Amoco Oil Co. v. Commonwealth

629 A.2d 259, 157 Pa. Commw. 222, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 445
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 19, 1993
DocketNo. 47 C.D. 1993
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 629 A.2d 259 (Amoco Oil Co. v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amoco Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 629 A.2d 259, 157 Pa. Commw. 222, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 445 (Pa. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

NARICK, Senior Judge.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (DOT), appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, denying DOT’s appeal from a decision of the Allegheny County Board of Viewers (Viewers). The decision of the Viewers granted Amoco Oil Company (Amoco) damages, pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code (Code),1 for the condemnation of a portion of their leasehold property. We affirm.

In 1954, Amoco entered into a lease with Ms. Alice Weiss (Ms. Weiss) to rent property located at 8140 Ohio River Boulevard in Emsworth, for the purpose of operating a gasoline service station. Amoco and Ms. Weiss continuously renewed the lease and in 1988 extended the lease through the year 2005.

Paragraph 12 of the lease agreement between Amoco and Ms. Weiss provides the following:

12. It is further covenanted and agreed that in the event of any change in grade of any adjoining streets, alleys or highways, or the condemnation of the whole or any part of the demised premises, LESSEE may, in the event it shall deem that the demised premises, or such portion thereof as shall remain after such condemnation, is not suitable for the purposes of a gasoline filling and service station, at its option, terminate this lease, or LESSEE may continue in possession of the remaining portion of the demised premises, in which event there shall be a proportionate reduction in rental in the same ratio as the area taken shall bear to the entire area included in this demise; and in addition to [225]*225the foregoing, LESSEE shall have any and all right or rights of action for all damages which may accrue to it against any person, firm or corporation by reason of any condemnation or other taking of the demised premises or any part thereof.

(3a) (emphasis added).

In December 1990, DOT informed Amoco of its plan to condemn a portion of the lease property. After receiving such notice Amoco evaluated its situation and determined that, pursuant to Emsworth’s zoning regulations, once the portion of property was condemned, Amoco would no longer be able to legally operate its service station on the remaining land.

In January 1991, Amoco submitted a letter to Ms. Weiss setting forth its desire to exercise its option to terminate the lease effective July 1, 1991. There is no evidence in the record that Amoco sought or received any rent reduction.

On March 5, 1991, DOT filed a Declaration of Taking in accordance with Section 402 of the Code, 26 P.S. § 1-402,2 condemning a portion of the lease property. Thereafter, Amoco filed a petition for the Appointment of Viewers to determine its damages under Section 502 of the Code, 26 P.S. § 1-502. On August 21, 1992, the Viewers issued a report awarding condemnation damages in the amount of $167,500.00, $131,000.00 of which was awarded to Amoco and $36,500.00 to Ms. Weiss.3

[226]*226DOT, Amoco and Ms. Weiss appealed to the trial court. The sole question raised by Amoco and Ms. Weiss concerns the amount of the award. DOT’s appeal alleged that because Amoco had no right to damages the court should determine their preliminary objection in accordance with Section 517 of the Code, 26 P.S. § 1-517.4 After consideration of briefs filed and oral arguments, the trial court affirmed the viewers determination and dismissed DOT’s appeal.

On appeal to this Court,5 DOT contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in affirming the viewers decision. Specifically DOT argues that Amoco had no standing to recover condemnation damages because:

the eligibility of a tenant to a portion of just compensation must fall within one of two categories. The first category being the bonus value approach where a total taking has occurred and the second category being a fair market value [227]*227approach in a partial taking where there is no rent abatement clause in the lease with the owner of the property.

(DOT’S brief at 12) (emphasis in original).

DOT contends initially that because this is not a total taking Amoco has no right to condemnation damages under the first category. Further it argues that because Amoco was entitled to rent abatement pursuant to the condemnation clause in the lease agreement, if Amoco chose to continue in possession it would forfeit its right to condemnation damages. We do not agree. In the present case Amoco never sought any rent abatement and continued paying the entire rent through the termination of the lease.

In making such an allegation, DOT’S interpretation fails to consider the specific language of the lease agreement. The condemnation clause of the lease agreement provides in addition to the lessee’s right to terminate or continue in possession with rent abatement, that the lessee has the right to any damages arising from a condemnation. The lease in no way conditions Amoco’s right to collect damages on whether or not they exercise these options.

In Hawk Sales Co. v. Department of Transportation, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 535, 394 A.2d 657 (1978), we held that in order to have standing to recover condemnation damages one must merely have a property interest at the time of the taking. The law clearly states that a leasehold interest is considered to be a property interest and the holder of such an interest is therefore entitled to just compensation for any whole or partial taking of his interest by eminent domain. Graham Realty Co. v. Department of Transportation, 67 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 318, 447 A.2d 342 (1982).6 Hence, the sole issue to be determined in the present case is whether Amoco [228]*228was in possession of a valid leasehold at the time of the condemnation.

DOT asserts that because Amoco submitted its termination letter one and one-half months before DOT filed its Declaration of Taking, Amoco was not in possession of a valid leasehold at the time of the condemnation. Although in January 1991 Amoco gave Ms. Weiss notice of its plan to terminate the lease, the actual termination was not effective until July 1991, three months after DOT filed its Declaration of Taking. Therefore, it is clear that the viewers were correct in finding that a valid leasehold existed between Amoco and Ms. Weiss at the time of the condemnation and as a result, that Amoco had standing to recover all damages it incurred as a result of the taking.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of DOT’s appeal.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of July, 1993, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.

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Related

Guttha v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation
871 A.2d 896 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2005)
Amoco Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation
679 A.2d 1369 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
629 A.2d 259, 157 Pa. Commw. 222, 1993 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amoco-oil-co-v-commonwealth-pacommwct-1993.