Amir Sirous Najafabadi, V. Housing Authority Of Snohomish County

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: August 8, 2022
• Docket: 82656-5
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

AMIR SIROUS NAJAFABADI, ) No. 82656-5-I ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ) SNOHOMISH COUNTY, ) ) Respondent. )

CHUNG, J. — Amir Najafabadi appeals pro se the Housing Authority of

Snohomish County (HASCO)’s termination of his Section 8 Housing Choice

Voucher assistance. HASCO received notice that Najafabadi may have been

receiving subsidized housing from two agencies simultaneously, in violation of

state and federal regulations. After proper notice and an administrative hearing, at

which Najafabadi failed to appear, the agency terminated his voucher and

demanded repayment of the improperly received benefits. Najafabadi challenges

HASCO’s termination of his voucher and claims that he should have been provided

with an interpreter; however, he does not provide any citation to the record or

authority, or legal argument to support his request for relief. Based on the record

of the agency action, we identify no error. We affirm. No. 82656-5-I/2

FACTS

I. Najafabadi’s Housing Vouchers and Notice of Termination of Benefits

Amir Najafabadi applied to HASCO for a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher

in March 2019.1 In the application, he certified that he had never lived in subsidized

housing and that he was currently at risk of homelessness. He was granted a

housing voucher, which specified that the residence acquired using the benefit

must be his only residence and that he could not receive a simultaneous housing

subsidy from any other agency or program. Najafabadi signed the voucher

agreeing to these terms and certified that all information he provided in his voucher

application was true and complete. He entered into a lease, and HASCO began

making rental payments in July 2019.

In June 2020, the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) notified HASCO that

Najafabadi had been living in SHA subsidized housing since November 2018 and

it suspected he was receiving subsidies from both agencies. On September 23,

2020, after confirming that the individual reported by SHA was the same person,

HASCO provided Najafabadi written notice that it had grounds to terminate his

benefits. It also notified Najafabadi that he would be required to repay the

improperly received benefits. These notices provided information about the alleged

program violations and advised Najafabadi of his rights to dispute the termination

and proposed repayment schedule through HASCO’s informal hearing

procedures.

1The federal Section 8 rental voucher program subsidizes rental payments for

qualified families in need. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), 24 C.F.R. § 982.1.

2 No. 82656-5-I/3

II. Pre-Hearing Communications between HASCO and Najafabadi

Najafabadi timely notified HASCO that he wished to contest the decision.

HASCO scheduled the hearing date for October 15, 2020, and provided Najafabadi

a summary of the hearing procedures and information on how to access the

agency’s complete policies and procedures online. Shortly after that, an attorney

with the Eastside Legal Assistance Program representing Najafabadi contacted

HASCO to request that it postpone the hearing. About a week later, a second

attorney, from Galloway Law Group, unaffiliated with the first, made a similar

request on Najafabadi’s behalf. HASCO provided both attorneys with the

requested information and rescheduled the hearing to allow both counsel time to

prepare. The hearing was rescheduled for October 27, then at the request of the

attorney from Galloway Law Group, postponed again until “after November 3.”

Najafabadi, through both counsel, asked that the hearing be conducted via Zoom

video conference and the agency confirmed, providing both telephone and

internet-based access instructions.

When a third attorney, this one from Snohomish County Legal Services,

contacted HASCO on Najafabadi’s behalf to request to reschedule the hearing, it

was discovered that the three attorneys were unaware of their overlapping

representations. The hearing was rescheduled for November 10, 2020, while

Najafabadi’s attorneys sorted out the details of the representation. The attorney

through Eastside Legal Assistance Program withdrew immediately. The

Snohomish County Legal Services attorney agreed to take the lead on the case,

but withdrew from representation several days later. The night before the hearing,

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the attorney from Galloway Law Group who had agreed to take over the

representation asked for a continuance so that he could become familiar with the

evidence, so HASCO rescheduled the hearing again until November 23.

