1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES P. ANDERSON, Case No. 21-cv-00922-WHO
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT v. 9 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
10 KEVIN RUNGE, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff James P. Anderson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is DISMISSED with 15 leave to file an amended complaint on or before July 16, 2021. His action cannot proceed 16 as currently constituted because it is unclear whether Anderson will be able to state a 17 cognizable claim, and it is unclear whether Anderson has named property defendants. 18 Failure to file a proper amended complaint by the deadline, or a failure to comply in 19 every respect with the instructions given in this order, will result in the dismissal of this 20 suit and the entry of judgment in favor of defendants. 21 DISCUSSION 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 24 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 25 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 26 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 27 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 1 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 3 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 4 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 5 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 6 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 8 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 9 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 10 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 12 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 13 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 14 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 II. LEGAL CLAIMS 16 Anderson alleges that he “was returned” to his cell “without any personal property.” 17 (Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”) at 3.) He seeks the return of his property, and damages. (Id.) 18 A. Anderson must clarify his claim. 19 It is unclear from the Complaint whether Anderson’s property was stolen or 20 whether he was deprived of his property pursuant to an SQSP policy. On the one hand, 21 Anderson names two defendants whom he alleges have stolen, or attempted to steal, 22 inmates’ property in the past. (See Compl. at 2.) On the other hand, exhibits attached to 23 the Complaint suggest that Anderson’s property was “mailed out” of SQSP in accordance 24 with prison regulations while Anderson was serving a prison disciplinary sentence. (See 25 id., Ex. 1.) 26 If Anderson’s property was stolen, then he should proceed in state court. Although 27 in general due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of hearing 1 intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under § 1983 if the 2 deprivation was random and unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 3 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other 4 grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 5 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). It is difficult to see how the 6 theft of an inmate’s property by a correctional officer could be anything but unauthorized. 7 In such instances, the availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state 8 tort action, precludes relief because it provides sufficient procedural due process. See 9 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore 10 provide meaningful hearing prior to, deprivation statutory provision for post-deprivation 11 hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process). 12 California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. 13 Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). 14 Accordingly, if Anderson believes that defendants stole his property, he should file a tort 15 action in state court. 16 If Anderson was deprived of his property pursuant to a policy, then he may be able 17 to state a federal claim. If the deprivation of an inmate’s property is not random and 18 unauthorized, but the result of “established state procedure,” the availability of a post- 19 termination tort action does not necessarily provide due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman 20 Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-37 (1982) (failure on part of state commission to hold 21 hearing within statutory time limits not permitted to terminate timely filed claim). Parratt 22 does not apply where the state has procedures designed to control the actions of state 23 officials and the officials act pursuant to those procedures. See Zimmerman v. City of 24 Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2001); Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866 (9th 25 Cir. 1994), aff’d in part on relevant grounds and vacated in part on other grounds on 26 reh’g en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In those instances, the Fourteenth 27 Amendment requires “‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a 1 U.S. at 437. Due process is violated where a deprivation is predictable and pre-deprivation 2 process possible, but state officials, acting under apparent authority of state procedures, 3 provide no pre-deprivation procedure and are specifically charged with the authority to 4 effect the deprivation complained of. See Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 739 (holding that a due 5 process challenge to the deprivation of property may go forward where (1) the deprivation 6 took place at a specific, predictable point in the seizure process; (2) the seizing officer was 7 delegated the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of; and (3) he 8 also had the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up under the local 9 ordinance); Armendariz, 31 F.3d at 866.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMES P. ANDERSON, Case No. 21-cv-00922-WHO
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT v. 9 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
10 KEVIN RUNGE, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff James P. Anderson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is DISMISSED with 15 leave to file an amended complaint on or before July 16, 2021. His action cannot proceed 16 as currently constituted because it is unclear whether Anderson will be able to state a 17 cognizable claim, and it is unclear whether Anderson has named property defendants. 18 Failure to file a proper amended complaint by the deadline, or a failure to comply in 19 every respect with the instructions given in this order, will result in the dismissal of this 20 suit and the entry of judgment in favor of defendants. 21 DISCUSSION 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 24 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 25 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 26 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 27 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 1 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 3 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 4 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 5 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 6 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 8 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 9 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 10 (9th Cir. 1994). 