American Federation of Teachers-Oregon v. Oregon Taxpayers United Pac

145 P.3d 1111, 208 Or. App. 350, 180 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3174, 2006 Ore. App. LEXIS 1523

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: October 4, 2006
• Docket: 0108-08942, 0012-12632 A122158 (Control), A122168
• Status: Published

Opinions

HASELTON, P. J.

Defendants Oregon Taxpayers United Political Action Committee (OTU-PAC) and Oregon Taxpayers United Education Foundation (OTU-EF) appeal a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Oregon Education Association (OEA) and American Federation of Teachers (AFT), and intervenor State of Oregon in this action pursuant to the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (ORICO), ORS 166.715 to 166.735. Defendants raise numerous assignments of error pertaining to the availability of unsworn falsification, ORS 162.085(1), as a predicate for ORICO purposes, the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ pleadings and proof of causation, and the scope of the trial court’s injunction. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court erred in entering judgment against OTU-PAC on the third count (“unsworn falsification”) of plaintiffs’ complaints and, consequently, in enjoining OTU-PAC based on liability on that count. We reject defendants’ other contentions. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and, with respect to one provision of the injunction, vacate and remand for reconsideration.

The circumstances of this case are unprecedented. As described more fully below, plaintiffs and the state, as intervenor, sought and obtained a judgment under ORICO based on defendants’ allegedly unlawful activities in connection with two 2000 initiative measures, Measures 92 and 98. Those measures would have severely restricted, or prohibited, the ability of school districts and other employers to implement “check-offs” for payroll deductions for union dues when some part of those dues were used for political purposes. Although the voters ultimately rejected both proposed measures in November 2000, plaintiffs contended that they had been injured by defendants’ activities in that those activities were calculated to, and did in fact, cause plaintiffs to expend substantial resources in opposition to the proposed measures.

Plaintiffs are labor organizations who represent, inter alia, public school teachers and classified employees, as well as community college instructors and other employees. Defendant OTU-PAC is an unincorporated association acting as a political committee organized under ORS 260.042. Defendant OTU-EF was, at all material times, an Oregon nonprofit public benefit corporation that purported to operate as a tax-exempt charitable or educational organization for purposes of Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3).

In December 2000, plaintiffs initiated this action against defendants for recovery of damages flowing from defendants’ alleged racketeering activities, as well as for equitable relief. See ORS 166.725 (persons harmed by unlawful racketeering may obtain treble damages and various other forms of relief). Plaintiffs’ complaints alleged three counts of racketeering activity. In the first count, plaintiffs alleged that Kelli Highley, while working as an employee and agent of both defendants, had forged signatures on statements of sponsorship for Measures 92 and 98,¹ in violation of ORS 165.007(l)(a).² Plaintiffs further alleged that, as a result of those forgeries, the Secretary of State approved for circulation initiative petitions for those measures. Thereafter, defendants gathered sufficient signatures on those petitions to place Measures 92 and 98 on the November 2000 general election ballot, compelling plaintiffs to expend substantial funds to oppose those measures.

In the second count, plaintiffs alleged that paid signature gatherers, acting as agents for defendants, had forged signatures on the initiative petitions for Measures 92 and 98 and falsely certified the petition sheets, again violating criminal forgery statutes. See ORS 165.007; ORS 165.013. Plaintiffs further alleged that, but for the “false, fraudulent or forged” signatures, neither measure would have qualified for the ballot.

In the third count, plaintiffs alleged that, through their agents Sizemore and Miller, OTU-EF had knowingly submitted false “CT-12” forms,³ and OTU-PAC had knowingly submitted false contribution and expenditure (C&E) reports, to state authorities. Plaintiffs further alleged that those false submissions violated ORS 162.085(1)⁴ and were calculated to facilitate and conceal the illicit tunneling of funds raised by the tax-exempt OTU-EF to support OTU-PAC’s efforts in promoting Measures 92 and 98. In particular, plaintiffs alleged that the CT-12 forms filed for OTU-EF “contain false statements about the use of OTU-EF funds”; that the false C&E reports filed for OTU-PAC “includ[edj misstatements on the amount of funds received from OTU-EF and other contributors for use by OTU-PAC”; and that those false submissions, in combination, “conceal [ed] the source of contributions to Measure 92 and 98 and enabl[ed] more funds to be raised to support Measures 92 and 98 through the tax exempt OTU-EF.”

The jury, by special verdict, found, as alleged in Count 1, that both defendants had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with the forged sponsorship signatures for Measures 92 and 98, and further found that plaintiffs had been damaged by defendants’ conduct. As to the second count, the jury found that both defendants had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in regard to signature-gathering on initiative petition 98, as well, but concluded that plaintiffs had not been damaged by that conduct. On Count 3, the jury found that defendants had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in regard to the filing of CT-12 and C&E reports and that plaintiffs had been damaged by defendants’ conduct.

The jury awarded plaintiff OEA damages of $65,112 on Count 1 and $671,658 on Count 3, and awarded plaintiff AFT damages of $40,500 on Count 1 and $170,000 on Count 3.⁵ The subsequent judgment, based on the jury’s special findings, awarded OEA damages of $2,014,974 ($671,658 trebled pursuant to ORS 166.725(7)(a)) and AFT damages of $510,000 ($170,000 trebled).

After the jury returned its verdict, the state intervened and, along with plaintiffs, sought injunctive relief. ORS 166.725(10). The trial court made extensive findings of fact in accordance with ORCP 62 and granted injunctive relief. In addition to finding essentially the same facts as the jury had with respect to defendants’ racketeering activities, the court specifically found that, because of Highley’s forgeries, Measures 92 and 98 ultimately were approved by the Secretary of State and placed on the 2000 general election ballot. The court further found that, if passed, those measures would have caused serious consequences to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs reasonably and necessarily expended funds to defeat those measures.⁶

As to Count 2, the court found that defendants’ agents had submitted forged signatures on petitions and certification sheets for Measures 92 and 98, that those actions constituted racketeering activity, and that, as a result of those racketeering activities, Measures 92 and 98 had qualified for the 2000 general election ballot. That is, the court found that without the forgeries, neither measure would have qualified for the ballot.

