that it was not “making any claims of intransigence” before it heard all the evidence.
6 No. 87253-2-I/7
approximately $75 million.7 Louis contended that Fresnel and its subsidiary
businesses were only worth $150,000, but also testified the equipment in Peru
was worth approximately $8 million. The court found neither of those valuations
credible and estimated Fresnel’s value to be closer to $8,324,093—the value at
the time of separation.8
The parties also disputed the extent of Andrea’s access to and knowledge
of the couple’s various bank accounts. The court stated numerous times it was
having a hard time following Louis’s cross-examination and testimony because of
the bickering between him and Andrea and Louis’s muddled questioning. During
his direct examination, Louis testified that he removed Andrea from the various
business accounts because she withdrew funds without notifying him
beforehand. Louis maintained he never took funds from the joint accounts and
redirected them for his personal benefit, and any withdrawal of money was to
“keep everything moving forward.” But Louis did not deny he had been
leveraging family business accounts to pay for travel, lodging, and other
expenses. Louis maintained any spending made from the Vanitas/Fresnel
assets during the four years after separation was to “promote the energy
company.”
7 Louis also stated that, if the business was fully operational, it could be worth as much as $75 million. 8 The court recognized the likelihood that the value was less, considering a 2023 tax filing noting a loss of $4,209,000.
7 No. 87253-2-I/8
Findings and Conclusions
The court did not find Louis’s testimony credible. In its findings and
conclusions, the court noted that, “[e]ven viewing the husband’s best intentions
charitably, the husband has nonetheless diverted considerable family assets
(which could not be fully traced) to his own plans, post-separation.” The court
also stated that Louis failed to comply with discovery requests and refused to
disclose bank accounts, tax information, and information about earnings. The
court opined that, as a result of Louis’s failure to provide accurate accounting, the
court “lacked a full complement of financial data that informed the value of
Fresnel, the question of the husband’s post-separation earnings and (mis)use of
community assets, and any basis to determine the current value of various
personal and business accounts the wife’s access to which was excluded.”
Additionally, the court did not find Louis’s assertion that Andrea “raided”
community assets credible. The court noted that Louis mainly pointed to the
$100,000 Andrea withdrew, but that withdrawal was “a wash considering the
husband’s steady use of community assets post-separation to sustain himself.”9
Because of Louis’s discovery violations and failure to trace expenditures,
the court drew an adverse inference against Louis and concluded he “spent
considerable community assets, even if some of those assets may have been
dedicated to salvaging the parties’ business interests.” Accordingly, the court
awarded all community financial accounts to Louis, including all community credit
9 The court pointed to Louis’s withdrawal of $388,000 from the community Fresnel account by the time he moved for contempt.
8 No. 87253-2-I/9
card debt. The court also awarded to Louis any loans against the marital
community and debt associated with these loans.
Included in the award of financial accounts to Louis was Fresnel and all
the subsidiary business interests therein. The court again drew an adverse
inference against Louis, noting his estimates of the businesses were not credible
and his refusal to produce transparent documentation made an accurate
accounting of the interests impossible. The court noted that Andrea “rightfully
does not want to be involved in the operation of these businesses that [Louis]
has controlled during the marriage (for better or worse) or be subject to business
contingencies that [Louis] has created.” The court concluded that, despite
Louis’s estimates, the business maintained considerable value.
The court awarded Andrea the Victoria property and the HELOC
associated with it. It also awarded Andrea the Carbon condominiums, excluding
unit one, which the court gave to Louis for his residence. The court tasked
Andrea with arranging any financing associated with the Carbon units, but
determined the cost should be split fifty-fifty. The court also split the payment of
the Parent Plus student loans for the adult children’s post-secondary education
fifty-fifty between Louis and Andrea. Finally, the court awarded Andrea $64,000
in attorney fees, noting Louis’s “intransigence permeated the litigation and the
parties’ financial arrangements before the litigation.”
Louis appeals.
9 No. 87253-2-I/10
ANALYSIS
Property Distribution
Louis claims the trial court abused its discretion and made an inequitable
distribution of assets when it awarded him essentially all the couple’s debts,
divided the property as punishment for Louis’s failure to make an accurate
accounting, and failed to appoint a special master. We conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it divided the marital assets and declined to
appoint a special master.
We review a trial court’s distribution of property in a dissolution proceeding
for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d 249, 254, 477
P.3d 643 (2019). A court abuses its discretion when its “ ‘decision is manifestly
unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.’ ” In re Marriage of
Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 893, 93 P.3d 124 (2004) (quoting State v. Brown, 132
Wn.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). A court that rests its decision on facts
unsupported in the record or reaches its decision by applying the wrong legal
standard abuses its discretion. Hundtofte v. Encarnacion, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7, 330
P.3d 168 (2014).
