Amiryan v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 25-9540
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-9540 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 10, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ANDRANIK AMIRYAN,

Petitioner,

v. No. 25-9540 (Petition for Review) PAMELA J. BONDI, United States Attorney General,

Respondent. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Pro se Petitioner Andranik Amiryan seeks review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (BIA) order denying his motion to reopen proceedings. 1 Exercising

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition for review. 2

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Amiryan is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). 2 While the petition for review has been pending in this court, Amiryan has been removed from the United States. His removal, however, does not moot the Appellate Case: 25-9540 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 12/10/2025 Page: 2

I. Background

Amiryan, a native and citizen of Armenia, first entered the United States in

1997 as a lawful permanent resident. A series of criminal convictions led to the

revocation of Amiryan’s status as a lawful permanent resident, and he was removed

to Armenia in early 2008. In late 2009, Amiryan unlawfully reentered the United

States. He was subsequently arrested, convicted of illegal reentry after having been

deported, and sentenced to a fourteen-month term of imprisonment. After serving his

term of imprisonment, he was removed to Armenia again in early 2011. By his own

account, Amiryan illegally reentered the United States in May 2012.

In 2021, Amiryan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Following the conviction, the Department of

Homeland Security reinstated his prior order of removal. Amiryan then filed

applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (CAT protection). The immigration judge (IJ) held a hearing on the merits

where Amiryan presented evidence of harm and threats of harm to him and his

family. Amiryan testified about his interactions with a well-known high-ranking

member of a paramilitary group, that person’s demands for money, and physical and

petition for review. See, e.g., Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263, 1268 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020) (observing that a petitioner’s “removal has not mooted his petition for review because, in the event this court grants his petition, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] would facilitate his return to the United States pursuant to its Facilitation of Return Policy.” (internal quotations marks omitted)).

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verbal intimidation during his time in Armenia in 2011. Amiryan’s daughter testified

about her visit to Armenia where individuals approached her and her brother

inquiring about her father’s removal proceedings. The individuals called Amiryan a

“rat,” inquired about his return to Armenia, and then physically assaulted them.

Amiryan’s brother also testified about a call he received from an unknown man on an

unknown Russian number. The caller stated he knew Amiryan was in immigration

custody and threatened to “cut his throat.” R. vol. II at 598. Amiryan also testified

about his fear of returning to Armenia based on his cooperation with United States

law enforcement. He stated that he feared certain members of a paramilitary group

and the Russian Mafia and that he distrusted the Armenian police’s willingness to

provide protection.

After the hearing, the IJ issued a written decision denying Amiryan’s

applications. Amiryan appealed, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and

dismissed the appeal. Amiryan then filed a petition for review in this court. On

August 1, 2025, this court affirmed the BIA’s decision and denied the petition for

review. See Amiryan v. Bondi, No. 24-9564, 2025 WL 2181466, at *1 (10th Cir.

Aug. 1, 2025) (unpublished).

During the pendency of Amiryan’s petition in this court, Amiryan filed a

motion to reopen his immigration proceedings with the BIA asserting changed

country conditions that qualified him for withholding of removal and protection

under the CAT. Amiryan presented new evidence that his brother-in-law was

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physically attacked and verbally threatened in person and in a text message. He also

surmised the attackers obtained a copy of his reasonable fear interview as he believes

it was stolen by an Armenian man named Arman who was associated with Amiryan’s

2020 arrest.

In March 2025, the BIA denied Amiryan’s motion to reopen concluding it was

untimely and Amiryan’s claimed harm was a “continuation of the circumstances

previously considered by the [IJ] and that, without more, do not establish a material

change in country conditions in Armenia that support the reopening of proceedings

for further consideration of his claim for withholding of removal” and CAT

protection. See R. vol. I at 4. The BIA also concluded Amiryan did not demonstrate

prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT protection.

This petition for review followed.

II. Discussion

Amiryan challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his case on

several grounds. He asserts the BIA erred in concluding the motion was untimely

and that his claim of changed country conditions and new evidence demonstrate he is

prima facie eligible for withholding of removal and CAT protection.

This court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen immigration proceedings

for abuse of discretion. Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013).

“The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation,

inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains

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only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We

keep in mind motions to reopen are disfavored, and thus a petitioner bears a heavy

burden to show the BIA abused its discretion. Id. So even when a petitioner presents

new evidence, or a prima facie case for relief, the BIA has discretion to deny a

motion to reopen so long as “its rationale is clear, there is no departure from

established policies, and its statements are a correct interpretation of the law.”

Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th Cir. 2004). This is true even when

“the BIA’s decision is succinct.” Id.

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven” and supply

evidence to support them. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). “The new facts [a petitioner]

presents must demonstrate that if proceedings before the [IJ] were reopened . . . the

new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.” Maatougui,

738 F.3d at 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA may deny a motion to

reopen on at least three different grounds: (1) the petitioner has failed to establish a

prima facie case for the substantive relief sought; (2) the petitioner has failed to

produce new material evidence that was previously unavailable, and (3) in the case of

discretionary relief, the BIA may determine whether the petitioner would be entitled

to the discretionary grant of relief. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

A. Timeliness of Motion to Reopen

Amiryan argues the BIA erred by concluding his motion to reopen was

untimely. Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days following the

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final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to this

deadline if the petitioner filed the motion to apply (or reapply) for withholding of

removal and CAT protection under the changed country conditions exception.

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA concluded

Amiryan’s motion was untimely and that he did not demonstrate a material change in

country conditions sufficient to support the changed country conditions exception.

Nevertheless, the BIA proceeded to analyze the merits of Amiryan’s

withholding of removal and CAT protection claims and concluded he did not

establish prima facie eligibility for either type of relief. Amiryan contends that the

motion was timely filed and the BIA’s reliance on the changed country conditions

exception constituted legal error and materially affected its analysis by applying the

wrong standard.