Regarding Count 3, the court found that OTU-PAC was required under Oregon law to file periodic C&E reports and that OTU-PAC’s agents had signed and filed false C&E reports from 1996 through 2000 by failing to disclose on those reports various cash and in-kind contributions that OTU-PAC had received from OTU-EF. The court determined that the result of those activities “was to cause tax deductible contributions which were made to OTU-EF, a charity, to be used illegally to fund OTU-PAC and to be paid to Bill Sizemore personally.” The court further found that Bill Sizemore had developed schemes by which contributors could secretly provide financial support to OTU-PAC by funneling those contributions through other organizations and that those were in-kind contributions for the benefit of OTU-PAC that should have been reported on its C&E reports.

Regarding OTU-EF, the court found that defendant was required to submit annual reports (CT-12 reports) to the state in order to maintain its tax-exempt status; that Sizemore as agent for OTU-EF had falsely certified on each CT-12 from the years 1996 through 2000 that OTU-EF had not “attempted to influence national, state or local legislation, including any attempt to influence public opinion on a legislative matter or referendum”; and that OTU-EF had not reported on its CT-12 any of its cash and in-kind contributions to political activities from 1996 through 2000 although those contributions were very substantial.⁷ The court further found that OTU-EF’s “involvement in educational activities was minimal”; that OTU-EF’s minutes reflected its extensive involvement in the activities of OTU-PAC; and that OTU-EF had improperly concealed its political activities from the Internal Revenue Service in documents that were attached and incorporated into each CT-12 submitted to the state.

The court also found that OTU-EF’s board of directors failed to provide ongoing oversight; that, after the jury verdict in the present case, a new entity called OTU2-PAC had been created in anticipation of the judgment in the present case; that no remedial action had been taken to protect OTU-EF resources from being used by OTU-PAC or OTU2PAC; that OTU-PAC had submitted yet another false C&E report to the state after the jury verdict; and that a website for OTU2-PAC was promoting “tax-deductible charitable contributions to OTU-EF, the ‘non-profit arm of Oregon Taxpayers United.’ ” Additionally, the court found that defendants had created yet another organization, Oregon Taxpayers Association/Union, “with the object of avoiding the judgment which will be issued based upon the Jury Verdict in this lawsuit”; that that organization used all of the same equipment and supplies as defendants; and that it used OTU-PAC’s donor list and referred to OTU-EF as “our education foundation.”

Ultimately, the court determined that defendants had

“engaged in conduct concerning successor organizations * * * with the intent of circumventing the legal consequences of their actions and the pattern of racketeering conduct which has occurred. The wrongful conduct of the defendants [is] on-going, threatens to continue and it is probable that it will continue in the future unless an appropriate injunction is entered to prevent it.”

The court concluded that, if it did not grant equitable relief, “there is a probability that defendants will continue to engage in a pattern of racketeering within the meaning of ORS 166.715(4). Injunctive relief is necessary to prevent continuation of this conduct which is probable and which threatens continued injury to the public interest.”

The court then entered a judgment that awarded monetary damages (see 208 Or App at 355-56) and equitable relief. As described in detail below, 208 Or App at 374-76 and Appendix “A,” the court dissolved OTU-EF and prohibited any successor organization of OTU-EF from making contributions to any political action committee for a period of five years. The court also prohibited OTU-PAC and any successor political action committees from receiving contributions from tax-exempt charitable organizations for a period of five years. Finally, the court enjoined OTU-PAC, OTU-EF, and their successor organizations from various specific violations of Oregon law and prohibited them from transferring or destroying assets until the judgment entered in the present case is satisfied or until further order of the court.

On appeal, defendants raise six assignments of error. In particular, defendants contend:

(1) The trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss all counts on the ground that plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, establish causation of the alleged damages.

(2) The trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs could not establish causation for the alleged damages.

(3) The trial court’s injunction impermissibly restrains protected expression and initiative-related conduct in violation of the Oregon Constitution.

(4) The trial court erred in enjoining nonparties, e.g., “successor organizations,” from participating in future political activities.

(5) The trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 3 on the ground that it failed to sufficiently allege cognizable predicate offenses of “unsworn falsification” as defined by ORS 162.085.

(6) The trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on Count 3 on the ground that plaintiffs failed to establish that the false statements in the CT-12 forms would have caused OTU-EF to lose its status as a charitable organization.

For cogency of analysis, we begin with the fifth assignment of error and then address, in turn, the first, second, and sixth assignments of error, all of which pertain to various aspects of causation. Finally, we address the third and fourth assignments of error pertaining to the scope of injunctive relief.

Defendants assign error to the trial court’s denial of their ORCP 21 A(8) motion to dismiss Count 3 on the ground that it failed to sufficiently allege cognizable predicate offenses of “unsworn falsification” as defined by ORS 162.085. Plaintiffs alleged, in pertinent part, that OTU-PAC’s knowingly false submissions of C&E reports and OTU-EF’s knowingly false submissions of CT-12 forms violated ORS 162.085(1). That statute provides:

“A person commits the crime of unsworn falsification if the person knowingly makes any false written statement to a public servant in connection with an application for any benefit.”

On appeal, as before the trial court, defendants contend that neither the C&E reports nor the CT-12 forms constituted “application[s]” for purposes of ORS 162.085:

“Assuming for purposes of argument that OTU’s filing of purely informational forms (the ‘C&E reports’ and ‘CT-12 forms’ discussed earlier) might conceivably qualify as a ‘gain or advantage’ in the sense that Oregon law requires the filings and one maintains the ‘advantage’ of abiding by the reporting requirements, nevertheless nothing about the filing of those particular informational reports constitutes, or qualifies as, an ‘application’ for purposes of the statutory definition of ‘unsworn falsification’ in ORS 162.085(1). Within the context of ORS 162.085(1), the term ‘application’ cormotes an act synonymous with ‘request’ or ‘petition.’ Yet one neither ‘applies’ for, nor ‘requests,’ [nor] ‘petitions’ for any ‘benefit’ by the filing of any such informational reports or forms.”

(Emphasis in original.)

Plaintiffs respond that the C&E reports enable political action committees “to receive and spend political contributions,” citing ORS 260.063, and argue that the ability to do so constitutes a benefit of the type contemplated by ORS 162.085. Plaintiffs further assert that the filing of CT-12 forms entitles charitable organizations to tax benefits, citing ORS 128.670. Defendants take issue with both of those characterizations, arguing first that C&E reports do not “enable” political action committees to do anything, but, rather, that failure to comply with the requirements for C&Es can merely lead to civil penalties, ORS 260.232, or court proceedings to require the filing of correct C&Es, ORS 260.225. Defendants further respond that the filing of CT-12 forms does not “enable” an organization to solicit tax deductible donations. They argue that, although such organizations may be fined and that court proceedings may be used to require compliance, see ORS 128.670 and ORS 128.710, an organization that fails to comply does not lose its ability to solicit donations, but merely is subject to having its corporate officers removed.

