Alsanabani v. Spear Operations Group, LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 18, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-1684
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ZENA ALSANABANI in her individual capacity and/or Executor of the Estate of Abdulmalek Anwar Alsanabani,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 25-1684 (JDB) SPEAR OPERATIONS GROUP, ABRAHAM GOLAN, REFLEX RESPONSES MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY LLC d/b/a REFLEX RESPONSE SECURITY CONSULTANTS, ERIK PRINCE, FIRST ABU DHABI BANK USA NV, JOHN DOE 1-100, and ABC CORPORATION 1-100,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Alsanabani has sued several private military contractors, entities, and associated

individuals for torts stemming from the United Arab Emirates’ military campaign in Yemen.

Defendant Erik Prince has filed a motion to dismiss for defects related to service. Alsanabani

declined to respond to the motion. For the reasons below, Prince’s motion is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Alsanabani filed her complaint on May 28, 2025. For nearly two months after, she did

nothing. She filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2025, and then nothing for nearly another

three months. On October 14, 2025, this Court ordered Alsanabani to file by November 19, 2025,

proof that the defendants had properly been served or provide the Court with a written explanation

as to why service of process had not been completed. See Order Regarding Rule 4(m) [ECF No.

5]. That Order explained that failure to properly serve defendants or demonstrate good cause for failure to do so could result in dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

4(m). Id. On the Court’s deadline, Alsanabani filed proof of service as to several defendants

including Prince. See ECF Nos. 6, 7.

Prince then filed a motion to dismiss based on defective service on November 24, 2025.

See Mot. to Dismiss (Mot.) [ECF No. 11]. Alsanabani failed to respond. See D.D.C. Loc. Civ. R.

7(b) (providing 14 days to respond to motions and that if a response “is not filed within the

prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded.”). Prince’s motion is now ripe.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for insufficient process or service of process

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and (5). In such cases, the plaintiff carries the

burden to demonstrate that they properly effected service. See Wilson v. Prudential Fin., 332 F.

Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Rule

4(a)(1), most relevant to the motion at hand, requires that a summons “(F) be signed by the clerk;

and (G) bear the court’s seal.” Service of process is not trivial—if the requirements are not

satisfied, a court lacks authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Gorman

v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd.

v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)).

Once a motion is served, an opposing party must respond to it “[w]ithin 14 days of the date

of service . . . .” Loc. Civ. R. 7(b). Upon the opposing party’s failure to timely respond, “the

Court may treat the motion as conceded.” Id. Courts in the D.C. Circuit, upon determining that a

motion is conceded under Rule 7(b), “may in their discretion consider” various actions based on

the severity of the litigant’s conduct. Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476,

480-83 (D.C. Cir. 2016). A failure to respond to a motion to dismiss for several months may

2 warrant dismissal with prejudice, but generally, lesser sanctions, such as dismissal without

prejudice, are warranted for failure to timely respond. See id. at 483-84.

ANALYSIS

Prince argues that the summons served by Alsanabani failed to comply with the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a). Mot. at 2. In general, “the procedural

requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Org. of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries, 766 F.3d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Omni Capital, 484 U.S.

at 104). Those requirements include that the summons be signed by the clerk of Court and bear

the Court’s seal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(1)(F), (G). Actual notice “cannot by itself validate an

otherwise defective service.” Id. (quotation omitted).

It is Alsanabani’s burden to demonstrate proper service. See Wilson, 332 F. Supp. at 87.

She has failed to carry that burden by not responding to Prince’s motion. By contrast, Prince

appended a picture to his motion showing a summons without the signature of the clerk or seal of

the Court. Mot. at 8. As such, Prince received a summons that does not comply with

Rule (4)(a)(1)(F) and (G). The Court thus concludes that service was improper.

The only remaining question is whether to quash service and allow Alsanabani to attempt

service again or to dismiss without prejudice. See Staton v. Vesta Corp., Civ. A. No. 22-374, 2022

WL 2663824, at *1 (D.D.C. July 11, 2022). For several reasons, dismissal without prejudice is

proper.

As an initial matter, Alsanabani failed to respond to Prince’s motion to dismiss. This Court

thus deems the motion conceded. See Local Civ. R. 7(b). Dismissal may be an appropriate remedy

when a party fails to timely respond to a motion to dismiss. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 480-84. In

this case, Alsanabani’s lack of diligence supports dismissal without prejudice. Failure to respond

3 to a dispositive motion is serious. Courts may dismiss without prejudice when litigants respond

to dispositive motions late. See Cohen, 819 F.3d at 481. But Alsanabani’s response is not merely

delinquent, it is nonexistent. In cases where plaintiffs totally failed to respond to a motion to

dismiss, the D.C. Circuit has upheld dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g., Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,

389 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Todman, 516 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And it is

worth noting that Alsanabani is represented by counsel, who should be familiar with the local and

federal rules.

Separately from the fact that Prince’s motion is conceded, even if Alsanabani had

responded this would not be a close case. Prince has provided clear evidence that service was

improper under Rule 4(a). And Rule 4(m) explicitly contemplates dismissal without prejudice as

the appropriate sanction for failure to timely effect proper service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“If a

defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its

own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant

or order that service be made within a specified time.”). Dismissal without prejudice is thus proper.

Finally, the Court has provided Alsanabani more time than required under Rule 4(m) to

effect service. See Order Regarding Rule 4(m). The Court also notified Alsanabani that failure to

properly serve the defendants could result in dismissal without prejudice. Id. At this point, even

if Alsanabani properly serves Prince, it would occur weeks after the deadline imposed by this

Court’s October 14, 2025, Order. And Alsanabani has not provided good cause for another

extension of time. Accordingly, consistent with the Court’s prior order, dismissal without

prejudice is warranted.

4 CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of [11] Defendant Erik Prince’s motion to dismiss, and the entire

record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED

that the claims against Erik Prince are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOHN D. BATES United States District Judge Dated: December 18, 2025