The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. In
re Marriage of Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. 235, 242, 170 P.3d 572 (2007).
“ ‘Substantial evidence exists if, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, a rational trier of fact could find the fact more
likely than not to be true.’ ” In re Dependency of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 186, 193, 525
10 No. 87253-2-I/11
P.3d 177 (2023) (quoting In re Welfare of X.T., 174 Wn. App. 733, 737, 300 P.3d
824 (2013)). We will not disturb a trial court’s findings of fact on appeal as long
as they are supported by substantial evidence. Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242.
“Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, the reviewing court's role is
simply to determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings of fact,
and if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law.”
Rockwell, 141 Wn. App. at 242. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on
appeal. In re Domestic Violence Protection Order of Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d
670, 677, 574 P.3d 127 (2025).
Under RCW 26.09.080, the trial court shall make a just and equitable
distribution of marital property in a dissolution proceeding. “A fair and equitable
division by a trial court ‘does not require mathematical precision, but rather
fairness, based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the marriage,
both past and present, and an evaluation of the future needs of parties.’ ” In re
Marriage of Zahm, 138 Wn.2d 213, 218-19, 978 P.2d 498 (1999) (quoting In re
Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996)). In
determining an equitable property distribution, the court must consider all
relevant factors, including the nature and extent of the community property, the
nature and extent of the separate property, the duration of the marriage, and the
economic circumstances of the parties at the time of the property division.
RCW 26.09.080.
11 No. 87253-2-I/12
The statutory factors are not limiting; the court may consider additional
factors, such as the parties’ “ ‘foreseeable future acquisitions and obligations,
and whether the property to be divided should be attributed to the inheritance or
efforts of one or both of the spouses.’ ” In re Marriage of Urbana, 147 Wn.
App. 1, 11, 195 P.3d 959 (2008) (quoting In re Marriage of Olivares, 69 Wn. App.
324, 329, 848 P.2d 1281 (1992)). The trial court is in the best position to
evaluate the assets and liabilities of parties, and we will not disturb a trial court's
order distributing property absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 707, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002).
1. Allocation of Assets
First, Louis contends the trial court failed to consider the economic
circumstances of the spouses and impermissibly awarded Louis the majority of
the debt and Andrea all the income-producing property. Louis maintains the
court erred when it assigned him the entirety of the parties’ credit card debit
expressly because he had “been living off community assets” during the
separation period. Louis claims the court ignored the fact that Andrea was also
living off community credit cards and she had withdrawn $100,000 from the
Fresnel account, which, “in large part,” caused Fresnel’s holdings to be
overwhelmed by debt. Louis also alleges the court’s decision to award him the
majority of the debt was punishment for his “supposed failure to make an
accurate accounting.”
12 No. 87253-2-I/13
It is the duty of the party in control of an asset belonging to the community
to “make a full and fair disclosure” of that asset’s value. Rentel v. Rentel, 39
Wn.2d 729, 736, 238 P.2d 389 (1951). When a party conceals assets or
withholds pertinent financial information, of which they are in control, the court
may draw an unfavorable inference concerning the missing information. See,
e.g., Henderson v. Tyrrell, 80 Wn. App. 592, 606, 910 P.2d 522 (1996); Rentel,
39 Wn.2d at 736.
Here, the court considered both Louis’s and Andrea’s spending from the
time of separation. The court noted in its order that all debt incurred by Andrea
since the date of separation must be paid by her, and likewise for Louis. But
other than the $100,000 taken from the Fresnel account, the majority of Andrea’s
debt was amassed on her separate credit cards, given she no longer had access
to most of the joint accounts. Concerning the $100,000, the court did not find
Louis’s testimony credible that the withdrawal of that amount was significant in
the overall functioning of Fresnel.10 Additionally, Andrea was allocated all of the
debt associated with the properties awarded to her, including the $259,267
HELOC secured by the Victoria and the $1,400,000 mortgage secured by the
Carbon. Andrea was also allocated one-half of the Parent Plus Student Loan.
While the court awarded Louis all the debt associated with the community
accounts, this was because Louis made it “impossible to determine the full
amount [he] spent on himself because [he] withheld documentation that might
10 The court also noted that Louis withdrew $388,000 from the same account.
13 No. 87253-2-I/14
elucidate the financial situation and did not cleanly trace what he spent for the
business and what he spent to sustain his life style.” Louis improperly blocked
Andrea’s access to the accounts, did not answer her discovery requests in full,
and failed to produce a complete set of bank records consistent with Local
Family Law Rule (LFLR) 10. Accordingly, the court did not err when it drew an
adverse inference against Louis and awarded all debt associated with the
community accounts to Louis.11
Louis also alleges the trial court failed to properly assess the value of
Fresnel, and it was inequitable for the court to award him the entirety of the
business. In determining the value of Fresnel, the court noted it did not find
either Andrea’s valuation of $75,000,000 or Louis’s valuation of $150,000
credible based on the information it had, including a 2019 earnings report and
2023 tax filing. The court noted that Louis had selectively produced documents
that supported his self-serving claim that Fresnel was only worth $150,000.
