Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided August 4, 2016·No. 14-879·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 14-879V Filed: June 28, 2016

* * * * * * * * * * * * * DONNA ANDERSON * * UNPUBLISHED Petitioner, * * Special Master Gowen v. * * Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Donna Anderson, pro se. Adriana R. Teitel, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Andrew D. Downing, Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC, as Petitioner’s former counsel.

DECISION ON INTERIM ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS1

On September 22, 2014, Donna Anderson (“Petitioner’) filed a Petition for compensation, with the assistance of counsel Andrew Downing, under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- 1 et seq. (2012). Petitioner alleged the she suffered from severe pain, total numbness, loss of dexterity, exhaustion, spasms, atrophy, constipation, and urinary problems as a result of the administration of the influenza (“flu”) vaccine on October 11, 2012. Petition (“Pet.”) at 1.

On March 23, 2016, Mr. Downing filed a motion to withdraw as the attorney of record for Petitioner. This motion was granted after a telephonic status conference with the Petitioner, Mr.

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the undersigned’s action in this case, the undersigned intends to post this ruling on the website of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). As provided by Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has 14 days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b).

1 Downing, and Respondent’s counsel on April 6, 2016. Petitioner is now proceeding with her case pro se.

On April 20, 2016, Mr. Downing filed a motion for an order granting him standing for the purpose of filing an application for attorneys’ fees and costs. Mr. Downing’s motion for standing was granted in an order issued contemporaneously with this decision. In the application for attorneys’ fees and costs, Mr. Downing requested a total award of $32,868.67, and Petitioner requested $2,400.00 as reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses related to this litigation. See Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (“Application”) at 1-3, filed May 20, 2016.

On June 6, 2016, Respondent filed a response to Mr. Downing’s Application. See Response to Application for Standing and Application for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Response”), filed June 6, 2016. In her response, Respondent indicated that she deferred to the special master’s discretion regarding whether an award of interim fees and costs incurred are appropriate, and did not object to the overall amount sought for Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 1-4. Respondent objected, however, to the inclusion of petitioner’s consultation with Dr. Amiram Katz as an out-of-pocket litigation cost, and questioned the reasonableness of the requested amount for Dr. Katz’s expert report. Id. at 5.

On June 20, 2016, Mr. Downing filed a reply to respondent, arguing that “an expert neurologist who reviews the medical chart and medical literature, and ultimately authors an expert report that is filed in a Vaccine Program claim, will frequently (if not always) incur a bill greater than $2000 for the work performed.” Reply to Response (“Reply”) at 2, filed June 20, 2016. Mr. Downing further argued that “[t]his is not an amount that is even remotely large or questionable based on what other neurologists typically charge the Program for their expert services.” Id.

Petitioner’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs is now ripe for a decision.

I. Discussion

The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. section 300aa-15(e). Additionally, interim fee awards are permissible under the Act. See Avera v. Sec’y of HHS, 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Shaw v. Sec’y of HHS, 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010). When a petitioner has yet to prove entitlement, a special master “may award an amount of compensation” for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs “if the special master . . . determines that the petition was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B); Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013).

“Good faith” is a subjective standard and petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith. Hamrick v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 99-683V, 2007 WL 4793152, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007); Grice v. Sec’y of HHS, 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Conversely, “reasonable basis” is an “objective consideration determined by the totality of the circumstances.” McKellar v. Sec’y of HHS, 101 Fed. Cl. 297, 303 (2011); Chuisano v. U.S., 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 286 (2014). In determining a reasonable basis, the Court looks “not at the likelihood of success [of a claim] but more to the feasibility of the claim.” Turner v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 99-544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007) (citing Di Roma v. Sec’y of HHS, No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at

2 *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993)). Factors to be considered include the factual basis of the claim, medical support, and the circumstances under which a petition is filed. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-*9.

The Federal Circuit has approved use of the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under the Vaccine Act. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349. Using the lodestar approach, a court first determines “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys’ fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347-58 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Then, the court may make an upward or downward departure from the initial calculation of the fee award based on other specific findings. Id. at 1348. Special masters are permitted to reduce the claimed number of hours to a reasonable number by means of a bulk reduction and are not required to assess fee petitions line- by-line. Wasson v. Sec'y of HHS, 24 Cl.Ct. 482, 484 (1991). Just as “[t]rial court courts routinely use their prior experience to reduce hourly rates and the number of hours claimed in attorney fee requests . . . [v]accine program special masters are also entitled to use their prior experience in reviewing fee applications.” Saxton v. Sec'y of HHS, 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Farrar v. Sec'y of HHS, 1992 WL 336502 at * 2 - *3 (Cl. Ct. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 2, 1992)).

a.

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Related

Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Avera v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
515 F.3d 1343 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
Sebelius v. Cloer
133 S. Ct. 1886 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Shaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
609 F.3d 1372 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
Chuisano v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
116 Fed. Cl. 276 (Federal Claims, 2014)
Grice v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
36 Fed. Cl. 114 (Federal Claims, 1996)
McKellar v. Secretary of Health & Human Services
101 Fed. Cl. 297 (Federal Claims, 2011)