NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0232n.06
Case No. 23-3927
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 04, 2024 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) AMBER GOODEN, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO v. ) ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) OPINION ) Defendant-Appellee. ) )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; McKEAGUE and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Amber Gooden applied for disability insurance benefits in
2014. A Social Security administrative law judge denied her application. She applied again in
2020. Another administrative law judge denied that application, too. Gooden made her way to
federal court. There, she argued that the second administrative law judge erroneously relied on the
first judge’s decision and failed to assess her second application independently.
The judge properly denied Gooden’s second application. We AFFIRM.
I.
A. 2014 Applications and 2018 Denial
Amber Gooden first applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income in December 2014. She alleged she had become disabled as of November 20, 2014. After
an initial denial of her application, she requested a hearing, which occurred in early 2018. No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
That April, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Gooden’s applications, finding that Gooden
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d).
Under the Social Security Administration’s five-step evaluation to determine disability, the ALJ
first found that Gooden had not engaged in any “gainful” work since her disability onset date of
November 20, 2014. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). The judge moved to step two. There, the
ALJ found that Gooden had several severe impairments, including cardiomyopathy, ischemia,
hypertension, depression, and anxiety, all of which “significantly limit” her ability to perform basic
work activities. At step three, though, the ALJ found that none of those impairments automatically qualified as an enumerated disability under Social Security regulations. So the ALJ moved to steps
four and five, both of which depend on a claimant’s “residual functional capacity”—in essence,
the type and amount of work a disability applicant can still do even after the onset of her disability.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.
Balancing various medical data, the ALJ found that Gooden’s residual functional capacity
included sedentary work with occasional ramp- and stair-climbing. The judge further determined
that Gooden could “occasionally use foot controls” with her “left lower extremity.” And the judge
concluded that she was “limited to performing simple routine tasks and tolerating few changes in
a routine work setting.” At step four of the evaluation, with that capacity finding in mind, the ALJ determined that Gooden was unable to perform her past work, which included jobs like home
health attendant, packager, and fast-food worker. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). But
Gooden’s claim failed at the fifth and final step. There, the judge determined that, despite her
impairments, Gooden could perform one of any “significant” number of jobs that exist in the
national economy. Relying on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Gooden
could work in certain sedentary positions, like “document preparer,” “call-out operator,” and “film
touch-up inspector.” So, under the agency’s evaluation framework for applying disability statutes,
Gooden was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. The Social Security Appeals
Council denied further review of the 2018 ALJ decision.
2 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
B. 2020 Applications and 2021 Denial
In January 2020, Gooden applied again for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. Her new claims alleged a period of disability beginning on April 24, 2018—the
day after the first ALJ denied Gooden’s initial applications. In describing Gooden’s application
history, the second ALJ noted the prior decision, stating that “I must adopt the prior decision’s
residual functional capacity, as well as its findings on past relevant work, date of birth, and
education, unless there is new and material evidence or changed circumstances” or “there has been
a change in the relevant law.” But, the ALJ also clarified, “I do not adopt the prior ALJ decision, as the claimant has presented new and material evidence for the unadjudicated period”—here, the
period of disability beginning on April 24, 2018. The ALJ continued, “Nevertheless, this new and
material evidence continues to support a finding of ‘not disabled,’ as explained in the decision
below.” And she concluded by “partially” adopting the prior decision’s “past relevant work”
findings.
Over thirteen pages of analysis, the second ALJ marched through the five-step evaluation
for identifying a legal disability. At step one, the second ALJ concluded that Gooden had worked
after April 24, 2018, but that the work did not constitute “gainful” employment under Social
Security regulations. This finding specifically covered the period after the first ALJ decision. At step two, the second ALJ found that Gooden had several severe impairments. Many were identical
to the impairments in the first decision. But the second ALJ also added two new impairments:
obesity and degenerative disc disease. At step three, the second ALJ determined that Gooden’s
impairments did not qualify as enumerated disabilities. So the ALJ then moved on to determining
Gooden’s residual functional capacity.
The second ALJ found that Gooden’s residual functional capacity included sedentary work;
the ability to lift or carry ten pounds occasionally; standing and walking for two hours in an eight-
hour day; sitting for two hours at a time with occasional breaks; occasional use of foot controls
with her left lower extremity; occasional ramp- and stair-climbing; occasional balancing and
3 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
stooping; and occasional exposure to extreme heat, cold, humidity, and vibration. The second ALJ
determined that Gooden could never kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
She also found that Gooden could not work at unprotected heights, work with moving mechanical
parts, or engage in commercial driving. And she concluded by determining that Gooden could
carry out and perform simple instructions and routine tasks.
