American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Standridge

Court of Appeals of Georgia

American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Standridge

122 S.E.2d 124, 104 Ga. App. 539, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 732

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 29, 1961

Docket38923

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 122 S.E.2d 124 (American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Standridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Standridge, 122 S.E.2d 124, 104 Ga. App. 539, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 732 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).

Pincite

Opinions

Frankum, Judge.

Under an insurance policy whereby, for a stipulated consideration, the insurer is obligated to pay to the insured owner of a specified automobile “. . . for direct and accidental . . . damage to the automobile, . . . except loss caused by collision . . . or by upset . . .” and which policy provides, “[bjreakage of glass and loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be deemed loss by collision or upset”, the insurer is obligated to pay the insured for direct [540]*540and accidental damage to the automobile, except damage to the same resulting from an event for which damage the insured is not liable under one or more of the exclusions stated in the policy. The policy specifically enumerates certain risks which are not excluded, and, therefore, they are risks for which coverage is provided. This case is before this court on petition and a general demurrer thereto, which petition is based upon an insurance policy containing the above stated provisions. The petition contains allegations, in substance, that while the policy was in full force and effect, the plaintiff was driving the automobile described in the policy, when the transmission of the same “exploded,” thereby causing damage to the automobile in the amount sued for. However, the petition does not allege that the explosion was produced from an accidental cause. The unexplained allegation that the transmission “exploded” is not the equivalent of alleging that the explosion resulted from an accidental cause, and, therefore, such defect in the petition renders it subject to general demurrer. See Newman v. Benefit Association, 173 Ga. 881 (162 SE 122); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571 (61 SE2d 579). The general demurrer to the petition should have been sustained.

Decided September 29, 1961. Erwin, Birchmore ■& Epting, Eugene A. Epting, for plaintiff in error. H. W. Davis, Jack S. Davidson, Rupert A. Brown, contra.

Judgment reversed.

Townsend, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Frankum, Judge.

Under an insurance policy whereby, for a stipulated consideration, the insurer is obligated to pay to the insured owner of a specified automobile “. . . for direct and accidental . . . damage to the automobile, . . . except loss caused by collision . . . or by upset . . .” and which policy provides, “[bjreakage of glass and loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be deemed loss by collision or upset”, the insurer is obligated to pay the insured for direct [540]*540and accidental damage to the automobile, except damage to the same resulting from an event for which damage the insured is not liable under one or more of the exclusions stated in the policy. The policy specifically enumerates certain risks which are not excluded, and, therefore, they are risks for which coverage is provided. This case is before this court on petition and a general demurrer thereto, which petition is based upon an insurance policy containing the above stated provisions. The petition contains allegations, in substance, that while the policy was in full force and effect, the plaintiff was driving the automobile described in the policy, when the transmission of the same “exploded,” thereby causing damage to the automobile in the amount sued for. However, the petition does not allege that the explosion was produced from an accidental cause. The unexplained allegation that the transmission “exploded” is not the equivalent of alleging that the explosion resulted from an accidental cause, and, therefore, such defect in the petition renders it subject to general demurrer. See Newman v. Benefit Association, 173 Ga. 881 (162 SE 122); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571 (61 SE2d 579). The general demurrer to the petition should have been sustained.

Decided September 29, 1961. Erwin, Birchmore ■& Epting, Eugene A. Epting, for plaintiff in error. H. W. Davis, Jack S. Davidson, Rupert A. Brown, contra.

Judgment reversed.

Townsend, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

122 S.E.2d 124, 104 Ga. App. 539, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 732, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-fire-casualty-co-v-standridge-gactapp-1961.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack