A.M., a minor, by and through her parent and legal representative, Nicole Mumma v. TODD MUMMA, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 A.M., a minor, by and through her parent Case No. 1:22-cv-00548 JLT SKO and legal representative, Nicole Mumma, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 13 DENYING EX PARTE APPLICATION TO

MODIFY THE PRELIMINARY 14 v. INJUNCTION

15 TODD MUMMA, et al., (Docs. 50, 51, 56)

16 Defendants. 17 18 A.M. alleges in this action that defendant Todd Mumma is liable under federal and state 19 laws that permit the victims of sexual abuse to seek compensation from their abusers. The matter 20 is before the court on her motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 50) and two related ex 21 parte applications (Docs. 51, 56).1 As explained in this order, the Court GRANTS the motion for 22 partial summary judgment and GRANTS the ex parte application to modify the terms of the 23 preliminary injunction. The Court also GRANTS A.M. leave to amend her complaint assert 24 additional or more express equitable claims related to Mumma’s assets. 25 /// 26

27 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to filed documents refer to those in this civil action, Case No. 22-cv-00548. Citations to filings in the related criminal case include references to the Criminal 28 2 A federal grand jury returned an indictment against Todd Mumma in 2020, which alleged 3 that he had violated criminal laws prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children and the receipt 4 of material depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. (Case No. 20-cr-168, Doc. 3 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252).) The indictment was docketed a few days after a criminal 6 complaint, which included an affidavit from a special agent with Homeland Security 7 Investigations. (Case No. 20-cr-168, Doc. 1 at 2–34.) According to that affidavit, a private 8 investigator had come to police with what seemed to be videos of Mumma’s teenage stepdaughter 9 in her bedroom. (See id. ¶¶ 4–20.) These videos also appeared to show that Mumma had 10 recorded them using a hidden camera. (See id. ¶¶ 21–26.) Officers spoke with Mumma’s wife, 11 obtained and executed search warrants of his home, questioned him about what they had found, 12 and discovered further evidence in his workplace. (See id. ¶¶ 27–75.) This evidence seemed to 13 confirm the officers’ suspicion that Mumma was attempting to and had successfully recorded 14 explicit videos of his stepdaughter in secret, leading to a criminal prosecution. (See generally id.) 15 The case went to trial in this Court in March 2024 on the first charge in the indictment, 16 i.e., for attempted sexual exploitation of a child; the court granted the government’s motion to 17 dismiss the second count. (See Case No. 20-cr-168, Docs. 131, 136, 138, 139.) The jury returned 18 a guilty verdict. (See Case No. 20-cr-168, Doc. 144.) The Court ultimately sentenced Mumma to 19 a prison term of 252 months, followed by a 120-month term of supervised release. (Case No. 20- 20 cr-168, Doc. 183 at 3.) The Court also imposed $55,100 in statutory assessments, restitution of 21 $71,200 to Mumma’s minor victim (id. at 7), and a forfeiture money judgment of $160,000 (Case 22 No. 20-cr-168, Doc. 182). Mumma’s direct appeal was pending at the time of this order. (See 23 Case No. 20-cr-168, Docs. 187, 189, 190.) 24 Meanwhile, in 2022, while the criminal case was still pending, the victim, Plaintiff A.M., 25 filed her civil complaint against him in this case. (See Doc. 1.) She seeks relief under 18 U.S.C. 26 §§ 2255(a) and 2252A(f), California Civil Code sections 1708.8 and 1708.85, and for negligence 27 under California common law. (See id.; see also Doc. 16 (First Amended Complaint).) These 28 laws permit plaintiffs to seek preliminary and permanent equitable relief, compensatory damages, 1 punitive damages, treble damages, fines, and disgorgements of profits, as well as awards of costs 2 and fees, including attorneys’ fees. 3 A few days after she filed her complaint, A.M. applied ex parte for a temporary 4 restraining order. (Doc. 5.) She claimed that Mumma had sold his business for $1.5 million, plus 5 an unspecified profit participation. (See Doc. 8 at 2.) The buyer had paid a small portion of this 6 sum up front, but most of the sale price was to be paid in $10,000 monthly installments. (Id.) 7 A.M. asked the court to order the buyer to direct these payments to the Clerk of Court, so as to 8 prevent them from dissipating, from being concealed, or otherwise being made unavailable to her 9 in the event of a favorable judgment. (See id. at 2–3.) The Court issued a more limited 10 temporary restraining order. (See id. at 8–9.) It ordered Mumma to “take no steps to make any 11 changes to how the periodic payments . . . are distributed, received, and/or held or utilized.” (Id. 12 at 8,) He was barred, for example, from taking any steps “to make any changes to how any such 13 payments are made, the account(s) into which the payments are deposited, and/or the use(s) to 14 which the funds are put.” (Id.) The Court set a hearing