In setting those limits, the second ALJ referenced several findings that the first ALJ made
about Gooden’s pre-2018 medical history. Specifically, the judge identified a November 2014
“episode” of left-leg ischemia and several coronary injuries. And the second ALJ agreed with the first judge that Gooden’s symptoms for these impairments had improved with time and treatment.
But then the second judge considered evidence that postdated Gooden’s first application, most of
which suggested that Gooden’s symptoms from these conditions had worsened—and that she now
suffered from new impairments, like obesity. The judge found that, while Gooden’s claims about
the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of her symptoms were “not entirely consistent
with the medical evidence,” her residual functional capacity was nonetheless less than what the
first ALJ had found. And the judge noted that she could not “give any specific evidentiary weight”
to “any prior administrative medical findings,” so she “fully considered” new assessments that
state consultants provided in 2020. Those assessments incorporated, at least in part, specific findings made in the first ALJ decision, largely because, in the consultants’ words, Gooden’s
“conditions have not significantly changed since the date of the [2018] decision.”
With Gooden’s functional capacity set, the second ALJ found at step four that Gooden was
unable to perform her past work. But at step five, this judge—like the first—found that Gooden’s
capabilities meant she could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. Those
jobs included “document specialist,” “surveillance system monitor,” and “ticket counter.” With
that finding, the ALJ concluded that Gooden was not disabled and denied her applications for
Social Security benefits. Again, the Appeals Council denied further review.
4 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
C. Procedural History
Gooden challenged the agency’s decision in federal district court. She alleged that the
second ALJ had erred by stating she “must adopt” the first ALJ’s findings. The district court
disagreed, finding that the ALJ properly applied Sixth Circuit precedent and independently
assessed Gooden’s new applications. Gooden timely appealed.
II.
A. Standard of Review We review de novo a district court’s order in a Social Security case. Emard v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). We review the administrative record to determine
whether “substantial evidence” supported the agency’s factual findings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). That’s
not a high threshold. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). It requires “more than
a mere scintilla” of evidence, but only “such relevant evidence” that a reasonable mind “might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938)). Where a claimant alleges that the agency applied the incorrect legal standard,
we review the legal criteria de novo and may reverse even if substantial evidence otherwise
supported the decision. See Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004).
Otherwise, the agency’s factual findings—if supported by substantial evidence—are “conclusive.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
B. “Fresh Look” at New Social Security Applications
Gooden claims that the second ALJ failed to give Gooden’s second application an
independent “fresh look,” as required under our precedent. See Earley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893
F.3d 929, 931 (6th Cir. 2018). As evidence, Gooden points to the ALJ’s statement that she “must
adopt” the first ALJ’s “residual functional capacity” unless “there is new and material evidence or
changed circumstances” or “there has been a change in the relevant law.” Gooden argues that this
error alone requires reversal and, in the alternative, that the error resulted in the second ALJ giving
5 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
too much weight to opinions from two state mental-health consultants. The Commissioner
responds that the second ALJ did assess Gooden’s second application anew, pointing to the judge’s
statement that she did “not adopt the prior ALJ decision, as the claimant has presented new and
material evidence for the unadjudicated period.” We agree with the Commissioner. The second
ALJ properly gave “fresh review” to Gooden’s new application by stating that she was not bound
by the first ALJ’s findings and independently assessing each allegation in Gooden’s new
application. Id. at 934.
The Commissioner draws our attention to a recent opinion in which we rejected a challenge to a successive disability insurance denial. That case bears a striking resemblance to this one. See
Dennis D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3667, 2024 WL 1193662, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024).
The opinion is unpublished, so it does not control here. Nonetheless, its reasoning squarely applies.
And under that reasoning, the second ALJ did not err.
As Dennis D. explains, Social Security judges must give subsequent applications for a new
period of disability a “fresh look” to assess whether any changed condition or new regulatory
threshold justifies a different outcome than an earlier application. See id. at *4; Earley, 893 F.3d
at 931–32. That said, res judicata principles do apply to the earlier determination—meaning that
neither the government nor an individual applicant can relitigate a “past final decision for no reason other than to take a second bite at the same apple.” Earley, 893 F.3d at 933; see also Drummond
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 827, 842–43 (6th Cir. 1997).