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 12 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 13 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 14 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 II. LEGAL CLAIMS 16 Anderson alleges that he “was returned” to his cell “without any personal property.” 17 (Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”) at 3.) He seeks the return of his property, and damages. (Id.) 18 A. Anderson must clarify his claim. 19 It is unclear from the Complaint whether Anderson’s property was stolen or 20 whether he was deprived of his property pursuant to an SQSP policy. On the one hand, 21 Anderson names two defendants whom he alleges have stolen, or attempted to steal, 22 inmates’ property in the past. (See Compl. at 2.) On the other hand, exhibits attached to 23 the Complaint suggest that Anderson’s property was “mailed out” of SQSP in accordance 24 with prison regulations while Anderson was serving a prison disciplinary sentence. (See 25 id., Ex. 1.) 26 If Anderson’s property was stolen, then he should proceed in state court. Although 27 in general due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of hearing 1 intentional deprivation of property states a due process claim under § 1983 if the 2 deprivation was random and unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 3 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner’s hobby kit), overruled in part on other 4 grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 5 517, 533 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). It is difficult to see how the 6 theft of an inmate’s property by a correctional officer could be anything but unauthorized. 7 In such instances, the availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, e.g., a state 8 tort action, precludes relief because it provides sufficient procedural due process. See 9 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore 10 provide meaningful hearing prior to, deprivation statutory provision for post-deprivation 11 hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due process). 12 California law provides such an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. 13 Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). 14 Accordingly, if Anderson believes that defendants stole his property, he should file a tort 15 action in state court. 16 If Anderson was deprived of his property pursuant to a policy, then he may be able 17 to state a federal claim. If the deprivation of an inmate’s property is not random and 18 unauthorized, but the result of “established state procedure,” the availability of a post- 19 termination tort action does not necessarily provide due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman 20 Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-37 (1982) (failure on part of state commission to hold 21 hearing within statutory time limits not permitted to terminate timely filed claim). Parratt 22 does not apply where the state has procedures designed to control the actions of state 23 officials and the officials act pursuant to those procedures. See Zimmerman v. City of 24 Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2001); Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 866 (9th 25 Cir. 1994), aff’d in part on relevant grounds and vacated in part on other grounds on 26 reh’g en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In those instances, the Fourteenth 27 Amendment requires “‘an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a 1 U.S. at 437. Due process is violated where a deprivation is predictable and pre-deprivation 2 process possible, but state officials, acting under apparent authority of state procedures, 3 provide no pre-deprivation procedure and are specifically charged with the authority to 4 effect the deprivation complained of. See Zimmerman, 255 F.3d at 739 (holding that a due 5 process challenge to the deprivation of property may go forward where (1) the deprivation 6 took place at a specific, predictable point in the seizure process; (2) the seizing officer was 7 delegated the power and authority to effect the very deprivation complained of; and (3) he 8 also had the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up under the local 9 ordinance); Armendariz, 31 F.3d at 866. 10 If Anderson chooses to amend, he must clarify whether he believes his property was 11 stolen or whether it was confiscated pursuant to an SQSP policy. 12 B. Anderson must name only proper defendants. 13 Anderson names two defendants in his Complaint: Property Officer Runge and 14 Property Officer Richardson. (Compl. at 2.) If Anderson’s property was taken pursuant to 15 an SQDP policy, the exhibits attached to the Complaint suggest that Property Officer 16 Runge deprived Anderson of his property. (See generally, id., Exs. 1-35H.) As to 17 Property Officer Richardson, Anderson appears to allege only that he spoke to this 18 defendant about the missing property. (See id. at 3.) But if Anderson believes that his 19 property was stolen, then the Complaint suggests that Anderson also believes both Runge 20 and Richardson were involved in the theft. (See id. at 2.) 21 To state a claim against a particular defendant for a violation of his civil rights, 22 Anderson must allege that the defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongs. 23 To do so, he must show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused 24 the deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 726 25 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 26 Either personal involvement or integral participation in the alleged constitutional violation 27 is required before liability may be imposed. See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769- 1 || the pleading stage, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that 2 |} an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. 3 || Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 If Anderson chooses to amend, he must identify the specific wrongful actions taken 5 || by defendants Runge and Richardson. 6 CONCLUSION 7 The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to file an amended complaint on or before 8 || July 16, 2021. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number 9 || used in this order (21-0922 WHO (PR)) and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 || on the first page. The amended complaint must also appear on this Court’s form. Because 11 || an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaints, plaintiff must include 2 in his first amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all of the defendants 5 13 || he wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may 14 || not incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. 15 Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 16 || dismissal of this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to
17 || prosecute. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: May 17, 2021 h ( “VQe 20 . LLIAM H. ORRICK 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28