Galloway withdrew from his representation on November 20, but in doing

so, confirmed that Najafabadi “is aware of the hearing tomorrow, but I am not sure

how he plans to attend.” That same day, HASCO emailed Najafabadi to confirm

the hearing and provide him with instructions how to connect via either computer

or telephone. On November 22, 2020, the afternoon prior to the hearing,

Najafabadi emailed HASCO, stating, “Due to my mental and physical disability

condition, I am not able to attend an Informal hearing.” He requested “a formal

hearing at your first available time.” HASCO replied the next morning, explaining

that there is no “formal” hearing process in their administrative procedure. It

reiterated that the hearing would still occur that day via Zoom and that there would

be a phone call-in option in case of technology concerns. HASCO also invited

Najafabadi to request disability accommodations if needed in order to participate.

III. Communications After the Hearing

Najafabadi did not respond to this message, nor did he attend the hearing.

After Najafabadi’s failure to appear, based on the evidence contained in HASCO’s

informal hearing packet, the hearing officer upheld HASCO’s cancellation of

benefits and its order for repayment of improper benefits.

4 No. 82656-5-I/5

HASCO sent Najafabadi notice of the hearing officer’s decision via letter

dated November 24, which was also emailed to him that afternoon.2 This letter

included information on how to request reconsideration from the agency and how

to appeal to the superior court. In response to the decision, at 2:52 p.m., Najafabadi

contacted HASCO via email saying that he had not been able to attend the hearing

because “I had an issue with the Internet. I did not get a phone call from HASCO.

I already sent an email. That’s [sic] I request formal hearing at the first time

possible. Whatever, I do not agree with this decision.” Within an hour, HASCO

responded via email and reiterated that he had been provided clear instructions

and that the only option was the informal hearing. The email also noted that as the

dismissal letter stated, he could appeal to the superior court.

Later that same afternoon, at 5:12 p.m., Najafabadi sent another email

saying that he was “sick and in pain” and complained that HASCO staff “put too

much pressure on me . . . .” The next day, November 25, he sent an additional

message explaining that he had attempted to join the Zoom call for the hearing but

his internet had not been working. He asked HASCO to reconsider its decision and

reiterated his request for a formal hearing “in person as soon as possible.” Several

hours later, he sent a separate email directly to HASCO’s Director of Tenant Based

2 The HASCO email states the time as 10:25 p.m. (GMT), which would be 2:25

p.m. Pacific Standard Time. We may take judicial notice of those “facts capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy and verifiable certainty.” CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 809, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996) (citing State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wn.2d 772, 779, 380 P.2d 735 (1963)).

5 No. 82656-5-I/6

Assistance, asking “I wonder if you don’t have the internet how can I access in

Zoom.”

On November 26, HASCO rejected Najafabadi’s request for

reconsideration, reiterating that the only option was the informal hearing, which he

had missed; that the matter was closed; and that if he disagreed with the hearing

officer’s decision, he would have to appeal to the courts as stated in the dismissal

letter.

IV. Najafabadi’s Petition for Review to the Superior Court

Najafabadi subsequently sought a writ of review in Snohomish County

Superior Court. In his petition for review, he explained, “The Snohomish housing

authority gave me informal hearing on Zoom but I don’t have the internet to join

zoom. I requested formal hearing so that I can attend the hearing but they didn’t

have it.” In a later letter to the court, Najafabadi alleged, “The Snohomish housing

authority gave me a hearing on zoom and I didn’t have a chance to attend because

I was sick, and I called them but they didn’t respond.”

The superior court held that by failing to appear at the administrative

hearing, Najafabadi had waived his objections to HASCO’s termination and

repayment decisions. It also ruled that HASCO did not abuse its discretion by not

granting reconsideration under the circumstances, and that the decision to

terminate Najafabadi’s Section 8 voucher and seek repayment of improperly paid

rents were supported by substantial evidence. The court denied the petition for

review and upheld HASCO’s decision.

6 No. 82656-5-I/7

Najafabadi appeals pro se the superior court’s dismissal of his petition for

review.

