Anderson v. Coolin

149 P. 286, 27 Idaho 334, 1915 Ida. LEXIS 48
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedMay 20, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 149 P. 286 (Anderson v. Coolin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. Coolin, 149 P. 286, 27 Idaho 334, 1915 Ida. LEXIS 48 (Idaho 1915).

Opinion

BUDGE, J.-

— W. B. Mitchell appeared in the district court

of the eighth judicial district as an attorney in the case wherein W. A. Anderson was plaintiff and Andrew Coolin, W. B. Mitchell, trustee, E. H. Berg, trustee, Charles W. Beardmore and Washington Trust Co., a corporation, were defendants. An appeal from the judgment in said cause is now pending in this court, in which the said W. B. Mitchell appears as attorney for the respondents, in whose behalf he prepared, filed and served upon counsel for the appellants a brief in said cause. On May 1st, 1915, counsel for appellant filed a motion in this court “to strike from all the papers and files originally filed in this court the name of W. B. Mitchell as attorney for respondent, .... upon the ground that the said W. B. Mitchell is not an attorney admitted or entitled to practice in the courts of Idaho, and upon the further ground that the district court has no power or authority to permit an attorney to practice law in this state, and particularly no authority to permit or grant him leave to appear in this court, and that the district judge, from whose decision this appeal is prosecuted, has never pretended or purported to grant such leave, and upon the further ground that the records and files in this case show that the said W. B. Mitchell is not entitled to be extended the right to appear as attorney for any litigant by courtesy or otherwise.”

See. 3990, Rev. Codes, provides: “Any citizen or person, resident of this state, who has bona fide declared his intention to become a citizen in the manner required by law, of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission as attorney and counselor in all courts of this state.”

[337]*337Sec. 3991, Rev. Codes, as amended by Sess. L. 1909, p; 110, provides: “Every applicant for admission as an attorney and counselor must produce satisfactory testimonials of good moral character, and, except as hereinbefore provided, undergo a strict examination in open court as to his qualifications, by the justices of the supreme court.”

Sec. 3992, Rev. Codes, provides: “If, upon such examination in the supreme court, the applicant is found qualified, the court shall admit him as attorney and counselor in all the courts in this state, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its record, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of the court, which certificate is his license. ’ ’

Sec. 3993, Rev. Codes, provides: “Every person, before receiving license to practice law, shall take the oath prescribed by law, and shall pay to the state treasurer the sum of twenty-five dollars for the use of the state library fund, and the clerk of the court shall require of the person so admitted the receipt of the said treasurer, before issuing such license, and in no ease shall the oath be administered or the license issued until such receipt is produced and filed in the office of the clerk.”

Sec. 3995, Rev. Codes, provides: “Each clerk must keep a roll of attorneys and counselors admitted to practice by the court of which he is clerk, which roll must be signed by the person admitted before he receives a license. ’ ’

Sec. 3996, Rev. Codes, provides: “If any person shall practice law in any court, except a justice’s court, without having received a license as attorney and counselor, he is guilty of a contempt of court. ’ ’

The district courts of this state, prior to the amendment of section 3991, Rev. Codes, supra, were authorized to admit applicants to practice as attorneys and counselors in the district courts of this state, upon like testimonials and examinations as are required now to be furnished and taken in the supreme court; but are not now so authorized.

Sec. 3997, Rev. Codes, provides the duty of an attorney and counselor, by the provisions of which he is required, inter [338]*338alia, to support the constitution and laws of the United States and this state, and to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. Rules of duty are further prescribed in this section, which are intended to regulate and control the conduct of attorneys and counselors with regard to the public and to those in whose behalf they appear in court and exercise their appropriate functions.

Sec. 4002, Rev. Codes, provides that an attorney is subject to the authority of the courts and may be, for cause shown, suspended or removed and deprived of the right to pursue his profession, by the supreme court. This may be for any of the causes enumerated- in said section, arising after his admission to practice. Subdivision 4 of sec. 4002, supra, provides, as one of the causes for which an attorney may be removed or suspended, the following:

“Lending his name to bé used as an attorney and counselor by any other person who is not an attorney and counselor.”

Said subdivision applies to regularly admitted resident attorneys of this state who, with knowledge, permit the use of their names by persons who have not been admitted either upon examination before the supreme court of this state, or upon motion as provided by sec. 3994, Rev. Codes, as amended by Sess. L. 1911, p. 338, resulting in such unauthorized persons appeáring as attorneys and counselors in the courts of this state.

All of the foregoing provisions of the statute were enacted, not only in the interest of those who employ the services of attorneys, but in the interest of the public at large.

Sec. 3994, Rev. Codes, as amended, supra, provides:

“The examination may be dispensed with in the case of any person who has been admitted to practice law under license or certificate from the highest court of another state or territory, and has been thereafter actually engaged in the practice of law as a principal occupation for not less than three years immediately preceding with [the] date of application for admission to practice in the state, and who is in good standing as such. The court shall, before admitting such person, require the production of his license or certificate and an [339]*339affidavit of his standing, and shall satisfy itself by questioning the applicant under oath, and such other means as it may adopt, that he has been engaged in actual practice as above stated.”

It will be conceded that the terms and conditions of the admission of an attorney to practice law, or to continue in the practice of law, as well as his powers, duties and privileges, are proper subjects of legislative control, to the same extent and subject to the same limitations as in the case of any other profession or business that is created or regulated by statute. It is a privilege or franchise that is extended' by legislative enactment, conditioned upon a compliance with the statutes regulating the practice of the law and the conduct of the attorney in his private life and dealings with the public, and the respect due the courts of justice and judicial officers. The legislature may rightfully provide under what circum-. stances and conditions attorneys may appear before the courts of this state in the practice of their profession, as well as provide that certain acts shall have been performed before the machinery of the courts is put in operation.

Sec. 4198, Eev. Codes, provides:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
149 P. 286, 27 Idaho 334, 1915 Ida. LEXIS 48, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-coolin-idaho-1915.