Anakin Lock Works v. Dillon Lock Works

292 F. 45, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2941
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 30, 1923
DocketNo. 6268
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 292 F. 45 (Anakin Lock Works v. Dillon Lock Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anakin Lock Works v. Dillon Lock Works, 292 F. 45, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2941 (8th Cir. 1923).

Opinion

FARIS, District Judge.

Appellant, who was plaintiff below, sued defendant for alleged infringement of its patent No. 1,021,651, issued on the 26th day of March, 1912, for an auxiliary locking mechanism for safes and similar receptacles. Being cast below, on the ground that there was no infringement, plaintiff appeals. The defenses urged below, in so far as we deem it necessary to consider them, were: (a) That the device of defendant did not infringe the patent of plaintiff, even if such patent be valid; (b) that plaintiff’s patent is invalid, by reason of anticipation and for lack of invention; and (c) that plaintiff had no such title to the patent sued on, as warranted an action in its name.

The trial court found for plaintiff upon' the issues of the validity of the patent and of plaintiff’s title thereto, but found for defendant upon the issue of infringement, and dismissed plaintiff’s bill. From [46]*46this judgment plaintiff appealed in the usual mode. The claim in its patent, which plaintiff contends was infringed by the device of defendant, is numbered 5, and reads thus:

“In combination, a safe comprising a door having a main locking mechanism therefor, inactive auxiliary locking means for said safe, arranged to co-operate with the door to lock the same closed, independently of the main locking mechanism, and a flexible connection secured to the auxiliary locking means at one end, and extending across the main locking mechanism in the path of abhormal movement thereof; said connection being permanently connected at its opposite end to the door aforesaid.”

Safe doors, combination locks, or main" locking mechanisms, and inactive auxiliary locking means, are all old in the art. The crucial question in the case is whether defendant has infringed as much of the above claim as provides as a part of the invention “a flexible connection, secured to the auxiliary locking means at one end, and extending across the main locking mechanism in the path of abnormal movement thereof.”

Except for this phase of alleged similarity, the claim of plaintiff and the device of defendant urged as infringing are wholly dissimilar. The device of plaintiff, when the wire (i. e., flexible means) is pulled, or stressed, pulls down a lug, which lug is thus drawn from a recess in a single independent bolt, in which this lug normally engages, and a spring throws forward this independent bolt, which bolt, engaging in a prepared recess in the jamb of the safe door (at almost any desired point), again locks' the door. This wire, or flexible means, is operated by increased stress created when the main locking mechanism is pushed from its normal position. It will be noted that the claim does not call for an attachment of the wire, or flexible means, to the main locking mechanism. It simply extends across such main locking mechanism, and functions necessarily, only when the abnormal movement of the latter is at an angle, approximately, of 90° to the stress put upon the wire, or flexible connection. If the main locking mechanism move abnormally, but parallel to the line of stress, the auxiliary locking mechanism will not function, except in the presence, also, of the rectangular movement. Ordinarily, in actual practice, such parallel movement could not occur.

The device of defendant, urged as infringing, locks the bolt plate or bolt bar of the original locking mechanism, which bolt plate or bolt bar, by means of eccentric cams, operates the bolts (in number usually from 6 to 24), which engage in recesses in the sides, top, and bottom of the door. There is a wire,.or flexible means, which is attached in a stressed condition to the main locking mechanism by passing around a screw and, passing thence, is attached to some part of the safe door. When this wire is burnt, cut, or broken by any abnormal movement of the main locking mechanism, or when, by any movement or means, stress is removed from this wire, a lug is released, which, disengaging from a spring-operated block, allows the latter to swing on its axis and to be thrust against the bolt bar, thus preventing movement of the bolt bar, thereby relocking all of the 6 to 24 bolts, theretofore held locked by the main locking mechanism.

These differences inhere and are apparent: (a) In the device -of [47]*47plaintiff, a pull, or jerk, or stress is necessary to operate this wire; in the device of defendant, the opposite is true, for the wire functions and the device is operated by a release" of stress, either by burning, breaking, or otherwise severing the wire, or by a movement of the main locking mechanism in the direction of the theretofore inactive auxiliary locking means. So, if this wire is cut, broken, or burnt, or if the main locking mechanism is punched clear of the block in which it is fixed, so that it may be drawn by stress toward the auxiliary locking means, the latter immediately releases a block rotatably mounted on a bolt, which block, swinging around, engages the bolt bar or bolt plate and retains all of the original lock bolts in position. In short, plaintiff’s device operates by pull, and defendant’s by release of pull; one requires stress, the other release of stress, to operate it. (b) Plaintiff’s device, as forecast already, shoots an independent bolt into a recess in the jamb of the safe door, at almost any desired position; while that of defendant swings on its axis and throws a block against the bolt bar or bolt plate thus locking all of the original bolts in the identical position in which the main locking mechanism held these bolts before such latter locking mechanism was destroyed, (c) The flexible means in plaintiff’s device, merely passes over, or extends across the main locking mechanism, without being physically (except by bare contact) attached thereto; while the flexible means, or wire in defendant’s device, is fixed to the main locking mechanism by a bolt or screw and passing thence is connected with the safe door by another screw, (d) The abnormal movement, rectangular to the line of stress, which causes the device of plaintiff to function, would not cause that of defendant to operate, at least, till such movement had proceeded far enough to push the combination free of the block in which it is positioned.

In passing, it would to a mere layman seem, that the defendant’s device would function precisely the same, whether this wire were carried from its screw connection with the main locking mechanism to the safe door or not. Connecting the wire to the safe door merely increases the chances of severing it. But, be this as it may, we are dealing with the device as made, and not as it might be made.

The patent of- plaintiff is not a pioneer patent. Many devices of somewhat similar sort have long been known and used in the mechanical and commercial world. Some of these prior devices, indeed, and the patents protecting them, were offered on the trial as anticipatory of plaintiff’s device and as making for the invalidity of its patent. In case of a pioneer patent the claims are to be given a broad and liberal construction (Railway Co. v. Sayles, 97 U. S. 554, 24 L. Ed. 1053); while in case of a patent involving mere improve-' ments, in view of the prior art, the claims are to be narrowly construed and limited to the particular mechanism described, and any device which accomplishes the same result by means of different mechanism is not an infringement (Garneau v. Dozier, 102 U. S. 230, 26 L. Ed. 133; Kokomo Fence, etc., Co. v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
292 F. 45, 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2941, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anakin-lock-works-v-dillon-lock-works-ca8-1923.