American Broadcasting Companies v. Gill

6 S.W.3d 19, 1999 WL 391645
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 12, 1999
Docket04-97-00838-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by78 cases

This text of 6 S.W.3d 19 (American Broadcasting Companies v. Gill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Broadcasting Companies v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19, 1999 WL 391645 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION

Opinion by:

SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice.

ABC appeals the denial of a summary judgment on the Gills’ defamation and non-defamation claims arising out of the news gathering process for, and the broadcast of, a Day One news program. We hold this court is statutorily authorized to exercise jurisdiction over all of the Gills’ claims, including the non-defamation claims ABC does not defend on free speech grounds, and ABC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order in its entirety and render judgment in ABC’s favor.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 2,1995, ABC aired a Day One news program that investigated why the Resolution Trust Corporation had recovered only a small part of the cost of the savings and loan bailout from the officers, directors, and other insiders at failed S & Ls, particularly in Texas and at Gill Savings Association in San Antonio. Three months after the program aired, ABC was sued by the Gills — Christopher Gill, his wife Laura, and his brothers Richardson and Peter. Initially, the Gills alleged ABC defamed them, invaded their privacy, and trespassed on their property in preparing for and airing the broadcast. The Gills later added additional defamation claims, as well as claims for tortious interference with contractual and fiduciary relationships, and abuse of process arising out of the news gathering process. ABC moved for summary judgment on all of the Gills’ claims under subsections (c) and (i) of Rule 166a, Tex.R. Civ. P., but the trial court denied ABC’s motion in its entirety.

II. Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, we must determine the scope of our jurisdiction.

As a general rule, an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. E.g., Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.1994). However, an interlocutory appeal is permitted in certain cases involving the constitutional right to free speech:

(a) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that:
(6) denies a motion for summary judgment that is based in whole or in part upon a claim or defense by a member of the electronic or print media, acting in such capacity, or a person whose communication appears in or is published by the electronic or print media, arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution, or Chapter 73....

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(6) (Vernon Supp.1998).

ABC, in its capacity as a member of the electronic media, filed a summary judgment motion based in part upon defenses arising under the free speech clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions and the law of libel contained in chapter 73. Therefore, under the plain language of section 51.014(a)(6), the entirety of the trial court’s order denying ABC’s motion is appealable. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Norris, 949 S.W.2d 422, 428-29 (Tex.App. — Waco 1997, writ denied). But see *27 KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 787 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (stating in dicta that section 51.014(a)(6) confers jurisdiction to consider only those claims that are “defended in whole or in part on free speech grounds”).

III. Summary Judgment Evidence

The Gills argue we may not consider as summary judgment evidence certain documents received from and statements attributed to certain employees and former employees of the FDIC because this evidence was excluded by a June 12, 1997 court order. 1 We disagree.

The June 12 order was not self-executing or unconditional. Rather, it excluded evidence only if the Gills provided the FDIC with a copy of the order and the information the FDIC requested, and the FDIC thereafter refused to permit depositions. The conditional nature of the order was in fact implicitly recognized by the Gills when they filed objections to evidence that might have been encompassed by the June 12 order. But the Gills failed to obtain rulings on these objections, and the correspondence attached to their objections establishes the Gills failed to meet the condition imposed by the June 12 order. We will therefore consider all of ABC’s summary judgment evidence.

IY. Standard of Review

Whether an order grants or denies a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same de novo standard of review on appeal. See Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane Co., 945 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1997, writ denied); San Antonio Express News v. Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, no writ). We will thus reverse an order denying a traditional motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(e) and render judgment in the mov-ant’s favor only if the summary judgment evidence establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a ground set forth in the motion. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c). We will reverse an order denying a “no evidence” motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(i) and render judgment in the movant’s favor only if the respondent fails to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). In deciding whether the summary judgment evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact, we view as true all evidence favorable to the respondent and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985).

V. Trespass

Christopher and Laura Gill allege ABC film crew members entered and filmed two of their properties, the Spanish Main Apartments and the Greenspoint office building, without their permission. However, there is no trespass without an *28 entry upon land, Railroad Comm’n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 567 (Tex.1962), and there is no summary judgment evidence of an entry upon either property by any ABC employee. 2 We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of ABC’s motion for summary judgment on the Gills’ trespass claim and render judgment in ABC’s favor.

VI. Invasion of PRIVACY

Christopher and Laura Gill also allege ABC’s filming of the Spanish Main Apartments and the Greenspoint office building invaded their privacy. However, because the Day One broadcast “provided the public with nothing more than could have been seen from a public street,” it cannot constitute an invasion of privacy. Wehling v. CBS,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 S.W.3d 19, 1999 WL 391645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-broadcasting-companies-v-gill-texapp-1999.