Amdahl v. Sarges

405 N.W.2d 638, 1987 S.D. LEXIS 271

Opinions

WUEST, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by plaintiffs Uydene and Roger Amdahl from a judgment entered in favor of the defendant, Jennifer R. Sarges, in this negligence case. We affirm.

This case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on November 8, 1983. Amdahls’ son Darin, a high school junior, was driving home on Highway 11 near Brandon, South Dakota. According to Darin, a car driven by defendant turned left in front of him, forcing him to hit the brakes; he then slid on some gravel and hit a parked car. Defendant and her passenger testified that defendant did not cut in front of Darin, but rather, Darin’s car hit some gravel and spun out, causing the accident. Defendant did not have a driver’s license at the time of the accident.

Prior to trial, defendant made a motion in limine to exclude evidence that she did not have a driver’s license. The trial court ruled that such evidence was relevant on the issue of the experience or inexperience of defendant, but that the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative and therefore inadmissible under SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403).

Footnotes

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* The trial court did, however, allow testimony regarding defendant’s lack of driving experience. The jury returned a verdict for defendant and Amdahls appealed.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of defendant’s lack of a driver’s license. Amdahls argue that defendant’s failure to have a driver’s license is causally connected to the alleged negligence and, therefore, it was prejudicial error to exclude the evidence.

A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are presumptively correct; this court has no duty to seek reasons to reverse. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659 (S.D.1986). The trial court may exclude evidence under SDCL 19-12-3 if the evidence, as admitted, would provide the jury with an undue tendency to decide the case on an improper basis. Id.

This court has never dealt with the precise issue raised in this appeal. Nevertheless, Amdahls rely heavily upon our decision in Arbach v. Gruba, 89 S.D. 322,330, 232 N.W.2d 842, 846 (1975), in which we stated that violation of a safety statute, unless justified or excused, is negligence per se. Amdahls’ reliance on this case is misplaced. Arbach was a negligent en-trustment case, with the primary question being the sufficiency of the evidence of defendant’s negligence; tangentially, we discussed whether it is negligence per se to allow an unlicensed driver (and possibly intoxicated driver) to operate one’s automobile. Consequently, Arbach is not controlling in the present case.

Furthermore, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that mere lack of a driver’s license is not evidence of negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 963 (1953) and cases cited therein. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that driving without a license is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of negligence. Jones v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633 (Minn.1982); Kronzer v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 415, 235 N.W.2d 187 (1975); Knutson v. Nielsen, 256 Minn. 506, 99 N.W.2d 215 (1959). And the Indiana Supreme Court, in a frequently cited case, has held that negligence cannot be predicated upon the mere fact of minority or lack of an operator’s license. Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1935).

We are persuaded that the majority rule on this issue is the correct rule. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence in question.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MORGAN, J., and FOSHEIM, Retired Justice, concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially. SABERS, J., dissents. MILLER, J., not having been a member of the court at the time this action was submitted to the court, did not participate.

SDCL 19-12-3 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”