Anderton v. Aronson

1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 216
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 15, 1886
StatusPublished

This text of 1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 216 (Anderton v. Aronson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderton v. Aronson, 1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 216 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1886).

Opinion

Lawrence, J.

When this action was before tbe general term on the appeal taken from the order denying the continuance of the temporary injunction, theretofore granted, the order at the special term was affirmed.

The presiding justice who delivered the opinion of the court-then said, that “there is much room for doubt whether the’ plaintiff, in respect to several of his alleged grounds of relief, is-at liberty to maintain this action without first showing that the-corporation has, on proper application for that purpose, refused to bring any suit, or to take any proper steps for the redress of those grievances.”

One of the first questions now to be considered is whether the plaintiff has established a right to maintain this action.

It was held by the court of appeals in Greaves agt. Gouge (69 N. Y., 154), that an action against an officer of a corporation to-[218]*218recover damages for a fraudulent misappropriation and conversion by him of the corporate property, can only be brought by a stockholder in his own name after application to and a refusal upon the part of the corporation to bring the action. The same ■doctrine was also enunciated in Robinson agt. Smith (3 Paige, 222, 223). And in the case of Leslie agt. Lorillard et al. (31 Hun, 305), the general term of this department said, in an action brought by a stockholder to restrain alleged wrongful acts of the corporation, that “ the complaint does not sufficiently aver that the corporation * * * has refused to bring an action to redress the alleged wrongs of its officers in such manner as to entitle the plaintiff to maintain this action as a stockholder of that corporation. To give him that right the stockholder must aver that the corporation has refused to bring the action.” And further on in the opinion it is stated that “ the refusal of the board of directors in such a case is essential in order to give the stockholder any standing in court, as the charter confers upon the directors the general management of the business of the company.”

In Hawes agt. Oakland (104 U. S. Rep., 460), a very strong opinion is rendered to the same effect. In Brinckerhoff agt. Bostwick (88 N. Y., 52), which was an action brought by a stockholder in behalf of all the other stockholders against the receiver of a national bank, and the directors thereof, to recover the ■damages alleged to have been sustained by the stockholders 1 through the gross negligence and inattention to the duties of their trust by said directors; it being alleged that the receiver was himself one of the directors chargeable with such neglect of duty, Rapallo, J., said: “ For these losses the bank, if still exercising its corporate functions, would have a claim upon the guilty'directors, which it could enforce by action. But if it - refused to prosecute, or if it still remained under the control of ■the very directors against whom the action should be brought, the stockholders would have a standing in a court of equity to ¡ sue in their own names, making the corporation a party defendant.”

[219]*219In. this case it is not claimed that any demand has been made ’by the plaintiff upon the board of directors to bring the action. "The allegation in respect to that matter is contained in the sixty-fourth paragraph of the complaint, which alleges that “inasmuch as the defendant Aronson controls a majority of the board •of directors, who are friendly to him, and aid and assist him in .his illegal acts, and without whose consent or direction this action cannot be brought, this suit has been commenced by the plaintiff, and the said corporation, the New York Concert Company (limited), is made a party defendant.”

That allegation is denied in the sixty-fourth paragraph of the answer of Eudolph Aronson, Albert Aronson and the New York Concert Company (limited), ancLsao direct proof was given .to substantiate it, the fact of the defendant, Eudolph Aronson, possessing such control, resting upon inferences, to be drawn from the general proofs which were offered in regard to the proceedings of the several boards of directors, which are the subject •of investigation in this action. Although the facts were much more clearly developed upon the trial than they were in the .affidavits upon which the injunction was claimed, still the main facts proven upon the trial were before the court on that application. And as the appellate branch of this court, while intimating grave doubts as to the ability of the plaintiff to maintain this action, did not go so far as to deny that he might be enti-fled to some relief, and as I am of the opinion that the just and fair inference to be drawn from the evidence is, that an application to the corporation to bring an action would have been •of no avail, for the reason that the majority of the directors were friendly to Eudolph Aronson, I think it should be held -that the plaintiff has a standing in court I am strengthened -in this opinion after reading the decision of the court of appeals in Barr agt. The New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company (96 N. Y., 444, 450), which seems to be the most ■recent case in that court upon this subject. This case has been most thoroughly tried, and counsel have filed very elaborate sand instructive briefs. Under such circumstances, unless con[220]*220strained by the most controlling authority, I do not think that I should decline to consider it upon its merits. It was urged that so far as this action relates to the 200 shares of stock, originally issued to Eudolph Aronson, the plaintiff has no standing in court, inasmuch as it appears that such stock was directed to be issued to him, either at the first meeting held in September, 1881, or shortly thereafter, and that the plaintiff did not purchase his stock until the 14th of June, 1882.

The authorities upon this point in this state seem to be conflicting. In Young agt. Drake and others (8 Hun, 61), Gilbert, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, after holding that the stockholder might maintain the action, because it had been shown that the corporation was still controlled by the same trustees, who were accused of the fraud, or where such accused persons are a majority of the trustees, goes on to say: “It is enough that the plaintiff was a stockholder when the action was brought. If he purchased his stock after the alleged fraud was committed, that did not condone the fraud. The plaintiff acquired all the-rights of the person of whom he purchased ”; and he cites the case of Ramsey agt. Gould (57 Barb., 398), as an authority for that proposition.

On the other hand, in the case of Patterson agt. Baker (6 T. & C., 76), which was an action brought by the holder of circulat-ing notes of a bank against a director for damages by reason of the notes having been rendered worthless by the acts of the-defendant and the other directors, it was held that the complaint was demurrable, because it did not show that the acts-occurred subsequent to the plaintiff’s acquisition of the notes.

To the same effect is the case of Butt agt. Cameron (53 Barb., 642).

In this case the plaintiff did not acquire the title to his stock until June 14, 1882. The precise date of the acquisition of the-stock is not stated in the complaint, the allegation being as before-stated, “that the plaintiff has owned and held the same (i.

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Bluebook (online)
1 How. Pr. (n.s.) 216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderton-v-aronson-nysupct-1886.