We begin by considering the text of ORS 162.085(1) in pertinent statutory context. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).⁸ We focus on the requirement that the “false written statement” must be made “in connection with an application for any benefit.” (Italics and boldface added.) “Benefit,” as used in ORS 162.085(1) means “gain or advantage to the beneficiary or to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.” ORS 162.055(1).⁹ We do not understand defendants to dispute that they enjoy certain “benefits” due to their status as, respectively, a political committee (OTU-PAC) or a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation (OTU-EF).¹⁰

Unlike “benefit,” however, there is no statutory definition of “application” for purposes of ORS 162.085(1). In common usage, an “application” as employed in ORS 162.085 means:

“APPEAL; request; petition <an ~ for a position) <an ~ to an underwriter for insurances”

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 105 (unabridged ed 2002); see also id. (defining “apply51’ as, inter alia, “to make an appeal or a request esp. formally and in writing and usu. for something of benefit to oneself < ~ to an employer for a job> < ~ to a bank for a loan>”). That usage of “an application” as connoting a “request” comports with statutory definitions of “application” in other, substantively unrelated contexts. See, e.g., ORS 343.395(1) (defining “application” for purposes of “talented and gifted children” educational programs as “a request by a school district for state funds”); ORS 469.300(2) (defining “application” for purposes of energy facility siting oversight as “a request for approval” of a site).

Before proceeding further, two aspects of the statute’s text and design bear emphasis. First, the statute is not limited to statements in an application itself; rather, it applies, more broadly, to any false written statement made “in connection with” an application for any benefit (emphasis added). Second, the statute does not apply to any and all false written statements made with respect to a benefit. Rather, the statement must be made in connection with “an application” for a benefit (emphasis added). Thus, unless there is some predicate, referent “application,” the statute is inapplicable — or, stated conversely, the existence of “an application” is the sine qua non of culpability under ORS 162.085(1).

Consistently with the foregoing, there are some circumstances in which ORS 162.085(1) would clearly apply. For example, if X applied for public employment, and Y knowingly wrote a materially false letter of reference to the putative public employer in support of X’s application, Ys letter would be a “false written statement to a public servant in connection with an application for any benefit.” ORS 162.085(1). The circumstances of this case are, however, very different. As noted, defendants contend that their C&E reports and CT-12 filings were not made — and could not have been made — “in connection with an application for any benefit” because there was no “application.” We agree with defendants’ arguments as to OTU-PAC but not as to OTU-EF.

We begin with OTU-PAC and the false C&E reports. OTU-PAC points out, correctly, that there is no statutory requirement that an entity submit an application, which must be approved, before it can begin to operate, or continue to operate, as a political committee. Although a political committee must file an initial “statement of organization” under ORS 260.042, as well as supplemental C&E submissions as appropriate,¹¹ no statute provides that an entity’s ability to operate as a political committee is contingent upon the Secretary of State’s, or any other authority’s, approval of the initial “statement of organization” or any supplemental submissions. An “application” in common usage means a “request,” see 208 Or App at 361 — and a “request” necessarily implies that the other party has some ability to refuse or withhold consent. With respect to an entity’s status as a political committee, there is no condition of approval — and, thus, there is no “application.” Thus, as OTU-PAC contends:

“A person (or group) becomes a ‘political committee’ automatically (and therefore subject to reporting requirements) if he either receives a contribution for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, measure or political party, or makes an expenditure for the purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate, measure or political party. He does not have to seek permission from the State to become a political committee; he is one ipso facto. Correspondingly, he does not have to ‘apply5 to continue that status.”

To be sure, as plaintiffs point out, a political committee that fails to file required C&Es, or falsifies those filings, is subject to serious consequences, including civil penalties. See, e.g., ORS 260.232. But the fact that the statement might be filed to avoid a detriment does not render it a statement made in connection with “an application for a benefit.” To so construe ORS 162.085(1) would be to impermissibly “insert what has been omitted.” ORS 174.010.

Because there was no “application” for purposes of ORS 162.085(1), OTU-PAC’s false C&E submissions could not have been made “in connection with an application for any benefit.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss Count 3 as to OTU-PAC.¹²

We turn, then, to whether OTU-EF’s conduct in filing fraudulent CT-12 statements violated ORS 162.085(1). We begin, again, with the meaning of “application” in this context.

OTU-EF points out, correctly, that its status as a section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entity was not dependent upon the filing of CT-12 reports with the Oregon Department of Justice. Rather, that status is granted by the United States Internal Revenue Service. Conversely, as plaintiffs emphasize, the universe of “benefits” that OTU-EF enjoyed was not limited to its mere status as a tax-exempt entity; rather, and in particular, OTU-EF enjoyed the “gain or advantage” of being entitled to engage in fund-raising activities in Oregon. As a “charitable corporation,” ORS 128.620, OTU-EF was required to comply with the reporting requirements of ORS 128.670 — and, if it failed to comply with those requirements, its fund-raising activities could be enjoined under ORS 128.866(1).¹³ Thus, in plaintiffs’ view, each time that OTU-EF submitted a CT-12 form, that submission represented a new and separate “application” for the benefit of being permitted to continue to engage in fund-raising activities. That is, there was not just one “application,” but, instead, a series of continuing “applications.”

We agree with plaintiffs. Nothing in the language or design of ORS 162.085 restricts “application” to a single original application. As a most obvious example, nothing in ORS 162.085(1) would preclude that statute’s operation with respect to written submissions requesting renewal of a license or permit. To be sure, the circumstance presented here — in which failure to make the requisite submission can result in effective revocation of the benefit — is less simple.¹⁴ And yet, to the extent that a person’s future eligibility and entitlement to engage in “beneficial” activity is contingent upon a written submission, we perceive no material principled distinction. In this circumstance, as in the case of an original request or a renewal request, a false written submission is material to future entitlement to the benefit.¹⁵

We emphasize, finally, the differences between OTU-EF and OTU-PAC in that regard. Although, as noted, OTU-PAC was subject to various detriments, including potential civil fines, by reason of its false C&E submissions, those submissions were not material to OTU-PAC’s continuing entitlement to the benefit of its status as a political committee. Conversely, OTU-EF’s submissions of the false CT-12s were material to its continuing eligibility and beneficial entitlement to engage in fund-raising activities in Oregon. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying OTU-EF’s motion to dismiss the third count.¹⁶

We proceed, then, to defendants’ three causation-related assignments of error. We begin with defendants’ first assignment, which challenges the denial of their ORCP 21 A(8) motion to dismiss the complaints in their entirety on the ground that the damages that plaintiffs alleged, which were incurred in opposing Measures 92 and 98, were not proximately caused by defendants’ alleged conduct. In particular, defendants argue that plaintiffs did not suffer “actual damages” “by reason of’ any of the alleged unlawful racketeering activity, ORS 166.725(7)(a), because plaintiffs’ expenditure of funds to defeat the ballot measures was not sufficiently directly related to the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. In support of their position, defendants rely primarily on Holmes v. SIPC, 503 US 258, 112 S Ct 1311, 117 L Ed 2d 532 (1992), which construed the causation requirements in the federal racketeering law, 18 USC §§ 1961-1968, on which ORICO was modeled.¹⁷

In reviewing the disposition of a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. See Brewer v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 167 Or App 173, 176, 2 P3d 418 (2000), rev den, 334 Or 693 (2002); accord Unified Western Grocers v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 204 Or App 673, 676, 131 P3d 796, rev den, 341 Or 80 (2006) (“[I]n reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss on real party in interest grounds, we accept the allegations in the complaint as true.”).

Consistently with that standard of review, the operative complaints here pleaded sufficient facts to establish the requisite causation. With respect to Count 1, pertaining to falsification of the sponsorship petitions, plaintiffs alleged that the purposes of the enterprise in which defendants participated were (1) to promote the initiative measures “to eliminate or restrict the ability of [plaintiffs] to receive payment of member dues through payroll check-off’; and (2) “to force [plaintiffs] to expend [their] resources opposing such initiatives, thereby preventing [plaintiffs] from initiating and implementing programs for the improvement of public education and the working conditions of [plaintiffs’] members.” The complaints further alleged, with respect to Count 1, that defendants’ conduct achieved the latter purpose and that plaintiffs’ expenditures to oppose the measures were reasonable and necessary and were the “expected consequence of the enterprise.”

Counts 2 and 3 reiterated the allegations of defendants’ intended purpose of causing plaintiffs to expend resources in opposition to the proposed measures, as well as the allegation that plaintiffs, in fact, expended funds as a result of defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct. In particular, in Count 3, plaintiffs explicitly alleged that plaintiffs expended funds “as defendants knew and intended they would [.]” In sum, plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ unlawful conduct with respect to the ballot measures caused them to expend substantial funds in opposing the ballot measures and that that expenditure was not only the foreseeable, but the specifically intended, consequence of defendants’ conduct.

Defendants contend, nevertheless, that those facts are insufficient to establish actionable causation for purposes of ORICO. That is, defendants assert that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that they had been “injured by reason of’ defendants’ unlawful conduct. ORS 166.725(7)(a). As support for their position, defendants invoke Holmes, which addressed the standard of causation under RICO. Defendants’ reliance on Holmes is unavailing.

In Holmes, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a nonprofit organization authorized by federal securities law to reimburse customers of member securities brokers who are unable to meet obligations to their customers, sought to recover damages pursuant to RICO from various defendants who allegedly had engaged in a stock manipulation scheme. 503 US at 261. SIPC’s causation theory was that (1) the defendants had, in violation of the securities laws, manipulated the stock of six companies to create a misleading appearance of a liquid market; (2) as a result of that manipulation, some of SIPC’s member broker-dealers had “bought substantial amounts of the stock with their own funds” for their own accounts; (3) after the defendants’ scheme was discovered, the stocks plummeted, with disastrous financial consequences for the broker-dealers; (4) because of the broker-dealers’ consequent insolvency and eventual liquidation, they were unable to cover their customers’ claims — claims entirely unrelated to the defendants’ stock manipulation — in the amount of nearly $13 million; and (5) consequently, SIPC was required to advance funds to cover those claims. Id. at 262. The court concluded that, in those circumstances, the causal relationship between the defendants’ unlawful conduct and the injury for which SIPC sought damages was too attenuated to permit recovery.

In so holding, the Court, after noting that Congress had intended to incorporate into RICO common-law principles of proximate causation, id. at 268, identified several reasons that supported cutting off causation for indirect injuries:

“First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors. Second, quite apart from problems of proving factual causation, recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. And, finally, the need to grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.”

Id. at 269-70 (citations omitted). In rejecting SIPC’s theory of causation, the Court emphasized that the customers on whose behalf SIPC had sought to recover had not bought the manipulated stock:

“[T]he link is too remote between the stock manipulation alleged and the customers’ harm, being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the broker-dealers. That is, the conspirators have allegedly injured these customers only insofar as the stock manipulation first injured the broker-dealers and left them without the wherewithal to pay customers’ claims.”

Id. at 271; see also Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,_US _ , 126 S Ct 1991, 164 L Ed 2d 720 (2006) (applying Holmes’s proximate causation test in RICO case involving fraudulent tax returns).

Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ theory of causation in the present case is similarly deficient. In particular, defendants describe plaintiffs’ theories as “labyrinthine, multiple-actor, multiple-event theories.” For the reasons that follow, we disagree with defendants that plaintiffs’ theory of causation is too attenuated to satisfy the requirements of proximate cause.¹⁸

Causation on the facts pleaded here was not “labyrinthine.” It was simple and direct. Defendants’ alleged predicate acts were directed at putting several initiatives on the ballot to achieve either or both of two purposes: (1) to severely restrict or prohibit plaintiffs’ abilities to collect union dues to the extent that some portion of those dues were used for political purposes — and, thus, ultimately to cripple plaintiffs’ participation in the political process; and (2) to force plaintiffs to expend substantial funds to defeat the measures and, in doing so, to divert those resources from other efforts. Thus,' unlike in Holmes, in which the chain of causation was reminiscent of the game of “Mousetrap,”¹⁹ causation, as alleged here, was basic and blunt. Defendants intended to cause precisely this sort of injury to plaintiffs. The only contingency in producing that injury was the success of defendants’ efforts.

We note, moreover, that none of the concerns with distant, indirect causation identified in Holmes militates against the imposition of liability here. Again, assuming the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, “the amount of [plaintiffs’] damages attributable” to defendants’ unlawful conduct is not “difficult * * * to ascertain.” Holmes, 503 US at 269. Rather, that amount — the sums expended in opposing the measures — is precisely quantifiable, and nothing in the pleadings suggests that those expenditures were, wholly or in part, somehow attributable to “other, independent causes.” Id. Nor do the pleadings disclose any material “risk of multiple recoveries” by absent parties “removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts.” Id.20 Finally, and in a related sense, the pleadings do not disclose the existence of other, more “directly injured victims,” who could act more efficiently as “private attorneys general” in pursuing claims under ORICO. Id. at 270. The trial court properly denied defendants’ ORCP 21 A(8) motion based on lack of legally cognizable causation.

We conclude our discussion of the first assignment of error by responding to a concern expressed in the dissent, viz., that imposition of ORICO liability in these circumstances will impermissibly “chill” citizen participation in the initiative process. See 208 Or App at 395-96 (Edmonds, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). We take that concern very seriously, and we respectfully disagree.

For generations of Oregonians, the initiative has been, and remains, a cherished legacy. It is not only part of our heritage but, as much, a vital, integral part of our political present and future. The initiative process was — as every Oregon school child once learned — adopted in 1902, as a feature of “the Oregon system,” to remedy legislative fraud and corruption. See generally Oregon Blue Book 2005-2006 352-53 (2005); David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon U’ren and “The Oregon System,” 67 Temple L Rev 946 (1994).²¹ The citizens who ratified the initiative in 1902 certainly never intended that it would confer a license for fraud and a shelter for “money laundering.” The citizens of Oregon did not intend to trade governmental corruption for private corruption by individuals and interest groups.

This case is not about innocent participation in the initiative process; it is not about good faith mistakes or errors in judgment in the course of such participation. Rather, as pleaded — and as ultimately found by the jury — this case is about a calculated course of criminal conduct perpetrated for the express purpose of crippling, and even destroying, defendants’ political opponents.

For the Oregonians of a century ago, the initiative process meant pure, “open” democracy — and (at least) most Oregonians would like to think that it still does. But this case involves the antithesis of that ideal: It involves cynical, criminal manipulation of the democratic process.

That is the conduct that is subject to ORICO liability. That is the conduct that is “chilled.” Imposition of ORICO liability in these circumstances fully accords with Article IV, section (1), of the Oregon Constitution. Cf. State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412, 649 P2d 569 (1982) (fraud is not constitutionally protected expression for purposes of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution); Smallwood v. Fisk, 146 Or App 695, 698, 703, 934 P2d 557 (1997) (same).

Defendants’ second assignment of error parallels their first assignment. Although the first assignment challenges the denial of an ORCP 21 A(8) motion to dismiss and the second challenges the denial of a motion for summary judgment, both are predicated upon the same arguments regarding lack of cognizable causation of damages.²² Defendants contend, again, that there was no proximate causation for ORICO purposes and assert, particularly, that the predicate acts of forgery underlying the first count were not the “cause” of plaintiffs’ damages because the intervening acts of the county clerks and Secretary of State in failing to detect the forged signatures and ultimately placing the initiatives on the ballot functioned, in essence, as a superseding cause of plaintiffs’ damages.

We do not address the substance of defendants’ arguments because, as presented here, defendants’ challenge to the denial of their motion for summary judgment is not reviewable. As we explained in York v. Bailey, 159 Or App 341, 345-46, 976 P2d 1181, rev den, 329 Or 287 (1999):

“[A]n order denying summary judgment is not reviewable following a full trial on the merits, unless the motion rests on ‘purely legal contentions’ that do not require the establishment of any predicate facts. E.g., Payless Drug Stores v. Brown, 300 Or 243, 246-48, 708 P2d 1143 (1985); Seidel v. Time Ins. Co., 157 Or App 556, 560, 970 P2d 255 (1998). Purely legal contentions are ‘those as to which the facts are not merely undisputed but immaterial, such as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.’ Id. In other words, the legal theory underlying the motion must be that the moving party has a right to prevail on any set of facts and that the facts, in effect, do not matter.”

Here, defendants’ arguments regarding proof of “proximate cause” — or, concomitantly, the potential operation of “superseding cause” — are necessarily fact based. That is, the facts are material — they are not “not merely undisputed but immaterial[.]” Id. Consequently, as in York, the denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion is not reviewable on appeal.

We proceed to the last of defendants’ three causation-related assignments of error. In the sixth assignment of error, OTU-EF argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on Count 3 on the ground that plaintiffs did not prove that, as result of the falsification of the CT-12 reports, OTU-EF “would necessarily have lost its lawful status as a charitable corporation, thus rendering it unable to receive tax-deductible contributions that might have been used for the signature-gathering process for Ballot Measures 92 and 98.”

OTU-EF’s argument depends on a false first premise. To establish causation, plaintiffs did not need to prove that OTU-EF would have lost its status as a charitable organization if its unlawful activities had come to light. Rather, plaintiffs could establish causation by showing that, if the Oregon Department of Justice had been aware of those activities, it would have secured an injunction, pursuant to ORS 128.866(1), precluding OTU-EF’s fund-raising activities and cutting off the flow of cash funneled to OTU-PAC to promote the initiative measures.

In reviewing the denial of a directed verdict, we view the evidence, including reasonable attendant inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party — the plaintiffs. Hudjohn v. S&G Machinery Co., 200 Or App 340, 342, 114 P3d 1141 (2005). That is so because “ ‘the jury must be permitted to consider every claim on which the plaintiff has presented some evidence tending to establish each element of that claim.’ ” Bolt v. Influence, Inc., 333 Or 572, 578, 43 P3d 425 (2002) (quoting State v. Brown, 306 Or 599, 602, 761 P2d 1300 (1988) (emphasis in Brown)). As the court emphasized in Brown, “[o]nly when there is no evidence to support an element may the claim be withdrawn from the jury’s consideration.” 306 Or at 603.

Consistently with those principles, we summarize the pertinent evidence. Sizemore, acting as an agent for OTU-EF and OTU-PAC, devised a scheme by which tax-deductible donations to OTU-EF could be secretly and unlawfully funneled to OTU-PAC and used to put Measures 92 and 98 on the November 2000 ballot. But for the unlawful scheme, the OTU-EF contributions could not have been used in that manner. The OTU-EF contributions that were unlawfully expended on OTU-PAC activities were significant. See 208 Or App at 357 n 7. Moreover, plaintiffs presented evidence that the unlawful scheme benefitted the OTU-EF donors because they could take tax deductions and also could shield their identities as supporters of the initiatives, which would have been revealed on accurate C&E reports had the contributions been made directly to OTU-PAC. Finally, plaintiffs presented the testimony of an expert, Pancoast, that, if OTU-EF had filed truthful CT-12 forms, the Oregon Department of Justice “almost certainly would have followed up on that” and would have had a variety of options to pursue, including “the least of which * * * would have been a cease and desist order.”