It plays out like this. Suppose someone files an application in 2014. They seek benefits for
a period of disability from, say, 2010 to 2014. An ALJ determines the person was not disabled
during that time period. Assuming exhaustion of the review process, that determination binds the
government and the applicant in later litigation. For example, if the applicant files a new
application in 2024 seeking benefits for the same 2010 to 2014 time period, the second ALJ is
bound by the first ALJ’s determination. See Earley, 893 F.3d at 932. And if the new application
covers a new time period, the second ALJ may abide by the first ALJ’s determinations as long as
6 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
the claimant has failed to present “evidence of a change in condition” or satisfy a “new regulatory
threshold.” Id. This make sense because, in such a case, “[n]othing ha[s] changed between the end
of the first application and the beginning of the second one.” Id.
Otherwise, when someone seeks benefits for a distinct period of time, the new application
“is entitled to review.” Id. at 933. But on appeal, we need determine only whether the second ALJ
actually afforded the new application a “fresh look” under Earley, notwithstanding rote recitation
of a legal standard suggesting otherwise. See Dennis D., 2024 WL 1193662, at *4. Despite
Gooden’s assertion that we “must reverse” if the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard, Earley requires remand only when the judge actually applied incorrect res judicata principles. See Cardew
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that we review de novo “whether
the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standard”). So under our precedent, the key question is
whether the second ALJ treated review of the new application “as if” they were “bound by the
prior decision.” Dennis D., 2024 WL 1193662, at *4. If not, then she did not reversibly err.
As in Dennis D., the ALJ here did not treat the prior decision as binding. Indeed, the second
ALJ disclaimed reliance on the first ALJ’s determinations. Her new findings—several of which
differ from the first ALJ’s—support the conclusion that she assessed Gooden’s second set of
applications anew. The judge properly followed Earley and “engaged in an in-depth review and analysis of new evidence relevant to” Gooden’s “current claim period as well as the evidence and
findings from the prior decision.” Id.
The analysis in Dennis D. provides helpful guidance. There, the second ALJ made what
we described as a “scrivener’s error” by stating that the first ALJ’s residual functional capacity
finding was “binding” for an “unadjudicated period . . . unless new and material evidence or
changed circumstances provide a basis for a different finding.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
reasoned that the ALJ had made a harmless error in reciting the legal standard. Our finding rested
on the fact that the ALJ did find that the claimant had produced “new and material evidence
documenting a significant change” in the claimant’s condition. Id. With that in mind, a “logical
7 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
reading of the paragraph” led us to determine that the ALJ’s “real finding” complied with our
caselaw requiring the ALJ to provide the new application an independent assessment. Id. (quoting
Calkins v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 85-5685, 1986 WL 17083, at *2 (6th Cir. May 7,
1986) (per curiam)). The second ALJ in Dennis D. believed new evidence supported conducting
an independent review. And the ALJ then conducted that independent review. See id.
We relied on the rest of the second judge’s analysis in Dennis D. to emphasize why the
judge had clearly engaged with the second application from scratch. For instance, the second ALJ
said, “I am not bound” by the prior decision. Id. at *5. Then the judge “independently considered the medical experts’ analyses,” rejecting one of the first ALJ’s impairment findings. Id. And the
second judge assessed new evidence, medical records, and medical episodes from the time period
postdating the first ALJ’s denial. Id. Finally, we pointed to the fact that the second ALJ determined
the claimant’s residual functional capacity was less restrictive than in the first ALJ’s assessment
as further evidence that the second ALJ reached an independent conclusion. Id. (noting the
“pointed difference in outcome”).
In this case, the second ALJ adequately reviewed Gooden’s new claim under Earley. She
followed almost exactly the same set of analytical steps as the ALJ in Dennis D. Much of the same
kinds of evidence that supported an independent assessment in Dennis D. also demonstrate that the ALJ here conducted a fresh review of Gooden’s claim. Indeed, in this case, the second ALJ
said that she “must adopt the prior decision’s residual functional capacity . . . unless there is new
and material evidence or changed circumstances . . . , or there has been a change in the relevant
law.” And then the judge continued, “Here, I do not adopt the prior ALJ decision, as the claimant
has presented new and material evidence for the unadjudicated period.” This is the same kind of
error at issue in Dennis D.: regardless of whether the second ALJ recited a standard indicating she
might be bound in other cases, in this case she expressly rejected the first opinion’s findings and
went on to make an independent assessment of Gooden’s claim. See id. at *4; see also Earley, 893
F.3d at 932 (“An individual may file a second application—for a new period of time—for all
8 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
manner of reasons and obtain independent review of it so long as the claimant presents evidence
of a change in condition or satisfies a new regulatory threshold.” (emphasis added)). So the “real
finding” here was a fresh one, regardless of the standard the ALJ recited at the beginning of her
opinion.
