Alvey v. City of North Miami Beach

189 So. 3d 859, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18763, 2015 WL 8937617
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedDecember 16, 2015
Docket3D14-2935
StatusPublished

This text of 189 So. 3d 859 (Alvey v. City of North Miami Beach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alvey v. City of North Miami Beach, 189 So. 3d 859, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18763, 2015 WL 8937617 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

ROTHENBERG, J.

In this second-tier certiorari proceeding, Errol Alvey, Charles M. Baron, Shelly Clay, and Robert Taylor (“the petitioners”) seek review and quashal of the decision of the circuit court entered in its appellate capacity, denying their petition for writ of certiorari to quash the resolution passed by the Mayor and City Council of the City *861 of North Miami Beach (“the City”). The resolution grants Braha Dixie, LLC’s (“the developer”) application to rezone its real property from CF, Community Facility, and RM-23, Residential Mid-Rise MultiFamily, to B-2, General Business. The developer seeks this zoning change to erect a hotel with two ten-story buildings and an 87,700 square foot six-story office building with 25,600 square feet of ground floor retail space and a four-story, 600-space parking garage.

Although we recognize that the scope of second-tier certiorari review is extremely limited, see Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1092 (Fla.2010), we are compelled to grant the instant petition based on the circuit court’s failure to apply the correct law, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. See Auerbach v. City of Miami, 929 So.2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (granting second-tier certiorari relief from the circuit court’s affirmance of the variance granted by the City of Miami based on the failure of both entities to apply the correct law); see also Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995) (holding that “applied the correct law” is synonymous with “observing the essential requirements of law”). As this Court has stated at least twice, “[t]he law ... will not and cannot approve a zoning regulation or any governmental action adversely affecting the rights of others which is based on no inore than the fact that those who support it have the power to work their'will.” Auerbach, 929 So.2d at 695 (quoting Allapattah Cmty. Ass’n of Fla. v. City of Miami, 379 So.2d 387, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)).

A. The location of the subject property

The subject property sits on the west side of West Dixie Highway on the northern most boundary of the City. This area of West Dixie Highway is a two-lane roadway with a speed limit of 30 mph. In the area where this property is located, the property abutting West Dixie Highway is primarily zoned B-l, limited business, with a height restriction of two stories. The stated purpose of this B-l zoning designation is to limit the businesses along West Dixie Highway to those “of a convenience nature” and to serve “the essential and frequent needs of adjacent residential neighborhoods.” North Miami Beach City Code (“the City’s Code”), Sec. 24-51(A).

There are only three pieces of property not zoned B-l on the west side of West Dixie Highway. One.is the subject property, which is partially zoned RM-23, which is a high density residential zoning designation with a permitted use of residential mid-rise multi-family buildings with a three-story height restriction, and the remaining portion of the subject property is zoned CF, community facility, which also has a three-story height restriction. Prior to the developer’s acquisition of the subject property, the portion zoned CF housed a one-and two-story nursing home. The second piece of property not zoned B-l is a very large 249-acre track of land that is directly north of and which abuts the subject property. This large track of land is occupied by a park and golf course (the Greynolds Park & Golf Course), and along the eastern border of Greynolds Park is the Oleta River, which was used by both the Tequesta and the Seminole Indians. The third piece of property not zoned B-l is a track of land just south of the subject property which is zoned recreational open space. All four zoning designations, CF, RM-23, Greynolds Park, and the recreational open space, are for uses more restrictive than the B-l limited business zoning along the west side of West. Dixie Highway.

To the west and southwest of the subject property, the zoning is RM-23 high densi *862 ty residential with a three-story height restriction, and farther to the west of those parcels are low density single family homes. To the south of the subject property abutting West Dixie Highway, there is a strip of land zoned B-l limited business, and farther south it is zoned recreational open space.

Thus, the subject property is bordered on the east by West Dixie Highway; the property to the north is zoned B-l limited business; the property to the west is all residential, beginning" with a three-story higher density designation and flowing into a low density single-family home designation; to the north is a park and golf course; and to the south the land is zoned B-l and recreational open space. There is no land zoned B-2 general business on the west side of West Dixie Highway. Along the eastern side of West Dixie Highway, the property is zoned B-l limited business, and farther east aré railroad tracks bordered on both sides with green space. Thus, there is no land zoned B-2 general business on the east side of West Dixie Highway either.

B. The City’s Code

Relevant to' this certiorari petition is the following section of the City’s rezoning requirements and “rezoning review standards.” Sec. 24-174(B)(2)' of the City’s Code mandates that “The proposed change would be consistent with and in scale with the established neighborhood land use pattern.” (emphasis added) As will be detailed below, the developer failed to present any evidence, and the record reflects that the ■ City failed to make any findings regarding section 24 — 174(B)(2), and, in fact, the City declined to apply this section of its Code, stating that it was premature to do so. Thus, the City failed to consider and apply its own Code.

Instead of presenting any evidence that the proposed zoning change would be “consistent with and in scale with the established neighborhood land use pattern,” the developer presented evidence and argued that the proposed zoning change would be “compatible” with the general area. The City also focused on compatibility and essentially approved the rezoning request, which was a necessary prerequisite for the proposed development project, based upon its finding that it would be an economic benefit to the City.

The circuit court’s order is equally defective. The circuit court made no reference to or findings as to section 24-174(B)(2), or any section of the City’s code. Instead, in conclusory form and language, the circuit court found that the City’s decision was based on competent substantial evidence, the essential requirements of law were met, and due process had been accorded. The circuit court, however, must have applied the wrong law because the developer presented no evidence that the proposed zoning change would be consistent with and in. scale with the established neighborhood land use pattern and because the City made no findings that it would be consistent with and in scale with the established land, use pattern and specifically refused. to consider section 24-174(B)(2); nor could the City have considered it because the only evidence presented on this requirement was totally adverse.

Thus; we are not reweighing the evidence — which we cannot do.

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Related

Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs
658 So. 2d 523 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1995)
Allapattah Community Association, Inc. v. City of Miami
379 So. 2d 387 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1980)
Auerbach v. City of Miami
929 So. 2d 693 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2006)
BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF BREVARD v. Snyder
627 So. 2d 469 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1993)
Custer Medical Center v. United Automobile Insurance Co.
62 So. 3d 1086 (Supreme Court of Florida, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
189 So. 3d 859, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18763, 2015 WL 8937617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alvey-v-city-of-north-miami-beach-fladistctapp-2015.