Because of Louis’s failure to produce accurate financial information for Fresnel,
the court had very little documentation to consider when determining how Fresnel
should be divided. Accordingly, the court determined the most equitable way to
assess Fresnel’s value was to consider the value at the time of separation, which
was $8,324,093.12 The court acknowledged the business’s value was likely less
11 Because the court lacked data concerning the current value of the parties’ accounts, the court assigned a value at the time of separation. 12 The trial court has broad discretion to determine an evaluation date that is equitable—whether it be the date of separation, date of trial, or somewhere in between. Koher v. Morgan, 93 Wn. App. 398, 404, 968 P.2d 920 (1998).
14 No. 87253-2-I/15
at the time of trial, but also noted that Louis had testified the business, fully
functioning, would be worth $75 million, and the equipment itself was worth
approximately $8 million.
In addition to recognizing the full earning potential of the business, the
court also concluded it would be unjust to saddle Andrea with an interest in a
business that she has not been involved in the operation of, or to subject her to
business contingencies that Louis has created. As the court noted, Louis had
made “an accurate accounting of the overlapping domestic and overseas energy
projects and business interests impossible,” and the most equitable division was
to award all of Fresnel’s business interests to Louis, who had been running the
company for the duration of the marriage and since separation. The court
reviewed all available documentation, considered the position of both parties,
and determined it was equitable and just to award Louis the entirety of the
business. This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
2. Division as Punishment
Louis also claims the court abused its discretion because it awarded him
the community debt as punishment for his failure to make an accurate accounting
of the community assets and in response to Andrea’s claims of abuse.
a. Misconduct
RCW 26.09.080 requires a court to make an equitable disposition of
marital property “without regard to misconduct.” Marital misconduct under
RCW 26.09.080 “refers to immoral or physically abusive conduct within the
15 No. 87253-2-I/16
marital relationship and does not encompass gross fiscal improvidence, the
squandering of marital assets or . . . the deliberate and unnecessary incurring of
tax liabilities.” In re Marriage of Steadman, 63 Wn. App. 523, 528, 821 P.2d 59
(1991). When determining property distribution, the court may consider the
actions of a party when such activities result in the dissipation of marital property.
In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 808, 538 P.2d 145 (1975).
Louis cites to several cases to support his contention that the trial court
abused its discretion, including In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795,
807, 108 P.3d 779 (2005), and In re Marriage of Peppin, noted at 152 Wash.
App. 1053, slip op. at 2 (2009), but these cases are distinguishable and do not
support Louis’s claims. In Muhammad, the court concluded that the trial court
improperly considered the wife’s decision to file a protection order against the
husband when it determined property distribution. 153 Wn.2d at 806. But, while
the court concluded that considering marital misconduct was improper, it
explicitly noted that “negatively productive conduct that causes the dissipation of
marital assets can be considered” when determining the just and equitable
distribution of marital property. Id. at 804 (emphasis omitted).
Louis also cites to Peppin to support his claim, but this case is not
inapposite to the trial court’s ruling here. In Peppin, the court concluded that it
was not error for the trial court to consider the party’s misrepresentation of
assets, noting “misconduct that causes the dissipation of marital assets can be
considered.” Slip op at 3. Here too, the court did not err when it considered
16 No. 87253-2-I/17
Louis’s failure to produce a reliable accounting of the assets, his violation of
discovery orders, and failure to comply with LFLR 10 as factors when
determining property distribution. As the court noted, Louis’s actions made it
impossible for the court to assess the various assets of the marital community.
b. Abuse
Louis also claims the trial court “may have improperly considered fault”
based on Andrea’s statements that Louis was abusive in the relationship.
A court may not consider marital misconduct when distributing marital
property. Urbana, 147 Wn. App. at 11. “Coercive control” is defined under
RCW 7.105.010(4) as “a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to
suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect
unreasonably interferes with a person's free will and personal liberty.” Coercive
control can include “[c]ontrolling, exerting undue influence over, interfering with,
regulating, or monitoring” a spouse’s finances and economic resources.
RCW 7.105.010(4).