From that evidence, a finder of fact could draw reasonable inferences that OTU-EF’s racketeering activity described above permitted it to obtain contributions from donors that were unlawfully used to promote ballot initiatives that were intended to — and did — cause plaintiffs to expend resources in opposition to those initiatives. A finder of fact could also reasonably infer from plaintiffs’ unrebutted expert opinion evidence and from the substantial flow of funds from OTU-EF to OTU-PAC for noncharitable purposes that, if OTU-EF’s unlawful use of funds to promote the ballot initiatives had come to light, the Department of Justice would have obtained an injunction against that unlawful activity and the damages suffered by plaintiffs would never have occurred.²³

In sum, plaintiffs presented “some evidence” to support requisite causation with respect to Count 3. Consequently, the trial court properly denied defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on that count.²⁴

We turn, finally, to defendants’ final two assignments of error, pertaining to the scope of the trial court’s injunction. In their third assignment of error, defendants contend that the injunction embodies an overbroad unconstitutional “prior restraint” of political activities protected under Article I, section 8, and Article IV, sections 1 and 2, of the Oregon Constitution. In their fourth assignment of error, defendants contend that the trial court erroneously enjoined “successor organizations” to OTU-PAC and OTU-EF, who were not parties to this litigation, from engaging in various activities.

Before addressing those assignments of error, we must, logically, determine which components of the trial court’s injunction are affected, and even abrogated, by our determination that OTU-PAC was entitled to dismissal of Count 3. That is, to the extent that the allowance of injunctive relief against OTU-PAC — or, even arguably, derivatively, against OTU-EF — was predicated on OTU-PAC’s liability on Count 3, those components of the injunction must be vacated or reversed. Once that determination is made, we can then determine whether, or to what extent, the assignments of error relate to the remaining provisions of the injunction.

Our threshold inquiry is substantially complicated by the procedural posture and, particularly, by the parties’ pleadings. In seeking injunctive relief in their original and supplemental pleadings, plaintiffs did not explicitly request specific equitable relief by reference to particular counts.²⁵ Nor, in allowing such relief, did the trial court explicitly relate various provisions to various counts in the pleadings. See Appendix “A” to this opinion (reproducing injunctive provisions of trial court’s judgment). Consequently, we are consigned to attempting to discern, contextually, which provisions of the injunction are unaffected by the reversal of Count 3 as to OTU-PAC.

Logically, those provisions whose substance corresponds solely to the allegations of Counts 1 and 2, on which both defendants were determined to be liable, should be unaffected by our disposition as to Count 3. Thus, paragraphs 8, 11, and 12, which pertain to initiative and signature-gathering activities, are unaffected. Similarly, those provisions that relate only to OTU-EF, and not OTU-PAC — viz., paragraphs 4, 5, and 10 — are unaffected. Conversely, two provisions, paragraphs 6 and 9, name only OTU-PAC and correspond solely to the substance of Count 3; accordingly, those provisions must be reversed in their entirety.

That leaves two provisions — paragraphs 7 and 13. Paragraph 7 names both defendants but is “holistic” in nature:

“OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their successor organizations and successor political action committees which are jointly referred to as ‘OTU successors’ are hereby enjoined from transferring or destroying any of their assets, whether cash, personal property or real property, and including documents, computers, and computer hardware, software and files, and are so enjoined until the judgment entered in this action is fully satisfied or until further order of this Court.”

We cannot tell, from the pleadings or the judgment, whether the trial court would have entered paragraph 7 against OTU-PAC based solely on that defendant’s liability on Counts 1 or 2, without reference to Count 3. Accordingly, we vacate paragraph 7 as to OTU-PAC but not OTU-EF. Finally, paragraph 13 names both defendants and pertains solely to the substance of Count 3:

“OTU-PAC and OTU-EF and their OTU successors are hereby enjoined from any violation of Oregon law in connection with the filing or submission of CT-12 Reports, Form 990s and C&E Reports.”

We reverse that provision as to OTU-PAC but not OTU-EF.

In sum, paragraphs 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 12 in their entirety and paragraphs 7 and 13, as they apply to OTU-EF, are unaffected by our disposition of Count 3. With those portions of the trial court’s injunction as “referents,” we return to defendants’ final two assignments of error.

In their fourth assignment of error, defendants assert that the injunction erroneously applies to unspecified Oregon Taxpayers United “successor organizations” who were not parties to the litigation — and, indeed, may not yet exist.²⁶

That contention founders on the “well-established principle of law that plaintiffs may assert only their own legal rights and cannot rest their claim upon the legal rights of third parties.” Kelly v. Silver, 25 Or App 441, 452, 549 P2d 1134, rev den (1976). That principle is equally apt as to defendants’ objections to the scope of relief granted to plaintiffs and intervenor as it pertains to nonparties. Although the term “standing” often is used to describe a plaintiffs ability to seek relief in the first instance, a party appealing a judgment also must demonstrate standing. In Utsey v. Coos County, 176 Or App 524, 543, 32 P3d 933 (2001), rev dismissed, 335 Or 217 (2003), we stated that “[t]o have standing, the person invoking the jurisdiction of the courts must establish that a decision would have a practical effect on him or her.” (Emphasis in original.) See also Just v. City of Lebanon (A122517), 193 Or App 132, 147-48, 88 P3d 312, rev allowed, 337 Or 247 (2004) (applying that principle to party seeking to invoke jurisdiction of appellate court).

Here, no justiciable controversy exists between the parties as to whether plaintiffs and intervenor are entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief pertaining to entities other than defendants because defendants have not demonstrated that obtaining relief for such other entities would have any practical effect on defendants.²⁷ Finally, plaintiffs note, and we agree, that those affected by an injunction that were not parties to the original proceeding have adequate legal remedies available to them. See Polygon Northwest v. NSP Development, Inc., 194 Or App 661, 667-69, 96 P3d 837 (2004) (describing ways in which nonparties affected by court order could seek relief). In sum, defendants’ arguments concerning the scope of the injunction as to nonparties do not present a justiciable controversy in this proceeding.