and briefing schedule on a preliminary 15 injunction, but the parties stipulated and agreed to retain the terms of the temporary restraining 16 order as a preliminary injunction. (See Doc. 36.) They also agreed that if Mumma “decides 17 during the pendency of this action to file a bankruptcy petition,” he would “give written notice to 18 plaintiff through her counsel of record” at least thirty days before he filed such a petition. (See 19 id.) The Court approved their stipulation and ordered accordingly. (Id.) 20 A little more than a year after Mumma was convicted and sentenced in the criminal case, 21 A.M. filed a motion for partial summary judgment in this action. (Doc. 50.) Her motion is 22 limited to her first claim, under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a), and to liability only, not damages and other 23 remedies. (See Doc. 50-1 at 2.) Damages, she argues, “will have to be considered and 24 determined by a jury at trial.” (Id.) She also asked the Court to relieve her counsel of his 25 obligation to meet and confer with his opposing counsel in connection with her summary 26 judgment motion, as the pretrial scheduling order requires. (Doc. 56.) 27 The day after A.M. moved for partial summary judgment, she filed an ex parte application 28 to modify the terms of the preliminary injunction. (Doc. 51.) She asks the Court to do two 1 things: first, prohibit Mumma “from receiving or making any expenditures or distributions from 2 the monthly payments” for the sale of his business “pending final resolution of this action,” and 3 second, order Mumma “to provide an accounting of all distributions received and expenditures 4 made from said payments from May 13, 2022 to the present.” (Id. at 1.) Mumma opposes both 5 the motion for summary judgment and A.M.’s ex parte request to modify the injunction. (Docs. 6 54, 57.) 7 First, with respect to summary judgment, he does not oppose the motion based on any 8 genuine disputes of material fact. Nor does he contend that A.M. is not entitled to partial 9 summary judgment as a matter of law. Instead, he argues the Court should deny A.M.’s motion 10 because her counsel did not meet and confer with his counsel before filing it. (Doc. 57 at 2.) 11 Although A.M. does not currently seek damages or other relief, Mumma also contends in his 12 opposition that she “has not set forth a case for damages,” and he disputes her claims about his 13 assets. (Doc. 57 at 2–3.) 14 Second, with respect to the ex parte application, Mumma argues this court cannot take 15 “any further action” on the preliminary injunction under the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo 16 Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), although he 17 acknowledges A.M. may be entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 and state 18 law. (Doc. 54 at 1–2, 5.) He devotes most of his arguments, however, to A.M.’s claims about the 19 $10,000 monthly payments and her damages claims. (See id. at 3–8.) His arguments fall into 20 essentially three categories: (1) he contends A.M. has not proven she is entitled to damages 21 greater than approximately $80,000; (2) he contends the $10,000 monthly payments either could 22 be or have already been put to legitimate uses, such as business expenses and attorneys’ fees; and 23 (3) he disputes assertions by A.M.’s counsel about what amount remains due to him under the 24 purchase agreement. (See generally id.) 25 A.M. filed replies in further support of both her summary judgment motion and her ex 26 parte application. (Docs. 58, 59.) Mumma then filed a request for judicial notice of several 27 income and expense declarations (Doc. 60.), and a document that purports to be a declaration by 28 his attorney, but which is more accurately described as an unauthorized surreply to the pending ex 1 parte application (Doc. 60-1). In this document, Mumma makes three more claims about his 2 assets: (1) that the $10,000 monthly payments have been used to pay mortgage expenses related 3 to a debt on the house occupied by his former spouse, Nicole Mumma, A.M.’s representative in 4 this matter, and to pay corporate expenses, taxes, and attorneys’ fees; (2) that other members of 5 Mumma’s family have not personally received or used those payments; and (3) that the balance of 6 payments to be made under the purchase agreement is $670,000, plus interest. (See id.) 7 With the exception of the pending ex parte application, the Court took all of these matters 8 under submission without a hearing. (Doc. 61.) Having now reviewed the filings related to the 9 pending ex parte application, the Court concludes that no hearing is necessary in connection with 10 that application, which is likewise submitted and will be decided on the papers. 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a party to move for summary judgment of a 13 “part” of a given claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party is entitled to “partial 14 summary judgment” if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 15 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “Material” facts are those that may affect the 16 outcome of the case. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 17 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is 18 “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to “return a verdict for the 19 nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 20 In addition to these standards, this Court issued pretrial scheduling order under Rule 16 in 21 this action, as noted above. (Doc. 47.) The scheduling order, like Rule 56, imposes obligations 22 on those who move for summary judgment. Among other things, they must meet and confer in 23 person or by telephone before filing any such motion. (See id. at 5.) As the scheduling order 24 explains, the purposes of the pre-filing meeting are to avoid unnecessary motions, to narrow 25 disputes, to explore the possibility of settlement, and to identify undisputed facts. (See id.) If a 26 party does not meet and confer, it must “set forth a statement of good cause for the failure to meet 27 and confer” in the notice of its motion for summary judgment. (Id. at 5–6.) 28 A.M.’s counsel did not certify in the notice of her motion for partial summary judgment 1 that the parties had met and conferred. (See Doc. 50.) Nor did A.M.’s counsel include a 2 statement of good cause for the failure to meet and confer. Instead, counsel requested to be 3 relieved of his obligation to meet and confer after the fact in a further ex parte application, which 4 he filed soon after Munna’s counsel made clear in an email that he intended to object to the 5 motion for summary judgment based on a failure to meet and confer. (Doc. 56 at 9.) 6 If counsel for both parties had met and conferred effectively and in good faith, they could 7 likely have agreed that certain material facts are undisputed in connection with A.M.’s first claim. 8 After all, Mumma’s opposition identifies no genuine disputes of material fact in connection with 9 his liability on A.M.’s first claim, and he suggests in other filings that an agreement was possible. 10 In opposition to A.M.’s request to modify the preliminary injunction, for example, he concedes 11 that she “may very well” establish in her summary judgment motion that he is liable in 12 connection with her first claim. Doc. 54 at 4. 13 “It is no secret this District has long faced a widely publicized caseload crisis. When 14 attorneys resolve disputes informally to the extent they can, they allow judges to give their 15 attention only to those disputes remaining and to other cases.” Mollica v. County of Sacramento, 16 No. 19-02017, 2022 WL 15053335, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2022). These concerns have led 17 Courts within this district and others to impose sanctions on those who do not meet and confer, 18 even striking or denying some motions outright. See, e.g., id. at *2. The Court declines to 19 impose such a sanction here, however. The first Federal Rule of Civil Procedure instructs courts 20 to construe and administer the rules so as “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 21 determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Striking or denying A.M.’s 22 motion would run contrary to those purposes, as would an order directing the parties to meet and 23 confer now. It is clear that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. The just and efficient 24 resolution here is to reach the merits of the summary judgment motion. In the future, however, 25 the Court my strike or summarily deny any motion that does not comply with this Court’s 26 requirements to meet and confer. 27 The claim at issue in A.M.’s motion arises under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). That section 28 permits minor victims of violations under 18 U.S.C. § 2251, among several other federal criminal 1 prohibitions, to “sue in any appropriate United States District Court” and to recover damages for 2 personal injuries they suffered as a result of the violation. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A.M. has cited 3 evidence and judicially noticeable facts showing she is a victim of a violation of § 2251, that 4 Mumma committed that violation, and that she was a minor at that time, i.e., that she was younger 5 than eighteen. (See Doc. 50-3 at 2–3; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).) Mumma has cited no evidence that 6 could demonstrate otherwise. A.M. is therefore entitled to partial summary judgment of 7 Mumma’s liability under § 2255(a). She is thus entitled to either $150,000 in liquidated damages 8 or her actual damages, whichever is greater, plus any punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs 9 that may be available under § 2255(a), and which remain to be ascertained. It is not necessary to 10 decide now whether a damages award must be reduced by the value of the restitution paid to 11 A.M. in connection with Mumma’s criminal sentence. (See, e.g., Doc. 54 at 4.) The Court does 12 not reach that question in this order. 14 Turning next to A.M.’s ex parte application, the Court begins with the requirements of its 15 standing order. A party who files an ex parte application must “include an affidavit indicating a 16 satisfactory explanation” for three things: “(1) the need for the issuance of such an order, (2) the 17 inability of the filer to obtain a stipulation for the issuance of such an order from other counsel or 18 parties in the action, and (3) why such request cannot be noticed on the court’s motion calendar as 19 provided by Local Rule 230.” (Doc. 4-1 at 3.) These requirements ensure litigants do not bypass 20 “the time-tested schedules and safeguards imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” 21 without a good reason. Cal. Chamber of Com. v. Bonta, No. 19-02019, 2021 WL 2109639, at *2 22 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2021) (citing Mission Power Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 23 491 (C.D. Cal. 1995)). The Court’s standing order also helps to avoid unnecessary haste. 24 “Accelerated briefing and hearing deadlines force unnecessary errors and divert a court’s 25 attention from other urgent matters.” Id. at *3; see also In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc., 101 B.R. 26 191, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (warning that ex parte applications “should not be used as a way to 27 ‘cut in line’ ahead of those litigants awaiting determination of their properly noticed and timely 28 filed motions”). The three requirements above also help to ensure that those who request urgent 1 relief are “without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex parte relief” or that “the crisis 2 occurred as a result of excusable neglect.” Mission Power, 883 F. Supp. at 492. 3 The declaration attached to A.M.’s ex parte application does not show that her attorney 4 attempted to obtain a stipulation from his opposing counsel, as the standing order requires, or 5 even that he discussed the ex parte application with his opposing counsel. According to that 6 declaration, her attorney emailed a draft of the ex parte application to his opposing counsel and 7 left a phone message with opposing counsel at about 8 a.m. on the morning of January 2, 2026. 8 (See Doc. 51 at 9.) He does not say whether his opposing counsel responded to the email or 9 phone message, but it seems he did not wait for a response in any event. According to the notice 10 of electronic filing generated automatically by the Court’s CM/ECF system, the ex parte 11 application was docketed at 8:59 a.m. on the same day. 12 Counsel’s declaration also lacks any explanation for why the ex parte application was not 13 filed sooner, why it could not be heard on the ordinary schedule established by Rule 230, and why 14 and need of urgent action was unavoidable or arose as a result of excusable neglect. Mumma was 15 convicted and sentenced in late 2024—more than a year before the ex parte application was 16 filed—and nothing in counsel’s declaration explains why A.M. did not seek partial summary 17 judgment or injunctive relief in the intervening year. Although counsel raises a concern that any 18 available funds will be depleted as time goes on, he states expressly that he has “no information 19 regarding how Defendant has utilized” the monthly payments he has received since he sold his 20 business. (Doc. 51 at 9.) The ex parte application itself also lacks any citations of evidence 21 substantiating counsel’s concerns. In short, plaintiff’s counsel hypothesizes that funds will soon 22 be unavailable, but he leaves that hypothesis untested and unsubstantiated. 23 The Court has not considered the evidence attached to Mumma’s unauthorized surreply, 24 which he presented as a request for judicial notice and a declaration by his counsel. (See Docs. 25 60, 60-1.) The arguments in these filings and their timing do show, however, that plaintiff’s 26 counsel created confusion and prevented the parties from collecting and presenting relevant 27 evidence by filing a hasty ex parte application. 28 A.M. has not explained why urgent action is necessary and has not complied with this 1 court’s standing order. The Court hesitates, however, to reject the ex parte application for these 2 reasons, given the possibility that the consequences of a failure to act quickly may truly be 3 irreversible. The Court has therefore reviewed the ex parte application. This Court’s heavy 4 caseload does not allow it to repeatedly excuse unjustifiably urgent requests for immediate action. 5 So again the Court cautions that future ex parte applications may be stricken or summarily denied 6 if they do not comply with the terms of this Court’s standing order. 7 On the merits, the relevant legal standards are clear. First, the Local Rules permit an 8 “affected party” to “apply to the Court for modification or dissolution” of a preliminary 9 injunction or temporary restraining order. LR 231(e). A district court’s authority to modify its 10 own injunctions under this Local Rule is part of its “long-established, broad, and flexible 11 authority” as a “court of equity.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 542 (2011) (quoting N.Y. State 12 Ass’n v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983)). Courts do not normally entertain requests to 13 modify preliminary injunctions, however, unless the moving party shows the modification is 14 necessary to relieve an inequity that arose “after the original order.” Credit Suisse First Bos. 15 Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005). The party who seeks to modify a 16 preliminary injunction therefore “bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in 17 facts or law” justifies the proposed modification. Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th 18 Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2000)). A party 19 cannot rely on arguments that could have been raised before. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1120 20 (9th Cir. 2013). 21 Federal district courts have similar inherent authority to “modify” nonfinal orders for any 22 reason they find “sufficient.” City of L.A., Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 23 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Melancon v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 24 553 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Local Rules accordingly authorize applications for reconsideration 25 under this inherent authority. See LR 230(j). In practice, however, courts do not reconsider their 26 previous decisions unless “there has been an intervening change of controlling authority, new 27 evidence has surfaced, or the previous disposition was clearly erroneous and would work a 28 manifest injustice.” Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 1995). The 1 Local Rules expressly require an explanation of “the material facts and circumstances 2 surrounding each motion for which reconsideration is sought,” including “what new or different 3 facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown,” and “why 4 [those] facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” LR 230(j)(3)–(4). 5 A.M.’s ex parte application is based on three claims of changed circumstances. First, she 6 cites Mumma’s conviction and his resulting incarceration. (Doc. 51 at 3–4.) As noted, his 7 criminal case was pending when the Court issued the temporary restraining order and preliminary 8 injunction. A.M. argues his intervening conviction shows she is more likely to succeed on the 9 merits of her claim under § 2255(a) than she was when the Court issued the preliminary 10 injunction. (Id.) Second, A.M. argues there is now a more “intensified” risk that Mumma will 11 wrongfully prevent her from recovering any damages due to her. (Id. at 4–5.) “An incarcerated 12 person,” she argues “has virtually no legitimate need for $10,000 per month” (id. at 4.), whereas 13 she is entitled to damages under federal law. Third, and similarly, A.M. argues a modification is 14 in the public interest because an “incarcerated sex offender” should not be permitted to spend 15 money “while his victim awaits compensation” that Congress has decided she is due. (Id. at 5–6.) 16 The Court agrees that A.M. is more likely now to prevail on the merits of her claim under 17 § 2255(a) than she was before Mumma was convicted. The Court also agrees that the likelihood 18 of irreparable harm to A.M. has increased as time has passed. More monthly payments have been 19 made, and less of the total fund remains to be distributed. Similarly, with respect to the balance 20 of harm, Mumma’s daily living expenses, presumably, nearly eliminated, given his intervening 21 incarceration. A.M. has not demonstrated, however, that the risk of dissipation or obfuscation is 22 greater now than it was before. As summarized above, the ex parte application does not cite 23 evidence showing funds have been or may soon be diverted, hidden, or frittered away. Mumma’s 24 intervening incarceration does not obviously increase or decrease these risks. He may very well 25 have legitimate uses for the monthly payments, such as his attorneys’ fees. But his intervening 26 incarceration and the passage of time are sufficiently significant changes to justify a modification 27 to the preliminary injunction. 28 When a party shows there has been a sufficiently significant change, the court must decide 1 whether that change warrants a revision to the preliminary injunction. See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 2 1170. The Court is “guided” in this decision “by the same criteria that govern the issuance of a 3 preliminary injunction,” i.e., (1) whether A.M. has “made a sufficient showing of a likelihood of 4 success on the merits;” (2) whether she “will be irreparably harmed absent interim relief;” 5 (3) “whether the issuance of an injunction will substantially injure other parties;” and (4) “where 6 the public interest lies.” 7 First, A.M. has now actually succeeded on the merits, at least insofar as she has 8 demonstrated Mumma’s liability under her first claim; only the amount of her damages, fees, and 9 other relief remain to be ascertained. Second, the Court finds irreparable harm is likely unless 10 stricter controls are placed on the remaining periodic $10,000 payments, given the diminishing 11 available funds. Third, though Mumma has not identified any specific harms that a stricter 12 injunction is likely to impose upon him, it is likely that they will decrease the assets he could 13 draw on for his legitimate expenses, such as his attorneys’ fees and any lingering business 14 expenses. Although these harms are nontrivial, they do not outweigh the potential harms to A.M. 15 on the current record. It is not clear, for example, that Mumma has no other assets and no other 16 sources of income to draw on to meet his legitimate needs. Fourth, as for the public interest, “the 17 federal government has expressed a policy favoring the strong and vigorous enforcement of laws 18 protective victims” of sex offenses against children. (Doc. 8 at 7.) A stricter preliminary 19 injunction is more likely to preserve funds for A.M.’s recovery, as Congress has directed in 20 § 2255, even if that means less is ultimately available for legitimate purposes, such as for the 21 compensation of Mumma’s counsel. In sum, A.M. has demonstrated the preliminary injunction 22 should be modified. 23 Beyond these four criteria, the parties disagree whether the Court may even modify the 24 terms of the preliminary injunction as A.M. proposes. Mumma argues this Court does not have 25 authority to take “any further action” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano, 26 527 U.S. 308. (Doc. 54 at 2.) A.M. argues “pre-judgment relief may be available to prevent the 27 dissipation of assets” when a plaintiff pursues equitable remedies. (Doc. 59 at 1.) 28 As the Supreme Court described it, the question in Grupo Mexicano was “whether, in an 1 action for money damages, a United States District Court has the power to issue a preliminary 2 injunction preventing the defendant from transferring assets in which no lien or equitable interest 3 is claimed.” 527 U.S. at 310. In general, the answer was no: “the District Court had no authority 4 to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their assets pending 5 adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money damages.” Id. at 333. As broad as that 6 holding may seem initially, the Court’s opinion makes clear that district courts do have power to 7 grant preliminary relief in some circumstances. 8 As A.M. correctly notes, multiple federal courts of appeal, including the Ninth Circuit, 9 have held that if a plaintiff “asserts a cognizable claim to specific assets” or “seeks a remedy 10 involving those assets,” then the district court may “invoke equity to preserve the status quo 11 pending judgment where the legal remedy might prove inadequate and the preliminary relief 12 furthers the court’s ability to grant the final relief requested.” In re Focus Media, 387 F.3d 1077, 13 1085 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 489, 496 (4th 14 Cir. 1999)). Similarly, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18, a plaintiff may simultaneously 15 pursue two claims “even though one of them is contingent on the disposition of the other.” Fed. 16 R. Civ. P. 18(b). The rule offers a “particular” example: “a plaintiff may state a claim for money 17 and a claim to set aside a conveyance that is fraudulent as to that plaintiff, without first obtaining 18 a judgment for the money.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(b). None of the parties or amici raised this Rule in 19 Grupo Mexicano, and the Court specifically declined to consider its application. See 527 U.S. at 20 323–24. 21 The Court’s decision in Grupo Mexicano was also premised on its holding that the 22 Judiciary Act of 1789 grants district courts “authority to administer in equity suits the principles 23 of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the 24 English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.” 527 U.S. at 318 25 (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)); see also Trump v. 26 CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 841 (2025) (“We have held that the statutory grant encompasses only 27 those sorts of equitable remedies ‘traditionally accorded by courts of equity’ at our country’s 28 inception.” (quoting Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 319)). The Court acknowledged, however, 1 that “there are indeed conditions that might call for a wrenching departure from past practice,” 2 such that a district court’s “flexibility” might reach “a type of relief that has never been available 3 before,” though “Congress is in a much better position” than the courts to decide when such a 4 “departure” is warranted. Id. at 322. 5 These two aspects of the Supreme Court’s holding in Grupo Mexicano lead this Court to 6 conclude that it has authority to impose stricter injunctive limits on the $10,000 monthly 7 payments. First, as A.M. notes, she has requested “preliminary and equitable relief” in this case, 8 including a “disgorgement of any profits.” (Doc. 16 at 3, 4.) Disgorgement is an equitable 9 remedy in these circumstances. See Liu v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 591 U.S. 71, 75 (2020). In 10 addition, from the beginning of this case, A.M. has put the $10,000 monthly payments in dispute, 11 alleging they are at risk of obfuscation and transfer, and has sought commensurate equitable 12 relief. (See generally Doc. 5.) The defense has in this way been on notice that even if A.M.’s 13 complaint does not formally plead a fraudulent conveyance or similar equitable claim, she is 14 pursuing equitable remedies related to the disputed $10,000 payments. See, e.g., Pac. Coast 15 Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2019) (“A party need not 16 plead specific legal theories in the complaint, so long as the other side receives notice as to what 17 is at issue in the case.” (quoting Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 F.2d 781, 18 786 (9th Cir. 1982)). This case thus includes equitable causes of action and claims for equitable 19 relief that can support a preliminary injunction against the disputed $10,000 payments. 20 Second, in the statute underlying A.M.’s first claim, immediately after Congress gave 21 victims he right to pursue money for past harms in the form of damages, costs, fees, it specifically 22 granted district courts the additional authority to award “preliminary and equitable relief as the 23 court determines to be appropriate,” without noting any limitation on that authority. 18 U.S.C. 24 § 2255(a). This provision implies strongly that in § 2255, Congress granted district courts 25 authority to issue preliminary relief if doing so is “appropriate” to preserve a plaintiff’s practical 26 ability to recover the types of monetary compensation it had just listed. For that reason, this case 27 appears likely to be one in which Congress has expanded federal court’s traditional equitable 28 powers by statute. The Court therefore concludes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Grupo 1 Mexicano does not bar it from imposing stricter injunctive limits on the $10,000 payments. 2 As noted above, A.M. requests two types of interim equitable relief. First, she asks the 3 Court to prohibit Mumma “from receiving, expending, or authorizing any distributions from the 4 monthly payments due under the Asset Purchase Agreement with Copier Headquarters, Inc., dba 5 GoodSuite, pending final resolution of this action.” (Doc. 51-1 at 1.) The Court finds this 6 additional restriction is appropriate given her high likelihood of success, her proven entitlement to 7 damages and other compensation under 18U.S.C. § 2255(a), the likely irreparable harms in the 8 absence of any restriction, the lesser harms to Mumma, and the public interest. A.M. asks the 9 Court to order the payor to deposit the $10,000 payments directly with the Clerk of Court. (Id. at 10 2.) The Court declines to impose this requirement. A.M. has not demonstrated that it is 11 necessary to prevent the funds from dissipating or being expended unjustly. Second, A.M. 12 requests “a complete accounting to [her] counsel” detailing, among other things, all payments 13 received, all expenditures made, and the current balance of any related accounts. (See Doc. 51-1 14 at 2.) A.M. did not include an equitable claim for an accounting in her complaint, and the parties 15 have not discussed the legal standards that would apply to an accounting claim, nor whether an 16 accounting is necessary to prevent funds from being expended unjustly while this action is 17 pending. The Court thus denies her request for an accounting but grants A.M. leave to amend her 18 complaint to assert additional and more express equitable claims related to Defendant’s assets. 20 For the reasons above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 21 1. The motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 50) is GRANTED. Plaintiff has 22 established Defendant’s liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a), with an appropriate award of 23 damages, fees, costs, and other remedies to be determined in due course. 24 2. The ex parte application to be relieved of the obligation to meet and confer (Doc. 25 56) is DENIED AS MOOT. 26 3. The ex parte application to modify the preliminary injunction (Doc. 51) is 27 GRANTED IN PART. The temporary restraining order previously entered by this Court on 28 May 13, 2022 (Doc. 8), as extended by stipulation on September 30, 2022 (Doc. 36), is hereby 1 | MODIFIED as follows: Defendant Todd Mumma is hereby PROHIBITED from receiving, 2 || expending, or authorizing any distributions from the monthly payments due under the Asset 3 | Purchase Agreement with Copier Headquarters, Inc., dba GoodSuite, pending final resolution of 4 || this action and a further order of this Court”. The injunction imposed in this order will remain in 5 | effect until the final resolution of this action or a further order of this Court. Defendant may 6 | apply to the Court for a modification of this order or for dissolution of the preliminary injunction 7 | in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of this District, and this 8 | Court’s standing order. 9 4. The Second Amended Complaint permitted by this order must be filed, if at all, 10 | WITHIN THIRTY DAYS. IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 | Dated: _ February 17, 2026 Cerin | Tower TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 > tn effect, GoodSuite must retain the remaining payments until further order of the Court. 15