Alvarez v. LaRose

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: February 8, 2021
• Docket: 3:20-cv-00782
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JACINTO VICTOR ALVAREZ, JOSEPH Case No.: 20-cv-00782-DMS (AHG) BRODERICK, MARLENE CANO, JOSE 12 CRESPO-VENEGAS, NOE ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 13 GONZALEZ-SOTO, VICTOR LARA- MOTION TO DENY PETITION FOR SOTO, RACQUEL RAMCHARAN, WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 14 GEORGE RIDLEY, MICHAEL JAMIL INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY 15 SMITH, LEOPOLDO SZURGOT, JANE RELIEF DOE, on behalf of themselves and those 16 similarly situated, 17 Plaintiffs-Petitioners, 18 v. 19 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior 20 Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al., 21 Defendants-Respondents. 22 23 24 This case comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to deny the petition for 25 writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief. In a November 18, 2020 Order, 26 the Court construed the motion as one to dismiss, and ordered the parties to complete 27 briefing on the motion, which they have done. For the reasons set out below, the motion 28 is denied. 1 I. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Defendants move to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for 4 failure to state a claim. Although Defendants set out the legal standards for both types of 5 dismissals, (see Mot. at 7-9), not all of their arguments fit neatly into those categories. 6 Nevertheless, the Court addresses those arguments below. 7 First, Defendants appear to argue that the Bail Reform Act and an April 6, 2020 8 Attorney General Memorandum “are the only appropriate legal avenue[s] through which 9 Petitioners may seek release due to the threat to health and safety posed by COVID-19.” 10 (Id. at 9.) The Court respectfully disagrees with this argument. As explained in the 11 Court’s orders on Plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary restraining order and motion for 12 preliminary injunction, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ claims as attacking the conditions 13 of Plaintiffs’ confinement, and those claims are cognizable outside the confines of the 14 Bail Reform Act. See Bacon v. Core Civic, No. 2020CV00914JADVCF, 2020 WL 15 3100827, at *6 (D. Nev. June 10, 2020) (“injunctive relief to put an end to an Eighth 16 Amendment violation may be available where a plaintiff states a colorable Eighth 17 Amendment claim, invokes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and asks the court to 18 exercise its traditional powers of equity in constitutional suits seeking injunctive relief 19 against federal officers in their official capacity.”); Wilson v. Ponce, 465 F. Supp. 3d 20 1037, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (stating challenges “to conditions of confinement are 21 generally brought pursuant to a civil rights statute, such as § 1983 or Bivens.”) 22 Accordingly, this argument does not warrant dismissal.1 23 24

25 1 Defendants raise a related argument, namely that the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 26 does not provide a basis for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over this case. (See Mot. at 27 15-16.) Defendants suggest the habeas statute is the only alleged basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, (id. at 15), but Plaintiffs allege other bases, as well. (See Compl. ¶14) (citing 28 1 Perhaps recognizing that there are other avenues through which Plaintiffs may seek 2 relief, Defendants next argue that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) “precludes 3 this Court from ordering the primary relief Petitioners seek here[,]” namely release from 4 Otay Mesa Detention Center (“OMDC”). (Mot. at 12.) As with the argument discussed 5 above, the Court addressed this argument in its orders on Plaintiffs’ motions for a 6 temporary restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction. In those orders, the 7 Court recognized that the remedy of release under the PLRA is strictly limited, but those 8 limitations do not require dismissal of the case. 9 Next, Defendants argue the case should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed 10 to exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs do not dispute that their conditions 11 claims are subject to exhaustion. Instead, they assert that administrative remedies were 12 not available, therefore they were not required to exhaust.2 13 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison 14 conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined 15 in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 16 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In Ross v. Blake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. 17 Ct. 1850 (2016), the Court interpreted “available” remedies as those “that are ‘capable of 18 use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. 19 Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). Here, Plaintiffs assert that the grievance procedures 20 at OMDC did not provide them with an available remedy for three reasons: (1) grievance 21 forms were not consistently available, (2) the grievance procedure for medical care claims 22 was unclear, and (3) there was no provision for marking a grievance as urgent. (Opp’n to 23

24 25 subject matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, this argument does not warrant dismissal of the case. 26 2 Plaintiffs also argue that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to their 27 habeas claims. Because the Court construes Plaintiffs’ claims as conditions claims only, the Court does not address the parties’ arguments concerning exhaustion of any habeas 28 1 Mot. at 23-25.) In support of these assertions, Plaintiffs rely on evidence submitted with 2 their Complaint, as well as evidence submitted by Defendants in support of the present 3 motion. Plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that grievance forms were not always available. (See 4 Decl. of Joseph Broderick in Supp. of Compl. ¶6, ECF No. 1-8) (stating slot where 5 grievance forms are found “was empty for 4-5 days prior to my filing my grievance.”) At 6 a minimum, this evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether the 7 grievance procedure at OMDC provided the prisoners with available remedies. See 8 Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding case to determine 9 whether prisoner had opportunity to file grievance within requisite time frame). 10 Accordingly, Defendants’ exhaustion argument does not mandate dismissal of the 11 Complaint at this time. 12 Defendants’ final argument is that this case should be dismissed because 13 Defendants are without authority to release Plaintiffs. Defendants appear to assert that 14 since Plaintiffs are in custody pursuant to orders of magistrate or district judges from this 15 Court, only those judges may order Plaintiffs’ release. The Court disagrees with this 16 argument. Clearly, Defendant LaRose is a proper defendant in this case. See Brittingham 17 v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 18 F.2d 1114, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., in chambers)) (“The proper respondent in a 19 federal habeas corpus petition is the petitioner's ‘immediate custodian.’”) And on habeas, 20 petitioners do not, and need not, seek release from the judge or court that remanded them 21 into custody. Thus, this argument also does not warrant dismissal. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons set out above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this case is denied. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 ||Dated: February 8, 2021 em Dh 6 an Yn. Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge United States District Court 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28