Andre D. Payne v. Ron Neal, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedMarch 17, 2026
Docket3:24-cv-00505
StatusUnknown

This text of Andre D. Payne v. Ron Neal, et al. (Andre D. Payne v. Ron Neal, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Andre D. Payne v. Ron Neal, et al., (N.D. Ind. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ANDRE D. PAYNE,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-505-AZ

RON NEAL, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Andre D. Payne, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two claims. First, he is proceeding against Case Manager Sara McCormick, Case Manager Morgan Thate, Warden Ron Neal, Deputy Warden of Operations Jason Nowatzke, Safety Hazard Manager Deborah Taylor, Sanitation Supervisor Thomas Frazier, Major Doug Wardlow, and Lieutenant Dennis Koen “for deliberate indifference to the build- up of bird feces in his cellblock from November 2023 to the present in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” ECF 4 at 4. Second, he is proceeding “against the Warden of Indiana State Prison in his official capacity for injunctive relief related to his ongoing need to be housed under sanitary conditions of confinement[.]” Id. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF 85. Payne filed a response, and the defendants filed a reply. ECF 101, 102, 103. Payne filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, and the defendants filed a response. ECF 92, 94, 99, 100. Both summary judgment motions are now ripe for ruling. Because the arguments for the cross-motions entirely overlap, they will be addressed collectively. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). This standard does not change when parties file cross- motions for summary judgment. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 176

v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 293 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2002). “When considering the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the defendants, and vice versa.” Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 818 (S. D. Ind. 2000); see also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (“With crossmotions, our review of the record requires that

we construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.”) (citation omitted). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment claim, courts conduct both an objective and a subjective inquiry. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” that the action or inaction of a prison official leads to “the denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Id. Although “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), inmates are entitled to adequate shelter and sanitation. Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). On the subjective prong, the prisoner must allege that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005). “Deliberate

indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)). “Negligence, or even objective recklessness, is insufficient to satisfy

deliberate indifference.” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615. Thus, a prison official that takes “reasonable steps” to prevent harm to a prisoner is not liable for subsequent injuries, even if the official acted negligently or did not act as quickly as possible to abate all risks. Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hunter v. Mueske, 73 F.4th 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2023) (as long as a prison official takes measures “reasonably

calculated” to address the risk faced by an inmate, he cannot be held liable under § 1983, even though he ultimately failed to prevent the injury). The defendants provide affidavits from themselves, Indiana State Prison’s (“ISP”) Maintenance Supervisor Scott Clouse, and ISP Sanitation Manager Alisha Winn, who attest to the following facts: D-Cell House, the restricted housing unit at ISP, consists of five separate floors, referred to as “ranges.” ECF 85-1 at 1. Each range

consists of individual cells and is covered by a metal grate, which prevents birds from flying onto the ranges. Id. at 1, 6 (photograph of D-Cell House). Between the metal grate and the individual cells is a hallway for inmates to walk to and from their cells in the stairwell, which prevents birds from entering or coming near the inmates’ cells. Id. at 2. Above the 500 range is a solid ceiling, known as the “top of the block,” which prevents bird droppings from falling into the D-Cell House. Id. At the very top of D-Cell House is

an exhaust system, which is about a floor higher than the 500 range and is located on the outer part of the metal grate that covers the ranges in D-Cell House. Id. at 2, 6. Any bird that might enter the D-Cell House and nest on top of the exhaust system would not be “anywhere close” to the cells located in D-Cell House. Id. at 2. The exhaust system pulls in fresh air from outside D-Cell House, passes it through air filters, and then

pushes it through a series of vents that are located at the top of the cellhouse facing the floor. ECF 85-7 at 1-2.

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Related

Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Loren Bagola v. Thomas Kindt
131 F.3d 632 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
Herbert L. Board v. Karl Farnham, Jr.
394 F.3d 469 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Townsend v. Fuchs
522 F.3d 765 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Knight v. Wiseman
590 F.3d 458 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Trade Finance Partners, LLC v. AAR CORP.
573 F.3d 401 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Eaton v. Onan Corp.
117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Indiana, 2000)
James Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
982 F.3d 451 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Gail Stockton v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin
44 F.4th 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2022)

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