Andersen v. De Ramon

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Andersen v. De Ramon

99 A.D.2d 500, 471 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16695

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 16, 1984

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 99 A.D.2d 500 (Andersen v. De Ramon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Andersen v. De Ramon, 99 A.D.2d 500, 471 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16695 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Buell, J.), dated June 8,1983, which granted defendant De Ramon’s motion to vacate his default in answering the verified complaint. Order affirmed, with costs. On the totality of the circumstances recited and in light of the recent legislation that has served to repeal the Barasch-Eaton rule (Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594; Eaton v Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 56 NY2d 900; see CPLR 2005, 3012, subd [d]; L 1983, ch 318), we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in relieving defendant De Ramon of the consequences of his default upon the payment to plaintiff of $250 (Robinson v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 97 AD2d 837; Tehan v Tehan, 97 AD2d 840; cf. Zaldua v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 97 AD2d 842). Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Buell, J.), dated June 8,1983, which granted defendant De Ramon’s motion to vacate his default in answering the verified complaint. Order affirmed, with costs. On the totality of the circumstances recited and in light of the recent legislation that has served to repeal the Barasch-Eaton rule (Barasch v Micucci, 49 NY2d 594; Eaton v Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 56 NY2d 900; see CPLR 2005, 3012, subd [d]; L 1983, ch 318), we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in relieving defendant De Ramon of the consequences of his default upon the payment to plaintiff of $250 (Robinson v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 97 AD2d 837; Tehan v Tehan, 97 AD2d 840; cf. Zaldua v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 97 AD2d 842). Mollen, P. J., Gibbons, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

99 A.D.2d 500, 471 N.Y.S.2d 4, 1984 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16695, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/andersen-v-de-ramon-nyappdiv-1984.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack