Amerson v. Yavapai, County of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided September 22, 2022·No. 3:22-cv-08117·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Ronald M Amerson, et al., No. CV-22-08117-PCT-MTL

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 County of Yavapai, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 I. 16 The matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State 17 a Claim (Doc. 6) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Strike Defendants’ 18 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7). The instant action originated in Yavapai County Superior 19 Court where Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 21, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Defendants 20 subsequently filed a Notice of Removal with this Court. (Doc. 1.) The Court’s previous 21 Order required the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing whether the Court has 22 subject matter jurisdiction over this action. (Doc. 14.) For the following reasons, the Court 23 finds that subject matter jurisdiction exists and grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 24 II. 25 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 26 of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to 27  Oral argument would not have aided the Court’s decisional process. See Patridge v. Reich, 28 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). 1 hear a case, and it can never be forfeited or waived. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 2 630 (2002). To determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the Court “considers 3 only ‘the pleadings filed at the time of removal without reference to subsequent 4 amendments.’” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 5 Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1085 n.1 (9th Cir. 6 2009)). The general rule, known as the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” is that a civil action 7 arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 when a federal question appears 8 on the face of the complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 9 Nonetheless, federal courts are charged with liberally construing the “inartful pleading of 10 pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal marks 11 and citations omitted). 12 Here, Plaintiffs’ supplemental briefing makes clear that Plaintiffs intend to bring a 13 “federal cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” (Doc. 16 at 1.) Despite 14 making only a passing reference to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the 15 Court, applying a liberal construction of the Complaint, concludes that Plaintiffs assert an 16 ADA claim – thus conferring jurisdiction. See Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr. v. Schact, 524 U.S. 17 381, 386 (1998) (“[T]he presence of even one claim ‘arising under’ federal law is sufficient 18 to satisfy the requirement that the case be within the original jurisdiction of the district 19 court for removal.”). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the related state law 20 intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as it stems from the same common nucleus 21 of operative fact. See In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005). 22 III. 23 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is well taken. A court may dismiss a complaint “if 24 there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under 25 a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th 26 Cir. 2011). A complaint must assert sufficient factual allegations that, when taken as true, 27 “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 28 (2009). Plausibility is more than mere possibility. A plaintiff is required to provide “more 1 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 2 will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 3 Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to meet these standards. The Complaint makes one 4 passing reference to the ADA, followed, two paragraphs later, by a bare conclusory 5 allegation that being informed of the continuation of a hearing constitutes a “direction 6 violation of ADA (sic).” (Doc. 1-1 at 7.) From what the Court can ascertain, Plaintiffs’ 7 ADA claim relates to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation or reasonable 8 modification for disabled persons under Title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The 9 duty to provide such accommodations or modifications arises when a policy, practice or 10 procedure discriminates based on disability. Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. 11 Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1997). But Plaintiffs’ Complaint leaves the Court 12 guessing as to what the requested accommodation was and how Defendants failed to 13 provide it, let alone what policy, practice, or procedure discriminated on the basis of 14 disability. Plaintiffs’ sole conclusory allegation does not plausibly allege an ADA 15 violation. 16 The Complaint also fails to plausibly allege intentional infliction of emotional 17 distress. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is rife with conclusory allegations – often, merely reciting 18 an element of the claim. For example, Plaintiffs say that an email was sent “with the intent 19 to inflict emotional stress.” (Doc. 1-1 at 7.) Also, Plaintiffs summarily assert that service 20 of a notice of a property violation constitutes “proof of intentional infliction of emotional 21 stress.” (Id.) These unadorned allegations fail to meet the pleading standards set forth in 22 Twombly and Iqbal. 23 Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. The amended 24 complaint must aver sufficient facts to plausibly state claims under the ADA and the 25 Arizona common law action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also appears 26 that Plaintiff Van Hoang Cao is not a proper plaintiff in this action. The Complaint provides 27 no indication of any injury to her. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs shall clarify the 28 basis for Plaintiff Cao’s claims. 1 Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 7), as well asa Motion to Amend (Doc. 9.). These motions are mooted by the instant Order. 3 IV. 4 Accordingly, 5 IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6.) 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing as moot Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike 7|| Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions. (Doc. 7.) 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing as moot Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend. (Doc.