Amantur Mozhubaev v. Luis Rosa, Jr.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00505
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 7 Amantur Mozhubaev, 8 Plaintiff CV-26-0505-PHX-DJH (JFM) -vs- 9 Luis Rosa, Jr., Defendant. Report & Recommendation 10 11 I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION 12 Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13 2241 (Doc. 1). The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 14 undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 15 pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 16 Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 17

18 II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 19 A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 20 The essential facts of this case are undisputed. Petitioner is a citizen and national 21 of Kyrgyzstan, who entered the United States to seek asylum on December 10, 2024. He 22 was detained and placed into expedited removal proceedings and was granted a “credible 23 fear” interview. The asylum officer found a credible fear and Petitioner was placed in 24 removal proceedings. Petitioner proceeded to a hearing with an immigration judge (IJ) on 25 May 15, 2025 and was granted withholding of removal. The Department of Homeland 26 Security (DHS) appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 27 That appeal is still pending. Petitioner has remained detained since December 10, 2024. 1 B. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS 2 Petition & Motion - Petitioner, detained at the time of the Petition in the Central 3 Arizona Correctional Complex, commenced the current case by filing through counsel his 4 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 27, 2026 5 (Doc. 1). “Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 6 U.S. 678 (2001), alleging that his removal is not significantly likely to occur within the 7 reasonably foreseeable future.” (Service Order 1/28/26, Doc. 5 at 1-2.) 8 Petitioner filed with his Petition a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 9 2) seeking immediate release. 10 The Court ordered a response to the Petition and Motion. (Order 1/28/26, Doc. 5.) 11 Response - On February 4, 2026, Respondents filed their Response (Doc. 7) to the 12 Petition and Motion, arguing that Petitioner is detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b), his 13 order of removal is not final and thus his detention is not pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (the 14 statute at issue in Zadvydas), and Zadvydas does not apply, and Petitioner has no statutory 15 or constitutional right to release. 16 Reply - On February 18, 2026 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 8). Petitioner argues 17 that even if he is detained under § 1225(b), and Respondents fail to address whether due 18 process requires his release or at least a consideration of release once his “detention 19 becomes unreasonably prolonged” 20 III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS 21 A. DETENTION UNDER 1225(B) PROPER 22 In Casas-Castrillon v. DHS, 535 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008), the court observed that 23 Athe Attorney General's authority over an alien's detention shifts as the alien moves through 24 different phases of administrative and judicial review.@ Id. at 945. Generally these phases 25 include the period before there is a final removal order, a post-removal-order “removal 26 period,” and subsequent thereto. 27 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Court summarized the pre- 1 Icne rstauimn ,a lUie.nSs. simeemkiinggra atdiomni slasiwo na iuntthoo trhizee cso tuhnet rGy ouvnedrenrm §e§n 1t 2t2o5 d(bet)a(1in) 2 and (b)(2). 3 583 U.S. at 289.1 The detention statute provides:

4 in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 5 admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding 6 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 7 The Jennings Court summarized: 8 That process of [deciding who may enter and/or stay in the 9 country] generally begins at the Nation's borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to 10 enter the country is admissible. Under [ ] 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but 11 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by 12 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3). 13 As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 14 1225(b)(2). * * * 15 Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on 16 parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017). Such 17 parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has 18 been served, “the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall 19 continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Ibid. 20 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-288. Thus, any parole from detention under § 1225 arises only 21 under § 1182(d)(5) under the discretion of the Secretary. 22

23 1 In responding to the TRO motion, Respondents cited to the recent decision in 24 Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,166 F.4th 494, 508 (5th Cir. 2026). (Doc. 16 at 3.) See also Avila v. Bondi, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). Cf. Rodriguez v. Warden, 25 Golden State Annex, 2026 WL 673401 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Rodriguez v. Warden, 2026 WL 688925 (E.D. Cal. 26 Mar. 11, 2026) (detailing disagreements with Buenrostro-Mendez). That Fifth Circuit’s decision in that case is inapposite here. It decided only whether aliens who have gained 27 entry (albeit illegally) and surreptitiously remained in the country could nonetheless be deemed to be “seeking admission,” and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1 Here, Petitioner’s removal order is not final, but instead remains pending before the 2 BIA. Accordingly, his detention is authorized by § 1225(b) and there is no suggestion a 3 discretionary release has been afforded him under § 1182(d)(5). 