Amezquita v. Garcia-Cortez

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: March 26, 2021
• Docket: 5:20-cv-08285
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 JOSE G. AMEZQUITA, 11 Case No. 20-08285 BLF (PR) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND v. 13

14 GARCIA-CORTEZ, et al.,

15 Defendants.

17 18 Plaintiff, a state inmate, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”).1 Dkt. No. 1. 20 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be addressed in a separate 21 order. 22 DISCUSSION 23 A. Standard of Review 24 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 25 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 26 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 27 1 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 2 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 3 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally 4 construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 6 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 7 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 8 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 9 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 10 Plaintiff was transferred from RJ Donovan Correctional Facility to SVSP on 11 November 3, 2018. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. On September 30, 2019, he filed a lawsuit claiming 12 staff misconduct at RJ Donovan Correctional Facility. Id. Plaintiff claims that on January 13 23, 2020, he was shot with a 40 mm block gun by Defendant Correctional Officer Garcia- 14 Cortez. Id. Plaintiff claims he was shot “unnecessarily” while on SVSP’s A-yard. Id. On 15 February 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance alleging misconduct by Defendant 16 Garcia-Cortez for the unnecessary shooting. Id. On February 25, 2020, Plaintiff was 17 interviewed by Defendant Lt. Meredith regarding his staff complaint; the interview was 18 video recorded, and Plaintiff felt very intimidated. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that two days 19 later on February 27, 2020, Defendant Meredith removed him from his seat on the Inmate 20 Advisory Council (“Council”) in retaliation for filing a staff complaint. Id. Plaintiff filed 21 an appeal alleging misconduct against Defendant Meredith for removing him from the 22 Council without due process. Id. The appeal against Defendant Garcia-Cortez was denied 23 in April 2020. Id. In May 2020, Plaintiff’s appeal against Defendant Meredith was 24 partially granted, and he was reinstated onto the Council. Id. Then Plaintiff appealed both 25 matters to the third level appeal. Id. 26 Plaintiff claims he has been a victim of the “‘Green Wall’ prison officer conspiracy 1 right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment “by their 2 actions of physical abuse, emotional abuse, mental abuse, intimidation, retaliation, and 3 other violations of law” against him. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendants “knew or should 4 have known that their conduct, attitudes and actions created an unreasonable risk of serious 5 harm” to him, and that their actions and conduct demonstrate deliberate indifference to his 6 Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that as a result of these violations, he 7 “has suffered, is suffering, and will continue to suffer injuries in the form of physical 8 injury, fear, emotional distress, mental distress, and other injuries.” Id. Plaintiff seeks 9 damages. Id. at 3. 10 1. Eighth Amendment 11 The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 12 inhumane ones. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The treatment a 13 prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 14 scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). 15 In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the Eighth Amendment places 16 restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive force against 17 prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The Amendment also 18 imposes duties on these officials, who must provide all prisoners with the basic necessities 19 of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See 20 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 21 189, 199-200 (1989); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). A prison 22 official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the 23 deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 24 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the prison official possesses a 25 sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton, id. (citing 26 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993). Where 1 him, to establish wantonness the inmate must show that prison officials were deliberately 2 indifferent to the inmate’s suffering. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528 (9th Cir. 3 1993). 4 Plaintiff’s general and conclusory allegations that Defendants violated his Eighth 5 Amendment rights are insufficient to state a cognizable claim. First of all, he fails to 6 identify an objectively and sufficiently serious deprivation under the first prong. With 7 respect to Defendant Garcia-Cortez, the allegation that he shot Plaintiff “unnecessarily” 8 implies an excessive force claim, which will be discussed in the following section. 9 However, there are insufficient allegations to establish that Plaintiff was subjected to 10 inhumane conditions or unnecessary suffering due to Defendant Meredith’s actions. Even 11 if it were true that Defendant Meredith unlawfully deprived Plaintiff of his seat on the 12 Council, it cannot be said that the loss of that seat amounts to a deprivation of a basic 13 necessity which is sufficiently serious to satisfy the first prong. Furthermore, Plaintiff 14 generally alleges that Defendants’ actions involved “physical abuse, emotional abuse, 15 mental abuse,” Dkt. No. 1 at 4, but provides no details or explanations regarding these 16 abuses to establish that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Secondly, 17 Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show that Defendant Meredith possessed a 18 sufficiently culpable state of mind under the second prong. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. He 19 alleges that Defendants “knew or should have known.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5 (emphasis added). 20 However, the second prong requires a subjective awareness: the official must both be 21 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 22 harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant 24 Meredith. In the interest of justice, Plaintiff shall be granted an opportunity to allege 25 sufficient facts, that are non-conclusory, to state an Eighth Amendment claim against 26 Defendant Meredith. 1 2. Excessive Force 2 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Garcia-Cortez shot him “unnecessarily” on January 3 23, 2020, while in the A-yard. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Liberally construed, Plaintiff may be 4 implying that Defendant used excessive force. 5 The treatment a convicted prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 6 which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. 7 McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton 8 infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth 9 Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal 10 quotation and citation omitted). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when 11 two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently 12 serious, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and (2) the prison official possesses a sufficiently 13 culpable state of mind, i.e., the offending conduct was wanton, id.; LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 14 1451. 15 Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the 16 Eighth Amendment, the deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate. Hudson, 503 17 U.S. at 6. Instead, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith 18 effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Id. at 19 6-7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21; Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001) 20 (applying “malicious and sadistic” standard to claim that prison guards used excessive 21 force when attempting to quell a prison riot, but applying “deliberate indifference” 22 standard to claim that guards failed to act on rumors of violence to prevent the riot). 23 Plaintiff’s brief allegation that he was shot “unnecessarily” is not sufficient to state 24 an excessive force claim against Defendant Garcia-Cortez. Plaintiff shall be granted leave 25 to amend this claim to state sufficient facts to indicate that the force was applied 26 maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or 1 which Defendant Garcia-Cortez used the block gun, and why the use of the gun was 2 “unnecessary.” He should also describe the injuries he received, if any, and what medical 3 care was required. 4 3. Retaliation 5 Plaintiff claims that Defendants used retaliation to subject him to cruel and unusual 6 punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Court has already discussed the 7 requirements to state an Eighth Amendment. See supra at 3-4. If Plaintiff wishes to state 8 a separate retaliation claim under the First Amendment, he must allege sufficient facts to 9 establish five basic elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 10 against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 11 (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 12 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 13 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). For example, Plaintiff claims Defendant 14 Meredith had him removed from the Council in retaliation for filing a staff complaint. 15 Dkt. No. 1 at 4. However, there is no allegation that Defendant Meredith’s actions chilled 16 Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights and that it did not reasonably advance a 17 legitimate correctional goal. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend to attempt to state 18 sufficient facts to state a retaliation claim. 19 4. Due Process 20 Lastly, Plaintiff claims Defendant Meredith removed him from the Council without 21 due process. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to state a due 22 process claim in this action, his allegations are insufficient. 23 Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from 24 two sources – the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 25 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones 26 pertaining to liberty. Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in 1 authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). A state may not 2 impose such changes without complying with minimum requirements of procedural due 3 process. See id. at 484. 4 Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely 5 related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a 6 procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations 7 narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the 8 inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” 9 See id. at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a 10 restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 11 ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect 12 the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. 13 Plaintiff makes no allegation that a seat on the Council is a procedurally protected 14 liberty interest under the Due Process clause (because it affects the sentence imposed) or 15 by a state law. Furthermore, he makes no allegation indicating that a seat on the Council is 16 a liberty interest of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. He shall be granted 17 leave to amend this claim to attempt to allege sufficient facts to state a due process claim. 18 Plaintiff is advised that if he did not suffer any deprivation, then he cannot state a 19 procedural due process claim. If Plaintiff did suffer a deprivation, he must show that the 20 deprivation was one of “real substance.” See, e.g., Jones v. Moran, 900 F. Supp. 1267, 21 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Wilken, J.) (adopting Justice Breyer’s two-prong analysis of 22 Sandin majority opinion). 23 24 CONCLUSION 25 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 26 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within twenty-eight 1 || the deficiencies described above. The amended complaint must include the caption and 2 || civil case number used in this order, Case No. C 20-08285 BLF (PR), and the words 3 || “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. If using the court form complaint, Plaintiff 4 || must answer all the questions on the form in order for the action to proceed. The amended 5 || complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent. 6 || Ramirez v. Cty. Of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). Consequently, 7 || claims not included in an amended complaint are no longer claims and defendants not 8 || named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 9 || F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). 10 2. Failure to respond in accordance with this order in the time provided will 11 || result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice and without further notice to 12 Plaintiff. E 13 3. The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint with a copy of S 14 || this order to Plaintiff. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 |) Dated: _Mareh 26, 2021 om Lhy home BETH LABSON FREEMAN = "7 United States District Judge Zz 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Order of Dismissal with Leave to Amend PRO-SE\BLF\CR.20\08285Amezquita_dwlta 26 27