As in Dennis D., extensive reasoning in the ALJ’s opinion supports our conclusion that the
judge properly reviewed Gooden’s new claim. The ALJ stated anew each of the steps in the
evaluation she had to undertake to review Gooden’s claim—including that she must “determine
the claimant’s residual functional capacity” and “consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not severe.” She noted ten impairments, two of which—obesity and
degenerative disc disease—do not appear in the first opinion. True, she then made a residual
functional capacity determination that agreed with parts of the first opinion. For instance, the
judges agreed that Gooden could perform sedentary work, occasionally use foot controls with her
left foot, and perform routine tasks. The judges also agreed that Gooden could occasionally
balance, stoop, and climb ramps and stairs. But the similarities ended there.
The second ALJ balanced new testimonial evidence that Gooden provided, like a 2020
“Function Report,” against other medical evidence. Some of the medical evidence appeared in the
first ALJ’s decision because it concerned diagnoses before Gooden’s new disability onset date. But nearly all of the second ALJ’s analysis focused on medical evidence from the period after the
first decision. “Moving into the period at issue,” she said, “in September 2018, imaging showed”
Gooden’s “aortic dissection.” She referenced an October 2019 medical report showing that
Gooden had continued to gain weight. She cited an April 2020 echocardiogram and further medical
tests from July 2020. She described, among other recent documents, a September 2021 treatment
report that assessed Gooden’s gait, range of motion, and strength. And the judge considered a
social worker’s March 2020 progress notes, which indicated that Gooden told her provider that her
medications were not helping.
9 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
The ALJ factored in scores of new datapoints, all of which resulted in new restrictions for
Gooden’s residual functional capacity: a ten-pound weight limitation; a standing/walking time
limitation; a sitting time limitation; and only occasional exposure to extreme heat, cold, humidity
and vibration. The second ALJ also determined—unlike the first—that Gooden should never
kneel, crouch, or crawl and that she should not engage in commercial driving. In sum, the second
ALJ adequately considered the evidence Gooden provided to support her new application. The
depth of the judge’s reasoning illustrates that she did not believe she was bound by the first judge.
So she did not apply an incorrect legal standard. Finally, we ask whether substantial evidence supports the judge’s analysis of the two
mental-health assessments that Gooden challenges on appeal. To be clear, Gooden challenges this
portion of the judge’s reasoning on the ground that both the judge and the consultants improperly
relied on the first ALJ’s determinations. But as we’ve explained, the judge did not apply an
incorrect legal standard. It’s “perfectly acceptable for a subsequent ALJ to presume the accuracy
of a prior finding.” Dennis D., 2024 WL 1193662, at *6 (citing Earley, 893 F.3d at 933). And
substantial evidence supports both the findings that the consultants made and the weight that the
second ALJ gave those findings.
Gooden takes issue with 2021 reports from two mental-health consultants: Doctors Hill and Delcour. In those reports, the doctors “adopted” the “ALJ dated 4-23-18” because they found
that Gooden’s mental conditions “have not significantly changed since the date of the decision.”
In the second ALJ’s opinion, after noting that she could not “defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight” to “any prior administrative medical findings or medical opinions,” she gave “careful
consideration” to the mental-health reports, finding them “persuasive.” But she considered the
mental limitations identified in those reports by comparing their conclusions to a consultative exam
that a psychologist—Doctor Twehues—conducted in December 2020.
In that evaluation, Doctor Twehues assessed Gooden’s affect as “pleasant,” “cooperative,”
“100% understandable,” “normal,” “adequately organized,” and “somewhat tense” but
10 No. 23-3927, Gooden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
“not . . . overly anxious.” She seemed “alert, responsive, and oriented to person, place, time, and
situation.” And Doctor Twehues noted that Gooden’s “overall intellectual abilities are estimated
to fall within normal limits.” Based on this evaluation, the second ALJ concluded that the
consultative exam was “generally unremarkable” and that the Hill and Delcour reports—which
indicated little change in mental status since the first ALJ’s decision—were persuasive. The judge
punctuated that conclusion with a reference to Gooden’s Function Report, in which Gooden
admitted that she regularly prepared meals, did chores, shopped, and drove. In short, substantial
evidence—evidence that the second ALJ cited—supports the judge’s conclusion that the Hill and Delcour reports were persuasive.
III.
Because the administrative law judge properly assessed Gooden’s new claims, we
AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.