7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ALYBEK BEKKULUEVICH Case No. 1:25-cv-01161-EPG-HC ZHUMADYLOV, 11 ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS’ Petitioner, MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING 12 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS v. CORPUS, AND DIRECTING CLERK OF 13 COURT TO CLOSE CASE WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 14 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., (ECF No. 10) 15 Respondents.
16 17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a 19 United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 6, 8, 9.) For the reasons set forth herein, Respondents’ 20 motion to dismiss is denied and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan who entered the United States on November 20, 24 2024. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2.1) On November 21, 2024, Petitioner was issued a Notice and Order of 25 Expedited Removal pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality 26 Act (“INA”). (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 5–6.) On December 14, 2024, Petitioner claimed fear of 27 returning to his country of origin, and his case was referred to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 1 Services (“USCIS”) for an asylum officer to conduct a Credible Fear interview. (ECF No. 10-1 2 at 2.) Petitioner had a Credible Fear interview on January 10, 2025, and was issued a Notice to 3 Appear (“NTA”) and placed into removal proceedings on January 21, 2025. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 4 8–10.) On February 24, 2025, USCIS issued a notice declining to parole Petitioner from 5 detention. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 12.) 6 On August 22, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) held a hearing on Petitioner’s asylum 7 application. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 14.) The IJ denied Petitioner’s asylum application and ordered 8 his removal to Kyrgyzstan but also granted Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal. 9 (Id. at 2, 14–22.) No appeal to that decision was filed. (Id. at 2.) 10 On September 8, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging 11 his prolonged detention. (ECF No. 1.) On November 7, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to 12 dismiss. (ECF No. 10.) As no certificate of service was attached to the motion to dismiss, and 13 none had been filed subsequently, the Court ordered Respondents to file a certificate of service. 14 (ECF No. 12.) On December 15, 2025, Respondents filed a certificate of service, (ECF No. 13), 15 and explained that the motion to dismiss had not been served on Petitioner and was mailed to 16 Petitioner on December 15, 2025, (ECF No. 14). To date, no opposition or statement of non- 17 opposition has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 18 II. 19 DISCUSSION 20 In the petition, Petitioner challenges his prolonged detention on due process grounds. 21 (ECF No. 1.) Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner is 22 subject to a final order of removal and thus, Petitioner is subject mandatory detention. (ECF No. 23 10.) 24 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens 25 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an 26 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 27 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 1 “Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the 3 United States.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). “After the entry of a 4 final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure the 5 noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day ‘removal period.’2 § 1231(a)(1)(A). The statute provides 6 that the Government ‘shall’ detain noncitizens during the statutory removal period. 7 § 1231(a)(2).” Id. at 578 (footnote added) (some internal quotation marks omitted). “§ 1231(a)(6) 8 provides that after a 90-day ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released 9 under terms of supervision.” Id. at 575. “After the removal period expires, the Government 10 ‘may’ detain only four categories of people: (1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified 11 grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to 12 be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order 13 of removal.’” Id. at 578–79 (quoting 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)). 14 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s removal order became 15 final on September 29, 2025 and therefore Petitioner is within the 90-day removal period during 16 which detention is mandatory. (ECF No. 10.) While Petitioner may have been within the 90-day 17 removal period when the motion to dismiss was filed on November 7, 2025, the 90-day removal 18 period expired on December 28, 2025. Therefore, Petitioner’s detention is no longer authorized 19 under § 1231(a)(2). Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is not warranted on the ground set 20 forth in the motion to dismiss. 21 However, as noted by Respondent, (ECF No. 10 at 3), once the 90-day removal period 22 ends, the government has discretion to continue detaining noncitizens pending removal pursuant 23 to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court 24 addressed a challenge to prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been 25 ordered removed by the government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, 26
2 “The removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes 27 ‘administratively final,’ (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement.” Johnson v. 1 but their removal could not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to 2 accept them or the United States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto– 3 Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court “read an 4 implicit limitation” into the statute “in light of the Constitution’s demands,” holding that 5 § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period 6 detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United 7 States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 8 After [a presumptively reasonable] 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant 9 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 10 showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the 11 “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every 12 alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been 13 determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 14 15 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ALYBEK BEKKULUEVICH Case No. 1:25-cv-01161-EPG-HC ZHUMADYLOV, 11 ORDER DENYING RESPONDENTS’ Petitioner, MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING 12 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS v. CORPUS, AND DIRECTING CLERK OF 13 COURT TO CLOSE CASE WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 14 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., (ECF No. 10) 15 Respondents.
16 17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 18 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a 19 United States magistrate judge. (ECF Nos. 6, 8, 9.) For the reasons set forth herein, Respondents’ 20 motion to dismiss is denied and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 21 I. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen of Kyrgyzstan who entered the United States on November 20, 24 2024. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2.1) On November 21, 2024, Petitioner was issued a Notice and Order of 25 Expedited Removal pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality 26 Act (“INA”). (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 5–6.) On December 14, 2024, Petitioner claimed fear of 27 returning to his country of origin, and his case was referred to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 1 Services (“USCIS”) for an asylum officer to conduct a Credible Fear interview. (ECF No. 10-1 2 at 2.) Petitioner had a Credible Fear interview on January 10, 2025, and was issued a Notice to 3 Appear (“NTA”) and placed into removal proceedings on January 21, 2025. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 4 8–10.) On February 24, 2025, USCIS issued a notice declining to parole Petitioner from 5 detention. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 12.) 6 On August 22, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) held a hearing on Petitioner’s asylum 7 application. (ECF No. 10-1 at 2, 14.) The IJ denied Petitioner’s asylum application and ordered 8 his removal to Kyrgyzstan but also granted Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal. 9 (Id. at 2, 14–22.) No appeal to that decision was filed. (Id. at 2.) 10 On September 8, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging 11 his prolonged detention. (ECF No. 1.) On November 7, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to 12 dismiss. (ECF No. 10.) As no certificate of service was attached to the motion to dismiss, and 13 none had been filed subsequently, the Court ordered Respondents to file a certificate of service. 14 (ECF No. 12.) On December 15, 2025, Respondents filed a certificate of service, (ECF No. 13), 15 and explained that the motion to dismiss had not been served on Petitioner and was mailed to 16 Petitioner on December 15, 2025, (ECF No. 14). To date, no opposition or statement of non- 17 opposition has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 18 II. 19 DISCUSSION 20 In the petition, Petitioner challenges his prolonged detention on due process grounds. 21 (ECF No. 1.) Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner is 22 subject to a final order of removal and thus, Petitioner is subject mandatory detention. (ECF No. 23 10.) 24 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens 25 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an 26 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 27 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 1 “Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. 2 § 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the 3 United States.” Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). “After the entry of a 4 final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure the 5 noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day ‘removal period.’2 § 1231(a)(1)(A). The statute provides 6 that the Government ‘shall’ detain noncitizens during the statutory removal period. 7 § 1231(a)(2).” Id. at 578 (footnote added) (some internal quotation marks omitted). “§ 1231(a)(6) 8 provides that after a 90-day ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released 9 under terms of supervision.” Id. at 575. “After the removal period expires, the Government 10 ‘may’ detain only four categories of people: (1) those who are ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified 11 grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to 12 be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be ‘unlikely to comply with the order 13 of removal.’” Id. at 578–79 (quoting 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)). 14 In the motion to dismiss, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s removal order became 15 final on September 29, 2025 and therefore Petitioner is within the 90-day removal period during 16 which detention is mandatory. (ECF No. 10.) While Petitioner may have been within the 90-day 17 removal period when the motion to dismiss was filed on November 7, 2025, the 90-day removal 18 period expired on December 28, 2025. Therefore, Petitioner’s detention is no longer authorized 19 under § 1231(a)(2). Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is not warranted on the ground set 20 forth in the motion to dismiss. 21 However, as noted by Respondent, (ECF No. 10 at 3), once the 90-day removal period 22 ends, the government has discretion to continue detaining noncitizens pending removal pursuant 23 to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court 24 addressed a challenge to prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been 25 ordered removed by the government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, 26
2 “The removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes 27 ‘administratively final,’ (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement.” Johnson v. 1 but their removal could not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to 2 accept them or the United States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto– 3 Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court “read an 4 implicit limitation” into the statute “in light of the Constitution’s demands,” holding that 5 § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period 6 detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United 7 States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 8 After [a presumptively reasonable] 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant 9 likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 10 showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the 11 “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that every 12 alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been 13 determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 14 15 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 16 “In Zadvydas, the Court construed § 1231(a)(6) to mean that an alien who has been 17 ordered removed may not be detained beyond ‘a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,’ 18 and it further held that six months is a presumptively reasonable period.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 19 583 U.S. 281, 298–99 (2018) (internal citations omitted). Here, although Petitioner has been 20 detained since November 2024, his post-removal period detention has not exceeded the 21 presumptively reasonable six-month period. Further, there is nothing in the record before this 22 Court rebutting such presumption. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to 23 habeas relief at this time. 24 III. 25 ORDER 26 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 27 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is DENIED; 1 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4) Dated: _ February 2, 2026 [Jee hey 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28