Finally, in their third assignment of error, defendants raise various constitutional challenges to the scope of the injunction, particularly paragraphs 5 and 6,²⁸ arguing that it is overbroad and effects a “prior restraint” of political speech and activities protected under Article I, section 8, and Article IV, sections 1 and 2, of the Oregon Constitution. We do not describe those contentions in detail because, whatever their abstract merit, they have no concrete application in this case for three salient reasons:

First, although OTU-EF raises a variety of challenges to provisions of the injunction restraining the future ability to make political contributions, including in support of initiatives, OTU-EF does not, so far as we can tell, challenge paragraph 4 of the judgment: “OTU-EF is hereby dissolved.” Indeed, while appellants’ opening brief specifically refers to other paragraphs in the judgment — viz., paragraphs 5 and 6 — it includes no mention whatsoever of paragraph 4. With paragraph 4 in place, unchallenged — that is, with OTU-EF “dissolved” — OTU-EF’s contentions regarding a possible prior restraint are hypothetical.

Second, to the extent that defendants complain about allegedly unconstitutional restraints imposed on non-party “successor” entities, those complaints are nonjusticiable. See 208 Or App at 376-77.

Third, to the extent that OTU-PAC asserts that the limitations on its receipt of funds, as specified in paragraph 6 of the judgment, are unconstitutionally overbroad and restrictive, we have now reversed that provision of the injunction. See 208 Or App at 375. We do not understand OTU-PAC to raise any constitutional challenge to any other portion of the injunction.²⁹

Thus, defendants’ third assignment of error fails.

Recapitulation is due: The trial court erred in denying OTU-PAC’s motion to dismiss Count 3 and in enjoining OTU-PAC based on liability on Count 3. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Judgment against Oregon Taxpayers United PAC on Count 3 reversed; paragraphs 6 and 9 of judgment reversed; paragraph 13 reversed as to Oregon Taxpayers United PAC; paragraph 7 vacated as to Oregon Taxpayers United PAC and remanded; otherwise affirmed.

1 See generally ORS 250.045 (prospective initiative petitions must be accompanied by a “statement of sponsorship” signed by at least 25 electors).

2 ORS 165.007(1) provides, in part:

“A person commits the crime of forgery in the second degree if, with intent to injure or defraud, the person:

“(a) Falsely mates, completes or alters a written instrument!.]”

3 ORS 128.670 requires charitable organizations to file periodic reports concerning assets and expenditures with the Attorney General. The Attorney General requires those reports to be made on “CT-12” forms. See generally OAR 137-010-0015.

4 ORS 162.085(1) provides:

“A person commits the crime of unsworn falsification if the person knowingly makes any false written statement to a public servant in connection with an application for any benefit.”

5 The record does not disclose why the jury awarded substantially different damages on the two counts. No party suggests that the jury’s verdict was somehow inconsistent in that regard.

6 Plaintiffs presented evidence that, in fact, Sizemore’s and Miller’s specific intent in promoting these and other initiatives through their activities with OTU-PAC and OTU-EF was to cause plaintiffs to have to expend funds to try to defeat them.

7 The court found that “OTU-EF spent 60% of its expenditures for fiscal year 1997-1998 on OTU-PAC related activities. OTU-EF spent 43% of its expenditures in fiscal year 1998-1999 on OTU-PAC related activities. OTU-EF spent 72% of its expenditures for fiscal year 1999-2000 on OTU-PAC related activities.”

8 The dissent begins with a different proposition. It suggests that the legislature, in enacting ORICO, may have intended that various “election offenses” should not be treated as predicate offenses for purposes of ORICO at all. See 208 Or App at 383-84 (Edmonds, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Whatever the abstract correctness of that proposition — which defendants have never advanced themselves — the statutory listing of predicate offenses does include both of the alleged predicate offenses here, ORS 162.085(1) (see ORS 166.715(6)(a)(B)); ORS 165.007(1) (see ORS 166.715(6)(a)(P)).

9 By contrast, “pecuniary benefit,” which is used in statutes such as the bribery statutes, ORS 162.015 to 162.035, is limited to gain or advantage “in the form of money, property, commercial interests or economic gain, but does not include a political campaign contribution reported in accordance with ORS chapter 260.” ORS 162.005(1).

10 See, e.g., ORS 316.102 (tax credits available for contributions to political action committees); ORS 317.080 (tax exemptions for charitable organizations).

11 See, e.g., ORS 260.058 - 260.073.

12 That error has very significant derivative consequences with respect to the trial court’s allowance of injunctive relief and some of defendants’ remaining assignments of error. See 208 Or App at 374-76, 378-79. For now, we defer that discussion.

13 OES 128.866 provides, in part:

“The Attorney General may obtain an injunction against solicitation of contributions until:

“(1) The charitable organization, beneficiary, professional fund raising firm or commercial fund raising firm has complied with all registration and reporting requirements of the Charitable Solicitations Act and OES 128.610 to 128.750U”

14 An analogous, and familiar, circumstance would involve a licensed attorney’s submission of a minimum continuing legal education report as required under Oregon State Bar Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MOLE) Eule 7.1. Failure to complete such a report can result in suspension from bar membership. MOLE Eule 7.6.

15 Our conclusion comports with the legislative history — which, frankly, is not very illuminating. The legislative history, albeit in cursory fashion, suggests that the legislature was concerned with efforts “to obtain ‘benefits’ by deception and unsworn falsification.” Commentary to Criminal Law Eevision Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Eeport § 185,187 (July 1970). In that connection, the legislative history noted the existence of a variety of preexisting statutes that “prohibit unsworn falsification in official matters” and indicated that the “ultimate decisions as to [the] retention or repeal of those statutes” following the enactment of OES 162.085 were ‘left to later legislative determination.” Id.

16 As noted, 208 Or App at 355, the jury awarded OEA damages of $671,658 and AFT damages of $170,000 on the third count. Although the jury answered separate special interrogatories as to OTU-PAC and OTU-EF on the third count, finding each to be hable, the verdict did not apportion the damages on that count attributable to either defendant. Rather, the jury, without differentiating between the defendants, simply stated the amount of damages awarded to OEA and AFT respectively.