ANALYSIS

We review the superior court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of review de

novo. City of Seattle v. Holifield, 170 Wn.2d 230, 240, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (citing

Sunderland Family Treatment Servs. v. City of Pasco, 127 Wn.2d 782, 788, 903

P.2d 986 (1995)). When we review a superior court’s decision on a writ of review,

we evaluate the “ ‘decision of the body that makes the findings and conclusions

relevant to the decision.’ ” Mansour v. King Cty., 131 Wn. App. 255, 262, 128 P.3d

1241 (2006) (quoting Davidson v. Kitsap Cty., 86 Wn. App. 673, 681, 937 P.2d

1309 (1997)).

“A writ of review is an extraordinary remedy granted by statute.” Holifield,

170 Wn.2d at 239. For a court to grant a statutory writ of review, two independent

prongs must be satisfied: “an inferior tribunal has (1) exceeded its authority or

acted illegally, and (2) no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at

law exists.” Id. at 240; RCW 7.16.040. As to the second prong, as HASCO

concedes, the only method of obtaining judicial review of a public housing agency’s

administrative hearing decision is through a statutory writ of review. Thus, in the

case of a review of a public housing authority’s denial or termination of benefits,

we review the legality of the hearing officer’s decision. Nichols v. Seattle Hous.

Auth., 171 Wn. App. 897, 903, 288 P.3d 403 (2012). One way in which a tribunal,

board, or officer “acts illegally” is by committing an obvious error that would render

further proceedings useless. Id. at 903 (citing Holifield, 170 Wn.2d at 244-45).

7 No. 82656-5-I/8

On appeal of a writ of review, we review issues of law de novo, and on

issues of fact, we review whether factual determinations were supported by

substantial evidence. Hilltop Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Island Cty., 126 Wn.2d

22, 29-30, 891 P.2d 29 (1995). “Ordinarily, an appellate court reviews the

administrative decision on the record of the administrative tribunal, not of the

superior court operating in its appellate capacity.” Hilltop Terrace, 128 Wn.2d at

29-30 (citations omitted). However, a court may consider evidence outside the

record on writ of review when the petition involves allegations of procedural

irregularities or appearance of fairness, or raises constitutional questions.

Responsible Urban Growth Group v. Kent, 123 Wn.2d 376, 384, 868 P.2d 861

(1994).

Here, regarding the agency’s actions, Najafabadi asks two questions: “Did

HASCO provide all terms, law regarding housing?” and “Did HASCO translate to

my language?”3 Unfortunately, the scope of his questions is unclear and his

briefing provides little to support these vague assignments of error.

Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and must

comply with all procedural rules on appeal. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App.

621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Failure to do so may preclude review. State v.

Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999). An appellant must

provide “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with

3 Najafabadi focuses his briefing mostly on his objections to the administrative

hearing proceedings, and he requests a new hearing in the superior court in order to present his case. But such relief is not available through a writ of review, which requires us to examine the administrative hearing itself.

8 No. 82656-5-I/9

citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP

10.3(a)(6). Arguments unsupported by references to the record or citation to

authority need not be considered. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118

Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

Najafabadi fails to provide any relevant citation or argument regarding how

or why he believes that HASCO’s hearing procedure or decision violated the law.

Similarly, insofar as his briefing alleges misconduct unrelated to the conduct of the

agency’s termination hearing, there is no record provided and no argument to

support such a review. In the absence of any meaningful argument, analysis or

authority to support his claims, we must reject them. See, e.g. Norcon Builders,

LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011); State

v. Rafay, 168 Wn. App. 734, 843, 285 P.3d 83 (2012).

I. Termination Hearing

To the extent we are able to provide a meaningful review of the agency’s

actions, there was no error. HASCO’s Administrative Plan, in accordance with

federal regulations for public housing authorities,4 requires HASCO to offer an

informal hearing for certain determinations, including termination of assistance.

There is no “formal” hearing procedure. The agency “has the sole discretion to

require that informal hearings be conducted remotely in case of local, state, or

national physical distancing orders,” as has been the case during the COVID-19

pandemic. To ensure due process and allow all parties to have full access to

4 24 C.F.R. § 982.555.

9 No. 82656-5-I/10

participate in the hearing, HASCO may conduct informal hearings remotely via

telephone or videoconferencing, as appropriate.