Here, Louis contends the court relied on Andrea’s testimony that Louis
was physically, verbally, and financially abusive when it determined property
distribution. But nowhere in the record does Andrea claim physical or verbal
abuse. Andrea does maintain Louis was financially abusive, but Louis presents
no evidence that the court considered abuse of any kind when making its
determination. In fact, Louis does not point to a single instance of the court
mentioning financial abuse.
17 No. 87253-2-I/18
Because the court did not improperly consider marital misconduct when
determining property distribution, we find no error.
Forensic Accountant
Louis contends the trial court abused its discretion when it did not appoint
a forensic accountant as special master. Andrea maintains the law does not
require the court to appoint a special master and, accordingly, the court did not
err by not ordering the appointment of a forensic accountant. We agree with
Andrea that the court was not required to appoint a special master.
Under CR 53.3, the court may appoint a special master to “provide
independent assistance to the court in resolving complex discovery issues.”
State v. Johnson & Johnson, 27 Wn. App. 2d 646, 649, 536 P.3d 204 (2023).
The court may make such an appointment upon its own motion or upon the
request of a party. CR 53.3.
Here, Louis contends the court abused its discretion when it did not order
a special master because the parties’ holdings and debts were complex and the
court admitted it did not have a full understanding of the assets. Louis alleges he
asked the court for an accounting at the beginning of litigation, but the trial court
“refused to listen to him or agree to such an accounting.”
First, Louis ignores the reason the court stated it did not have a full
understanding of the assets: Louis refused to answer Andrea’s discovery
requests in full and did not produce a complete set of bank records and tax
returns in compliance with LFLR 10. Additionally, the court never denied Louis’s
18 No. 87253-2-I/19
request for a valuation of the community assets. In fact, the court granted a two-
month continuance in order for Louis to seek an audit. The court asked the
parties to “cooperate with respect to these auditing firms” and told the parties the
court would help if there was any dispute. When Andrea expressed disinterest in
conducting an audit, the court told Louis that he would need to ask the court for
an appointment of an auditor if Andrea did not agree. The court clarified that
Louis would “have to file a motion in order to compel such a thing,” and the
burden was on Louis because he was requesting it. Louis never moved for
appointment of a special master to conduct a financial audit.
The court made it clear to Louis that it was his responsibility to move for a
special master, and he never did so. The court did not abuse its discretion by not
making an appointment upon its own motion.
Attorney Fees
Louis claims the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Andrea
attorney fees based on his intransigence. Andrea contends the trial court was
well within its discretion to award her attorney fees based on Louis’s behavior
before and during trial. We agree with Andrea.
A trial court’s award of attorney fees based on intransigence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Wixom v. Wixom, 190 Wn. App. 719, 725, 360 P.3d 960
(2015). The court abuses its discretion when its decision “is outside the range of
acceptable choices or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.”
Wixom, 190 Wn. App. at 725.
19 No. 87253-2-I/20
Under RCW 26.09.140, the court may order a party to pay reasonable
attorney fees and expenses for the cost to the other party of maintaining or
defending the proceeding. Typically, when ordering attorney fees, the court
balances the “ ‘needs of the spouse requesting them with the ability of the other
spouse to pay.’ ” In re Marriage of Morrow, 53 Wn. App. 579, 590, 770 P.2d 197
(1989) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 333, 679 P.2d 961 (1984)).
However, “[i]t is well settled that ‘[a] trial court may consider whether additional
legal fees were caused by one party’s intransigence and award attorney fees on
that basis.’ ” In re Marriage of Bobbitt, 135 Wn. App. 8, 30, 144 P.3d 306 (2006)
(alteration in original). “ ‘When intransigence is established, the financial
resources of the spouse seeking the award are irrelevant.’ ” Bobbitt, 135 Wn.
App. at 30 (quoting Morrow, 53 Wn. App. at 590). Examples of intransigence
include, “foot dragging and obstruction, filing repeated unnecessary motions, or
making the trial unduly difficult and costly by one’s actions.” Bobbitt, 135 Wn.
App. at 30.
Here, Louis mainly focuses on Andrea’s claim that he evaded service as
the reason the court awarded attorney fees based on intransigence. But, the
court did not mention evading service as a basis for its award of attorney fees to
Andrea. Instead, the court noted that Louis (1) refused to cooperate with Andrea
during discovery, (2) filed an unsuccessful motion for contempt to block Andrea
from assets that he routinely accessed for personal use, and (3) failed to comply
with discovery orders and LFLR 10 requirements. The court concluded that
20 No. 87253-2-I/21
Louis’s behavior hindered Andrea’s ability to prepare for trial and the court’s
ability to assess the marital assets.
The court’s award of fees to Andrea is supported by the record; therefore,
it was not an abuse of discretion.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
_______________________________