Given our determination that the trial court should have dismissed the third count against OTU-PAC, this case presents, at least in the abstract, a “we can’t tell” issue — viz., to what extent did the jury award damages based on OTU-PAC’s conduct, or did the jury view the damages resulting from defendants’ conduct as coextensive? Consistently with the analysis announced in Shoup v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 335 Or 164, 61 P3d 928 (2003), we conclude that a remand is unnecessary and that the judgment against OTU-EF for the full amount of damages awarded should be affirmed. That is so because (1) as in Shoup, OTU-EF, as the party potentially disadvantaged by the verdict, failed to procure a verdict of sufficient particularity “to make a record that demonstrates prejudicial error,” id. at 173; and (2) aside from its causation-related arguments, which we reject, see 208 Or App at 365-74, OTU-EF did not, and does not, contend that plaintiffs’ proof was legally insufficient to support an award of damages in the entire amount against OTU-EF.

17 Neither defendants nor plaintiffs contend that the standard of actionable causation under ORICO is materially different from that under RICO, as articulated in Holmes.

18 The dissent contends that the decisional amplification of the standard for actionable causation under RICO, as articulated in Holmes and subsequent cases, is inapplicable because those decisions were rendered by federal courts after ORICO was enacted. See 208 Or App at 381-86,395-97 (Edmonds, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). We have twice at least implicitly assumed otherwise. See Ainslie v. First Interstate Bank, 148 Or App 162, 188, 939 P2d 125 (1997), rev dismissed, 326 Or 627 (1998); Loewen v. Galligan, 130 Or App 222, 882 P2d 104, rev den, 320 Or 493 (1994). As noted, see 208 Or App at 366 n 17, the parties on appeal invoke only the Holmes formulation.

In all events, even if ORICO’s causation standard is not precisely congruent with RICO’s causation standard, as elucidated in Holmes, the analysis under ORICO should, at the very least, conform to principles expressed in Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or 329, 339-42, 83 P3d 322 (2004). For the reasons described below, see 208 Or App at 369-70, the facts pleaded here are sufficient under either standard.

19 Or, to others of another generation, of Rube Goldberg.

20 Defendants contend that plaintiffs did not themselves expend funds in opposing the measures but, instead, merely made contributions to “measure committees” formed to oppose the measures — and, thus, that those committees, and not plaintiffs, “actually spent opposition money.” Defendants reason that, because the measure committees were the “more direct victims” of defendants’ conduct, there is a substantial risk of multiple recovery.

Defendants’ argument circumvents our standard of review for dispositions of motions under ORCP 21 A(8). See 208 Or App at 366. Nothing in plaintiffs’ operative complaints refers to measure committees or any other entities making expenditures in opposition to the measures. In all events, to the extent that plaintiffs recover damages in the amount of their “contributions”/expenditures, a concomitant reduction of any recovery by any measure committee would not require the adoption of “complicated rules” for the apportionment of damages. See Holmes, 503 US at 269.

21 Professor (now Judge) Schuman described the conditions that were the impetus for the adoption of the initiative:

“By the 1880s, Oregon politics had a national reputation for corruption and inefficiency. At least in the yellow press,

“ ‘the story dealing with the frauds, the bribery, the abuse of power, and misuse of money in Oregon politics, [was] a very long one, and as full of local color as any western state could ask. Fraud and force and cunning were for so many years features of Oregon politics that they came to be accepted, not only as a part of the game, but by many as the attractive feature of the game.’

“The legislature consisted of‘briefless lawyers, farmless farmers, business failures, bar-room loafers, Fourth-of-July orators, [and] political thugs.’ It spent an inordinate amount of its time, sometimes entire sessions, electing United States Senators, although the term ‘election’ dignifies a process that was apparently more akin to an auction. The bidders at these auctions, who bid as well for the votes and other services of legislators, were the state’s major corporate interests: timber, railroads, utilities, and banks. Distrust and resentment ran high. So did the call for reform.”

Id. at 948-49 (quoting Allen H. Eaton, The Oregon System: The Story of Direct Legislation in Oregon 3 (1912) (footnotes omitted)).

22 Indeed, appellants’ briefs do not distinguish between the two assignments in presenting arguments in support of reversal.

23 Indeed, that inference was substantiated here because the State of Oregon did ultimately intervene to seek and obtain OTU-EF’s dissolution.

24 In our analysis of defendants’ first, second, and sixth assignments of error, we have addressed defendants’ principal contentions regarding causation. We reject, without discussion, defendants’ remaining derivative and collateral contentions.

25 We note, however, that the state’s pleadings, while not so stating expressly, appear to have been predicated solely upon allegations corresponding to Count 3 in plaintiffs’ complaints.

26 For example, paragraph 5 of the judgment provides:

“OTU-EF successor organizations are hereby enjoined from making any contributions or providing anything of value, including loans or in-kind contributions, to any political action committee and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An ‘OTU-EF successor organization’ is defined as any educational foundation, or similar organization, that is eligible for I.E.C. § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status in which Bill Sizemore is a manager, officer, director, trustee, or controlling person of the successor organization or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the direction or control of the activities of the OTU-EF successor organization.”

27 We recognize that there may be situations in which a plaintiffs entitlement to relief from one entity could have a significant effect on its entitlement to relief from another. The present dispute, however, does not involve question as to whom plaintiffs are entitled to recover from or who is responsible for what amount of damages. We see no way in which the injunctive relief granted in relation to non-parties in this case could have any effect on the nature or extent of defendants’ obligations under the judgment.

28 Paragraph 5 is set out above. 208 Or App at 376 n 26. Paragraph 6 provides:

“OTU-PAC and its successor political action committees are hereby enjoined from receiving any contribution of anything of value from any I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, including but not limited to OTU-EF or any OTU-EF successor organization, and are so enjoined for a period of five years from the date the judgment is entered in this action. An ‘OTU-PAC successor political action committee’ is defined as a political action committee in which Bill Sizemore is a director or treasurer or chief petitioner of the successor political action committee, or otherwise participates, directly or indirectly, in the direction or control of the activities of the successor political action committee, and shall include but not be limited to the Committee to Restore Freedom in the Workplace, No More Political Fund-raising at Taxpayer Expense, Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings Committee, Committee to Preserve Self Government, Committee for Teacher Merit Pay, No New Taxes Without a Vote Committee, and Oregonians Against Double Taxation.”

29 In particular, we do not understand OTU-PAC to contend that enjoining future unlawful conduct — e.g., violations of election laws governing submission of statements of sponsorship or initiative signature sheets (see Judgment, ¶¶ 11, 12) — would somehow violate Article IV, sections 1 or 2, of the Oregon Constitution.