4 B. LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 5 Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release (or at least a bond hearing) under the 6 Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He asserts 7 this Court should apply the general standard for evaluating due process claims under 8 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing individual’s liberty interest, risk of 9 erroneous deprivation, and government’s interests), and conclude that he is entitled to an 10 individualized determination (i.e. a hearing) at which the government would be required 11 to make a showing of the risks of his release and the government’s interest in limiting 12 those risks by keeping him detained. 13 Petitioner’s argument presumes he is entitled to the ordinary protections of the Due 14 Process Clause. The Supreme Court says he is not. 15 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the petitioning alien had (after a 16 period of residence) left the United States and spent 19 months “behind the iron curtain” 17 before attempting to return to the U.S. The Court found he was not challenging his 18 exclusion, just his continued detention on Ellis Island because other countries would not 19 take him. 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953). The Mezei Court quoted a 1950 case for the 20 proposition that while aliens who had already “passed through our gates, even illegally, 21 may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness 22 encompassed in due process of law...But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands 23 on a different footing: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 24 as far as an alien denied entry to the country is concerned.’” Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 25 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). The Court went 26 on to determine whether Mezei could be detained indefinitely on Ellis Island, concluding 27 1 216. 2 In Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court discussed the due 3 process rights of arriving aliens seeking admission. “[A]s to ‘foreigners who have never 4 been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence within the United States, nor even 5 been admitted into the country pursuant to law,’ ‘the decisions of executive or 6 administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due 7 process of law.’”591 U.S. 103, 138 (2020) (quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 8 660 (1892)). It is true that the facts of Thuraissigiam were limited to a challenge to the 9 admission decision, and were so disconnected from detention that the Thuraissigiam court 10 found no basis for habeas jurisdiction, and the decision contains no language extending its 11 holding beyond the admission decision. However, the Court’s analysis is a demonstration 12 of the enduring authority of Mezei. 13 No Controlling Contrary Authority - Petitioner’s arguments provide no basis for 14 avoiding Mezei. 15 In his Reply, Petitioner argues § 1225(b) imposes “indefinite detention.” (Doc. 8 16 at 2.) This argument was rejected in Jennings. “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), unlike § 17 1231(a)(6), provide for detention for a specified period of time.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 18 299. Iin particular, “that detention must continue until immigration officers have finished 19 consider[ing]’ the application for asylum, § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), or until removal 20 proceedings have concluded, § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. To be sure, the time for that to occur 21 cannot currently be calculated or scheduled. But it does not mean it is without an 22 identifiable end. 23 In support of his argument, Petitioner points to Lopez v. United States Dep't of 24 Homeland Sec., CV-20-1063-PHX-JJT-MTM, 2021 WL 2079840 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 25 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2075733 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2021). 26 There, Magistrate Judge Morrissey observed “§ 1225(b)(1) does not allow for indefinite 27 detention, i.e., where removal or release is not “reasonably foreseeable.” Id. at *3. But 1 (9th Cir. 2018 ), where the Ninth Circuit observed: 2 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that 3 those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so. 4 Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is 5 the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Civil detention 6 violates due process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 7 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As Justice Breyer wrote in Rodriguez, 8 The Fifth Amendment says that “[n]o person shall be ... 9 deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” An alien is a “person.” To hold him without bail is to 10 deprive him of bodily “liberty.” And, where there is no bail proceeding, there has been no bail-related “process” at all. The 11 Due Process Clause—itself reflecting the language of the Magna Carta—prevents arbitrary detention. 12 138 S.Ct. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 13 (citations omitted). 14 Rodriguez IV, 909 F.3d at 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018). 15 Ninth Circuit Judge Bumatay (concurring in denial of pre-removal order bond for 16 deportable2 aliens under § 1226) addressed the above dicta from Rodriguez IV, and 17 observed:

18 Absent any allegation that the extended detention here is unrelated to an immigration purpose, the mere fact that detention is “prolonged” 19 doesn't alter the statutory framework. Indeed, in our circuit, the median processing time for an immigration case to reach a merits 20 determination is 39 months. Does that mean that any immigration proceeding appealed in the Ninth Circuit would automatically 21 invalidate mandatory detention under § 1226(c)? Why should our delays in processing cases impact Congress's design? And dicta from 22 Rodriguez v. Marin isn't a basis to rule otherwise. First, the Rodriguez order was written after the Supreme Court expressly rejected our 23

24 2 “The United States immigration laws have long distinguished between deportable aliens 25 and excludable aliens. A deportable alien is one who has entered the country; an excludable alien is one who seeks to enter the country.” Sharma v. Reno, 902 F. Supp. 26 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted). The 1996 immigration act, IIRIRA, adopted a new term that merged portions of the deportation and exclusion processes into 27 “removal.” “IIRIRA changes somewhat the nomenclature applicable to immigration cases. What used to be “excludability” is now “inadmissibility”; what used to be “deportation” 1 bSoecnodn dh,e aRroindgrsig aufetez'rs dmetuesnitniogns sw beerceo mmaei nplryo ljounsgteifdi.e d9 0b9y F a.3 cdr aimt 2in5a5l. 2 law ruling. Id. at 256–57 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). But that's 3 irrelevant when it comes to immigration law. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 521 [ ]. Third, Rodriguez cites Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 4 690 [ ] (2001), for the proposition that “[c]ivil detention” violates due process outside of “certain special and narrow nonpunitive 5 circumstances.” Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257 (simplified). But Zadvydas only holds that immigration detention must “serve its 6 purported immigration purpose,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 526, 123 S.Ct. 1708, and there is no argument that the detention of criminal 7 aliens serves no immigration purpose. Finally, Rodriguez quotes at length Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 8 583 U.S. 281, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 330 [ ]) (Breyer, J., 9 dissenting). But respectfully, a dissenting view is no reason to upset congressional will. 10 In contrast, Rodriguez ignored the long history of deference to the political branches in administering the immigration 11 system. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 538–40 [ ] (O'Connor, J., concurring); Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1215–18 (Bumatay, J., 12 concurring). Thus, no extra bond hearing was due here. 13 Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2024) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (emphasis 14 added). While Judge Bumatay’s reasoning may not be entirely convincing, it does indicate 15 that the dicta in Rodriguez IV was not the law. 16 As noted by Judge Bumatay, in an earlier appeal in the same case as Rodriguez IV, 17 i.e. in Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez II”), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth 18 Circuit addressed in a class action the concerns that prolonged detention under §§ 1225(b) 19 and 1226(c) without a bond hearing would be “constitutionally doubtful,” and thus 20 construed the statutes to require bond hearings after six months. But that case was reversed 21 by the Supreme Court in Jennings, finding unsupportable the Ninth Circuit’s attempts to 22 employ “constitutional avoidance” to write in limitations on detention under those 23 sections, and remanding for further proceedings on the underlying constitutional claims. 24 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312. 25 Moreover, in so doing, the Supreme Court in Jennings recognized that “some 26 members of the certified class may not be entitled to bond hearings as a constitutional 27 matter,” and cited to Mezei, and cited portions of Rodriguez II and III where the Ninth 1 In sum, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have any remaining 2 precedent deviating from Mezei’s limitation on the due process rights of admission- 3 seeking aliens to be released from detention under § 1225(b). Cf. Barrera-Echavarria v. 4 Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no constitutional limitation on 5 prolonged detention of excludable aliens even post removal order, relying in part on 6 Mezei).3 7 The undersigned is aware that other district judges in the Ninth Circuit have reached 8 the opposite conclusion. See Avakian v. Cantu, CV-26-00104-PHX-SHD-CDB, Report 9 and Recommendation, Doc. 17 at 18-19 (D.Ariz. 2026), adopted 2026 WL 746351, at *2 10 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2026) (detailing cases). 11 But at least some judges in this District have found no due process limitation on 12 detention under § 1225(b). See e.g. Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, CV-20-0739-PHX-DWL, 13 468 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1177 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding no limitation on detention of 14 admission-seeking alien during removal proceedings); Munoz v. Bondi, CV-25-02951- 15 PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 380610, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2026) (same, citing Thuraissigiam’s 16 reference to rights limited to those provided by statute); Korneva v. Rokosky, CV-26- 17 01505-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 851591, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2026) (same). Cf. Avakian 18 v. Cantu, CV-26-00104-PHX-SHD, 2026 WL 746351, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2026) 19 (finding opposition to claim of due process violation from prolonged detention under § 20 1225(b) waived by failure to raise in response). 21 Accordingly, the undesigned concludes that Petitioner has no due process right to 22 release from his current detention under § 1225(b),4 except as provided by Congress, e.g. 23 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Thus, the Court need not consider the application of the 24 Matthews factors or other due process analyses, to determine whether the facts of 25