The BIA stated that Amiryan’s motion, “filed on February 18, 2025, [was]

untimely.” R. vol. I at 3. But our review of the record shows the BIA

misapprehended when Amiryan filed his motion to reopen. See id. at 46, 60. Even

so, the BIA also denied the motion to reopen on the alternative grounds that Amiryan

failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for either withholding of removal or CAT

protection. It is on these grounds we affirm the BIA and deny the petition for review.

See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104. 3

3 Amiryan challenges the BIA’s determination that he did not present a material change in country conditions. But because we affirm the BIA and deny the petition for review on the alternative grounds, we need not decide this issue.

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B. Withholding of Removal

Amiryan contends that his new evidence establishes prima facie eligibility for

withholding of removal. Mandatory withholding of removal to another country is

available when an applicant’s “life or freedom would be threatened in [the country of

removal] because of the [applicant’s] race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The term

“particular social group” is not defined in the statute. See Rodas-Orellana v. Holder,

780 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Congress did not define the term ‘particular

social group’ in the INA.”). The BIA has interpreted the phrase to mean the group

(1) shares “a common, immutable characteristic . . . beyond the power of an

individual to change,” (2) is defined with “particularity,” meaning it “cannot be

indeterminate[,] . . . too subjective, inchoate, and variable,” and (3) is socially

distinct, meaning it is “perceived as a group by society.” Id. at 990-91 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

The BIA concluded Amiryan did not demonstrate how his proposed particular

social group “meets the general requirements of immutability, particularity, and

social distinction to be cognizable . . ., his membership in the group, or that his

claimed harm has a nexus to this ground.” R. vol. I at 5. The BIA also concluded

Amiryan did not sufficiently identify a political opinion, actual or imputed, that is

motivating the people he fears to harm him.

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Amiryan asserts he is eligible for withholding of removal based on his

membership in a particular social group. Amiryan describes his particular social

group as “Armenians whose sworn testimony against oligarchs becomes public.”

Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). He contends this group

consists of those who have testified against political elites “in a political climate

where dissenters and informants are severely punished.” Id. at 13. Although

Amiryan submits evidence that he has been threatened, and his family members were

attacked and threatened, in response to his testimony in immigration court and past

cooperation with United States authorities, he does not provide evidence of shared

characteristics that define the particular social group such that Armenian society

would perceive it as a group. This court’s precedent is clear that Amiryan must

provide evidence that Armenians would perceive “Armenians whose sworn

testimony against oligarchs that becomes public” as a distinct social group. See

Rodas-Orellana, 780 F.3d at 992. Thus, he fails to show the BIA’s conclusion was

arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.

Amiryan also asserts he is prima facie eligible for removal based on his

political opinion. He appears to argue that his membership in his proposed particular

social group imputes a political opinion associated with retaliation for exposing

corruption or abuse by political elites. But he does not explain, or provide evidence

of, how the individuals he fears are motivated to harm him because of his actual or

imputed political opinion. Motive is critical to establish the nexus between the harm

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and protected ground. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992)

(concluding that “since the statute makes motive critical, [an applicant] must provide

some evidence of it” to establish a fear of persecution because of a political opinion

(emphasis omitted)). Again, Amiryan fails to show the BIA’s conclusion was

C. CAT Protection

Amiryan contends his new concrete evidence of the clear risk of torture with

the Armenian government’s acquiescence demonstrates he is prima facie eligible for

CAT protection. Prima facie eligibility for CAT protection requires an applicant to

prove “it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to the proposed

country of removal.” Escobar-Hernandez v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir.

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Torture is defined as any act by which

severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . when such pain

or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence

of a public official.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). A public official’s

acquiescence requires that “the public official, prior to the activity constituting

torture, have awareness of such activity,” and fail to intervene. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(7). “[A]wareness requires a finding of either actual knowledge or

willful blindness.” Id.

The BIA succinctly concluded Amiryan’s evidence of Armenian prison

conditions and violence by police were insufficient to establish the need for CAT

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protection. The BIA also concluded that past torture was not necessarily enough to

demonstrate a high probability of particularized risk of future torture sufficient to

invoke CAT protection. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir.

2005) (“[U]nder the CAT a petitioner is not entitled to a presumption of future torture

based on evidence of past torture; nor does a showing of past torture automatically

render her CAT eligible.”).

Amiryan contends he submitted evidence of “credible, individualized threats,

including a violent attack on his brother-in-law by individuals who referenced [his]

immigration testimony and called him a ‘rat.’” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 14. He also

contends that the public officials’ failure to respond when his brother-in-law was

attacked shows the assault happened with government acquiescence. Finally, he

argues his country conditions evidence details “Armenia’s persistent failure to

prevent or investigate violence by politically connected individuals . . . against

whistleblowers and perceived dissidents.” Id. at 15.

We recognize Amiryan’s brother-in-law suffered a horrible attack, and the text

message is ominous. But Amiryan’s evidence does not demonstrate a high

probability that he will be tortured with the acquiescence of the Armenian

government. And under this court’s authority, generalized evidence of government

corruption and unsuccessful policing is insufficient to show actual knowledge or

willful blindness. See, e.g., Escobar-Hernandez, 940 F.3d at 1362 (“[P]ervasive

violence in an applicant’s country generally is insufficient to demonstrate the

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applicant is more likely than not to be tortured upon returning there.”). Thus,

Amiryan fails to demonstrate the BIA acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or in a manner

contrary to law in rejecting his CAT protection claim.

III. Conclusion

We conclude the BIA did not abuse its discretion and we deny the petition for

review.

Entered for the Court

Timothy M. Tymkovich Circuit Judge