Ameer Siddiqui v. Netjets Aviation, Inc.

Eleventh Circuit

Ameer Siddiqui v. Netjets Aviation, Inc.

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit·Decided May 31, 2019·No. 18-13463·Unpublished

Opinion

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-13463

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-23924-KMW

AMEER SIDDIQUI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

NETJETS AVIATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

(May 31, 2019)

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Ameer Siddiqui appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, NetJets Aviation, Inc. First, Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani descent, argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for NetJets on his discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, based on its finding that he failed to show that NetJets’s proffered reasons for placing him on administrative leave, unreasonably extending that leave, and ultimately terminating him were pretexts for discrimination. Second, Siddiqui argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for NetJets on his retaliation claims under the same statutory provisions, based on its finding that he did not demonstrate causation between any protected activity and an adverse employment action. We agree with the district court—Siddiqui has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to either discrimination or retaliation; accordingly, summary judgment in NetJets’s favor is appropriate.

The facts are known to the parties; we repeat them here only as necessary to aid in our analysis.

I

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and drawing all inferences in his favor. Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To overcome a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present more than a scintilla of evidence supporting his position—rather, “there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Brooks v. Cty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Looking first to Siddiqui’s discrimination claims, Title VII prohibits an employer from intentionally discriminating against an employee based on his race, religion, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects employees against racial discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs. Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Section 1981 and Title VII discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework. Standard, 161 F.3d at 1330.

When an employee’s discrimination claim is based on circumstantial evidence, we generally use the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Then, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Id. If it does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext

for discrimination. Id. A legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer is not a “pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (quotation marks omitted). “The court must, considering all the evidence, ascertain whether the plaintiff has cast doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to determine that the defendant’s proffered legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.” Silvera v. Orange Cty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). An employee must meet his employer’s proffered reason “head on and rebut it.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). When an employer asserts misconduct by an employee as the legitimate reason for its action, the pretext inquiry focuses on the employer’s beliefs and whether the employer was dissatisfied with the employee for nondiscriminatory reasons, “even if mistakenly or unfairly so.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266; see also Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that inquiry is not whether the employee was indeed guilty of misconduct but whether the employer in good faith believed so, and whether this belief was the reason for the termination).

In Flowers v. Troup County, Georgia, School District, for example, we held that the plaintiff had not offered sufficient evidence of pretext to allow a

reasonable jury to infer that the school district’s true motivation for terminating him was racially discriminatory. 803 F.3d 1327, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2015). We explained that the school district’s “ham-handed investigation and actions singling out” the plaintiff could have led a reasonable jury to conclude that the superintendent “had it in” for the plaintiff from the start. Id. at 1338. Yet because the plaintiff offered no evidence “that the investigation was pretext of discrimination on the basis of his race,” we held that “[e]ven if [the superintendent’s] purported explanation for his decision to fire [the plaintiff] had been a bald-faced lie,” the plaintiff’s claims still could not survive summary judgment. Id. at 1339. “Put frankly,” we explained, “employers are free to fire their employees for ‘a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.’” Id. at 1338 (quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984)).

To the extent that an employee seeks to show discrimination via disparate treatment of comparators, those individuals must be “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). The analysis of comparators should be conducted at the prima facia stage of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting framework, rather than during the pretext stage. Id. Nevertheless, “[e]vidence necessary and proper to support a

plaintiff’s prima facie case may of course be used, later as it were, to demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation for its conduct was pretextual.” Id. at 1223 n.9. We must also keep in mind that differences in treatment of different comparators by different decisionmakers can rarely be the basis for a viable discrimination claim. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1261 n.5.

Turning to Siddiqui’s case, even if we were to assume that he has shown that NetJets’s reasons for placing him on administrative leave and extending his leave were false, that does not necessarily entitle him to get past summary judgment. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.1 Like the school district in Flowers, NetJets’s arguably “ham-handed investigation” and unreasonable delay in resolving the situation could perhaps lead a jury to conclude that NetJets’s asserted reasons for those problems—security concerns, negotiations, and changes in senior management—were pretexts for something. See 803 F.3d at 1338. But Siddiqui does not point to any evidence in the record, apart from his proffered comparators, that would support an inference that the real reason for either the initial investigation or the ensuing delay was discrimination on the basis of his race, religion, or national origin. See id.; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 514–15.

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