Anderson v. City of Tea

2006 SD 112, 725 N.W.2d 595, 2006 S.D. LEXIS 199, 2006 WL 3523998
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 6, 2006
Docket23949
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2006 SD 112 (Anderson v. City of Tea) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. City of Tea, 2006 SD 112, 725 N.W.2d 595, 2006 S.D. LEXIS 199, 2006 WL 3523998 (S.D. 2006).

Opinion

MILLER, Retired Justice.

[¶ 1.] In this appeal we affirm the circuit court and hold that petitions seeking to bring a municipal ordinance to a public vote do not conform to statutory requirements.

[¶ 2.] Deb Anderson objected to a resolution adopted by the City of Tea that required the construction of sidewalks along various streets and avenues in the municipality. She and others circulated petitions among the residents of Tea attempting to refer the resolution to a public vote. The petitions were filed with the city finance officer, but rejected for failure to conform with statutory formatting guidelines. Anderson requested a writ of mandamus from the circuit court seeking to compel the City to conduct the election. The circuit court, following a hearing, denied Anderson’s request “because the Petitions were not self-contained as required by South Dakota law.” Anderson appeals. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶ 3.] The parties stipulated to the following basic facts.

• On February 7, 2005, the City of Tea, acting through its Common Council adopted Resolution No. 05-02-03 entitled Resolution of Necessity — -Resolution Declaring the Necessity to Construct Sidewalk on Various Streets and Avenues in Tea, South Dakota and Assessing the Cost of Each Lot or Tract of Land Benefiting Thereby (hereinafter “Resolution”).
• Resolution No. 05-02-03 was published in the Tea Champion on February 23, 2005.
• Within twenty (20) days of the publication of Resolution No. 05-02-03, Anderson with assistance of legal counsel and in conjunction with other qualified electors of the City of Tea, prepared, circulated, and signed petitions protesting the passage of the resolution and petitioning that the resolution be submitted to a vote of the qualified and registered electors of the City of Tea for their approval or rejection, as provided by law.
• The signatures contained a sufficient number of qualified voters in order to require a referendum election on the resolution of necessity.
• On March 14, 2005, all of the petitions so circulated were filed with the finance officer for the City of Tea.
• Based upon advice of the Secretary of State and legal counsel, it was determined that the referendum petitions did not conform to the requirements of State Law.

*597 [¶ 4.] The appeal raises the following issue:

Did the circuit court err in determining that the referendum petitions did not conform to South Dakota law?

Standard of Review

[¶ 5.] Our rules of statutory construction are as follows:

Questions of law such as statutory interpretation are reviewed by the Court de novo.... The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed. Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. When the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.

Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17 (citing U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 505 N.W.2d 115, 122-23 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted))).

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 6.] The sole issue before this Court is whether each page of a municipal referendum petition must be signed and verified by the circulator. Anderson argues that the circuit court erred when it determined that the referendum petitions were not self-contained because only the last, rather than each individual page, contained the required verification. She argues that only SDCL 9-20-9 applies to municipal referendums and that SDCL 2-1-9, which requires that each page of a petition must be verified, is not applicable to municipal election petitions.

[¶ 7.] This Court previously addressed the issue of verification in two key cases. First, in Corbly v. City of Colton, 278 N.W.2d 459 (S.D.1979), the Court analyzed SDCL 9-20-9, SDCL 2-1-10 and SDCL 2-1-11, as they read at the time, to determine if a referendum petition can be valid without a verifying affidavit by the circulator.

[¶ 8.] In examining the issue of verification, this Court held that “[v]erifi-cation, as used in connection with referendum petitions, means the swearing under oath by the circulator that he or she has personally circulated the petition and attests to the validity of the signatures.” Id. at 461 (citing Nist v. Herseth, 270 N.W.2d 565 (S.D.1978)). “Requirements for circulation and verification of referendum petitions, whether statutory or administratively adopted, are substantial in character and not merely requirements of form.” Id. (citing Nist, 270 N.W.2d 565 (S.D.1978); Headley v. Ostroot, 76 S.D. 246, 76 N.W.2d 474 (1956)). Therefore, verification requirements must “have been substantially complied with in order to render the petition valid.” Id.

[¶ 9.] In reiterating that the provisions of SDCL chapter 2-1 are applicable to *598 municipal elections, we held in Baker v. Jackson, 372 N.W.2d 142 (S.D.1985), that SDCL

Related

Zubke v. Melrose Township
2007 SD 43 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 2007)
McKittrick v. McKittrick
2007 SD 44 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 2007)
Johnson v. Powder River Transportation
2007 SD 26 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 2007)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 SD 112, 725 N.W.2d 595, 2006 S.D. LEXIS 199, 2006 WL 3523998, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-city-of-tea-sd-2006.