Najafabadi appears to mistakenly conflate the remote nature of the hearing

with its designation as an “informal hearing” and his ability to participate by

presenting evidence. He argued “the informal hearing won’t for me [sic] because I

can not provide witnesses, documents and evidence I have.” The hearing

procedures he was provided with, however, make it clear that “[y]ou may call

witnesses and present documents and other evidence relevant to the decision

being challenged.” As there was no right to any other kind of hearing to contest a

housing benefit termination, HASCO did not err by denying Najafabadi’s request

for a “formal” hearing.

Next, we consider whether the agency erred by denying Najafabadi’s

request to reconsider the decision, or to provide an opportunity for a second

hearing. According to the agency’s procedures, if a participant does not appear for

a scheduled hearing, they must contact the agency within 24 hours of the

scheduled hearing date; however, HASCO will reschedule the hearing “only if the

[participant] can show good cause for the failure to appear, or if it is needed as a

reasonable accommodation for a person with disabilities.” “Good cause” is defined

as “an unavoidable conflict which seriously affects the health, safety or welfare of

the [participant].” “If the [participant] cannot show good cause for the failure to

10 No. 82656-5-I/11

appear, or rescheduling is not needed as a reasonable accommodation, HASCO’s

decision will stand.”5

While Najafabadi did timely reach out to the agency after the hearing, his

purported reasons for missing the hearing were not supported by any evidence.

He stated he was disabled, but failed to request or document a need for a particular

reasonable accommodation, even after being specifically asked. His claim that he

did not have internet was belied by the multiple emails he sent in close proximity

to the hearing, both before and after. He did not attempt to call in to the hearing,

despite having clear instructions on how to use the telephone log-in option. His

purported technical difficulty, when all evidence pointed to the contrary, does not

meet the definition of good cause to support rescheduling the hearing after the

fact.

As for whether the agency should have reconsidered its substantive

decision, a participant may request reconsideration by the agency within ten

business days of the date of the order. “Any such request must be supported by

proof and/or corroboration of Participant’s reason for failing to appear” and must

be provided to both the housing specialist and the hearing officer. Najafabadi did

request reconsideration within the required timeframe, but failed to include the

hearing officer on the request and, further, provided no evidence or argument as

to his failure to appear. Under these circumstances, the agency did not exceed its

5 The agency’s procedures for rehearing or further hearing reiterate clearly that

“[f]ailure of the [participant] to appear for a scheduled informal hearing without good cause will result in the dismissal of the [participant’s] appeal and it will not be rescheduled.”

11 No. 82656-5-I/12

authority or act illegally by terminating Najafabadi’s housing voucher or by denying

reconsideration.

II. Access to Interpretation Services

Finally, regarding Najafabadi’s allegation that he was improperly denied

access to an interpreter, this argument is also unsupported either by citation to the

record or legal authority. Instead, our review of the record shows that HASCO

provided information about how to request interpretation and translation services,

along with the written notice of termination and the hearing outcome. In fact, after

HASCO first notified him of the decision to terminate his voucher, Najafabadi

requested an interpreter for a telephone call with HASCO to discuss the

allegations, and the agency accommodated the request. The first interpreter

requested to withdraw after a heated exchange in Farsi with Najafabadi. Another

interpreter then joined the call but also withdrew a short time later because

Najafabadi was “challenging and disrespectful.” Najafabadi agreed to continue the

conversation with HASCO staff in English. After the conversation ended,

Najafabadi followed the staff member’s oral instructions on how to submit a written

request for a hearing.

To the extent that Najafabadi argues that he should have had an interpreter

when he signed the housing voucher or at any other point in the process, he does

not provide meaningful analysis or argument in support of the issues “together with

citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record” as

required by RAP 10.3(a)(6). Further, Najafabadi has not met his burden to provide

a sufficient record to review such a claim. See In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn.

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App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990). HASCO’s Administrative Plan includes a

provision that the agency will provide interpretation services and translated

documents upon request, but Najafabadi provides no evidence or argument that

he ever requested language assistance.

As Najafabadi fails to provide any meaningful analysis or argument in

support of his right to language assistance at the time he executed the housing

voucher, to the extent we are able to review the claim, we determine there was no

error.

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR: