NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1524-20
ALONZO ALFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT RAIL OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted January 27, 2022 – Decided February 7, 2022
Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0307-19.
Keller & Goggin, PC, attorneys for appellant (James M. Duckworth, on the brief).
Florio Perrucci Steinhardt Cappelli Tipton & Taylor, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Brian R. Tipton and Matthew P. Rocco, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Alonzo Alford appeals from the Law Division's January 11, 2021
order granting summary judgment to defendant New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc. and dismissing plaintiff's complaint for damages under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. We reverse.
The facts are neither complicated nor in dispute. On January 20, 2016,
plaintiff was working for defendant at Newark's Penn Station inspecting
escalators. As his shift was nearing its end, plaintiff walked toward an escalator
in order to inspect it. As plaintiff did so, he noticed a man in front of him who
was swaying back and forth as he walked. Plaintiff smelled alcohol coming
from the man. The man got on the escalator ahead of plaintiff and as the
escalator stairs moved upwards, the man turned to face plaintiff, shouted "watch
this," and then put both his legs on the handrail. Plaintiff told the man to stop,
but he fell and kicked plaintiff in the leg. Plaintiff grabbed and held the man
until they got to the top of the escalator. The man then walked away.
Plaintiff felt that his leg was injured but he did not report the injury until
the next day because there was no supervisor present. Plaintiff testified at a
deposition that defendant did not have any police assigned to provide security
on the evening of his injury. Plaintiff also provided records showing that
between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2017, Transit Police responded to 932
A-1524-20 2 complaint calls involving intoxicated persons at Penn Station. Plaintiff stated
he saw intoxicated individuals at the station on almost a daily basis and reported
these encounters to his supervisor on numerous occasions.
Plaintiff received treatment for a knee injury for approximately four years.
On January 11, 2019, he filed a complaint against defendant under FELA.
Among other things, plaintiff alleged defendant negligently failed to provide a
safe place to work or sufficient security to prevent intoxicated people from
injuring employees.
After some discovery, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
On January 11, 2021, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice. In a short oral decision that did not include detailed
findings of fact, the court stated it granted the motion because plaintiff did not
show that defendant had "actual [or] constructive notice of the dangerous
condition that was the responsibility of the defendant to alleviate." This appeal
followed.
Plaintiff now argues that summary judgment was not warranted under
FELA because he offered sufficient facts to present a jury issue on the question
of whether defendant provided him with a safe and secure workplace. We agree.
A-1524-20 3 In deciding motions for summary judgment, like the trial court, we review
"the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify whether
there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J.
22, 38 (2014); R. 4:46-2. Summary judgment should be denied unless the
moving party's right to judgment is so clear that there is no room for controversy.
Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, L.L.C., 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399 (App.
Div. 2015). This means summary judgment should be granted only "when the
evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The court's function is not to weigh the evidence to determine the final
outcome, but only to decide if a material dispute of fact exists. Suarez v. E. Int'l
Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012). It is not the judge's role to assess
credibility or determine the truth of the evidence, DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380
N.J. Super. 511, 522 (App. Div. 2005), or to examine whether the preponderance
of the evidence weighs towards one side or the other. Mandel v.
UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55, 71 (App. Div. 2004). A motion
judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact. Suarez,
A-1524-20 4 428 N.J. Super. at 27. In addition, we owe no special deference to the motion
judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459,
472 (2018). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.
Ibid.
Plaintiff brought this action under FELA, alleging that defendant
negligently failed to provide a reasonably safe workplace and that this alleged
negligence resulted in his injury. In pertinent part, FELA provides that "[e]very
common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury . . . resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of such carrier . . . ." 45 U.S.C. §51. Thus, in a FELA case, the plaintiff must
produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that justifies or supports an
inference of employer negligence. Stevens v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 356
N.J. Super. 311, 318 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957)).
The FELA standard "is more liberal than generally provided by the
common law of negligence . . . ." Ibid. A plaintiff may recover against a
defendant under FELA where
the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
A-1524-20 5 slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, or grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1524-20
ALONZO ALFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT RAIL OPERATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent. _________________________
Submitted January 27, 2022 – Decided February 7, 2022
Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0307-19.
Keller & Goggin, PC, attorneys for appellant (James M. Duckworth, on the brief).
Florio Perrucci Steinhardt Cappelli Tipton & Taylor, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Brian R. Tipton and Matthew P. Rocco, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Alonzo Alford appeals from the Law Division's January 11, 2021
order granting summary judgment to defendant New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc. and dismissing plaintiff's complaint for damages under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. We reverse.
The facts are neither complicated nor in dispute. On January 20, 2016,
plaintiff was working for defendant at Newark's Penn Station inspecting
escalators. As his shift was nearing its end, plaintiff walked toward an escalator
in order to inspect it. As plaintiff did so, he noticed a man in front of him who
was swaying back and forth as he walked. Plaintiff smelled alcohol coming
from the man. The man got on the escalator ahead of plaintiff and as the
escalator stairs moved upwards, the man turned to face plaintiff, shouted "watch
this," and then put both his legs on the handrail. Plaintiff told the man to stop,
but he fell and kicked plaintiff in the leg. Plaintiff grabbed and held the man
until they got to the top of the escalator. The man then walked away.
Plaintiff felt that his leg was injured but he did not report the injury until
the next day because there was no supervisor present. Plaintiff testified at a
deposition that defendant did not have any police assigned to provide security
on the evening of his injury. Plaintiff also provided records showing that
between January 1, 2014 and January 1, 2017, Transit Police responded to 932
A-1524-20 2 complaint calls involving intoxicated persons at Penn Station. Plaintiff stated
he saw intoxicated individuals at the station on almost a daily basis and reported
these encounters to his supervisor on numerous occasions.
Plaintiff received treatment for a knee injury for approximately four years.
On January 11, 2019, he filed a complaint against defendant under FELA.
Among other things, plaintiff alleged defendant negligently failed to provide a
safe place to work or sufficient security to prevent intoxicated people from
injuring employees.
After some discovery, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
On January 11, 2021, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice. In a short oral decision that did not include detailed
findings of fact, the court stated it granted the motion because plaintiff did not
show that defendant had "actual [or] constructive notice of the dangerous
condition that was the responsibility of the defendant to alleviate." This appeal
followed.
Plaintiff now argues that summary judgment was not warranted under
FELA because he offered sufficient facts to present a jury issue on the question
of whether defendant provided him with a safe and secure workplace. We agree.
A-1524-20 3 In deciding motions for summary judgment, like the trial court, we review
"the competent evidential materials submitted by the parties to identify whether
there are genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J.
22, 38 (2014); R. 4:46-2. Summary judgment should be denied unless the
moving party's right to judgment is so clear that there is no room for controversy.
Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, L.L.C., 439 N.J. Super. 391, 399 (App.
Div. 2015). This means summary judgment should be granted only "when the
evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995) (quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The court's function is not to weigh the evidence to determine the final
outcome, but only to decide if a material dispute of fact exists. Suarez v. E. Int'l
Coll., 428 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2012). It is not the judge's role to assess
credibility or determine the truth of the evidence, DeWees v. RCN Corp., 380
N.J. Super. 511, 522 (App. Div. 2005), or to examine whether the preponderance
of the evidence weighs towards one side or the other. Mandel v.
UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 55, 71 (App. Div. 2004). A motion
judge may not abrogate the jury's exclusive role as the finder of fact. Suarez,
A-1524-20 4 428 N.J. Super. at 27. In addition, we owe no special deference to the motion
judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459,
472 (2018). Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.
Ibid.
Plaintiff brought this action under FELA, alleging that defendant
negligently failed to provide a reasonably safe workplace and that this alleged
negligence resulted in his injury. In pertinent part, FELA provides that "[e]very
common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury . . . resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of such carrier . . . ." 45 U.S.C. §51. Thus, in a FELA case, the plaintiff must
produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that justifies or supports an
inference of employer negligence. Stevens v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 356
N.J. Super. 311, 318 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
352 U.S. 500, 508 (1957)).
The FELA standard "is more liberal than generally provided by the
common law of negligence . . . ." Ibid. A plaintiff may recover against a
defendant under FELA where
the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
A-1524-20 5 slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, or grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury question is presented is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer played any part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if that test is met, are bound to find that a case for the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows the jury a choice of other probabilities.
[Id. at 318-19.]
FELA requires every employer to exercise reasonable care to provide its
employees with a safe work environment. However, reasonable foreseeability
is a prerequisite to any claim. Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 268
(3d Cir. 1991). The employer's responsibility is measured by "what a reasonably
prudent person would anticipate as resulting from a particular condition."
Gallick v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 118 (1963). As our Supreme
Court has observed, "[t]he question of whether a duty to exercise reasonable
care to avoid the risk of harm to another exists is one of fairness and policy that
implicates many factors." Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 143 N.J. 565, 572
(1996).
A-1524-20 6 Applying these standards, we are satisfied plaintiff's evidence was
sufficient to present a jury issue. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to
summary judgment.
Plaintiff presented uncontested evidence that defendant was aware
intoxicated individuals frequented Penn Station. The Transit Police responded
to over 900 complaints concerning this issue over a three-year period. Plaintiff
testified he encountered intoxicated people on a near daily basis and reported
these incidents to his supervisor on numerous occasions. Yet, on the night the
intoxicated man injured plaintiff on the escalator, there were no police officers
on duty and defendant did not establish that there were any other security
measures in place to protect plaintiff. Because plaintiff marshaled sufficient
evidence at this stage of the proceedings to permit a jury to conclude that
defendant's negligence on the security front played a role, however slight, in his
injury, the trial court should have denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-1524-20 7