America First Legal Foundation v. Merrick Garland

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: August 5, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3105
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICA FIRST LEGAL ) FOUNDATION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. 24-3105 (RJL) ) PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General ) of the United States, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION August S'", 2025 [Dkt. #5, Dkt. #6]

Plaintiff America First Legal Foundation ("plaintiff') brings this action against the

Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Attorney General of the United States (together,

"defendants"), seeking to compel defendants to register certain entities under the Foreign

Agents Registration Act ("FARA"), 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants have abdicated their duties to enforce FARA, and thus filed suit under the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Now before the Court are

two motions: defendants' motion to dismiss and defendants' motion to excuse production

of the administrative record. For the reasons set forth below, I will GRANT both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

FARA is designed "to prevent covert influence over U.S. policy by foreign

principals." United States v. Craig, 401 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54 (D.D.C. 2019); see also United

1 States v. McGoff, 831 F.2 d 1071, 1073-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987 ). To that end, FARA requires

agents of foreign principals to register with the Attorney General. 2 2 U.S.C. § 612(a).

"Foreign principals" include, but are not limited to, foreign governments; foreign political

parties; persons outside of the United States who are not citizens of or domiciled within

the United States; and foreign partnerships, associations, corporations, and organizations.

Id. § 61 l(b). An "agent of a foreign principal" is any person who (1) "acts as an agent,

representative, employee, or servant" or "in any other capacity at the order, request, or

under the direction or control, of a foreign principal"; and (2 ) takes certain actions within

the United States on behalf of that foreign principal, such as engaging in political activities,

serving as public relations counsel, collecting or-disbursing money, or representing the

foreign principal before U.S. Government agencies. Id. § 61 l(c).

Absent an exemption, an agent of a foreign principal must file with the Attorney

General a registration statement which includes information about the agent, the foreign

principal, their relationship, and the agent's activities on behalf of the foreign principal.

Id. § 612(a). Submitted registration statements are "public records and open to public

examination." Id. § 616(a). The Attorney General must make each submitted registration

statement or its contents available to the public over the Internet. Id. § 616(d).

Failure to register can carry criminal penalties. Id. § 6 l 8(a). Additionally,

"[w]henever in the judgment of the Attorney General any person" fails to comply with

FARA's requirements, "the Attorney General may make application to the appropriate

United States district court for an order enjoining such acts or enjoining such person from

continuing to act as an agent of such foreign principal, or for an order requiring compliance

2 with any appropriate provision of [FARA] or regulation thereunder." Id. § 618(f). "The

district court shall have jurisdiction and authority to issue a temporary or permanent

injunction, restraining order or such other order which it may deem proper." Id.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is "a national nonprofit legal foundation that advocates for 'America First'

policies" and, "[t]o that end, it gathers official infonnation, analyzing and disseminating it

through reports, press releases, media, and communications with congressional oversight

cmmnittees." Compl. [Dkt. #2] ,r 5. Plaintiff believes that certain entities and

individuals-AJP Educational Foundation, Inc., National Students for Justice in Palestine,

Osama Abuirshaid, Hatem Bazian, and WESPAC Foundation, Inc. (together, the "alleged

agents")-are agents of "Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Liberation

Organization, Islamic Jihad, and other similar 'Palestinian' organizations or persons." Id.

,r,r 35, 41, 47, 51, 56, 60. In August 2024, plaintiff petitioned defendants to register the alleged agents under FARA. Id. ,r 63. According to plaintiff, defendants have neither

adjudicated this petition nor required the alleged agents to register. Id.

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court in November 2024, asserting that defendants violated

the APA by failing to enforce FARA's registration requirements against the alleged agents.

Id. ,r,r 61-67. Plaintiff asks the Court to (1) "[c]ompel the defendants to require [the alleged

agents] to register as foreign agents"; and (2) "[h]old unlawful the defendants' refusal to

require" their registration. Id. at 19 (Prayer for Relief).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to excuse compliance with Local

Civil Rule 7(n). See generally Defs.' Mot. to Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ. Rule 7(n)

3 ("Defs.' LCvR 7(n) Mot.") [Dkt. #5]; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. ("Defs.' MTD")

[Dkt. #6]. The Court ordered the parties to brief the motions together, and they are now

ripe. Pl.'s Mem. Opposing Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ.

Rule 7(n) ("Pl.'s Combined Opp'n") [Dkt. #7]; Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss

and to Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ. Rule 7(n) ("Defs.' Combined Reply") [Dkt. #11].

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint for lack of standing and for

failure to state a claim. See generally Defs.' MTD. Because I agree with defendants on

the former, I need not reach the latter.

"[O]ne 'essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement' is

that a plaintiff must establish Article III standing to sue." See Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d

859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992)). Plaintiff alleges informational standing: It has a statutory right to information

which would be in the alleged agents' registration statements, but it has been wrongfully

deprived of that information. See Pl. 's Combined Opp'n at 3-8. While informational

injury can support standing, plaintiff has not met the standing requirements here.

"Under any theory, 'the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains

three elements': (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' that is 'concrete and

particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) there must

exist 'a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3) it

must be 'likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision."' Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

4 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). In assessing standing, the Court assumes the merits

of plaintiffs legal claim and accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true. See

Tanner-Brown v. Haaland, 105 F.4th 437, 443, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Still, plaintiff

ultimately bears the burden of establishing standing. Friends ofAnimals, 828 F.3d at 992.

Plaintiff here has failed to carry this burden, as its injury in fact and redressability

arguments ignore the structure of FARA's registration and enforcement mechanisms. 1

First, as to injury in fact, plaintiff must show the alleged injury is '"concrete and

particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]'" Id. at 991-92

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Plaintiffs claimed injury is that "defendants' refusal

to require [the alleged agents] to file registration statements has deprived [plaintiff] of

access to information for which it has a statutory right." Compl. ,i 64; see also Pl.'s

Combined Opp'n at 3-4. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has alleged a concrete and

particularized informational injury, it has not established that this injury is actual and

imminent, as opposed to conjectural and hypothetical. See Friends of Animals, 828 F.3d

at 991-92. Plaintiff has a statutory right to the alleged agents' registration statements only

once those statements have been filed with the Attorney General. See 22 U.S.C. § 616(a).

For that to occur, a long and uncertain chain of events would have to unfold first.

Neither defendants, nor this Court, can register the alleged agents or require the

alleged agents to register themselves. FARA places the onus of registration on the entities

acting as agents of foreign principals. See id. § 612(a). If the Attorney General believes

1 The Court need not reach the issue of traceability, as plaintiff must establish all three elements of standing and here fails to establish at least two of them.

5 an entity needs to register, she must either pursue a criminal case or file a civil suit seeking

an injunction ordering the alleged agents to register. See id. §§ 618(a), (f). This Court

cannot issue such an injunction in this lawsuit because the alleged agents are not parties to

this case and because FARA does not provide a private right of action. See Comm. for

Free Namibia v. South West Africa People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982)

(finding that there is no private right of action under FARA).

Instead, the most this Court can do would be to order defendants to file a separate

lawsuit seeking an injunction. 2 Defendants would then have to persuade the court handling

that case that the alleged agents violated FARA and that an injunction ordering registration

is appropriate. Only once the alleged agents comply with that injunction would the

Attorney General be obligated to make their registration statements publicly available to

plaintiff and others.

As such, plaintiffs purported injury in fact depends on the outcome of a separate

case and "is too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court." See Whitmore

v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157-59 (1990) (finding that an alleged injury in fact was

"nothing more than conjecture" because "[i]t is just not possible for a litigant to prove in

advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case"); see also

2 It is questionable whether this Court could even issue such an order. Defendants compellingly argue that deciding whether to pursue enforcement of a potential FARA violation is an act of prosecutorial and enforcement discretion, and that a court order requiring defendants to prosecute the alleged agents would inappropriately involve the Court in such discretionary decision-making. See Defs.' MTD at 9-11, 15-16; see also United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 684-85 (2023) ("[T]his case raises only the narrow Article III standing question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions against violators of federal law-here, by making more arrests. Under this Court's Article III precedents and the historical practice, the answer is no.").]

6 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 (2013) (emphasizing the Supreme

Court's "reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions

of independent actors"). Plaintiff therefore fails to establish the injury in fact element of

standing.

Second, and for essentially the same reasons, plaintiff cannot establish

redressability. Plaintiff must "show that it is 'likely,as opposed to merely speculative,that

the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'" ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum

& Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 167 (1997)). As discussed,the outennost limit of this Court's ability to provide relief

would be ordering defendants to initiate a separate lawsuit. I do not have a crystal ball to

reveal the outcome of that case, nor could I simply mandate that the other court rule in

defendants' favor. Since any prospect of relief in this lawsuit is purely speculative, plaintiff

has failed to establish redressability. See Hecate Energy LLC v. FERC, 126 F.4th 660,666

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (explaining that "standing theories that require guesswork as to how

independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment" are not sufficient to establish

redressability (quoting Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024))).

Plaintiff cannot show injury in fact or redressability, and therefore cannot establish

standing. I will grant defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. 3

3 "A dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when a trial court 'determines that "the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency."'" Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jarrell v. United States Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Here, plaintiff fails to establish standing because ofFARA's statutory enforcement scheme and this Court's inability to either predict or mandate the outcome of a case before another court. There are no facts plaintiff could plead to overcome these obstacles.

7 III. MOTION TO EXCUSE COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7(N)

Defendants also move to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n), which

provides that "[i]n cases involving the judicial review of administrative agency action ...

the agency must file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record with the

Court ...simultaneously with the filing of a dispositive motion." Loe. Civ. R. 7(n).

Defendants seek excusal from this obligation because their motion to dismiss raises only

threshold questions of law and does not rely on any materials that would be part of the

administrative record. See Defs.' LCvR 7(n) Mot.at 2. As set forth above, I will grant

defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, and the grounds for doing so do not require

production of the administrative record. See supra ·Section II. I will therefore grant

defendants' motion to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to excuse

compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n) are GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED

with prejudice.A separate Order consistent with the above accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

RICHARD J.LEON United States District Judge