26 3 In Xi v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir.2002) the Ninth Circuit observed that insofar as Barrera extended to post-removal detention, it has been superseded by the 27 adoption 8 U.S.C. § 1231. 1 Petitioner’s case justify release. Therefore, the Petition must be denied. 2 “As Applied” Challenge - Finally, Petitioner argues in his Reply that any reliance 3 on Jennings is improper because his challenge is an “as applied” challenge in an individual 4 case, and Jennings did not address an “as applied” claim. (Reply at 3-4.) Petitioner cites 5 no authority for this proposition. 6 “A facial challenge requires a plaintiff to establish that no set of circumstances 7 exists under which a statute would be valid. An as-applied challenge, by contrast, focuses 8 on the statute's application to the plaintiff.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Mahogany 9 Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1217 (9th Cir. 2020). 10 Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, Jennings was not a facial challenge. Rather it 11 was an “as applied” challenge raised by various subclasses of detained immigrants held 12 pre-removal-order under §§ 1225 or 1226. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 290-291. The class was 13 defined as: “[A]ll non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are or 14 were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration 15 detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, 16 (2) are not and have not been detained pursuant to a national security detention statute, 17 and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their detention is justified.” 18 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 290. Moreover, at the time of the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, 19 the named claimant, Alejandro Rodriguez, had been detained since 2004, some 14 years. 20 Id. Petitioner proffers no reason why his circumstances are so unique from the Jennings 21 class that they would call for a different result from that reached in Jennings. 22 Moreover, Mezei controls this case, not Jennings. Jennings declined to address the 23 underlying constitutional issues, and was limited to the statutory construction issues. In 24 contrast, Mezei decided the underlying constitutional issue, i.e. the application of the Due 25 Process Clause to detention of an excludable alien, and concluded it was limited to the 26 processes provided by Congress. 27 / / 1 C. ZADVYDAS INAPPLICABLE 2 Petitioner relies primarily on Zadvydas (habeas challenge to post-removal order 3 detention) to support his claim. However, in Zadvydas, the Court distinguished Mezei in 4 finding a right to a detention hearing for aliens post-removal order. The Court discussed 5 Mezei’s status as an “arriving alien” deemed “stopped at the border.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 6 at 693-694 (“this Court's …rejection of his challenge to continued detention rested upon a 7 basic territorial distinction,” i.e. his detention on Ellis Island was not a “landing”) (citing 8 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215). With that distinction in mind, the Zadvydas Court held that for 9 deportable aliens, who had effected an entry, post-removal order detention without a bond 10 hearing was limited, and created a six month window in which continued detention was 11 presumptively constitution. In Xi v. U.S. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2002), the 12 Ninth Circuit recognized Mezei describes the limits of due process rights of arriving aliens 13 regarding detention, but found Zadvydas’s constitutional construction of § 1231(a)(6) to 14 apply to all post-removal order aliens, including arriving aliens. 15 Of course, here, Petitioner is not being detained post-removal order pursuant to § 16 1231(a)(6). Rather, his removal is still being adjudicated administratively. Thus his 17 current detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Accordingly, the statutory provision 18 construed by Zadvydas, and applied in Xi, has no application to Petitioner. 19 Indeed, in Jennings the Court declined to extend Zadvydas to an inadmissible alien, 20 because: (1) detention under § 1225(b) has a definite term (completion of proceedings); 21 (2) the detention is statutorily mandated, rather than permissive, and thus not ambiguous; 22 and (3) unlike § 1231(a)(6) detention, detention under § 1225(b) is subject to exceptions, 23 namely § 1182(b)(5). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 299-301. (The Jennings Court reached similar 24 conclusions with respect to detention under § 1226. Id. at 303-306.) Thus the Court found 25 no opportunity to apply the constitutional avoidance canon employed in Zadvydas. 26 D. CONCLUSION RE DETENTION 27 1 detained under § 1225(b) and that his only due process rights regarding that detention are 2 those established by Congress, which at this point is limited to discretionary release under 3 § 1182(d)(5) which he has not been granted. Accordingly, his Petition must be denied. 4 5 E. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 6 As noted by Petitioner, to obtain temporary relief, Petitioner “must establish that 7 he is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 8 20 (2008). (Motion, Doc. 2 at 3.) Because Petitioner’s Petition is without merit, he cannot 9 show a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, his Motion for Temporary 10 Restraining Order must be denied. 11 12 IV. RECOMMENDATION 13 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: 14 (A) Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 15 (B) Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) be DENIED. 16 17 V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION 18 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 19 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 20 Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 21 However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 22 have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 23 which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 24 Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 25 within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 26 findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 27 party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 l appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 2 || recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 3 || Cir. 2007). 4 In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 5 || “[uJnless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 6 || issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 7 8 || Dated: April 10, 2026 _ AL ie 9 26-0505: RE 2604 OS on HE docx United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28